
PALGRAVE STUDIES IN POLITICAL HISTORY
Reactionary Nationalists, Fascists and Dictatorships in the Twentieth Century
Against Democracy
Edited by
Ismael Saz · Zira Box
Toni Morant · Julián Sanz
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Abbreviations

AET	Traditionalist Student Union (*Agrupación Escolar Tradicionalista*)
AF	French Action (*Action Française*)
AIB	Brazilian Integralist Action (*Ação Integralista Brasileira*)
AN	National Assembly (*Assembleia Nacional*)
ANI	Italian Nationalist Association (*Associazione Nazionalista Italiana*)
APRA	American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*)
BA	Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State
BDM	League of German girls (*Bund Deutscher Mädel*)
CAMDE	Women's Campaign for Democracy (*Campanha da mulher pela democracia*)
CEDA	Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Right-wing Groups (*Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas*)
CO	Organization Committee (*Comités d'Organization*)
DAF	German Labour Front (*Deutsche Arbeitsfront*)
DNVP	German National People's Party (*Deutschnationale Volkspartei*)
ENT	The National Labour Statute (*Estatuto Nacional do Trabalho*)
FE-JONS	Spanish Falange and Unions of the National-Syndicalist Offensive (*Falange Española de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista*)
FET-JONS	Traditional Spanish Falange and Unions of the National-Syndicalist Offensive (*Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista*)
FN	National Front (*Front National*)
GIL	Littorio Italian Youth (*Gioventù Italiana del Littorio*)
GUF	Fascist Universitary Groups (*Gruppi Universitari Fascisti*)
HJ	Hitler Youth (*Hitlerjugend*)

IL	Lusitanian Integralism (*Integralismo Lusitano*)
JAP	Acción Popular's Youth (*Juventudes de Acción Popular*)
JONS	Unions of the National-Syndicalist Offensive (*Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista*)
KPD	Communist Party of Germany (*Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands*)
NS	National Syndicalist Movement (*Movimento Nacional Sindicalista*)
NSDAP	National Socialist German Workers' Party (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei*)
NSF	National Socialist Women's League (*Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft*)
NSKK	National Socialist Motor Corps (*Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps*)
OCRPI	Central Office for the Distribution of Industrial Products (*Office Central de la Répartition des Produits industriels*)
OKW	*Wehrmacht* High Command (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*)
ONB	National Opera Balilla (*Opera Nazionale Balilla*)
PCF	French Communist Party (*Parti Communiste Français*)
PNF	National Fascist Party (*Partito Nazionale Fascista*)
PPF	French Popular Party (*Parti Populaire Français*)
PRR	Radical Republican Party (*Partido Republicano Radical*)
PSF	French Social Party (*Parti Social Français*)
RAD	Reich Labour Service (*Reichsarbeitsdienst*)
RSI	Italian Social Republic (*Repubblica Sociale di Salò*)
SA	Storm Detachment (*Sturmabteilung*)
SEU	University Spanish Union (*Sindicato Español Universitario*)
SFIO	French Section of the Worker's International (*Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière*)
SS	Protection Squadron (*Schutzstaffel*)
UN	National Union (*União Nacional*)

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Ismael Saz, Zira Box, Toni Morant and Julián Sanz

The last few decades have witnessed a proliferation of studies on fascism, nationalisms of different kinds, and the dictatorships of the right in interwar Europe. New perspectives, new approaches and new sets of problems have emerged in almost every case. All this activity has enabled us to appreciate that these new lines of research in turn generate new debates, which at times go beyond the arguments that dominated the field for virtually the

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whole of the twentieth century, but at others seem explicitly or implicitly connected to these earlier discussions, and intertwined with them.

Of course, progress in research and changes in approach have never been entirely linear nor uniformly accepted in the same way, nor have they been reflected in all aspects of any particular field to the same extent. In this regard, the phenomenon that has taken centre stage in all debates and most caught the attention of the public has unquestionably been that of fascism. The advances made in the study of fascism over the last half-century are undeniable, and this has had a decisive impact, in different ways, on the overall picture mentioned above. However, one consequence of this emphasis has been that the role of reactionary nationalism has almost always been obscured precisely by the prominence of fascism, a situation that we seek to correct in the current volume.

Given this complex picture, it is necessary to begin this collection with a rapid overview of the historical evolution of the historiography on fascism, which will help us to evaluate the current situation with greater precision. We can locate the point of departure of the main lines of recent renewal in the crisis of the great theories on the subject, of the great paradigms. Following Renzo de Felice, we may begin by recalling the three major "classical" interpretations of fascism that emerged at the same time as its rise: the liberal interpretation, also known as that of the parenthesis or moral sickness; the analysis that could be called radical-democratic, or the theory of historic defects; and finally, understood in its broadest sense, the Marxist analysis (De Felice 2017). At the same time, we can also see the ways in which the great overarching historical paradigms that predominated in the years from 1945 almost to the end of the twentieth century were interlinked with these "classical" interpretations of fascism.

It is clear that theories of totalitarianism, broadly speaking, were associated with the liberal interpretation. In part, because both regarded fascism as the opposite of liberalism, in part due to these theories' initial tendency and subsequent determination to identify together fascism and communism as similar phenomena, and lastly because they focused attention on the masses and their relationship with elites. There were also differences, however, not the least being that theories of totalitarianism ultimately reduce the masses to an aggregate of individuals, isolated, atomized and easily manipulated by external totalitarian elites.[1] The desire to identify together fascism and communism, for its part, led to a relative lack of interest in exactly *who* made up these elites, *which* social interests they represented or

just *what was* the specific nature of their ideology or political culture, in short, in what their *ideas* and their project actually consisted of.

At the opposite extreme from the liberal interpretation was the "radical-democratic" approach, which pointed out the supposed defects or absences in particular societies—a weakness of the Enlightenment, failed bourgeois revolutions—so that the pre-democratic elites, and not the masses, became the basis for explanations of fascism. In broad terms, there were undoubtedly close connections between these analyses and subsequent theories or perspectives on modernization in general. Most of all, because on the back of these approaches a hegemonic status was effectively acquired in the historiographies of many countries by ideas of the failure of their bourgeois, industrial or national revolutions, as the case might be. In these conceptions, older notions of backwardness were articulated in a manner that conceded a decisive role to the traditional or feudal elites. Within this general approach, moreover, we should note the existence of at least two major currents. Firstly, the one constituted by what can properly be called theories of modernization, with an economicism reflected in the attribution of the very appearance of fascism to different levels of economic development, albeit that in the earliest formulations of these ideas emphasis was placed on the pact made between traditional and modern elites in order to demobilize the subaltern classes in the period of transition from traditional to modern societies (Organski 1965). Less purely economicist in style was the line of argument that established connections between the absence of a bourgeois revolution, the hegemony of feudal elites and the subordination of the bourgeoisie. This basic approach was shared, for all the possible variations between them, by, among others, the ideas of a Barrington Moore, the *Sonderweg* theory of a uniquely German path from aristocracy to modernity and the successive developments of Gramscian theories. The distinction between these two currents is not an idle one, among other reasons because some variations of the theories of modernization lead ultimately to a convergence with significant aspects of theories of totalitarianism, as when, for example, they attribute "modernizing" objectives to antidemocratic elites, whether fascist or communist (Gregor 1979).

Alternatively, the stress placed on the antidemocratic nature of the feudal and post-feudal elites makes possible a convergence between the focus on failed revolutions and—think only of Gramsci—Marxist approaches. As we know, the latter have been characterized above all by an analysis of fascism within the framework of class struggle, understanding it essentially as a form of bourgeois reaction, a useful instrument for capitalist

socio-economic interests, even when such theories also note the significance of its petit-bourgeois component (Beetham 1983). Nevertheless, Marxist authors have also been able to observe that an interpretation based on class interests was ultimately insufficient by itself as a means of explaining the dynamics of fascism, given both its power of social attraction and the accumulated evidence that fascists possessed particular final goals of their own, what Mason has called "the primacy of politics" in fascism (Mason 1995).

If we have devoted some time to this overview, necessarily condensed and in very broad terms, of the major paradigms for the analysis of fascism as they existed virtually up until the last years of the twentieth century, we have done so precisely in order to highlight the key elements in the subsequent crisis of these same ideas, the points of departure for the renovation of studies on the subject and, also, their limitations.

For, what was it that the focuses on totalitarianism, on modernization or on Marxist concepts had in common, in general terms? In first place, the near-fundamental leading role they accorded to elites, whether capitalist, "feudal" or totalitarian. In second place, and consequently, the reduction of the "masses", seen as open to being manipulated, repressed or crushed, to an entity that was in large part undifferentiated. In third place, a relative or absolute lack of attention paid to the fascist as historical subject, who might be portrayed simply as an agent of big capital, a figure subjugated by traditional interest groups or just dispensable. In fourth place, a near-complete lack of knowledge of fascist ideology, since this was considered to be non-existent (the liberal interpretation), purely reactionary and irrational (in Marxist analyses) or a matter of indifference (in focuses on modernization or theories of totalitarianism). In fifth place, the consolidation of an image of fascism as an abstract entity always identified with actual fascist states or regimes. And finally, this is the most corrosive and extraordinary of the paradoxes, *fascism* became a historical phenomenon that existed independently of the facts of whether *fascists* existed or not, but at the same time also a category within which, due to this same lack of differentiation, the most varied regimes could be included.

How, then, did the demolition of many of these suppositions come about in different areas of historiography? We can summarize the changes that have occurred in terms of the following specific fields—the rediscovery of the fascist subject, of their culture, their ideology and of masses with features and faces.

Thus, fifty years ago Ernst Nolte (1966) already made a major contribution by shifting the spotlight onto the ideological origins of fascism and encouraged an avalanche of fresh studies on fascism in general. Shortly afterwards, Renzo de Felice (1975) recognized the existence of particular social and ideological profiles in a fascist movement that could be separated analytically from the regime itself. In the same years, the studies of George L. Mosse (1974) on German culture also opened up a new way forward that would have a decisive influence on subsequent studies, in highlighting the importance of aesthetics in politics, civic religion and mythical thinking in general. Emilio Gentile (1975, 1993), concerned from the beginning with the problem of the ideological origins of fascism, connected with the ideas of Mosse in the emphasis he laid on the central role of political religion in fascist Italy.

For his part, Zeev Sternhell (1978) called our attention strikingly to the importance of the cultural crisis or revolution in the decades around the turn of the twentieth century, to locate the first fascist ideology in France prior to the First World War, considering it a peculiar synthesis of a revised version of Marxist ideas with a new tribal nationalism. The central importance of culture in fascism was again argued forcefully by Roger Griffin (1993, 2002), who also put forward a new characterization of fascism as a political ideology—as a palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism—which was suggestive enough to give a new impulse to debates around fascism in general. His most recent contributions on fascist modernism (Griffin 2007) also interlink, moreover, with a range of approaches that from different perspectives all tend to highlight the elements that fascism possessed of being an alternative form of modernity (Peukert 1993; Bauman 1991; Gentile 2003; Eley 2013).

Of course, this brief survey cannot be remotely exhaustive, although it does help us to locate some of the dividing lines in current historiography. Equally, even among those who distance themselves from any supposed or substantive "cultural" or "essentialist" view of fascism, the importance of the *ideas* of these movements is now recognized. This would be the case with Robert Paxton (1998, 2004) or Michael Mann (2004), who otherwise give more attention to contextual, functional or sociological aspects.

This undeniable cultural re-emergence of the fascist as individual and historical subject has been reinforced, perhaps as a more "negative" factor, by the relegation to a secondary level of the previously all-powerful processes or actors that had practically predetermined everything. This has been the case with "grand capital" or "monopoly capital", due to the extent

to which more detailed research tended to undermine old myths and highlight the great complexity of the relationships between fascism and large-scale capital (Melograni 1972; Turner 1985). The old conceptions associated with a *Sonderweg*, passive revolutions or failed bourgeois revolutions were also subjected to profound re-evaluation, which contributed to dispelling any kind of determinism regarding the stages of modernization or the less than the decisive role of old elites, whether "traditional", "feudal" or "post-feudal".[2] Finally, social history "from below" and the history of daily life—including micro-history or *Alltagsgeschichte*—have aided the "discovery" that, among other things, the supposed isolated, manipulated and subjugated individuals had their own rationality and interests, and were therefore capable of "making history on an everyday level" (Lüdtke 1995). The contributions of Peter Fritzsche (1998), too, have revealed the extent to which Nazism, far from preying upon "atomized" individuals, was able to approach them and feel close to them due to its ability to penetrate intermediate levels of society.

All these ideas ultimately signify, as we have suggested, an acknowledgement of the leading role of fascists themselves in the emergence of fascism. It is not that other actors or forces have disappeared completely, but that these elements were not the decisive protagonists. To put this another way, historiography in general has come to recognize the specific existence of a fascist historical subject, a fascist movement, a fascist ideology and a fascist political culture.

In this regard, it is important to stress that the concept of *political culture* is also central to the present volume. In recent decades, a revised conception of political cultures (Baker 1994; Sirinelli 1997; Bernstein 1999; Pérez Ledesma and Saz 2014–2016) has demonstrated its usefulness in the historical field as an analytical instrument for the study of the cultural basis of major movements and traditions that were political in nature. Among its other features, this concept enables us to include within the scope of our analysis those elements who, on the one side, had a shared vision of the world and interpreted the past, read their present and conceived the future in similar terms, and who, on another, also shared and accepted a series of representations and perceptions made up of—and, in turn, expressed in—particular forms of discourse, rituals and forms of sociability. This perspective overcomes the rigidity of earlier approaches, both those restricted to different kinds of 'structuralist' focus and others that tended to reduce the framework of analysis to party organizations or exclusively ideological criteria. The focus on political cultures permits us to highlight the specific

elements of each example—their cultural roots, ideological foundations, social and political practices, symbolic codes—together with their capacity to construct identities, their role in the establishment of regimes, their changes and permutations over time and the relationships and transversal similarities between movements. In addition, the national particularities of each of these movements did not prevent the members of the same political culture from recognizing that they were part of the same process that extended beyond the frontiers of their respective countries.

As we shall see, it is not that there has been complete agreement on every point, nor that the work that led from this basic starting point has been free of polemical developments. We shall not go into this at any length at this point, but will look at two central questions: that of the place of fascist political culture within the overall framework of reactionary political cultures and the far right, and secondly the particular problem presented by the characterization of the different dictatorships of the extreme right. For, as we have mentioned, on both issues the recognition of the fascist actor has led to a relative blurring of other historical actors. This is so to the point that it can seem as if the problem for historiography with regard to the entire political culture of the antidemocratic right is nothing more than determining whether a movement was fascist or not, and then, if the answer is negative, relegate it to a position of secondary importance. The same can be said, with certain exceptions that we will indicate, regarding the political regimes of different countries.

On the first of these questions, that of the place of fascist culture within reactionary political cultures in general, we need first to examine, as a significant problem, the nature of reactionary nationalism and its relationship to fascism, among other reasons because nationalists and fascists provided the leading elements in all the most significant European dictatorships of the far right. In historiographical terms, the initiation of the current debate can be located in the previously mentioned work of Nolte. With a qualitative leap in terms of the attention given to the ideology of fascism, he identified *Action Française* as one of its three central facets. However, this perspective, albeit that it met with only a minimal response in the relevant historiography at the time, would eventually have the effect of to some extent expelling the nationalists from the universe of studies on fascism. For it is clear that while, in Nolte's view, *Action Française* formed part of a wider whole, that of fascism, it is no less visible that, once a separation had been established between both phenomena, nationalism of this kind became reduced to a purely local, French, phenomenon. With the

result that, while historians embarked upon reiterated debates upon the nature of fascism, its ideology, the existence or not of a generic fascism, a minimum level of fascism, and so on, the study of reactionary nationalism seemed restricted, compartmentalized into different national experiences, when not diluted between broader conceptual frameworks.[3]

Reinforcing this new compartmentalization of studies on nationalism was the extent to which there did not appear to be any other conceptual alternative regarding nationalist movements than that of defining the extent of the influence of *Action Française* in other movements and experiences. Hence, attempts were made to consider whether this or that nationalist movement could be regarded as any sort of copy of the French model or not. If the results were negative, as they were in repeated instances, the different nationalist political cultures were left in their compartments, as if each country had its own nationalist experience, which had *nothing to do with the others*. For, ultimately, no one contemplated the possibility that, in the same way that *Action Française* could not be reduced to Charles Maurras, nor could the whole of reactionary nationalism be reduced to *Action Française*.

It is true that studies of reactionary nationalisms have made important advances in recent years. It is equally true that there is now a tendency to acknowledge that the history of these movements did not end at their own frontiers (Papadia 2006, p. 13). However, it is difficult to go beyond this acknowledgement. In effect, the most extensive studies on these questions have been those undertaken recently by French historians, although here, once again, the argument has tended to flow from a starting point in the relationship between one explicit actor, *Action Française*, and the "other" movements (Pomeyrols and Hauser 2001; Dard and Grunewald 2009).[4]

Overall, albeit that historians have admitted the existence of a whole interplay of influences, relationships, adaptations and modifications between movements, what does not seem even to be contemplated is the possibility of examining the potential existence of any sort of "generic nationalism" or "generic reactionary nationalism" (Saz 2012). In other words, the existence is not contemplated of a political culture that was as transnational as fascism had the ability to be. We could say that the paradox is most evident in the extent to which an unavoidable transnational perspective, in this field, is reserved for fascism (Bauerkämper and Rossoliński-Liebe 2017).[5] Outside fascism it appears that transnational factors disappear; everything that was not or is not considered to have been directly fascist is again relegated to an undifferentiated body of secondary

importance, with arguments that at times are limited to a statement that movement x was not actually fascist, as if that is enough. The absence of monographs on transnational nationalism is the greatest demonstration of the point we wish to make here.

This is not intended to suggest in any way that the relationships that we can observe between nationalisms and fascisms, on a national and transnational level, were not multiple, complex, sometimes porous, or that there were not all kinds of mutual "loans", influences and inter-influences between them. Nor that the importance can be denied, compared to other historical legacies, of nationalism in the origins of fascism, nor to deny that, at particular moments, or in the context of broader processes, nationalism and fascism could at times move closer and closer together, just as much as at others they could develop a more or less explicit rivalry. Neither, ultimately, does it suggest that either of these political cultures, like every other, can and should be treated as closed compartments. In fact, all of these questions are very present in this volume. Nevertheless, before going on to deal with them, it is worthwhile to alert readers to the point that in this game of "what is fascism – what is not", there can be a temptation to return in more muted fashion to the old positions of Nolte, that is, to a re-identification of *Action Française* and other reactionary nationalisms with their respective fascisms. A dubious stance that, moreover, can lead us to obscure and stretch the outlines of the historical actor that is fascism by making space for other actors within it.

The position that admits the effective disappearance of established models or concepts of fascism in order to examine the interactions of rightist movements from a relational perspective can also, though not necessarily, be interpreted in this way (Dobry 2011). Albeit that, in talking of relational perspectives, one cannot ignore the fact that "relation" in itself supposes a recognition of the existence of two distinct subjects, and that an awareness of the relationships between such subjects as different entities is and has always been effectively essential for any definition and self-definition of these same subjects in all the historical processes and moments of which they form part. From this standpoint, a relational perspective can be of use, like comparative history, in enriching tools so necessary to the historian as general concepts and models. One can understand a rejection of some of the abusive applications of different concepts or models, their "essentialist" derivations or consequent obsession with classification (Dobry 2003). However, to dispense with the use of such models entirely could rebound in a fresh lack of differentiation when it comes to the analysis of different

phenomena, which could lead us back to old categorizations, on the one hand, or on another to the renunciation of an instrument so necessary to the historian as conceptualization.

To sum up our position, we consider that a recognition of the existence of differentiated political cultures is a condition *sine qua non* for the study of these cultures and for us to capture the complexity of the relationships between them. The use of this perspective also underlines the central position of the two political cultures that, within the undoubtedly broader framework of the radical right, have been the focus of all our earlier reflections: those of reactionary nationalism and fascist ultranationalism.

A large part of what we have been discussing here is very closely related, as is obvious, to the question of the nature of the respective regimes, the various dictatorships. In this terrain too, there was for decades a near-total lack of differentiation, to the point that at times nearly all right-wing dictatorships could be held to be fascist—for example, in Marxist analyses or theories related to modernization. These ideas were "compensated" for from another quarter, in the theories of totalitarianism, determined as they were to establish their own form of indifferentiation, embracing within their formulations both fascism and communism.

Fortunately, we have made great advances in terms of defining and differentiating between dictatorships. It is true that there are still scholars who, for different reasons, consider the German dictatorship as something that cannot be identified with the regime in Italy,[6] in the same way that there are also still those who include in the "fascist" category the dictatorships in Spain, Portugal, Austria or France.[7] Nevertheless, we can say that a relatively broad consensus exists across a range of fields of historical study that views the Italian and German dictatorships as the only fully fascist regimes or, at the very least, the regimes that were most unquestionably fascist.

However, once we have accepted this last point, the question then raised in historiographical terms is that of just what, then, the rest of the dictatorships of the right actually were. It is not necessary to go back as far as the problematic arguments of Juan José Linz (1964) in the differentiation he made between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, with its focus on a division into dichotomies, self-definition—any regime that is neither totalitarian nor democratic is authoritarian—historical imprecision—in this argument, ultimately, any regime that was not strictly totalitarian, that is the vast majority of the dictatorships of the twentieth century would be authoritarian—and, overall, limited regard for a historical reality in which fascist regimes explicitly acknowledged themselves to be both authoritarian and

totalitarian.[8] Nor will we enter into the other possible characterizations of dictatorial regimes, in many instances no less confusing, in terms of "Bonapartism"—a label which some used for fascism and others for other political phenomena—or other conceptions that included military dictatorships (Kühnl 1978; Poulantzas 1974).

Some answers to these questions that were clearly intended to incorporate a recognition of the complexity of dictatorships, without falling back into asphyxiating dichotomies, were provided at the beginning of the 1990s by Roger Griffin, with his use of the concept of "para-fascism", and Ismael Saz, with his idea of the fascistized dictatorship. The former identified as "para-fascist" those counter-revolutionary regimes in which power was held by conservatives and military officers, but which also adopted a populist façade and a series of organizational modes and instruments of legitimation and control typical of the fascist dictatorships. Such regimes might cooperate with genuine fascist movements, but only with the aim of diluting their nature, co-opting them and, ultimately, neutralizing them (Griffin 1993, p. 120ff.; Griffin 2014). Focusing originally on the specific case of the Franco dictatorship in Spain, Saz's characterization of the latter as a "fascistized dictatorship" stresses the fact that power was exercised by a counter-revolutionary alliance or reactionary coalition, but with the unequivocal presence of political, ideological and institutional elements that were fascist in nature. In this regard, this type of dictatorship would be the product as much of a prior process of selective adoption of elements of fascism by the right—that is, their "fascistization"—as of the presence of specifically fascist elements. Or, one could say, a fascistized regime would be a form of hybrid counter-revolutionary dictatorship with fascist components and points of reference, even though these were always subordinate to other elements (Saz 1993, 2004b; Vincent 2009).

Even if we recognize that both these conceptualizations represented a clear break with dichotomous approaches, they were still not free of certain problems. In Griffin's theories, the non-fascist political actors tend to disappear within the inevitable "traditional elites". An imprecision that, as we have seen, has led to the different anti-liberal nationalisms being distributed around a diversity of analytical categories, with the result that the role of these nationalisms in the various para-fascist regimes has been under-valued. Nor has the approach of Saz succeeded in overcoming some of these limitations. It is true that within this view the central importance of the process of political fascistization of particular political actors—traditionalists, monarchists, "official" Catholics—is recognized,

and that an assessment is made of the extent of this fascistization and its impact on the dictatorship. However, the concept of fascistized regime—like that of para-fascism—does not really tell us very much about the adjective—fascistized—and little about the substantive element, about the nature of the groups who were being fascistized. For, if the hegemonic political culture was not actually fascism, what was this hegemonic culture?

This is the key question if we wish to escape from the old opposition between fascism and traditional elites. Above all, if we seek to recognize that the "traditional elites" or holders of power—the military, business circles, bureaucracies, the church(es)—were not in fact composed of culturally and politically uniform, but otherwise apparently rather amorphous, sectors, who were all consistently ready to defend their own "elite" interests without any kind of political or cultural mediation.

We should also consider the possibility that one potential development of these approaches, which lays emphasis on the circulation of ideas and the clear influence of fascism upon actors who were not themselves fascists, and continued not to be so in fundamental areas, has been vitally enriched by a focus on hybridization (Kallis 2014; Kallis and Costa Pinto 2014). The proposition that the process of fascistization of a broad range of political sectors and a variety of regimes was not a unidirectional one, and that this in turn could also produce hybrid outcomes that had the capacity to provide new centres of attention and points of reference for other movements elsewhere, offers a further avenue towards an appreciation of the interplay of influences, connections and interrelationships between regimes and movements in all their complexity, at local and transnational levels. The necessary and long-hoped-for comparative perspective is also reinforced by this approach, as an indispensable methodological principle.

Nevertheless, we need also to call readers' attention once again to the possibility that these approaches could also generate fresh tendencies towards vagueness or a lack of definition. For, if everything becomes an appreciation of a diversity of elements characterized by constant and complex hybridization in a kind of indefinite circulation of examples, ideas and interrelationships, the risk arises that any possibility of conceptual precision could be nullified. As a result, we could see a de facto disappearance of specific political actors and of the political cultures that operate in the construction of regimes, especially in the case of reactionary nationalism. When it might be better, in cases where such a culture has been able to gain hegemonic status, to talk of nationalist dictatorships whose hybridization

consisted of particular levels or degrees of fascistization, that is, of fascistized nationalist dictatorships (Saz 2012, pp. 180–85).

Of course, this is not a matter of suggesting here that there can be no other types of right-wing dictatorships. However, if we are to speak of different forms of hybridization, the circulation of ideas and the interplay of influences from a transnational perspective, we cannot leave everything to a new abstract concept, ignoring the fact that reactionary nationalism played a significant role in these processes and that nationalist dictatorships also had a lot to say in this regard. After all, the influence of Action Française upon Portuguese *Integralismo* is unquestionable, and the latter was one of the most important and most fully elaborated ideological currents—though not the only one—that came together in the Salazar regime; equally unquestionable was the extent to which *Action Française* and the Italian Nationalist Association (ANI) mirrored each other, even when members of the latter wished to deny the former's influence upon them. *Action Française* and Portuguese Integralism in turn, together with Italian fascism—although the latter to a lesser degree—exercised a powerful influence over *Acción Española* in Spain. In terms of regimes, Maurras and other figures in *Action Française* never concealed their enthusiasm for the Salazar government, while the Portuguese regime, which itself experienced a certain level of fascistization, was no less attractive as a model for the Francoists in Spain than Italian fascism. Subsequently, the Vichy regime, which was not lacking in Maurrasian imprints, sought inspiration more in the Iberian dictatorships than in those of Italy or, still less, the Nazis (Saz 2012).[9]

The present volume seeks to look deeper into the problems we have been discussing here, taking as a starting point and basic principle the central role of political cultures and their transnational character, and, within them, to examine the cultures of reactionary nationalists and fascists, as in general the most significant in the regimes and movements under consideration. Such a study has required, on the one hand, specific and differentiated—that is, not indiscriminate—examinations of each of these political cultures in terms of their national and transnational dimensions, their interconnections and transversal characteristics, and on the other, a study of the different dictatorships, of the place of nationalists and fascists in their formation and evolution, and the manner in which their own particular political cultures underwent changes and permutations in the course of these processes. This is why the exposition of the main arguments has been organized into three

large sections or blocs. In this regard, one could say that the structure of this collection is the first and principal application of our focus on political cultures.

The first section focuses specifically on reactionary nationalisms, covering most of its most important representatives: *Action Française*, naturally, and Italian nationalism, as well as the authoritarian nationalism embodied by *Acción Española* and German ultra-conservative nationalism, to conclude with a brief examination of the radical right in South America. The second deals with the political culture of fascism and its movements, beginning as is logical with Italian Fascism to continue with an analysis of National Socialism, the different French fascisms, Spanish Falangism, the Portuguese National Syndicalists and the significant, though often overlooked, fascist movements of Central and Eastern Europe. The third section meanwhile analyses the mutual influences, reciprocal relationships and disputes between these political cultures within the dictatorships headed by Mussolini, Hitler, Salazar, Franco and Pétain, to end with an overview of this question in the Latin American dictatorships.

It is not our intention, naturally, to suggest that these were the only political cultures within these dictatorships, nor to argue that the questions raised by contemporary dictatorships are exhausted by an examination of the regimes considered here. Nonetheless, we have sought to open up a perspective for the analysis of a series of complex processes related to the specific nature of the two political cultures that are our main focus, their national and transnational peculiarities, their reciprocal influences and interrelationships, and the fields in which there may have been hybridization between them. We have sought, too, to study the place of both cultures in the various dictatorships and, of course, to examine the regimes themselves, understood as the product of complex processes that cannot be explained without the presence of these two political cultures.

Throughout this collection, one central problem that emerges is that of the extraordinary complexity of the relations between nationalism and fascism, in every sense and from every angle. This becomes apparent in a multifaceted approach, as is seen very clearly in the contributions of Olivier Dard and Lorenzo Benadusi, which incorporate, and integrate, different national and transnational viewpoints. At times, these accounts tend to suggest an almost perfect triangle: the influence of *Action Française* upon the ANI and then through it, or directly, upon fascism; the question of the supposed paternity or ideological ascendancy of French or Italian nationalism over fascism; the interplay of identities, similarities and differences in

the very processes of definition and self-definition of nationalists and fascists. What stands out with absolute clarity, in whichever case we examine, is the position of reactionary nationalism among the cultural origins of fascism. This is very well demonstrated in the chapter by António Costa Pinto on Portugal, or Maximiliano Fuentes Codera's chapter on Spain. However, these chapters also underline that in every case this nationalist presence was neither linear nor much less exclusive, and that in the final analysis there were also unquestionable differences between the two political cultures. Equally, again, however, this still does not imply that these same cultures represented any kind of closed compartments. On the contrary, as both Benadusi and Fuentes point out, there were porous boundaries and cross-fertilization between them, processes of hybridization and mutual contamination, and so ultimately elements of "fascistization" in nationalism and an integration of elements from reactionary nationalism into fascism.

Nevertheless, all the processes just mentioned did not prevent it being the case that these two distinct political cultures remained recognizable as such throughout their existence, even in those instances where they underwent a process of formal political unification. Equally recognizable in virtually every example was a greater identification of the nationalists with the economic, social, military, ecclesiastical and, in some cases, cultural elites of their respective countries—albeit that there is also a possibility, as Hermann Beck suggests, that this identification was exaggerated to an extreme by the Nazis in their obsessive hammering-home of the reactionary and bourgeois nature of the nationalists and conservatives. Naturally, this leads us back to the complexity of relationships between groups who were both allies and rivals, and consequently to the question of who became the "victor", the hegemonic force. In this regard, both Beck and Michael Grüttner examine the solidity and depth of the Nazi victory. So too, looking at Italy, does Benadusi, who, continuing in the line of Emilio Gentile, rejects the idea of "ideological capture" and stresses the political hegemony of the fascists. "Defeated" in their pretensions of preserving certain elements of more or less "constitutional" continuity with the past, many of the German nationalists continued to maintain a collaborative stance towards the regime. The same could be said to a slightly lesser extent of their Italian equivalents, albeit that they did not cease to complain, even if very discreetly, up until the final days of the regime.

Many of the contributions here highlight the central importance of certain questions that are not always dealt with in much of our historiography: when and where. This is strongly underlined by Dard in his analysis of a

political culture as long-lasting as *Action Française*, which over time had to confront a succession of different historical contexts, national and international, which cannot be ignored by the historian. Something similar can be seen in the case of Italian fascism, as described by Patrizia Dogliani, or the experience of the dictatorships in Latin America considered by Daniel Lvovich, as far removed in time from their local nationalist predecessors as they were from the model of European dictatorships studied elsewhere in this collection.

These issues are also considered by Fernando J. Devoto, who goes much further in his reflections with a strong injection of theory regarding the question of "where". Or, more exactly, on the "where" that is Latin America. This touches upon two of the central questions, from a methodological point of view, in this volume. The first is that of the potential of comparative and transnational history and their possible limits, as applied in this case to nationalisms. He also makes reference almost tangentially to the precedent of historicism, which, he implies, may have been at the root of the propensity to consider that the nationalism of each country was peculiar to itself and could not be assimilated with any other. Devoto also casts a certain shadow of scepticism by pointing out that comparative history may be one form of undertaking historical study, but is not the only one.

The second question he considers central is the often-cited issue of the ultimate limitations of attempts to analyse Latin American experience according to European parameters. In the particular case of nationalisms, importance has been given to European influences—which he does not deny—in the diverse and successive currents of Latin American nationalism, but he also emphatically underlines the profound roots of these nationalisms and their development in the work of native thinkers and earlier indigenous political processes. In this respect, these countries' own cultures can be seen as equally or more important than the importation of European nationalist, conservative or reactionary thought.

Perhaps the best conclusion that can be drawn from this particular discussion is to point to a simplistic reductivism that can be seen in many historiographical practices: all those which in one way or another posit a *tabula rasa* in the evolution of different national cultures, in order to seek out direct influences from the European political cultures of the time. This needs to be highlighted, above all, because transnational contacts are not some sort of phenomenon that appeared in the first decades of the twentieth century, since they can be traced much further back, at least as far as the previous century and its final decades. To put this another way, there

was already a circulation of ideas and cultures throughout the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, which can explain both the elements these countries shared with Europeans and their own particular evolution, presenting us with a broader picture through which, for example, the presence, greater or lesser, more or less direct, of Maurras in Latin American nationalisms can be placed in a wider context. It is worth noting, too, as Dard points out, or as we can appreciate in Fuentes' work, that there were already strong elements of "pre-Maurrasian" similarities in the cultures of France, Catalonia and Spain as a whole.

The studies of fascist movements and their political cultures in this collection operate within similar parameters of complexity. In her analysis of Italian fascism, one could say that Patrizia Dogliani takes into consideration two chronological dimensions. On the one hand, that of the evolution of the relevant historiography and its enrichment thanks to new perspectives more open to a comparative approach. On the other, the chronology that, in a more strictly historical sense, demonstrates the existence of successive generations in the evolution of Italian fascism. The outcome of this use of tandem viewpoints is, among other things, a new vision of the role of Mussolini, together with the verification of the existence of a very significant capacity for self-renovation in the final generation of a fascist movement that had appeared exhausted. For his part, Toni Morant reminds us that, although a transnational phenomenon, fascism nevertheless had its starting point in Italy, and that this is also a fact of crucial importance for an understanding of Nazism. A point that of course cannot lead us to ignore the specific features, within our overall framework, of Nazi anti-Semitism, nor the greater emphasis given by the Nazis to their supposed or real "social revolution". Nevertheless, the aspiration towards totalitarianism, all the elements visible in Nazism of political religion, were not features that separated it, other than in rhythm and intensity, from the Italian experience. Also notable are the attention the author gives to gender perspectives and those relating to youth, which enable us to incorporate an indispensable, if frequently forgotten, means of access to closer knowledge of the Nazi experience.

Naturally, the experience of the "triumphant" fascisms was not the same as that of those others that remained far from achieving their objectives. However, in this regard, as several authors demonstrate here, each case had its own specific features. Thus, the growth of a fascist movement like that of Portugal, from its beginnings under the unavoidable influence of *Integralismo Lusitano* until it took on the characteristics typical of a true

fascist organization, was not enough to prevent its defeat at the hands of Salazarism. Paradoxically, as Costa Pinto indicates, it was the establishment of a military dictatorship that gave strength to a national-syndicalism based in large part among junior officers, and with a not-insignificant level of support among manual workers, but equally it was the subsequent imposition of the Salazar regime that eventually cut the ground from under its feet. An experience that had some points in common with that of Spanish fascism, so close in many other ways to its Portuguese contemporary. In Spain, the military dynamic of civil war strengthened the fascist party, while at the same time encouraging its subordination to the state. However, subordination was not the same as defeat, and, as Julián Sanz underlines, Spanish fascism remained a permanent presence throughout the existence of the Franco regime, so that it is difficult to consider it an absolute failure among fascist movements.

Once again, the general and the specific, in historiographical terms, crisscross and intersect whenever we analyse the historical trajectories of different fascisms. Hence, the importance of the emphasis laid by Sanz on the extent to which international historiography has tended to ignore the principal contributions of Spanish specialists on the field, relying instead on formulations that are largely obsolete and conceptions so amply surpassed by historical studies within Spain as those of backwardness or failed revolutions. A similar point is made in the reflections by Traian Sandu on fascism in Central and Eastern Europe, when he points out the diversity and complexity of the dynamics of these movements, scarcely susceptible to any reduction to a uniform conception of "Eastern Europe", while at the same time also highlighting the fact that it was this region that saw the most powerful fascist movements outside Italy and Germany. This strength was based upon a strong capacity to penetrate into society and an ability to express a nationally based, popular and antisemitic radicalism, which, nevertheless, was not sufficient to enable them to impose themselves, by themselves, upon the more traditional sectors of anti-liberal radicalism.

If there is one national experience in which all the different historical strands associated with nationalism, fascism and the country's own experiences of dictatorship are intertwined it is, as we have already seen, that of France. In this regard, the idea of a supposed French immunity to fascism, together with that of the non-fascist nature of the Vichy regime, has for decades marked French historiography and sparked its angriest debates. As Olivier Forlin explains, this has had a great deal to do with the relationship established over successive decades between history and memory. More

recently, a fresh openness to transnational perspectives and comparative history has made possible a richer approach to the political culture of the French fascists and, simultaneously, enabled us to appreciate the importance of the processes of fascistization and hybridization. All of which contributes to our placing the relative weakness of French fascism in its proper context.

Closely related, obviously, to the problem of French fascism as such is the no less long-standing debate on the nature of the Vichy regime. Olivier Wieviorka confronts this issue to distance himself equally both from the affirmation of the fascist character of Vichy sustained by Zeev Sternhell, among others, and from those theories, such as those of Michel Dobry, that question the very relevance of any definition of fascism. At the same time, though, he also stands apart very clearly from any benevolent view of the Pétain regime. It had the same enemies as fascism and Nazism, coinciding with them especially in such matters as the destruction of civil liberties and the persecution of elements considered "anti-national", and it also had a desire to rebuild French society and construct a new order. Except, however, that this new order was of a different kind, at some distance from the modernity of the fascists and closer—like that of the Franco regime—to Catholicism and traditional values, and the regime also lacked a single party and a powerful armed militia, and so was, overall, more reactionary than revolutionary. Nevertheless, all these limitations did not make Vichy any less tyrannical; on the contrary, this was an example of a genuinely counter-revolutionary tyranny whose sources of inspiration can be found not in fascism or Nazism but in the indigenous traditions of the French counter-revolutionary right.

Closest to the French case were the dictatorships in Portugal and Spain, which served precisely as inspirations for Vichy in certain fields. This does not mean, however, that in these countries, as elsewhere, there were not also significant processes of fascistization. In Portugal, Goffredo Adinolfi argues, Italian fascism was one of the principal sources of inspiration for the *Estado Novo*, particularly in the conception of the "ethical state" and, among other features, its corporatist organization. However, the limits of this inspiration were evident both in the ideological and the constitutional field. Wholly antidemocratic, the regime's "constitution" located its ideological roots in the most right-wing form of liberalism, Lusitanian *Integralismo* and Catholicism. Equally, Salazar himself was far from committed to a totalitarian state. Nor would fascism become a hegemonic force in Spain, although the process of fascistization there went considerably further than in Portugal, due among other reasons to the fact that the fascist party

always kept itself in positions of power, however subordinate they might be. This is why it is essential, as Zira Box shows, to focus on an analysis of the different political cultures, especially those of *Acción Española* and the Falange, to understand the dynamics of a regime in which the always-conflictive hybridization of these two cultures would eventually result in a no less hybrid common Francoist culture.

In Italy and Germany too, there were two separate political cultures that were essential to the configuration of the respective dictatorships. With the difference that in these cases, evidently, the hegemonic role corresponded to the fascists and Nazis. In both countries, these situations came about through a complex series of developments. In Italy, as Ismael Saz shows, the organic fusion of fascists and nationalists signified the dominance of the former, but not the total disappearance of the other sector, who were always recognized and recognizable. Their counterparts also remained visible in Germany, although here, as Grüttner points out, there was a greater degree of differentiation within the world of conservative nationalism between the German National People's Party (DNVP) and the *Stahlhelm*. Significantly, both Italian and German nationalists played an by no means insignificant role in the destruction of civil liberties, the Italians with the *fascistissime* laws and the Germans with the measures that led to the termination of the Weimar Republic. In both instances, the nationalists operated as points of reference and reassurance for the business world and other sectors of "traditional" power, and in both cases, they appear to have acted with some hopes of retaining some elements of legalism and "constitutionalism" in the new regime. However, it was already too late, for once they had fulfilled their mission of destroying liberal freedoms the Italian nationalists were pensioned off with greater or lesser honours, while in Germany a similar elimination of civil liberties, in which the nationalists had been complicit, was used much more drastically to ensure that they themselves were de facto neutralized. Nevertheless, many figures from both sectors, in both countries, continued to collaborate with their regimes at least until the course of the Second World War threatened a catastrophic end.

If there is a common feature in all these experiences it is their complexity, and the significant presence within them of both of these political cultures. They were not the only elements involved, as has been indicated regarding Portugal and Spain, and this was also partly true in Germany, and still less the case in the Vichy regime, with its plurality of political forces from the far right. Moreover, several other political sectors that are commonly referred to slightly ambiguously, such as those of the "non-conformists",

"technocrats" and so on, evidently remain outside this analysis. If this heterogeneity was visible in the European dictatorships that form our primary object of study here, it would be a still more important feature of the South American dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s. In these regimes, as examined by Daniel Lvovich, over and above the forms and practices of ideological legitimization was the doctrine of national security. Equally, while we have to dismiss the notion that these dictatorships did not seek to establish forms of national consensus and social support behind them, we cannot claim that their political ambitions were dictated by a single ideological model. On the contrary, the intrinsic diversity of these regimes made it possible for them to connect with a range of different political traditions; among others, with nationalists, but not only with them.

The volume that we present here, therefore, proposes a body of analysis that, far from closing a debate, seeks to kindle discussion and animate it further. We have sought to offer perspectives that take into account the complexity of these different political cultures, the ways in which they changed, their lines of continuity and the reciprocal influences between them, studied from a transnational viewpoint, in a manner that enables us to look deeper into the development of these cultures over time and across different countries and continents. Throughout a long and turbulent period marked by all the transformations associated with mass society and the growth of the pressures of democratization, both reactionary nationalists and fascists engaged in extensive political activity that sought to combat democracy and the workers' movement in order to construct a new authoritarian or totalitarian order. These actions gave rise to political movements that were often extraordinarily vigorous—above all those that were clearly fascist—and to the construction of a succession of dictatorships that crushed many of the democratic political and social advances attained in earlier years, deploying widespread repression and political violence in the process.

Far removed from the contemporaneous visions and theories of the time that were satisfied with explanations of these phenomena centred around ideological irrationalism, manipulation of the masses or control and instrumentalization by elites, this collection can be seen as part of a now-extensive tradition of studies that have set out to investigate the cultural and political foundations out of which these antidemocratic forces developed. In a context today in which—however much so many things have changed, and in which, as always, it is advisable to avoid over-simplistic parallels—movements, forms of language and policies from the radical right

of a xenophobic, authoritarian and populist kind are once again advancing across Europe, it seems to us indispensable to continue probing deeper in our analysis of the offensive against democracy driven forward by reactionary nationalists and fascists in the first half of the twentieth century.

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Notes

1. Here, the fundamental point of reference continues to be Arendt (1951).
2. A classic analysis of this topic, on Germany, is that in Blackbourn and Eley (1984). On Italy, see Romanelli (1991). On Spain, Pérez Garzón (1998).
3. Note that Weber's classic book on Action Française (1962) was published only a year before that of Nolte. Three years later, together with Rogger and Weber (1965), Weber moved towards a tripartite classification of the right—into reactionaries, conservatives and radicals—in which nationalism, nearly always highly present in the radical right, was nevertheless seen as neither of the left nor the right. For his part, Payne (1995) subsumed "authoritarian nationalism" into a conceptual framework that included a diversity of rightist forces, from conservatives to radicals and fascists. Nor was a lack of conceptual definition absent from the otherwise excellent contributions of Martin Blinkhorn (1990, 2000). In addition, to give a final example, Griffin (1993, pp. 118 and 122–24) includes the Italian ANI and the DNVP in the category of "proto-fascist" groups, considering both of them, moreover, to be examples of "integral nationalism", but places Action Française, Acción Española and Portuguese Integralismo in a no less ill-defined "non-fascist radical right".
4. One should nevertheless point out the existence of a strong impetus towards new approaches of the kind we have been discussing, as in, for example, Dard et al. (2017). Particularly notable was the conference titled Être nationaliste. Les nationalistes en régimes autoritaires et totalitaires held in Paris in 2017 and organized by Olivier Dard and Didier Musiedlak. See also the chapter by Olivier Dard in the current collection.
5. This approach has undoubtedly enriched studies on fascism, and in fact, it is worth recalling here that at the time of its rise, fascism was already considered an international phenomenon; the first interpretations of these movements treated them as such; and there were even moments when it seemed

difficult to localize "national" fascisms. There have also been numerous studies devoted specifically to this international fascism; two outstanding examples are the works of Mosse (1980) and Griffin (1998).

6. Following in the line of argument, for example, put forward by two "classic" authors such as Renzo De Felice or Karl Dietrich Bracher.
7. See the identification of a political sector characterized as "Catholic fascism" by Collotti (1997). On the argument regarding the fascist nature of Vichy France, the best-known figure is Zeev Sternhell, who, moreover, excludes Nazism from the category of fascism because of its biological racism. See Sternhell (2000) and Sternhell et al. (1994).
8. On authoritarian fascism and totalitarian fascism, see Gentile (1995, p. 136). The creation of a "totalitarian and authoritarian state" was what Mussolini's envoy Roberto Farinacci recommended to Franco in 1937 (Saz 2004a, p. 137).
9. The Portuguese example, which as we have seen had a crucial effect upon the dictatorships considered here, also influenced others, such as, for example, the regime of Metaxas in Greece. See Costa Pinto (1992), Costa Pinto (2000), and Kallis (2010).

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PART I

Reactionary Nationalisms

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CHAPTER 2

The Action Française in a Transnational Perspective

Olivier Dard

Introduction

The Action Française (AF) and Maurrassisme are inseparable from the figure of Charles Maurras (1868–1952), yet at the same time they both encompass and surpass him. A discussion of the AF entails the exploration of a polymorphous web centred on three primary components: a doctrine, a daily newspaper and a league. The AF played an important role in the history of modern France, while its influence and reach broadly surpassed French borders. The aim of this contribution, which owes much to a historiography that is in full renewal, is to examine this question from different angles. We will firstly restate a few elements from the definition of the AF and Maurrassisme, and then propose a historiographical overview that follows both its strictly French dimension and its international extensions. We will then place the influence of the AF outside of France in chronological context, in an attempt to shed light on the drivers favouring penetration and political transfers between the AF and different nationalist and fascist

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movements. In particular, we will examine how the AF analysed (and at the same time was analysed by) Italy, Spain and Portugal.

A Few Elements from the Definition of the Action Française and Its Historiography

A Political Doctrine

The doctrinal heart of Maurrassisme was the "integral nationalism" theorized by Maurras at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Various works by Victor Nguyen (1991) and Michael Sutton (1994), and more recently by Bruno Goyet (2000), Stéphane Giocanti (2006), Domenico Fisichella (2006) and Tony Kunter (2009), to which we take the liberty of adding our biography of Maurras, have analysed the origins of Maurras' thought. His inspiration was linked to a reactionary and counter-revolutionary culture, along with the influence of Auguste Comte and positivism. Constructed in opposition to Enlightenment philosophy (what he called "clouds") and romanticism, Maurras' thought entailed a radical refusal of liberal individualism.

Logically enough, Maurras was an open and avowed enemy of democracy. As such, he denounced the Third Republic, a regime he considered to be the triumph of what he called "Anti-France", which was symbolized by the domination of the "four confederate estates" (Jews, freemasons, Protestants, *métèques*). The regime Maurras advocated was a monarchy organized primarily around federalism, decentralization and corporatism.

Maurras' thought was essential at the AF. He was its "Master" and political leader, a term that should firstly be understood as that of a political school. However, Maurrassisme cannot be understood solely through the lone figure of Maurras. Room should also be given to other figures that served as important references, given the extent to which their reflections nourished AF doctrine.

The first is Jacques Bainville, a historian and specialist on Germany and geopolitics. Bainville played an essential part in defining the AF's programme against Germany before the First World War, doing so up until his death in February 1936. His book *The Political Consequences of Peace* was important at the time; it was generally opposed to John Maynard Keynes's *Economic Consequences of Peace*, which was published at the same time. The importance enjoyed for two decades by Georges Valois, who was

considered the AF economist by Maurrassians and their enemies alike, should also be mentioned. A disciple of René de La Tour du Pin and Georges Sorel, Valois was a dynamic corporatist in the Proudhon Circle before the First World War, as well as in the early 1920s, when he reflected on a project for a "new economy" and the construction of various corporations in the field. His success did not match his ambitions, and Valois chose to leave the AF to launch le Faisceau, which during the mid-1920s was the first attempt to create a French fascism inspired by the Italian model. Coming after his stinging electoral defeat of 1924 that marked Valois, but before the papal condemnation of 1926, Valois' dissidence began a difficult period for the AF, as religious questions were added to diplomatic and economic ones. Maurras naturally wrote a great deal about the Catholic Church and Christian democracy, particularly against its primary promoter Marc Sangnier (*Le dilemme de Marc Sangnier*).[1] However, other authors should also be taken into account with regard to religious questions, such as Louis Dimier (a specialist on the subject until his departure in 1926), the philosopher Jacques Maritain, who was a neo-Thomist at the time, and Henri Massis, the director of *La Revue universelle*. A final register involved aesthetic questions. Maurras had very limited ideas on the subject: he demonstrated a penchant for neoclassicism and endeavoured to establish a "Romanic school" in literature. Not all of his supporters followed him, including his friend Léon Daudet, who proclaimed himself an admirer of Marcel Proust and Louis-Ferdinand Céline. During the 1930s, the Maurrassian Jeune Droite (Young Right) also freed itself from the artistic canons of the "Master", which gave the literary page of the *Action Française* a fairly particular tone.

In short, while "*Politique d'abord*" (Politics first) coupled with "integral nationalism" provided a common foundation for the AF, it was certainly less uniform than appears.

A Daily Newspaper

For contemporaries as well as numerous historians, the AF primarily denotes a daily newspaper that appeared continuously between 1908 and 1944. In fact, at the beginning the *Action française* was no more than a "little gray review", even though having a newspaper at his disposal was a constant concern of Maurras. The daily's influence was undeniable, and here we will simply cite the account of Albert Thibaudet, the famous critic and *Nouvelle Revue française* journalist, who foresaw what would happen

in February 1927: "Action française is not the name, or just the name, of a political party: it's the name of an admirably produced large circulation newspaper". The newspaper can be considered the most important element within the system and played a major role in Maurrassian sociability, for it was at the newspaper that Maurras met with people and worked day after day, or rather night after night. Maurras and his closest friends (Bainville, Daudet) were men of letters and journalists. This was essential and was considered by Maurrassians to be the primary driver that enabled the AF to diffuse its ideas and influence public opinion. In the spirit of Maurras and those close to him, whose watchword was "*Notre force est d'avoir raison*" (Our strength is that we are right), it was through reading that conviction would set in and lead to militant action. As a result, propaganda via print, and chiefly through the newspaper, was essential. This primacy of the daily newspaper explains why the banning of the league in 1936 ultimately disturbed Maurras so little. What mattered for him was the publication of the newspaper.

The Role of the Action Française League

The league was founded on 15 January 1905. It was the third pillar of the group, although its role should be made clear. The league was organized around different organizations (*Camelots du Roi*, *Dames royalistes*, *Jeunes filles royalistes*). In the presentation of AF organizations, the term "Action" followed the term "intellectual work". The priorities were fixed, and "action" referred firstly to propaganda, as league organizations were considered as "propaganda centers". This point is essential for understanding the role of the Camelots du Roi [King's street-hawkers]. Their central function in the street was to sell the daily, which did not prevent them from simultaneously being the league's shock troops. As mentioned earlier, the newspaper held much greater importance for Maurras than the league; the AF leader never seriously theorized what an effective league would be, and what relation such an organization could have with militant action and violence (Dard 2009; Philippet 2011). Maurras was criticized on this point by Louis Dimier, who pointed out that while Maurras had the qualities of a "Master", he did not have those of a political leader (Dimier 1926, p. 335). The regional establishment of the league is a good indicator for assessing its influence, with research in this area showing that its branches did not cover all of national territory (Vavasseur-Desperriers 2008; Secondy 2008; Gaudin 2008; Schmidt 2017). There is consequently an important contrast

between the AF's intellectual influence and its political influence. Albert Thibaudet, who was cited above, wrote in 1932: "With all of its intellectual influence, *l'Action Française* cannot elect a senator or congressman, or a town councilor here in Paris, where the majority is on the right" (Leymarie 2006, p. 220). The assessment was accurate, as Daudet was elected congressman for Paris in 1919, but the 1924 elections ended in disaster. The difference between the AF and fascism was striking with regard to political action. The oft-mentioned "overthrow" was never seriously prepared in advance, and this was true from the pre-war period to the riot of 6 February 1934, which had little resemblance to a fascist coup d'état attempt. Moreover, the AF, which had served as a model league from the pre-war period to the 1920s, faced competition from other organizations that outrecruited it during the early 1930s (Jeunesses Patriotes, Solidarité française, Croix-de-Feu, etc.) (Dard 2011b). Within the AF itself, young activists were champing at the bit, some of whom left after 6 February, switching to French fascism.

A Historiography Undergoing Renewal

Long dominated by the work by Eugen Weber, the historiography on the AF and Maurras has been widely renewed in recent years. First, there has been an abundance of new academic research on the AF and Maurras, including studies on the history of the AF and the intellectuals gravitating around it (Morel 2013; Joly 2015). There has also been important collective academic research conducted between 2008 and 2012, primarily focusing on the relations between Maurrassisme, society and political life, as well as on the relations between Maurrassisme and culture, and between Maurrassisme and literature (Leymarie and Prevotat 2008; Dard et al. 2010; Leymarie et al. 2012). Finally, if we traditionally consider that the history of the AF ended in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War—if not in 1936—recent studies have focused on the history of the AF and Maurrassisme after 1945. This has been done from three starting points: figures such as Philippe Ariès (Gros 2008), Louis Salleron (Gros 2011) and Pierre Boutang (Giocanti 2016); movements (la Restauration nationale, Nouvelle Action française) and newspapers (Pierre Boutang's *Nation française*) (Louis 1955, 1994; Gautier 2002; Cucchetti 2011); and an even more novel study examining AF activism after 1945 (Cucchetti 2017).

This renewal of the national historiography of the AF went hand in hand with the emergence of a new field of research on Maurrassisme outside of France, in connection with notions of influence, networks, circulations and transfers. During the 1970s, various works were published in *Etudes maurrassiennes* (publication edited by Victor Nguyen) that focused on the relations between the AF and Italian fascism, and between the AF and Romania.[2] During the early 2000s, a collective work was published by Catherine Pomeyrols and Claude Hauser with contributions exploring French-speaking Canada and Switzerland, two foreign areas that were important in the history of Maurrassisme outside of France (Pomeyrols and Hauser 2001). In the late 2000s (2008–2011), in parallel to the conferences on the AF in France cited above, an important international research programme (DRFRIT) was conducted, in connection with the Maison des sciences de l'homme de Lorraine, on the international influence of the AF, and more broadly of French nationalism. Beyond Maurras (Dard and Grunewald 2009), the research emphasized the reception and influence of central AF figures as Bainville (Dard and Grunewald 2010) and Valois (Dard 2011b), but also Maurice Barrès, who despite not being a member of the AF and having serious divergences with it, nevertheless played a major role in the history of French and European nationalism (Dard et al. 2011).

The Action Française and Its Influence Outside France: Outlines for an Intersecting Chronology

The chronology of the history of AF influence in and especially outside of France is much more familiar today than it was 15 years ago. In France, the question of the AF's rise has been revisited, with its peak being dated around 1922–1923, and its decline beginning after the electoral failure of 1924, in other words before the condemnation of Rome. Yet what does AF influence denote? Firstly, it was much more cultural than strictly political. While the AF never stopped proclaiming the importance of "Politics first", its capacity to significantly impact this field was limited, despite the fact that the AF was a school for political training, with the term being understood here as a school of thought. This first assessment is joined by a second one relating to the sociology of Maurrassians. The future of AF militants (often engaged during their student years) rarely took the form of partisan political action or high-level administration. Still, the AF had networks in the army, as well as in a few liberal professions (lawyers, doctors), even

though the penetration of these circles should not be exaggerated. On the other hand, it had solid representation in literary, journalistic and editorial circles.

What of the influence of the AF outside of France? In order to assess its influence, three elements should be taken into account: its important moments, actors and meanings. This should be done for each of the countries discussed in the framework of this conference: Germany, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Romania in Europe, and Argentina outside of Europe. On a general level, it spanned over half a century from the 1910s to the late 1960s and did so in different contexts, with out-of-sync chronologies and modes of appropriation, in the form of varying political and cultural transfers. As a result, there is not *a* history but rather *multiple* histories of Maurrassisme outside of France, which can be connected to four key periods: the pre-1914 period, the immediate aftermath of the First World War, the condemnation of 1926 and its consequences and finally the post-1945 period.

The Pre-1914 Period

The first country in which the AF's international influence is attested is French-speaking Switzerland in 1908–1909, especially under the auspices of the brothers Cingria (Clavien 2009, p. 98). In Belgium, a "French-Belgian" group was created in Ghent (1910) and Brussels (1911). In view of the geographical area covered by this volume, Belgium was important in that it was a land of welcome for Portuguese monarchists exiled after the proclamation of the Republic in Portugal (1910). In this configuration, Belgium can be seen as a central hub for Maurrassisme on the European level. This is particularly true of the development of the Lusitanian integralism supported by Luis de Almeida Braga and Francisco Rolão Preto. These men did not have direct relations with Maurras and the AF at the time, although they read Maurras and *l'Action française* with great interest, but also from a critical point of view (Sardinha 2009, p. 282; Costa Pinto 2000, p. 11).

In Italy during the same period, Maurras was familiar to all nationalists. Was he simply "read, copied, and learned by heart", in Luigi Salvatorelli's well-known phrase? The situation was more complicated in reality. Maurras' influence on Enrico Corradini is indisputable, Maurras himself insisted on the AF's influence on Italian nationalism, particularly on the review *L'Idea Nazionale*. In addition, the debates at the nationalist

congress of Florence in 1910, which were largely about Maurras, should not be forgotten. While all Italian nationalists recognized the importance of Maurras' political thought, a few of them, such as the future fascist Alfredo Rocco, questioned whether the analyses of Maurras and the AF were adaptable to Italy. Rocco criticized "the nostalgia" that characterized the AF and called nationalism "conservative" and defensive, whereas Italian nationalism should be "expansive and aggressive" (cited in Musiedlak 2009, p. 161). This is an essential point, because a few years later during the time of fascism, Maurras was presented as a man of the past and French nationalism as an old nationalism (Musiedlak 2009). While Maurras was the best-known AF figure in Italy before 1914, the role of Georges Valois should not be neglected. Before 1914, Valois and his corporatist economic project, largely developed in his work *La monarchie et la classe ouvrière*, was diffused in Italy, notably by the monarchist Alberto Viana (Nacci 2011). However, the latter was not a major figure in Italian nationalism, which most probably explains why Valois did not have a larger following at the time.

Pre-1914 Spain has yet to be discussed. At the time, Maurras was only familiar and diffused in Catalonia, especially by the Catalonian movement "Renaixença", which brings to mind the famous Provençal movement of "Félibre" (González Cuevas 2009). Maurras was famous there as the defender of federalism and the Romanic school.

The Immediate Post-War Years

The AF supported the "sacred union" during the First World War, especially Raymond Poincaré (president of the Republic) and various presidents of the council, beginning with Georges Clemenceau upon his rise to power in 1917.

The AF considered a unified Germany to be a danger for peace in Europe and defended a programme for the dismemberment of the country. In the background, the AF made reference to the Treaty of Westphalia from 1648. It is important to grasp that the AF criticized the Treaty of Versailles—what Maurras called the "bad treaty"—because it preserved the unity of "eternal Germany" and with it the danger of a future war, which Bainville foresaw in his *Les conséquences politiques de la paix*.

The AF's positions against Germany brought it support outside of France, including among figures far removed from the Maurrassian political and intellectual world. In Germany itself, Walter Benjamin explained

to Gerhard Scholem in a letter dated 13 June 1924 why he had a subscription to the daily. He denounced the "incredibly fragile foundations of their [Maurrassians'] policies in so many domains, as well as with regard to essentials". Yet he believed that the "orientation" of the AF "ultimately appears to be the only one that allows for examining German politics without becoming half-witted" (Benjamin 1910, p. 320). In the early 1920s, the AF enjoyed considerable influence on this subject in two countries. AF influence was important in Belgium, and Eric Defoort has rightly stressed the importance of Jacques Bainville; his articles were published with great regularity, especially in Fernand Neuray's newspaper *Le XXème siècle*, which was the major daily of Belgian nationalism and was considered the "Belgian edition of *l'Action française*" (Defoort 1914, p. 129). At the same time, the AF's leaguer model was considered with interest by future leaders of 1930s Rexism, José Streel more so than Léon Degrelle.

Romania is another country where analyses of Germany found fertile ground. Before the war, Léon de Montesquiou (an important figure in Maurrassisme who died during the conflict) wrote an enthusiastic account of his travels in Romania entitled *Notes sur la Roumanie* (Montesquiou 1914). After 1918, and especially during the 1920s, Maurrassisme enjoyed a breakthrough in Romania. For Jacques Bainville, Romania was the "bastion of the East" (an expression he borrowed from the famous novel by Barrès regarding the Lorraine). As a result of its Latinity, this "bastion" was deemed essentially to be geopolitical, strategic and cultural.[3] As it had in Belgium, Maurrassisme found outlets in prominent newspapers (the Bucharest organ *Cuvântul*), and the AF fuelled public debate by sparking strong opposition in liberal and socialist circles, which believed that Romanian nationalist newspapers were copies of the Maurrassian press (Boisdron 2010).

The Condemnation of 1926 Seen from Abroad

The objective here is not to revisit the causes and stages of the papal condemnation that sparked so much controversy, but simply to point out its consequences, the primary one being that Catholics could no longer be members of AF formations or read its daily newspaper.[4] For Maurrassisme, the major problem resided in Catholic countries, beginning with Belgium, where the trial that led to the condemnation had initiated. Officially, it did not rattle the AF or Maurras, who considered the condemnation as being primarily political and responded in the same mode:

> French nationalism exports as well as and even better than the opposing doctrine, with no state support, no assistance from churches, no financial resources, and often while struggling against these various official forces.[5]

AF propaganda, especially its almanacs from 1928 and 1929, mobilized support abroad to report on its influence. Writers published articles and accounts delivering glowing opinions of the AF; in 1928, these included ones by Adrien de Meeüs (Belgium) along with certain Latin American figures, such as the Paris-based Peruvian sociologist Francisco García Calderón, or the Mexican historian Carlos Pereyra, who was based in Spain. The almanac published other authors the following year, including Eugenio d'Ors, *New Criterion* editor Thomas Stearns Eliot (Sutton 2009) and a "Bavarian priest".[6]

On the same register, the AF emphasized the role played by its correspondents and groups of "friends" abroad. In the early 1930s, the list included Europe (Great Britain, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland) as well as Argentina, Brazil and Canada.

Behind the facade of propaganda, the situation was more difficult than it seemed, as illustrated by the examples of Italy and Spain.

In Italy, the primary difficulty encountered by Maurras and the AF was less the condemnation than their relation to fascism. The five volumes of Maurras' *Dictionnaire politique et critique* are very instructive in this respect, in so far as they include an entry for Mussolini, but not one for Fascism. This was a logical choice considering Maurras' theoretical objections to fascism, whose "statism" he denounced in particular. These objections, however, did not prevent the AF leader from appreciating the Duce, as demonstrated by this text published in *l'Action française* on 18 July 1923:

> We have no difficulty in recognizing the great value of Mussolini's formulas, even though they are related to and even closely match those that the Action française has tirelessly been raising in the world for nearly a quarter of a century now. (Maurras 1933, p. 125)

The words used are instructive. On the one hand, they seem to support Ernst Nolte, who devoted the first volume of his trilogy, *Le fascisme dans son époque*, to *l'Action française* (Nolte 1970). However, close reading of Maurras shows that he interpreted Italian fascism in a personal manner by connecting it directly and almost exclusively to the Italian nationalism for which the AF served as the model:

> We did not have extensive contacts with fascism, but the nationalists were longstanding friends of our group. Beginning in 1905, their small review published in Florence, if I am not mistaken, *Il Regno*, The Kingdom, initiated relations based on Latin affinity and doctrinal sympathy with *l'Action française*, which at the time was a simple review appearing just twice per month. The Coppolas, Corradini, and Federzoni for a long time frequently paid us the great honor of commenting on us, and we responded with the cordial admiration due to the scope, intensity, and penetration of their research, as well as the lightning speed of their success.

It is also important to weigh the words used by Maurras when mentioning *L'Idea Nazionale* and its success prior to joining "Mussolini's Army". For instance, *L'Idea Nazionale* "provided, in addition to moral and political influence of the first order, a vocabulary, a method, and a general point of view on the country's political life, and made it available to the Dictator, who delved into it with both hands" (Maurras 1933, p. 125).

The result was a reading of the Duce's policies in this light: "All one must do to realize this is to read him, or to watch his actions". Or more precisely yet: "The realistic Italian organizer is touching on precisely those points where the realistic organization's theory was watching and waiting for him" (Maurras 1933, p. 124). The conclusion is clear for the reader: according to Maurras, Mussolini had made the AF's principles his own.

The favourable view of his influence proposed by Maurras is contestable to say the least. A first limitation is connected to the analysis he offers of the relation between himself and Italian nationalism, and between Italian nationalism and fascism. We emphasized earlier how the first term in his proposal was contradicted by the analyses of Didier Musiedlak as pertaining to the differences between the two nationalisms around 1910. Another element relates to the question of masses, and the consideration they were given. Didier Musiedlak has shown that Italian nationalism took this element into account. Things were entirely different at the AF (Dard 1900, pp. 30–34), which was primarily concerned with forging new intellectual elites driven by Maurrassian theories, but never seriously considered the need to create a nationally established organization that could penetrate different classes of society. What mattered at the AF was more the preparation of the newspaper and its diffusion, rather than becoming established regionally, which the league was never ultimately charged with doing.

A second limitation of the influence about which Maurras boasted involves his relation with the Duce, and particularly the importance the

latter gave to the AF. Mussolini considered Maurras as a "man of the past", and hardly referred to him, citing him only three times in the 35 volumes of his *Opera Omnia* (Musiedlak 2009, p. 165). Another instructive point involves the view of fascism proposed by Georges Valois, another AF figure who became the leading figure of French fascism. He also helped nurture the theories of Zeev Sternhell on the "revolutionary right" and the "French origins of fascism". Valois explained this in the early 1920s to Mussolini when he met him (which was not the case for Maurras or Bainville) (Musiedlak 2011).[7] The Duce met with Valois on 10 January 1924. Valois, who was presented by Malaparte, expressed his admiration for Mussolini, who expressed interest in Valois as a man who had understood the modernity of fascism, unlike Maurras. Yet when Valois attempted to explain that fascism had French origins, Mussolini refused to admit that the AF had been the cradle of fascism and responded to Valois: "I'm the one who put the baby in the cradle". Another difference between Mussolini and Valois involved corporatism and the role of the state. For the Duce, the revolutionary trade unionism defended by Valois belonged to the past, like the corporatism of De Ambris in Italy, which Valois knew well.

Spain represents a second leading example. Spanish figures that could have taken an interest in the AF were not particularly won over at the outset, looking more to Germany than France during the First World War. There were nevertheless exceptions, such as Azorín, who maintained relations with Maurras. That being said, the start of significant AF influence in Spain took place in 1931–1932, after the fall of the monarchy and the proclamation of the Republic. The *Acción Española* review was founded on 15 December 1931 by intellectuals influenced by Maurras, Ramiro de Maetzu in particular (González Cuevas 2009, pp. 244–54). The Catholic hierarchy marked its opposition to *Acción Española*, especially through the Catholic newspaper *El Debate*; it repeated all of the grievances addressed to the AF in 1926, beginning with a text published on 2 January 1932 and continuing with numerous articles in 1932. The objective is not to evoke at length the important debates fuelled by Maurrassisme in Spain around the *Acción Española*, which bring to mind the controversies that took place in Belgium between 1925 and 1927. Like José Streel, Maurras' Spanish admirers expressed their affinity. First among them was Eugenio Vegas Latapie, the founder of *Acción Española*. He presented Maurras as an author with whom he was "very familiar", and as a "scientific monarchist" whose work should contribute to the Spanish debate. Vegas published the first translation of *Enquête sur la monarchie* and used Maurrassian

theories to draft his proposed constitution (Vegas Latapie 1995, pp. 122, 142, 149, 279, 411, 461). In the same vein, *Acción Española* and its publisher, "cultura española", published Maurrassian authors, especially the historians Jacques Bainville and Pierre Gaxotte.[8]

The Maurras' influence developed during the late 1930s. During the civil war, Maurras and the AF clearly chose the national camp. At the same period in France, Maurras was convicted and imprisoned (the Front populaire was in power in France). During his detention at la Santé prison in 1936–1937, Maurras received many letters and telegrams, notably from Spain.[9] When he was elected to l'Académie française, his foreign supporters (especially Spanish ones, such as the Duque de Alba) publicly expressed their satisfaction. In May 1938, Maurras travelled to Spain and was presented to the national camp as the "ambassador of the authentic France". Franco met with him and named him as the correspondent of various academies (González Cuevas 2009, p. 256). The removal of the newspaper from the Index on 15 July 1939 closed the cycle that had begun in 1926, but less than two months later came the outbreak of the Second World War.

War and Post-War

Maurrassians were divided during the war. The daily and Maurras himself were "*pétainistes*". Others (de Bénouville or Rémy) joined de Gaulle or Giraud (Boutang). The Maurrassians of *Je suis partout* [I am everywhere] ended up pursuing a collaborationist policy. Finally, the use that the Nazis made of Bainville should also be noted (Grunewald 1930).

In the face of Germany and Nazism, the "official" AF did not change its point of view, and Maurras continued his idea of "France alone", an increasingly untenable position as the war unfolded. At the same time, Maurras remained a reference outside of France, notably in Switzerland, where he published various books, and in French Canada. Everything changed in 1944–1945. Maurras was convicted for "passing intelligence to the enemy", a penalty he would refuse by incessantly proclaiming his long-standing opposition to Germany, although the mark of infamy left by the decision helped break his influence in democratic countries (Belgium, Switzerland, French-speaking Canada).

The influence of the AF nevertheless remained strong in the Iberian Peninsula. Maurras was defended in Spain, especially by Eugenio d'Ors. The stenographic transcript of his trial was translated into Spanish in 1946 (Maurras 1946), while upon his death in 1952 *ABC* paid him homage and a

street was named after him in Madrid. The question of generations should be taken into account in Spain's relation to maurrassism, as should his adaptability to the transformations of Spanish society. As the years passed, Maurras' influence grew smaller in traditionalist circles, especially with the review *Arbor* (Rafael Calvo Serer) and among monarchists (Luis María Anson Oliart, de Juventud Monárquica). From the 1970s onwards, Maurras can no longer be considered as a reference for the Spanish right, with the exception of reviews such as *Verbo* and *Fuerza Nueva*.

Portugal's situation is also instructive. Salazar served as a reference for the AF since the 1930s, especially for Maurras and Henri Massis, who met Salazar, as he recorded at length in his work *Chefs*. After 1945, Massis met Salazar on a number of occasions to both give laudatory messages from Maurras ("*Tenez, Tenez*!" [Here, here!]) and to conduct interviews, which would appear in his *Salazar face à face* (Massis 1961). For Portugal, another important element was the presence of Frenchmen who settled there for the long term (Colonel Rémy) or were exiled there, such as Jacques Ploncard d'Assac, who lived there from 1947 to 1974. Ploncard translated Maurras into Portuguese (Maurras 1960) and played an essential part in Salazarist propaganda intended for France during the 1960s. Ploncard considered Salazar to be the defender of the West (Dard 2010, pp. 423–27). The influence of Maurras and the AF on Salazar was not as substantial as French Maurrassians thought, although research conducted on Salazar's correspondence has shown the importance of Maurrassians among his French correspondents, whether they were supporters of Vichy (Ploncard) or of de Gaulle (Rémy, Bénouville). Salazar was a model for Maurrassians until the end. During the Caetano government, his speeches were published in French with a laudatory introduction by Michel Déon, a declared admirer of Salazar (Dard and Sardinha-Desvignes 2018).

There remains South America (Compagnon 2009) and Argentina in particular. In the late 1940s, Maurras took interest in Argentina. There had been Maurrassian networks there since the interwar period: the Irazusta brothers, *La Nueva República* (Devoto 2002, pp. 177–79, 201–4) and later Zuleta Álvarez (Cucchetti 2012). The panorama broadened after the Second World War with new figures such as the priest Julio Meinvielle, and new reviews such as *Dinámica social*, which gave much importance to Maurras, and devoted a special issue to him upon his death (notably with contributions from Julio Irazusta and Alberto Falcionelli) (Cucchetti 2013, pp. 203–4). Maurras' different books were translated and published during the 1960s (*L'Ordre et le désordre*. *Les idées positives et la Révolution* and

L'avenir de l'intelligence). The "Argentine Maurras" of the 1960s must, however, be placed in a particular context: a religious context marked by traditionalist and fundamentalist Catholicism (e.g. la Cité catholique), as well as the fight against subversion.

Conclusion

Examining the history of the AF from a transnational perspective oriented towards the regimes and countries studied in this volume calls for emphasizing various elements. The first relates to the different chronology between the French and other cases: context and national scale play an essential role here. Second, the Maurrassisme of foreigners was hardly a copy of the French model. There were cultural and political transfers that reveal a variety of temporalities, templates, drivers and forms of appropriation. The major markers of a transnational Maurrassisme can nonetheless be identified: regionalism, federalism, classicism aesthetics, monarchism and traditionalism. The present challenge is to provide a name for this overall series, which can be likened to a conservative revolution or radical conservatism.

Notes

1. Le dilemme de Marc Sangnier was published in 1906. See Maurras (1921).
2. *Etudes maurrassiennes*, no. 2 (1973, pp. 83–96), discusses the case of Italian (Gérard Gaudin) and Romanian (Pierre Gourinard) fascism.
3. "En Roumanie", *L'Action française*, 10 October 1927, reprinted in Bainville (1937, p. 207).
4. Prévotat (2001, p. 503). According to him the league had 30,000 members in the fall of 1927.
5. Maurras Charles, *L'Action française*, June 7 1927.
6. Vaulx, Bernard de. "La pensée de Charles Maurras hors de France". *Almanach de l'Action française* (1929): 263–74 (Paris).
7. See also the account given by Valois in L'homme contre l'argent (Valois 2012, pp. 109–10). The first edition appeared in 1928 in the Valois bookstore when he broke with his fascist orientation.
8. The influence of Bainville as a historian was important in Portugal at the time, especially on João Ameal (Sardinha-Desvignes 2010).
9. See the *Almanac* for 1937 ("Pour avoir sauvé la paix, Charles Maurras est en prison", p. 35).

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CHAPTER 3

"Fellow Travelers": The History and Evolution of the Relationship Between the Nationalists and the Fascists

Lorenzo Benadusi

Most of the existing research on Italian nationalism is focused on the period before the First World War and reconstructs the various phases that led to the foundation of the Italian Nationalist Association (ANI) and the eventual introduction of a large-scale political and cultural proposal.[1]

Indeed, even though ANI never had more than a relatively small following and only ever reached limited consensus, it succeeded in creating a cultural background imbued with strong patriotic values and sentiments, which made it easy for a large part of the population to feel linked to its project, not so much in terms of a political affiliation as by a more generic cultural and moral bond. As Lucia Strappini observed, "it did not act so much on a directly political level but rather on a cultural ideological level, and only from this mediation did it gain political force" (Strappini 1970, p. 12).

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Such undervaluation of the political role of the nationalists is one of the reasons why the idea of fascism as nothing more than the armed hand of nationalist doctrine, introduced by Luigi Salvatorelli immediately following the March on Rome, was accepted without contestation and the evolution of the relationship between the two movements has never been examined in depth (Salvatorelli 1923).[2]

Moreover, the large body of historiography on the post-war period and the failure of liberalism are mostly concentrated on the socialists and the fascists. In describing this period, as simply a red biennium followed by a black biennium, we risk leaving out other colours which are present on the Italian political scene, such as the light blue of the nationalists, the grey-green of the ex-combatants and more generally the tricolour (Fincardi 2008): a vast category which includes veterans and war wounded groups; civic, professional and student associations; patriotic and voluntary work organizations; cultural and local associations; anti-socialist and anti-Bolshevik leagues; national defence; and futurist political fasces. These groups shared an interest in protecting the war from its denigrators and the objective of forming a political organism capable of giving voice to their ideals.

The nationalists (the blues), who had already positioned themselves to assume a central role before the war, represented one possible path for uniting these various forces. After putting themselves at the head of the interventionist movement, they were then seeking to extend their political space and to establish themselves as the new leading force of the right (Roccucci 2001, p. 231). An analysis of their association helps us better understand both the final outcome of their movement and the origins of fascism. In fact, the descending parabola of the nationalists coincides perfectly with the increasing parabola of the fascists, which is one of the reasons why both of the movements chose to use the metaphor of passing the torch when describing their relationship with each other. This comparison helped them to emphasize the continuity between the Italian Nationalist Association (ANI) and the National Fascist Party): the nationalists were perceived as spiritual fathers of fascism, while the fascists were becoming their legitimate successors: their little sons.[3] From this point of view, the First World War represents a break between the two different ways of understanding and making politics: the elitism of the nationalists, who were willing to create a strong State in order to maintain the existing order and to discipline the masses, national mass patriotism of the fascists, who were willing to mobilize the masses in order to destroy the Liberal State. In large part, the failure of the nationalists' can be tied to the way in which they chose to

re-elaborate the war and to interpret ongoing changes in Italian society and the national political system. At first glance, the war seemed to represent the triumph of nationalism. Having fought in and won the war, in many ways the nationalists should have been the ones to reap the fruits of victory. Moreover, the war helped them reach many of their goals such as defeating Austria, strengthening the army and the heavy industry, weakening parliament, highlighting the authoritarian features of the State, putting an end to the Giolittian age, giving the country an important role in international politics, and spreading patriotism. Therefore, the war became a symbolic resource that was used by the nationalists to legitimize themselves in the eyes of the country and to present themselves as the only movement able to express the national will.

The Rider's Dilemma

In Corradini's vision, the war had brought the productive bourgeoisie and the fighting people to the fore (Corradini 1918, 1923), but after the victory there was the risk that the internal enemy could weaken the foundations of the State.[4] By denying the war the socialists had also denied the nation, which, thanks to the victory, had established the prerequisites for defeating its enemies.

And while the 1919 elections showed the success of the two parties who had opposed intervention, the Catholics and the Socialists, the 1921 elections would define a transition from 20 years of socialism to 20 of nationalism (10 nationalistic and 35 fascist deputies were elected in 1921).[5] As such, it was fundamental to collaborate with Mussolini's movement, the avant-garde movement of a new Italy, which seemed to be finally carrying out the teachings of the nationalist ideology. In doing so, Corradini would become a precursor of fascism as well as a founder of an entire mythological apparatus that in the post-war period would be reused and transformed into a religion of the fatherland. In other words, Corradini's dream seemed to have finally found its political solution. Corradini himself was deeply satisfied with such outcome:

> If before the war or after the war someone had told you that a "party of the masses", a party with its patriotic myths, national myths, the mythology of Italian victory and greatness would rise in Italy; if someone had made such an announcement, would you have believed it? No. You would never have believed it. Socialism seemed to have a monopoly on the

> "party of the masses", patriotism was considered a part of medieval remains, and Nationalism was merely a fairy tale told by few madmen.[6]

Fascism, therefore, was considered the ultimate consequence of nationalism and the fulfilment of nationalistic ideology.

Just as the idea that national-fascism was a united and completely cohesive phenomenon is unconvincing, in fact fascism was able to make use of notions introduced by other movements, such as unionism, futurism, arditism and combattentism. As Emilio Gentile rightly claims, fascist culture and ideology were not totally inspired by nationalist doctrine that remained only one of its components, and the nationalists always maintained an autonomous position as "fellow travelers" who were used by fascism and who, in turn, tried to use it (Gentile 2005, p. 332). It is also reductive to describe the relationship between nationalism and fascism as one between thought and action. The idea of fascism ideologically capturing nationalism is incorrect, because, if anything, it is fascism that ideologically captured nationalism. In my opinion, it would be more precise to describe the relationship between the two movements in terms of contamination and hybridization and not in terms of capturing, even though the ideological differences and tensions between the two visions, authoritarian on the one hand and totalitarian on the other hand, remained evident even after the fusion of the two parties in March 1923. Both parties were struggling for supremacy over each other and for the position of the coalition leader.

The rider's dilemma sums up the relationship between nationalism and fascism, since both movements were eager to undertake the role of the rider and not that of the horse, although it was becoming progressively more evident who would be the one to take the reins.

The hegemonic role of fascism became obvious after the March on Rome. As we have seen, Corradini himself bitterly admitted that, while he was the leader of an army of generals without soldiers, a nationalist party of masses had finally been born. Moreover, considering the importance that the figure of the Duce was obtaining, Corradini was starting to realize the possible risks of a personal (and not national) dictatorship and the risks connected with the tendency of fascism to put its ideas before the nation, while what was needed was "less Fascism and more Italy, less Party and more Nation, less Revolution and more Constitution" (quoted in Federzoni 1967, p. 17). In other words, the intention was to nationalize fascism but prevent the fascistization of the nation. But, as Emilio Gentile

observes, "most of Corradini's doubts and expressions of dissent remained personal thoughts and only rarely, and very cautiously, were they heard in public. Therefore, they did not in any way slow down or prevent the totalitarian fascistization of the Nation" (Gentile 2009, p. 155).

Even at the time of his death in 1931, Corradini's role as prophetic forerunner of fascism was highlighted.[7] Therefore, fascism was perceived as the final result of nationalism and the realization of all of its ideals. Such a vision was meant to attenuate the revolutionary impact of Mussolini's regime and to connect it with the Risorgimento process and the history of Italy. By commemorating Corradini, the nationalists were trying to re-establish themselves as fascism's predecessors and to define fascism as the "final result of a process that has long been present in the conscience and will of a Man, who seemed to have embodied, in his persona alone, the conscience and will of the entire race".[8]

Fascism Moves Towards Nationalism and Vice Versa: Alfredo Rocco's Political Proposal

The relationship between revolution and restoration was at the heart of Alfredo Rocco's reflections on the effects of the First World War.

Rocco's role nationalist activity, and especially the fundamental role he played beginning with the congress in Milan in 1914, has been largely examined (Ungari 1974; D'Alfonso 2004; Battente 2005; Gentile; Lanchester and Tarquini 2010; Simone 2012). His biographers have also analyzed the difficult interlude in his activities during the war, a break that was connected with the disorientation caused by the loss of Rocco's main political points of reference: the conservatives and the Catholics had both come out against the war. Nevertheless, Rocco immediately grasped some particular aspects of the war, namely the fact that, since the conflict involved not merely the armies but entire nations, it would have been long and destructive and would represent a battle between entire nations, races and empires. Rocco's visionary realism allowed him to identify the roots of the escalating ideological conflict between authoritarianism and democracy, between nationalism and imperialism. And in doing so, Rocco foresaw the climate of civil war which would engulf Europe between the two wars.

Giovanni's Gentile's reflections on the post-victory phase demonstrated how involved Rocco was in defining the new program, the *Manifesto* of *Politica*, which became so crucial for defining nationalism's major objectives. For him, the war put an end to liberalism and caused a juxtaposition

between the forces of the war and revolution, leading to an inevitable collision between nationalism and socialism. On the one hand, the idea of saving the national honour in order to restore a healthy, even dictatorial State, and, on the other, the revolution as a means of realizing communism and following Russia's example.[9] Herein lie the reasons why both the nationalists and the socialists were defeated by the fascists, the only movement capable of combining nation and revolution. Revolutionary ideas were of course present among the nationalists as well who—especially on the occasion of D'Annunzio's Fiume exploit—were planning an armed move aimed at conquering Rome and taking power.

The first attempt to convince D'Annunzio to undertake a military coup was made in October 1919. The idea was to organize a march on Trieste, since, as Rocco recalls, "we were convinced that the occupation of Trieste would have caused a collapse in Rome. The Commander seemed to be convinced and decided to take action. I cannot explain why nothing happened in the end".[10] A year later another persuasion attempt failed, since at the last minute D'Annunzio "hesitated" and the possibility of action disappeared with the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo.[11]

However, the objective of the nationalists was the restoration of authority, not the totalitarian transformation of state and society. According to Rocco, fascism managed to abandon its pseudo-revolutionary aspects thanks precisely to the beneficial impact of nationalism.[12]

As we can see, the "legend" of the fascist revolution was an invention used by both the black shirts and their antagonists: the black shirts wanted to seem "heroes, super humans, gods", while their enemies used it in order to convince the country that what had happened was "an overturning, a revolt", and not an actual revolution.[13] However, according to Vittorio Cian, the revolution actually took place, even though the fascists tried to avoid it. For him, the revolution had been carried out through the martyrdom "of the young and generous who had sacrificed themselves".[14] At the end of the war, many Ulysses(es) set off on Odysseys in search of their home: the fatherland that had been besieged by the Bolsheviks. However, the counterrevolution aimed at fighting those enemies was not carried out by the generation of Ulysses (nationalists), but rather by that of Telemachus (fascists) who, being "too young to participate in the war", were ready to confront "those who deny the victory".[15]

For the nationalists, who were the first ones to understand a new political role of the young (Papadia 2015), the generation gap was quite evident. In his speech, Rocco was calling the young to get together right after

the war.[16] Young people and veterans were meant to become nationalists' main audience, but the ANI's attempt to engage returning veterans was not successful. With the support of the officials but not of the soldiers, the Nationalists were not able to create a strong connection with the veteran organizations (Benadusi 2016). Moreover, not all of the ex-soldier's requests could have been accepted. Proposals such as a constituent assembly and universal disarmament were completely in contrast with the nationalists' program, aimed at maintaining the war conditions during peacetime. Moreover, as Roberto Vivarelli notes, for the nationalists "war politics first of all meant authoritative politics": the nation's militarization was meant to put an end to parliamentarism.[17] The paramilitary blue shirts organization was a clear example of both the regimentation of political participation and the growing contrast between a friend and an enemy which had taken root during the conflict. However, the Nationalist Militia: the *Sempre Pronti per la Patria e per il Re* (Always Ready for King and Country) still didn't have the violent and revolutionary features inherent to *squadrismo*. On the contrary, their intention was to protect the monarchy and institutions from attacks, including the actions of young fascists, for example, on the occasion of the March on Rome (Paolucci di Valmaggiore 1952, pp. 295–96; Cuzzi 2003). Collisions between the black shirts and the blue shirts which, especially in the South,[18] were frequent, show how despite the success of fascism (the number of party members grew from 20,000 to 187,000 between the 1 of January and the 30 of May 1921), nationalism was still getting support from the patriotic bourgeoisie.

One notices this in the boom of new nationalistic groups that appeared in the south in 1922. Simona Colarizi claims that between the summer months and the March on Rome more than 250 new sections of ANI were born, 124 in the Center-North and 126 in the South. In general, at the end of 1922, ANI had around 20 weekly magazines, 23 provincial offices and more than 1500 sections. There were more than 55,000 registered members at the end of 1921 (the members of the National Association of Railway Workers alone counted 30,000 members), while there were around 800,000 members of the *Sempre pronti* (Roccucci 2001, p. 529). As Giovanni Preziosi put it, "everything that could not be fascism tended to become nationalism".[19] One could also add that all the groups that were not willing to completely embrace the fascist party because of their hostility towards the excessive revolutionary features of *squadrismo* tended to become nationalist. In any case, thanks to Mussolini, fascism was succeeding in expanding its electorate, from the city to the countryside, from

industrial to agricultural zones, from the bourgeois to the working-class. Nationalism and anti-socialism were the two strongest political instruments for mobilizing the masses.

From this point of view, Rocco's political proposal was quite different from that of fascism. Rocco's response to the crisis of the Liberal State consisted in establishing a form of absolutist state, based on the principles of authority and on an illiberal juridical system. His model was meant to increase the force of the state in order to control and discipline the masses, facilitating their subordination and not their participation. However, as Emilio Gentile legitimately claims, the political game in the post-war period was based on the concept of consensus, not on the idea of repression (Gentile 1999, p. 197). Though nationalists had realized the importance of all of that, they never managed to break their ties with the elite and the conceptual frameworks of the nineteenth century. The result was a complicated coexistence of the old and the new, in which the incentives for political modernization were constantly in confrontation with traditional models. Therefore, nationalists were living a border experience: intolerant to the margins which contained the old right elite, they still found themselves linked to this category by family, cultural, political and electoral ties. They were attracted to, but at the same time scared by the new scenario of mass politics. This ambivalence was one of the most important characteristics of the nationalists, who would see themselves overcome by fascism in its appeal to the people. This ambiguity between the old and the new was used by both the fascists and the nationalists, in order to emphasize the differences between an aristocratic movement and a democratic one, a conservatory movement and a revolutionary one, between a movement defending God, fatherland and family and a movement aimed at creating new values. While the nationalists saw the demagogic populism of the fascists as an annoying form of revolutionary romanticism that should be abandoned in favour of "order and classicism",[20] according to the fascists, nationalism was nothing more than a "melancholic" movement, an expression of the "petty bourgeoisie, which was conservative in the name of its own interests and was reactionary by nature".[21] "The inevitable identification", as Rocco defined it,[22] between the two movements did not cancel the differences between them and forced the nationalists to choose between either "remaining a solitary group of aristocrats representing old traditional economic and political institutions or beginning to consider the Italian problem as one of educating the masses, who despite their errors, prejudices and excesses, had become an integral part of politics which aimed at

conquering the State".[23] The final decision was made in 1921. After Tomaso Monicelli stopped being a director of *L'Idea Nazionale*, the nationalists "completely lost the specificity that used to distinguish them from fascism and as a result their independence and the possibility to promote other options" (D'Alterio 2017, p. 341). Starting in November 1921, after the *Congresso dell'Augusteo*, with its turn to the right and the abandonment of a reconciliatory effort (*Patto di Pacificazione*) with the socialists, fascism moved closer towards the positions of nationalism, making it clear, however, that the nationalists would be the ones to assume their position and not vice versa (De Felice 1995, pp. 193–97). It was clear at that point that the success of the Mussolini's movement would inevitably influence the choices of the ANI and would force it to scale down its dreams of leadership.

Fascism was able to engage more segments of the population, by giving a voice to social classes which had only previously been addressed by the socialists. It mobilized these classes not by inviting them to protect the status quo, but by giving them the possibility to subvert the existing political and social order. In addition, fascism proved that the masses could be engaged by skilfully using their irrationality in order to create active and faithful militants and not simply passive and obedient subjects. From this point of view, Mussolini was using the same political content as the nationalists'. By changing the style, he was able to reach those individuals who would never have been able to accept the language of Rocco and Corradini. People who were happy to agree with the same political agenda, when reviewed, corrected and presented in a more pleasant and attractive way (Vivarelli 2012, p. 305). By doing so, the fascists got the result that Rocco had envisioned: nationalism as a way of thinking was now used by those who were capable of putting it into action. Mussolini reaffirmed this idea in his preface to Rocco's writings: "From the moment of its establishment fascism has always been beyond other schools. Fascism uses the vital elements of each movement and rejects the rest. […] Many of the nationalists have realized from the very beginning that Fascism is the future, especially because Fascism does not debate, Fascism fights: action, conflict and punishment are at the heart of its propaganda" (Mussolini 1938, p. VIII).

Nationalism as an Internal Current of Fascism

Apart from its adoption of many of the mythological and ideological foundations of nationalism, fascism also drew from the nationalist political body in order to fill its foremost technical roles. The nationalists had a politically prepared intellectual elite, with the support of the industrial world, vast areas of Italian culture, the monarchy, and military and religious spheres. Mussolini himself resorted to the nationalists in an instrumental way in order to contain the *squadrismo* and the more intransigent fascists. Even after the merger, the nationalists tried to maintain their independence within the National Fascist Party. It is worth remember that those ex-members of ANI who had been very critical of the merging of the two parties, tried at all costs to protect its individual qualities within the PNF and even believed that "calling themselves fascists was humiliating".[24] The nationalists maintained a sense of superiority due to the feeling of being the older group with a stronger and more coherent ideological baggage. As Franco Gaeta observes, they felt *maîtres à penser* of fascism: "chefs among amateur cooks" (Gaeta 1965, p. 481). The idea of obtaining hegemony over the forces of the right and by doing this fulfilling Rocco's intention to become "soul and life" of the coalition that would become a big and united "national party" was still strong.[25] The opportunity was lost just hours before the March on Rome,[26] and soon again after, during the Matteotti crisis, when Federzoni's nomination as a minister seemed to present the possibility of creating an accord with the liberals which consisted in "imposing on Mussolini the choice of resignation or the liquidation of the fascist movement". And if he had chosen the latter alternative, his fall would have been imminent (Lyttelton 2004, p. 221). Federzoni could also count on "the goodwill of those who had wrongly or rightly seen fascism as a means of restoring order and a sense of national pride" and "still considered him to be a representative of the nationalist current" (Federzoni 1967, p. 91).

During the agitated moments of late December (1924), there seemed to be a convergence between the nationalists and the liberals that would result in a government with Federzoni and Salandra at the head, the first steps towards the liberal right opposition. On the 30th of December, Federzoni promised Alessandro Casati that he was ready to set a crisis of government into action, but after a discussion with Mussolini he changed his mind and accepted the role of firefighter, with the task of stopping liberal ministers from resigning (Mazzei 2018, pp. 198–200).[27] The reasons for the failure

of this alternative scenario to fascism are not very clear: it is quite possible that the disagreement between Federzoni and Salandra about who was supposed to become the Prime Minister contributed to the failure. Another possible reason could have been tied to Federzoni's fear of possible retaliations from the intransigent wing fascism. Its failure could also simply be tied to the intention to postpone the manoeuvre while waiting on the full support of the monarchy.[28] On the 31 December, *L'Idea Nazionale* stated its support of the government, reaffirming that it was Mussolini's duty to remain in place.[29] From that point and until at least 1927, the Interior Minister Federzoni was used as an instrument aimed at intensifying the repression of the opposition, taming *squadrismo* and fostering the normalization of fascism, by placing the State before the party. In that situation, Federzoni was progressively more isolated and opposed by Farinacci's wing of the part. Nevertheless, after Matteotti's murder, Federzoni and Rocco were able to impress on the new regime their view that the State, not the Fascist Party, should be "the primary engine of political and social action" (De Grand 1978, p. 173).

As we can see, the group of ex-nationalists continued to implicitly maintain their main qualities (Simone 2013). The police considered the nationalists a sort of "inner movement", while "the fascists of the first hour" saw them as "snakes" in the heart of the party, as a foreign body that at all costs was trying to "secure the most important places for themselves".[30] The conflict exploded in 1927 when the heads on the National Fascist Party decided to establish the date of the nationalists' registration in the fascist party based on the date when the two movements merged, even though, according to the agreement made in 1923, the nationalists had the full right to be considered as equals to the 1919 fascists.[31]

Their significant influence in the rising regime is very clear from the political appointments of ex-nationalists and especially from the fundamental role that Federzoni and Rocco had in creating the ultra-fascist laws and the structure of the fascist State. In general, the nationalists made a crucial contribution to the fascistization of institutions, culture, school and society. After all, as Luigi Russo bitterly mentions in his dialogue with Adolfo Omodeo, even among the great plurality of factions within the regime, the bourbon and "out of date" nationalists, in 1920s Italy, still represented the only real power. As such, nationalism was one of the most important components of fascism, both for its participation in forming the regime and its particular vision of fascism. Leading personalities such as Rocco and Federzoni continued to have significant tasks at least until 1929, when

Mussolini showed his determination not to allow any stable governing elite to crystallize. "After Corradini's death in 1931 and Rocco's death four years later, Federzoni remained the real leader of the ex-nationalists" (Parlato 2016, p. 240). After serving as Interior Minister and Minister of the Colonies, Federzoni became president of the Senate and President of the Italian Academy, just to name the most important roles he had (Vittoria 2001). As Donatello Aramini rightly observed (Aramini 2006, pp. 336–76), the ex-nationalists had clearly softened their attitude of the "party inside the party", acting as "a conventicle, a sect, some sort of a Masonry".[32] With the deterioration of the existing compromise between the monarchy and the fascism, the condemnation of Action Française and the signing of the Lateran Pacts, the political role, clerical and conservative, of the nationalists were significantly reduced. This is very clear from the plebiscite in 1929, in which only 24 members out of 400 deputies were nationalists. Moreover, at that point the nationalists stopped being part of the Directory (*Direttorio*) of the National Fascist Party until 1943, except for Iti Bacci who was the vice-secretary when Giuriati was secretary, nor did they directly hold positions in the Provincial Fascist Federations. The ministerial positions assigned to the nationalists had diminished as well as the nationalists' presence in the Grand Council (*Gran Consiglio del Fascismo*).

The influence at that point was mostly connected to the world of culture, education and information and not to the world of politics. Even though *L'Idea Nazionale* had been closed, *La Tribuna* still remained a truly and exclusively nationalist newspaper, both from the point of view of its contents and authors. The same could be said about the weekly magazine *Roma Fascista* that proudly created a platform for the voices of "fascism's *enfants terribles*".[33] As the report from 27 October 1933 claimed, "the original ideas of the nationalists' had not been forgotten, since their adhesion to Fascism was subordinate to maintaining the old reactionary ideas inherited from Idea Nazionale".[34] The magazine *Politica*, most of whose collaborators were part of the original group of nationalists, also acted as the uncontested domain of Francesco Coppola. And as a result of Federzoni's direction, above all the prestigious magazine *Nuova Antologia* became a point of reference for the nationalist thought (Baldini 2017).

Similar to how it used to be in the past, the fascists' mistrust was growing. Federzoni was considered a cunning conspirator, capable of using his power in order to influence the regime's most important decisions. In the report directed by the Socialist Party to Mussolini on the 25 of January 1931, Federzoni and his "faithful executor" Guglielmotti were accused of

pulling "mysterious strings in order to cause quarrels, sow disaccord, push men into strategic positions, […] actions aimed at obtaining the monopoly in the 'Urbe' and in the party's direction".[35] In 1932, Rocco was dismissed from his ministerial position, but then immediately appointed Dean of the Università La Sapienza in Rome. Numerous ex-nationalists were the heads of fascist institutes of cultures and other important cultural institutions: Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, Dante Alighieri, Società Italiana Autori ed Editori, Società Geografica Italiana, just to cite the most important examples. Maraviglia was the head of the Press and Propaganda Office, Alfieri was the head of the Minculpop, Guglielmotti was the head of the national fascist union of journalists, while Forges Davanzati, with his radio broadcast *Cronache del regime*, embodied the demoniac fanaticism of the militant intellectual. Their long journey through fascism continued up until Mussolini's fall, having reached the end of the road, the nationalists returned to reassert their original differences, leading to a retrospective cancellation of the course that had been done together with the fascists (Parlato 2001, pp. 229–50).

Notes

1. Among the most recent contributions see Pomoni (1998), Roccucci (2001), Rainero (2003), Papadia (2006), Mazzei (2015), and Salvatori (2016).
2. Salvatorelli stressed the relationship between the type of nationalism that dominated the mentality of a so-called humanistic petty bourgeoisie and fascist ideology.
3. A. Musatti. "Il nostro figliolo", in *L'Idea Nazionale*, 27 November 1921.
4. Corradini, "La distruzione della vittoria", 19 February 1920, in Corradini (1925b, p. 404).
5. Ibid., "Le elezioni della vittoria", 11 May 1921, in Corradini (1924, pp. 112–19).
6. Ibid., speech that took place in Florence on the 8th of February 1925, in Corradini (1925a, pp. 3–4).
7. The book on Corradini was part of the series "I prefascisti", see D'Andrea (1928).
8. F. Ercole, "Il pensiero e l'opera di Enrico Corradini", in *Educazione Fascista*, no. 3 (1932): 195.
9. A. Tamaro, "La necessità della dittatura", in *Politica*, no. 2 (1920): 67–83.
10. A. Rocco, "Gli antecedenti, lo spirito, le date della marcia su Roma", in *L'Idea Nazionale*, 28 October 1923.

11. See Giuriati (1954), Chiarini (2003), Staderini (1983), and Ungari (1998). On the attempt of military uprising of the Pietralata Fort on 6 and 7 July 1919, see Roccucci (2001, pp. 377–78).
12. A. Rocco, "Il fascismo e il nazionalismo", in *L'Idea Nazionale*, 6 January 1922.
13. M. Pantaleoni, "Finanza fascista", in *L'Idea Nazionale*, 6 July 1923.
14. V. Cian, "Rivoluzione fascista? Lettera aperta all'on. Maffeo Pantaleoni", in *L'Idea Nazionale*, 15 July 1923. On the revolutionary value of the March on Rome see L'errore fondamentale, in *L'Idea Nazionale*, 26 April 1924.
15. E. Bodrero, "Il poema della controrivoluzione", in *L'Idea Nazionale*, 28 July 1923.
16. A. Rocco, *Il dovere dei giovani* (pamphlet of 1919), in Rocco (1938, p. 527).
17. R. Vivarelli (2012, p. 133). According to Vivarelli, "the ideology of nationalism was nothing but idealization of the State of war and justification of all the forces and reactionary interests that establish themselves and flourish in that State" (ibid., p. 291).
18. On the armed conflicts between the nationalists and the fascists, see Mancini (2002, pp. 365–70), Bernabei (1975, pp. 19–21), Colarizi (1977, pp. 170–74), Baris (2007, pp. 16–18), Miccichè (1977, pp. 139), Staderini (2014, pp. 34–36), Ponziani (1988).
19. Il Giornale d'Italia, 31 December 1922.
20. L. Coletti, "Verso una fusione del nazionalismo con il fascismo", in *L'Idea Nazionale*, 9 December 1921.
21. Missiroli (1924, p. 301); see also Bottai, "Noi e il nazionalismo", 2 February 1921, in *Pagine di critica fascista* (1941, pp. 167–71). The PNF's secretary Michele Bianchi who considered Corradini "his black beast", was hoping for "the conflict between fascism and the reactionary nationalists" (see Rocca 1952, p. 83).
22. A. Rocco, "Il fascismo verso il nazionalismo", in *L'Idea Nazionale*, 6 January 1922. On Rocco's idea of fascism as a national, instinctive and mass movement, based on action more than on thinking, see ibid., "Nazionalismo e fascismo", in *L'Idea Nazionale*, 25 February 1923.
23. D. Grandi, "Per intenderci", in *Il Popolo d'Italia*, 2 February 1922; see also S. Galli, "In tema di pregiudiziali", in *Il Popolo d'Italia*, 27 January 1921.
24. ACS, MI, DGPS, DPP, fascicoli per materia, b. 102, fasc. 9, "Nazionalisti", informativa confidenziale del 3 October 1928.
25. A. Rocco, "Programma politico nazionale", speech made at the Augusteo on the 11th of May 1921, in Rocco (1938, vol. II, p. 648).
26. The nationalists tried up to the end to convince Mussolini to accept the government headed by Salandra (Mussolini would be the Minister of the Interior and Federzoni—the Minister of Foreign Affairs). For this purpose,

Corradini even started imagining a possible transfer of power between Vittorio Emanuele III and the Duke of Aosta.

27. The confirmation of that manoeuvre was given by Tomaso Monicelli, who was proposing on the pages of Resto del Carlino to substitute Mussolini with Federzoni, an action aimed at "slowly undermining il duce", as also Anna Kuliscioff reported to Turati (Turati and Kuliscioff 1959, p. 209).
28. In his memoirs Federzoni claims that the so-called coup on the 3 of January 1924 was mostly against himself and in favor of Farinacci (Federzoni 1967, p. 99). In the aftermath of the turn on the 3 January Corradini was hoping for the fascist party's substantial subordination to the State that would deprive them from any revolutionary autonomy. (E. Corradini, "Governo e partito", in *Gerarchia*, January 1925).
29. "Il dovere di Mussolini", in *L'Idea Nazionale*, 31 December 1924.
30. See information in ACS, MI, DGPS, DPP, fascicoli per materia, b. 102, f. 9 « Nazionalisti » . See also Edoardo Torre's letter to Mussolini, in which he encouraged Mussolini to beware the nationalists, who, thanks to Federzoni, were trying to enter into the nerve centres of the State and the party in order to weaken the revolution "and to hit fascism" (4 Febraury 1925), cit. in Aramini (2005–2006), p. 173.
31. Thanks to Mussolini's mediation the nationalists managed to reach the backdating of their registration on March 23 1919, see Federzoni (1993, pp. 118–19).
32. *Il Fascismo e la crisi attuale*, s.l., [1925], p. 2.
33. In *Roma Fascista*, 29 July 1928. On the history of the periodical which transitioned in 1935 from the ex-nationalists's direction to the direction of the fascist university groups in Rome, see (Martelli 2014).
34. ACS, MCP, Gabinetto, II versamento, b. 15, f. "Tribuna".
35. ACS, SPD, CR, 1922–1943, b. 86, f. W/R "Guglielmotti Umberto", s.f. 1 "Informazioni PS e RR.CC.".

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CHAPTER 4

The Intellectual Roots and Political Foundations of Reactionary Spanish Nationalism in an International Context

Maximiliano Fuentes Codera

A Political Arena in Tension, a Political Culture Under Construction

As the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, a complex series of political, cultural and social processes took place that gave rise to the so-called *fin-de-siècle* crisis which, among other things, led to the emergence of new nationalist movements throughout Europe. Among the intellectuals at the forefront of such movements, one of the focal points for

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discussion was the notion of *decadence*: society, race, nation, culture—everything in Europe was in decay (Gentile 2008). Such concerns had been raised in Spain centuries earlier, but now returned with renewed vigour, first with the failure of the First Republic (Juliá 2004, pp. 75–96), and then with the loss, in 1898, of Spain's few remaining colonies (Saz Campos 2003, pp. 64–77). In the face of such decadence, Spain's National Catholicism movement turned to the Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo (Botti 2008, pp. 69–80). As Laín Entralgo pointed out (1944), the Catholic right saw in his work the most systematic criticism of liberal historiography. Educated in the traditionalism of Jaime Balmes and the idealistic doctrine of the *volkgeist*, Menéndez interpreted the history of Spain as the ongoing renewal and unfolding of the Catholic spirit over the course of time. The history of Spain had consisted of a perpetual dispute between Catholic orthodoxy and heterodoxy, a process repeated with highs and lows for either side. This led Menéndez y Pelayo, in *Historia de los heterodoxos españoles*, to praise the reign of the Austrians and to describe the period of the Bourbons as decadent. However, he would eventually accept the liberal Restoration system, and this meant that the diverse sectors of the Catholic world, ranging from traditionalism to social Catholicism, could each claim his legacy as their own (González Cuevas 2000a, pp. 170–75).

At the turn of the century, Carlist traditionalists proclaimed their defining elements: anti-liberalism, counter-revolutionary thinking and the defence of tradition and the *fueros* [regional privileges], all under the motto of "God, Patria, King". Their conception of nation was based on the ideas of Menéndez y Pelayo: Catholic unity represented the foundational element of nationhood, and the monarchy was the quintessential national institution (Canal 2006, especially pp. 77–95). Religion and civilization were seen as being irreconcilable with liberalism. After a process of internal tensions during the interwar period, the ideological renewal of Carlism initiated by Juan Vázquez de Mella was culminated by Víctor Pradera. While not ignoring aspects of dynastic legitimacy, Pradera highlighted the corporatist and organicist elements and argued that only by establishing a traditional and federative monarchy could superior harmonious coexistence be guaranteed. Catholic unity continued to occupy a central place in the articulation of his Pan-Hispanic, imperialist project (González Cuevas 2005, pp. 77–83).

Despite the heterogeneity of the Spanish Catholic world, this anti-liberal ideology was an essential influence on a wide range of groups that held that Catholicism was a fundamental component of Spanish national

identity (Salomón Chéliz 2015). In this context, Maurism (the conservative movement inspired by Antonio Maura) took on a major political and ideological significance. It was an attempt to reconcile liberal conservatism with the Catholic right (González Hernández 1990). Although the Catholic hierarchy had played little part in its development, the Catholic component weighed more heavily than it had in any other previous conservative grouping, with the exception of the Unión Católica.

After the Great War, there were calls in the Catholic world demanding a more authoritarian approach towards ending the crisis of liberalism. Faced with the danger of the Soviet revolution, the ideas of Charles Maurras began to gain ground in the speeches of the Maurist leaders, especially among their younger members. As Antonio Goicoechea emphasized in *La crisis del constitucionalismo moderno* (1925), the intellectual and political environment in Europe in the mid-1920s was marked by a radical aversion to the "false dogmas" of the French Revolution. For Goicoechea, *Action Française* was therefore a group that was "worthy of our utmost admiration for its patriotic decision" What was needed was "the implantation of a great system, general and organic", orientated "towards the resurrection of the spirit of the social ideas of the Middle Ages".[1] The presence of the new European right as a synthesis that transcended the visions of traditionalism and conservatism was clear in the theorizations of Antonio Goicoechea, José Félix de Lequerica and *La Acción*, the principle Maurist newspaper, where, in 1922, appeared articles promulgating the ideas of Mussolini, along with calls to correct the wayward course of the State and make way for a "new system" (Gil Pecharromán 1994, pp. 31–33). Generally speaking, Maurism as a whole eventually identified with the authoritarian and corporate regime of Miguel Primo de Rivera. The new regime became the touchstone of National Catholicism and carried out a process of nationalization which had the full approval of the Catholic hierarchy (Quiroga Fernández de Soto 2008).

The political cadres that shaped reactionary nationalism as a political culture were forged in the regime of Primo de Rivera. For the Unión Patriótica, the official party of the regime, the nation encompassed society as a whole conceived as a set order of associations, classes and guilds, which was to be understood from a general organicist perspective. According to José María Pemán, one of the party's main intellectuals, the Restoration had been an artificial regime and was incompatible with national tradition because it linked the Crown with liberalism. Liberal tradition was rejected even more strongly by José Pemartín, who identified Carlism as the authentic

representative of national tradition (Quiroga Fernández de Soto 2007; Álvarez Chillida 1996). In this context, the revitalization of Hispanic-Americanism with a traditionalist flavour was fundamental, as expressed in the magazine *Raza Española*, edited by Blanca de los Ríos, with contributors such as António Sardinha, the Count of Santibáñez del Río[2] and other representatives of Spanish conservatism (Marcilhacy 2014, pp. 78). Another key element in this project was the activity of Ramiro de Maeztu as ambassador in Argentina, where traditionalism and fundamentalist Catholic thought was also on the rise, as expressed in articles by Julio Irazusta and Juan Carulla published in *La Nueva República* (González Calleja 2007).

With the fall of Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, seasoned Maurist figures, such as Goicoechea, reappeared, and there was also an important mobilization among Madrilenian aristocrats in the context of a particular intellectual and social unrest, which did not exclude violence. The result of all this was the formation of platforms such as the Unión Monárquica Nacional and the Partido Nacionalista Español (which, somewhat erratically, embodied certain features of the political practices of fascism) and newspapers such as *La Nación* (Gil Pecharromán 1994, pp. 74–86; González Calleja 2011, pp. 131–38). The proclamation of the Republic on the 14th of April 1931 strengthened these movements but also led to a dispute between those who promoted a conservative movement of the masses that accepted the new regime and those who opposed it from the very beginning. As Ismael Saz has claimed, the 14th of April acted as a founding event that saw the birth of one of the central political cultures of Francoism: reactionary nationalism, a movement that coexisted and interacted in multiple ways with another anti-liberal political culture, the fascist/Falangist movement, but also with anti-liberal outbursts of political Catholicism, which were expressed in the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA—the Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Right-wing Groups) and the traditionalism expressed in Comunión Tradicionalista (Saz Campos 2015, p. 30). Reactionary nationalism found its spokesmen among the ideologists of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera—with Ramiro de Maeztu as a central figure (González Cuevas 2003)—and certain Alfonsist monarchists linked to the Maurist right wing, such as Antonio Goicoechea. Its ideas were propagated via the magazine Acción Española, founded on December 16, 1931.

Acción Española: European Influences and Ties

Acción Española was a school of thought, a magazine and a cultural society. It represented a political culture that defined a representation of the world and, therefore, of Spain, of its past and its future. Its proposal was to unite all traditions of Spanish reactionary thinking in order to "bring them up to date" by incorporating the most radical elements of the new trends of European right-wing movements. Regular contributions by authors such as Balmes, Donoso and Menéndez y Pelayo—suitably purged of elements other than unequivocal reactionary thinking—built its essentially pre-modern and religious perspective. Integrism, Carlist traditionalism, traditional conservatism, social Catholicism, counter-revolutionary positivism, interest in Italian corporatism: all the anti-liberal traditions merged into a programme of "integral restoration" whose central points were the principles of "Religion, Family, Property, Order and Work".[3] Based on these presumptions, the magazine and the society exercised a significant influence on the Spanish right wing as a whole during the Second Republic, especially in the political parties Renovación Española headed by Antonio Goicoechea and Bloque Nacional led by José Calvo Sotelo. Its central strategy was always to re-establish a traditional monarchy by means of a military coup. *Acción Española* was founded as a nucleus of conspiracy against the Second Republic (González Cuevas 2011, pp. 434–38). Ramiro de Maeztu conceived the magazine as a tool for reconciling thought and violence: "We had forgotten the soul that had to direct the swords. That is why we founded *Acción Española*".[4]

The editorial team of the magazine consisted of the Count of Santibáñez del Río, as director, Miguel Herrero García as editor-in-chief and Eugenio Vegas as editorial secretary. From 1933, Maeztu took over as director. Although the initiative won the support of the aristocracy, it did not include active collaboration from prominent conservative and traditionalist intellectuals such as, among others, Eugenio d'Ors, José María Salaverría, Ricardo León and Gabriel Maura (González Cuevas 1998, pp. 148–51), although these did exert a significant influence on the magazine. Of particular interest, in this sense, was an article by José María Pemán in which he described the impact of Eugenio d'Ors on the conception of the struggle against romanticism in the name of classicism.[5]

The ideas of Maurras were ever-present. In January 1932, *Acción Española* proclaimed that "the doctrine of the French thinker is therefore implacable. Those who are not with the caudillo shall be against him".[6]

Maurras had argued that the triad of reform-revolution-romanticism was the reflection of the bourgeois experience of freedom. With the aim of ending the process of decadence that had begun in 1789, he transposed Greco-Roman and Catholic heritage onto the historical base of the French nation. The conciliation between nationalism and Europeanism was articulated through the concept of "Latinity", which sustained the idea of France as the heir and standard-bearer of Greco-Latin civilization and the expression of sympathy for the nations of Catholic tradition and monarchist regimes, such as Spain, Italy and Portugal (Weber 1985; Dard 2013). That is why it is no surprise that their influence was relevant in Spain, in the Catalanist circles, among intellectuals such as Azorín, Eugenio d'Ors and Salaverría and, fundamentally, among the Maurists, in particular Goicoechea, head of its youth movement and member of *Acción Española* (Pla 2012; González Cuevas 2000b).

The importance of Action Française in the thinking of *Acción Española* was both implicit and explicit. The magazine published numerous works by disciples and followers of Maurras such as Pierre Gaxotte, Robert Vallrey Radot, Jules Lemaître, Charles Benoist, Paul Bourget, Georges Deherme, "Thierry Maulnier" (pseudonym of Jacques Talagrand), René La Tour du Pin, Marius André and Jacques Bainville (Morodo 1985, pp. 92–100). However, there were also indications of tension between the two groups. The process of secularization experienced in France, which was positivist and deterministic, contrasted with the Catholic, iusnaturalist and providentialist perspective of Spanish reactionary nationalism. Maurras considered society as an organism, whose equilibrium depended on the exclusion of any kind of social engineering, while *Acción Española*, through articles by José Calvo Sotelo and Eduardo Aunós, advocated state interventionism to correct the imbalances typical of capitalist economies. Hence, it was Maurassian secularism that received the brunt of the criticism, in particular from Ramiro de Maeztu, who believed that the idea of *politique d'abord* had been placed, from his point of view, above any moral considerations.[7]

The influence of French integral nationalism was combined with a sizable contribution from Integralismo Lusitano (Morodo 1985, pp. 107–14).[8] As the editor of *Acción Española* pointed out, the three groups had similar intellectual foundations: "Portuguese nationalism was born, as was the French and the Spanish, as a reaction in the face of danger, as a desire to restore what is public".[9] The main tenets of Portuguese integralism were traditional monarchy, municipal autonomy, reconstitution of the province, a consultative assembly formed by municipalities and corporations, national

syndicalism, family reconstruction, protection of property, national production and the centrality of the Catholic Church, and these beliefs united intellectuals such as Bonald, De Maistre, Comte, Balmes, Donoso Cortés, Menéndez y Pelayo, Maurras and Maeztu through the figure of António Sardinha.[10]

Sardinha had been a republican but eventually became a convinced Maurassian monarchist, casting off a certain degree of religious insensitivity at the end of the century after experiencing a "revelation" that eventually led him to see Catholicism as an indispensable part of Portuguese national regeneration (Sardinha Desvignes 2006, pp. 152–64). As a young man, alongside José Hipólito Raposo, João do Amaral, José Pequito Rebelo and Alberto Monsaraz, he had organized a nucleus of integralists that began to operate in Portugal and who, in 1916, became the *Junta Nacional do Integralismo* (Archer de Carvalho 1992). The integralist project was defined by what it rejected, which was most aspects of modern society, and by a longing for a utopian return to a "natural" order based on an agrarian society, under the leadership of a paternal monarch and a blue-blooded nobility. The movement was decentralist, anti-cosmopolitan and close to the theories of *Action Française*, albeit with a strong dose of anti-Spanish sentiment (Braga da Cruz 1986; Costa Pinto 1982, 2000, pp. 2–15). This anti-Spanish feeling however was toned down and eventually reversed thanks to the ideas of Sardinha expressed in his last book, *A Aliança Peninsular* (1924), in which he upheld the idea of Iberian unity to confront the hegemony of France and England in Europe. Spain and Portugal had fought the Muslims together and were the inheritors of the Catholic civilization and Latinity (Sardinha Desvignes 2006, pp. 238–41).

The ideas of the Lusitanian Integralism were known among the Spanish conservative intellectuals before the appearance of *Acción Española*. Although many of their propositions had significant aspects in common with the ideas of Eugenio d'Ors on empire and nation (Fuentes Codera 2017, pp. 7–35), it was the Count of Santibáñez del Río who emphasized the importance of integralism in *Portugal y el hispanismo* (1920). During the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, Sardinha's ideas came to acquire an almost official dimension through his collaborations with *El Debate* and *Raza Española*. In 1930, *A Aliança Peninsular* was translated into Spanish by the Count of Santibáñez, with a prologue by Maeztu, who maintained that Sardinha had understood that "the main mission of the Hispanic peoples must be to ensure its common patriotism, which is its true value in the face of universal history" (González Cuevas 1998, p. 95).

With this in mind, it is no surprise that *Acción Española* would receive the collaboration of José Pequito Rebelo, Hipólito Rasposo, Rolão Preto and other Lusitanian intellectuals and that the first one hundred subscribers—as announced on the final page of its second issue—received a free copy of the aforementioned translation of Sardinha's book. *Acción Española*, congratulated itself for sharing with Lusitanian Integralism a "degree of kinship and humanity"—a phrase used by Maurras—which "introduced into the lives of their peoples the relationships between their ruling families".[11] Maurras appeared alongside Sardinha to represent "the pure doctrine of monarchism and the exaltation of hierarchies (…) with classicism as a concept".[12]

Acción Española's concept of Spain was based on a vision of Europe shared with the French and Portuguese nationalists: the path towards a universal monarchy had been interrupted in 1789 and had been taken up again with the House of Hohenzollern, who had reclaimed the inheritance of the Enlightenment and Rousseau.[13] Europe, the Empire and the construction of a historical account of Spain as a nation were all part of the same project.

La Hispanidad: Past, Present and Future

The beginnings of the political project of *Acción Española* were clearly idealistic in character. "History is the record of the values which, above and beyond what is natural, are accumulated over generations", Ramiro de Maeztu argued during a speech delivered in June 1932. For Víctor Pradera, in the face of the crisis of Europe, the solution was "to become Spanish again" and to forge the "material unity" between the past—"the dead *are* Spain"—and the present, in order to engender a new future. In this construction of the nationalist vision, centred on a history of Spain that was diametrically opposed to the 'denationalizing' liberal vision, Catholicism occupied a central place. *Acción Española*, according to Pradera, represented "Spanish thought" in front of the Republican "foreign thought". *Acción Española* was "the counterrevolution".[14] They needed, therefore, to develop a philosophy of history as "regress", as opposed to that of "progress",[15] since Spain had already been "*national* under Fernando and Isabel".[16]

From various perspectives, which did not always coincide, the main voices of reactionary nationalism identified the period of the Catholic Monarchs as the epitome of national unity. During their reign, they had

restored to the State "its full power" and, to the regions, "their full autonomy".[17] After their reign, the eighteenth century had seen the confirmation of national decadence and the rupture with Catholic ideals due to the imitations of French ways, the "germ of corruption and de-Christianization".[18] In this context, the "national dimension" of the uprising of May 2, 1808, needed to be "regained" as an example of an ongoing struggle against "foreignness"; a struggle that was "Catholic, monarchical, individualist, violent and rebellious".[19]

In contrast to Rousseau's contractualist approach, Víctor Pradera defended the organicist tradition according to which the emergence of society and the State had been the result of a process of historical aggregation originating with the family. In this context, as Maurras had suggested, the king became the institutional and historical personification of national sovereignty. Through the monarchy (the perfect assemblage of patriarchal Rome and Christian Rome),[20] Spain was projected towards the past and the future while preserving its essential identity and expressing its continuity (González Cuevas 1998, pp. 367–71). The past and future of Spain were encapsulated in the concept of *Hispanidad* articulated by Ramiro de Maeztu in *Defensa de la Hispanidad*. With its Catholic component, *Hispanidad* was a supra-regional ideal that would convey an awareness of unity to the fragmented Spanish nation—dispensing with the dilemma between universalism and particularity—and which, like Christianity, involved the idea of plurality. It was a permanent community based on Catholic principles and composed of those peoples who owed their culture to Spain and Portugal (Ocio 2014, pp. 157–78).

As Pemartín put it, the idea was "to restore the great Spain of the Catholic Monarchs and the Austrians" in order to "become, once again, protagonists of Universal History". Spain was "the most perfect representation" of the Christianity of the Crusades and "the true heir of Catholic Europe".[21] The "new" Middle Ages advocated by Pemartín was not so much a specific historical period, but rather, a historiological constant (important for its absolute and unquestionable values, a *myth* in the Sorelian sense) that was opposed to democracy, individualism and rationalism. It was a question, then, of "emancipating" the history of time, as Pemán suggested in line with Eugenio d'Ors who, in 1932, proclaimed the need to "prophesy the past" and in line also with Pradera who claimed that whatever was "in conflict with the principles derived from the nature of Man" could not "be traditional".[22] Ramiro de Maeztu summed it up by saying "Our past is waiting for us to create the future".[23]

A Political Culture Struggling for Position in a Broad Anti-liberal Arena

Denouncing democracy and liberalism were central elements of *Acción Española*'s political stance. The "elective principle", as stated in an editorial in January 1936, had demolished "the whole magnificent edifice of the Catholic State".[24] Their aspirations were based upon a radically anti-democratic State (one that was therefore contrary to the "accidentalism" of CEDA),[25] whose function should be to defend traditional society against the antagonistic forces that threatened it. This meant defending the great agricultural landowners, as the Portuguese integralist José Pequito Rebelo had pointed out. However, Calvo Sotelo, an active contributor to the magazine who had been minister of finance during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship and now led Renovación Española and the Bloque Nacional, was less nostalgic than Pequito; he was inclined towards technocratic approaches combining economic interventionism, protectionism and economic nationalism in a corporatist model (Calvo Sotelo 1938). Similarly, Eduardo Aunós, who absorbed elements from the new fascist corporatism into the Catholic corporatist schemes (Aunós 1935). The corporatism of *Acción Española* was not, therefore, exclusively traditionalist or "medievalist".[26]

The reactionary nationalism expressed in *Acción Española* was part of a broad, anti-liberal spectrum of voices in which different trends coexisted, including, of course, fascism (Blinkhorn 1990). They saw themselves as part of a platform shared with Action Française, Integralismo Lusitano and "the national idea of Corradini", as well as Nazism and fascism.[27] *Acción Española* had intersecular origins and a propensity to bring together various political traditions; it is therefore no surprise that it shared many elements with Spanish Falangism, which could not have arisen from any other platform but that of counter-revolution (Gallego 2014a, p. 233). This can be clearly seen in the ideas espoused by deeply traditionalist, Catholic and Maurrasian Falangists, such as Rafael Sánchez Mazas (Morente 2013) and Eugenio Montes. Even Ernesto Giménez Caballero, in 1928, eventually emphasized the Catholic component of Maurras (Gallego 2014b, pp. 67–70), while Onésimo Redondo, avid reader of Sardinha's works, acknowledged the influence of Menéndez y Pelayo and Maeztu in his concept of nation (Tomasoni 2017, pp. 66–67).

In essence, Spanish reactionary nationalism and Spanish fascism found common ground in condemning other "nationalisms" conceived as

individual entities without supranational aspirations. However, there was a difference in their concept of nation. For *Acción Española*, it was a phenomenon that could plausibly be (re)-traditionalized and made inseparable from the Church. For the Falange, the nation was seen as an entity that should be exalted in imperial terms. Its view differed from *Acción Española* in how it saw the role of the Church with regard to the State. In asserting its idea of nationalism, *Acción Española* rejected the deification of the nation while defending the nation's dependence on the religious and moral order that the Catholic Church provided.[28] There was also a distinction between the traditionalist elitism of *Acción Española* and the kind of nationalism which sought to integrate the masses. Broadly speaking, a pre-liberal nationalist perspective was up against another post-liberal, ultra-nationalist perspective (Griffin 1993).[29]

Such differences did not imply that *Acción Española* was impervious to European fascism or that the political culture of Spanish Falangism, for its part, was completely antagonistic to that of the reactionary nationalists. In fact, a number of fascist ideologues, such as Carlo Costamagna, Pietro Giovanni and Giorgio del Vecchio contributed to the pages of the magazine, as did Ramiro Ledesma Ramos. The magazine even published a translation of Mussolini's *La dottrina del fascismo* in 1933 and highlighted some of the most important rallies of the Spanish Falangists. As in many European countries, there was, in Spain, an admixture of the most openly rupturist ideological components and those of a conservative and traditional nature (Kallis 2014). In this sense, reactionary nationalism was as porous a political culture as any other and had to jostle for position with other political cultures among the anti-liberal right wing (Cobo Romero 2016, pp. 49–50). It was a process similar to that which took place in Portugal, where *A Monarquia* eventually proclaimed Mussolini and the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera to be "the magnificent triumph of the truths and methods that *Integralismo Lusitano* has recommended to all right thinking Portuguese since 1914" (Costa Pinto 2000, p. 12).

The convergence between reactionary and Falangist nationalists was also set out in an article by Eugenio Montes entitled "*Discurso a la catolicidad española*" in which he claimed that Mussolini, by recognizing the king as the symbol of national unity, had made a "tribute to the eternal"[30] and declared that the violent uprising was articulated with religiousness and Spain's imperial past. José Pemartín also repeatedly appealed to the Army to impose a "religious military" monarchy in the sense that Ramiro de Maeztu had also called for (Trullén Floría 2016, pp. 240–41). In this context,

in March 1937, *Acción Española* defended the "lawfulness" of the insurrection in the name of "the spirit of sixteenth-century Spain". On behalf of the *fallen*—Maeztu, Calvo Sotelo, Sanjurjo, Pradera and others—he summarized his idea: "Let us rise up against our fathers, side by side with our great-great-grandfathers! […] I shall join the young Spain that unearths the truths that made our Golden Age possible!" As Eduardo González Calleja has shown, violence was a central element in the process of fascistization that brought together reactionary nationalists and fascists (González Calleja 2011). For *Acción Española*, the reference point continued to be the imperial past with its traditionalist base.[31]

In an article which was part of a compendium edition of the magazine in 1937, José Pemartín asserted the need to adopt "the rhythm of the world, the tone or shape of fascism".[32] In the midst of the Civil War and just a month before the Franco's Decree of Unification (which forced all the disparate right-wing forces into one political party under his control),[33] *Acción Española* revised its critical views of the absolute Hegelianism of Italian fascism and German National Socialism because both States had joined with the Church and had become part of the Catholic and providentialist conception of history. The circle was completed in a *paradoxical dualism* that combined Hegelian and rationalist legal elements with a traditional, qualitative substantiality of history and blood. It followed that the solution to the Spanish problem appeared to be within sight: "Fascism, Hegelian absolutism, can and must occur in Spain; indeed, Spain is the only European nation which suits it in an absolute sense […] we can be more Fascist that fascism itself […] Fascism will be, therefore, the religion of religion". From this perspective, Spain had been fascist "four centuries earlier than the others [Italy and Germany]. When it was one, great, free and true Spain […], the *alma máter* of Christian and Western civilization". Hence, Spain was constituted as the fusion of the national realm—the religious and monarchical substance of traditionalism—and the state realm, that is, the legal totalitarianism of fascism. Fascism in Spain had to be "the technique of Traditionalism; the translation of Traditionalism in terms of the present".[34]

Bearing in mind all of these elements, there is clearly no point in talking about the supposed "purities" of Spanish reactionary nationalism or those of Spanish fascism since each of these political cultures were formed in dynamic processes during the 1930s—in particular, during the Civil War—and both experienced reciprocal influences. Therefore, it should not be forgotten that, in order to set in motion a regime such as Francoism

in the aftermath of an immensely destructive war of ideological and social extermination, a great many people had to take part; they had to concur in a formula that meant a coalescence of their non-fascist ideas with fascist practices, examples and methods. Without the fascist model, without fascists and without the support of the fascist powers, there would have been no political model for the Franco regime that embodied the ideology of a broad spectrum of right-wing ideas which had sought to contain the working-class masses and to consolidate the "authentic" Catholic and traditional Spanish identity (Ruiz Carnicer 2015, pp. 350–51).

With the Francoist triumph, it was time to give political and institutional form to the victorious nation. The two great political cultures of reactionary nationalism and fascism were deeply involved in this process (Box 2015). From April 1937 onwards, the two had to work together within the *Movimiento Nacional* and this meant taking on board elements of the each other's culture. For the fascists, this implied making Catholicism and tradition more visible while moderating their views on the subordination of the Church to a totalitarian State, as Pedro Laín Entralgo attempted to do in *Los valores morales del nacionalsindicalismo*. As Dionisio Ridruejo said, traditionalism had to be subsumed within an ideology that was recognized as revolutionary.[35] The reactionary right wing for their part had similar work to do. As we have seen, this was made explicit when Pemartín (1938) declared that Spanish fascism should be the technique of traditionalism, adapting the values of an idealized sixteenth-century Golden Age to the needs of the twentieth century. Both sectors, the Falangist-fascist represented by Laín and Ridruejo and the nationalist sector exemplified by Pemartín, were manifestly the result of a process of *absorption* and *distortion* between two political cultures. Nonetheless, even after the triumph of the Francoist forces, they continued to struggle for ascendancy and power within the new dictatorship (Saz Campos 2003, pp. 161–71; 2015).[36]

Notes

1. Quoted in González Cuevas (1998, p. 63).
2. Fernando Gallego de Chaves y Calleja, who signed his articles with his aristocratic titles, Count of Santibáñez del Río or Marquis of Quintanar.
3. "A los dos años", *Acción Española* (16 December 1933: 627).
4. "El banquete de 'Acción Española'", *Acción Española* (1 February 1934: 1021).
5. José María Pemán, "Perfiles de la nueva barbarie", *Acción Española* (1 January 1932: 140).

6. J. Hurtado de Zaldívar, "Actualidad internacional", *Acción Española* (1 January 1932: 181).
7. Ramiro de Maeztu, "El ser de la hispanidad", *Acción Española* (16 April 1933: 233–39).
8. On Action Française's influences on Integralismo Lusitano see Sardinha Desvignes (2009).
9. El Conde de Santibáñez del Río, "El integralismo lusitano", *Acción Española* (1 July 1932: 145).
10. See: El Conde de Santibáñez del Río, "El integralismo lusitano", *Acción Española* (16 July 1932: 254–60) and, in particular, the final issue, published on 16 November 1932.
11. El Conde de Santibáñez del Río, "El integralismo lusitano", *Acción Española* (16 November 1932: 495–96).
12. C. G.-R., "Charles Maurras y su Diccionario Político y Crítico", by Pierre Chardon, *Acción Española* (1 December 1932: 666).
13. Javier Reina, "El liberalismo y la verdad", *Acción Española* (1 July 1932: 127); Fernando Gallego de Chaves y Calleja (1936).
14. "Actividad intelectual. La Sociedad Acción Española", *Acción Española* (1 July 1934: 259).
15. M. H. G., "Actividades culturales", *Acción Española* (1 July 1932: 194–224); the quotations are from 195, 212 and 222.
16. José Pemartín, "España como pensamiento", *Acción Española* (1 March 1937: 365–407); the quotations are from 373 and 375.
17. Miguel Herrero García, "Poder y descentralización", *Acción Española* (1 February 1932: 358).
18. Eugenio Vegas Latapié, "Un centenario (1833–1933)", *Acción Española* (1 March 1937: 148).
19. "Dimensión nacional del 2 de mayo", *Acción Española* (1 March 1937: 240–43). See also Box (2007).
20. José Pemartín, "España como pensamiento", *Acción Española* (1 March 1937: 365–407); Quotations on 388–393.
21. José Pemartín, "España como pensamiento", *Acción Española* (1 March 1937: 374–75).
22. Pemán stance in "Nuestra Reforma y nuestro Renacimiento", *Acción Española*, 1 April 1934, 115; that of Eugenio d'Ors, in D'Ors (1982, p. 9); the quote by Pradera in González Cuevas (1998, p. 355).
23. Ramiro de Maeztu, "Servicio, jerarquía y hermandad", *Acción Española* (16 January 1934: 889).
24. "Elecciones", *Acción Española* (1 January 1936: 5–10).
25. For more on this, see: Vegas Latapié (1932).
26. See Giorgio del Vecchio, "Estado fascista y viejo régimen", *Acción Española* (16 January 1934: 852–63). For an opposing view, see the traditionalist criticism of fascist corporatism by Vicente Gay, "La concepción económica del fascismo", *Acción Española* (1 April 1933: 144–150).

27. For more on this, see: M. H. G., "Actividades culturales", *Acción Española* (1 April 1933: 212–15) and J. V. S., "Lecturas", M. H. G., "Actividades culturales", *Acción Española* (1 April 1933: 222–23).
28. See "Nuestro nacionalismo", *Acción Española* (1 March 1937: 64–72) and Francisco G. Del Campillo, *La nueva catolicidad*, by E. Giménez Caballero, *Acción Española* (1 March 1934: 1267–69).
29. On the case of Spain, Saz Campos (2013).
30. Eugenio Montes, "Discurso a la catolicidad española", *Acción Española* (1 March 1937: 203).
31. "En el 5º Aniversario. 'Vox clamantis in deserto'", *Acción Española* (1 March 1937: 7 and 16).
32. José Pemartín, "España como pensamiento", *Acción Española* (1 March 1937: 365–407); quotations on 395.
33. On 19 April 1937, Franco imposed the merger of disparate right-wing forces in the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional thus assuming both the political and military leadership of the rebellion (Thomàs 2014).
34. José Pemartín, "España como pensamiento", *Acción Española* (1 March 1937: 365–407); quotations on 399–402. See also Eugenio Vegas Latapié, "Romanticismo y democracia", *Acción Española* (1 May 1936: 316–62).
35. See his article on "Revolución y tradición" (1940).
36. On debates on fascistization of Franco regime, see Sanz (2013).

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CHAPTER 5

Reactionary Nationalism and Fascism: The German Case

Hermann Beck

The relationship between National Socialists and reactionary nationalists in Germany—the latter including members and supporters of the conservative DNVP (German National People's Party or "German Nationals") and the conservative bourgeoisie—is more complex than conventional wisdom would suggest. At first glance, commonalities seemed to prevail: both shared an extreme nationalism, a preference for authoritarian solutions, strong revisionist goals with regard to the Versailles Treaty, support for rearmament, and (different forms of) anti-Semitism. Conflicts between the two camps, however, bubbled underneath the surface: the conservative DNVP feared the NSDAP's "socialism", and the Nazis, in turn, considered the "reactionary" to be as deadly a political foe as any "Marxist". In everyday politics, the Nazis' hatred of the bourgeoisie, coupled with their rejection of the German Empire's political heritage, constantly came to the fore. In Goebbels' view, for example, National Socialism stood alone as a new anti-bourgeois, unspent, unspoiled, and

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uncompromising force, signifying a break with the bourgeois past of the German Empire: "The three-class franchise classifying voters along property lines, the social 'pittance' legislation… the 'lord-of-the manor' way of thinking, the industrial capitalist firebrands, all of these are typical fabrications of conservative reactionaries….".[1]

Despite such animosities emanating from the Nazi camp, DNVP members and leaders basked all too long in the illusion that the Nazis could be tamed, that radical young National Socialists could be led back to the proper path because they were essentially reasonable, and that one could do business with them despite clear signs to the contrary. The German National press strenuously downplayed the numerous constitutional violations and crimes during the early 1930s (e.g. Reichswehr Trial, Boxheim Documents, murder at Potempa) and defended Nazi actions against political opponents. From the perspective of the NSDAP, as the following analysis shows, the relationship between the two parties was characterized primarily by antagonism. This seemed paradoxical to many, given that conservatives from Papen to Hugenberg held the stirrups for Hitler and hoisted him into office. Therefore, much of the literature on the late Weimar Republic and the period of the seizure of power tends to minimize or ignore the deep hostility radiating from the camp of National Socialism (Bracher et al. 1962; Broszat 1995, pp. 82–173; Jasper 1986; Thamer 1986; Frei 2001; Kershaw 1998, pp. 547–626; Evans 2005, pp. 417–513). Instead, emphasis is placed on the later alliance of conservative and National Socialist elites (Mommsen 1983, pp. 157–81). The following examination, focusing on the last phase of the Weimar Republic, the period of the Nazi seizure of power, and the peacetime years of the Third Reich, illustrates that their relationship was more complex and conflict-ridden than has been previously assumed.

During the Republic: 1929–1933

From the beginning, political circumstances surrounding the later coalition between the NSDAP and DNVP were deleterious to long-term cooperation. Already during the common struggle against the Young Plan in 1929, which Alfred Hugenberg had used as an opportunity to mobilize an all-encompassing movement of the political Right, tensions had come to the fore (Beck 2008, pp. 53–60). The "Harzburg Front" of October 1931, when the Nazis came together in a tactical alliance against the Weimar Republic with parties, organizations, and personalities of the political Right, showed anew that the apparent unity of the nationalist forces

was deceptive (Brüning 1970, pp. 425–28; Bracher 1964, pp. 407–15). Except for uncompromising opposition to the Weimar Republic, there was little agreement among the participants. The NSDAP's Reichstag faction held a separate sitting before the Harzburg meeting in which it was emphasized that the coalition with the DNVP should be viewed as a purely tactical manoeuvre, and Joseph Goebbels made no secret of the fact that the coalition with the German Nationals would be a mere temporary expedience. All this was given its symbolic expression when Hitler left the stage on which the Harzburg dignitaries observed the opening formalities after his SA formations marched by, as if consciously seeking to provoke an affront.[2]

The relationship between the NSDAP and the DNVP sank to its lowest point after the successful vote of no confidence lodged against the Papen government (512 in favour, 42 against) and the subsequent dissolution of the Reichstag on 12 September 1932. During the election campaign running up to the November 1932 elections, Nazi propaganda was directed not only against its political opponents but also against the DNVP. On the eve before the formation of the Hitler-Papen-Hugenberg cabinet of "national concentration", the mood between both national-oriented parties could hardly have been worse.[3]

At the same time, there existed an ideological component to Nazi distain for conservatives. Nazi aversion to the bourgeoisie and bourgeois parties was a familiar theme in political debates during the rise of the NSDAP in the 1920s and the early 1930s.[4] Criticism of the *Bürgertum* constituted an attack on a particular way of life and a culture that supposedly enfeebled Germany and rendered it unfit for struggle in the conflicts to come. This primarily cultural and ideological criticism of the bourgeoisie and bourgeois forms of life was not just a domain of the left wing of the NSDAP; it was practised by all factions and groups within the party. One example of many is a long piece Hitler published in the *Völkischer Beobachter* in November 1929, in which he castigated the "political unreliability, halfheartedness, cowardliness, opportunism, and inertia of bourgeois political parties", arguing that he could understand every Social Democrat and Communist "in his inner abhorrence of bourgeois parties".[5] The bourgeois press usually reprinted such tirades and warned their readers not to cast their vote for Hitler, since he stood outside respectable "bourgeois society". 1931 marked the high point of Nazi anti-bourgeois indictments. Throughout that year, National Socialist publications were replete with charges that "Marxism and *Bürgertum* murder German youth", accompanied by crusades against "the completely stultified *Bürgertum*", and expressions of

contempt for the "wretched rabble of the *bürgerlich* middle-of-the-road parties".[6]

In 1932, with the presidential elections, the Prussian parliamentary election of 24 April, and the *Reichstag* election of 31 July, the NSDAP became far and away the strongest party, so that the legal assumption of power became a distinct possibility. In order not to discourage the support of centre-right parties for a possible coalition with the NSDAP, anti-bourgeois tirades became more subdued until the campaign for the next *Reichstag* elections on 6 November 1932, when National Socialists again vehemently attacked the conservative establishment as embodied in the Papen government and its supporter, the DNVP.

The NSDAP–DNVP Coalition Government in 1933

During the period after 30 January 1933, when NSDAP and DNVP were partners in a coalition government until the DNVP broke up at the end of June 1933 (and political parties other than the Nazi Party were subsequently banned on 14 July 1933), Nazis purposely used "revolutionary" anti-bourgeois rhetoric to undermine the position of their German National ally and competitor. After the Reichstag Fire Decree, the elections of 5 March, the Nazi takeover of the German states not yet in Nazi hands during the week following the elections, and the Enabling Act of 24 March, the political Left and the Center party were largely neutralized, so that, beginning in the second half of March, attention was focused on the German Nationals as the NSDAP's sole remaining competitor. In addition to countless violent attacks, the struggle against the German Nationals was carried out on economic and institutional levels, as the Nazis made an effort to call into question existing hierarchies.[7] In several law courts, for example, National Socialist "complaint centers" were established that were designed to undermine the conservative establishment's predominance in the legal system and civil service. Osnabrück's district court and Frankfurt's high regional court are two examples: here low- and mid-echelon civil servants could lodge complaints against high-ranking civil servants, a good many of whom had close ties to the DNVP.[8] This kind of egalitarianism was used to undermine the position of the NSDAP's German National rival and coalition partner.

Numerous incidents typical of the social upheavals that took place in the winter and spring of 1933 further undermined the position of the establishment. On 8 March 1933, for example, a low-ranking National Socialist

office assistant raised the swastika flag on the building of the Ministry of Finance, a public authority that, like all Prussian Ministries, was characterized by its rigid hierarchical structure. The Minister of Finance, Johannes Popitz, a right-wing conservative and monarchist, immediately ordered that the flag be taken down, whereupon, according to official records, the office assistant openly defied him: "No – the flag stays raised".[9] On the following day, Popitz issued a written order requiring that the office assistant be suspended and leave the Ministry that same day. The office assistant thereupon appealed to a National Socialist Reichstag deputy; the counter-reaction was not long delayed. The Finance Minister received a letter from the Reich Chancellery, in which Hitler's Chief of Staff, Hans Heinrich Lammers, informed Popitz in no uncertain terms that he should refrain from taking any disciplinary action against the office assistant or else the "Reich Chancellor" would have to personally intervene.[10] Confronted with Lammers's threat to involve Hitler directly, Popitz complied. The simple office assistant had prevailed in a direct confrontation with the conservative Minister. The extent to which the Nazis—in the hierarchically structured Prussian world—looked after their own people remains astonishing. And it was entirely novel that members of all social classes—provided they were members of the Nazi Party—felt free to lodge complaints against the authorities.

An often-used accusation (sometimes accurate and sometimes overblown) to discredit the German National *Bürgertum* was its alleged "culture of corruption", especially embezzlement and misappropriation of funds.[11] These charges were an effective means to weaken the conservative bourgeoisie, since its members occasionally engaged in special interest politics, for it was not unusual to engineer mutually beneficial commissions and orders in their circles. In the winter and spring of 1933, several prominent members of the *Bürgertum* had been implicated in corruption scandals, such as the German National mayor of Düsseldorf, Robert Lehr, and the Commissioner for Job Creation, Günther Gereke. Accusations against them were widely publicized in the National Socialist press. This emphasis on corruption in bourgeois economic behaviour was also prominent with French fascists.

Nazi Attacks with Social Revolutionary Overtones

A new note was struck in Nazi anti-bourgeois proclamations during the period of the seizure of power, when Nazi criticism of the conservative *Bürgertum* became especially vociferous. Already in 1930, Joseph Goebbels

had attacked the bourgeoisie for its lack of a "sense of exclusiveness that demands either everything or nothing at all", and an unwillingness to engage in battle.[12] This attitude on the part of the Nazi leadership had already implied a break with Germany's imperial past, which was noted in Western Europe.[13] Three years later, disparagement of the "class conceit of the Bürger" and the goal of overcoming class differences were fused with the National Socialist concept of the "New Man". The great offence of the bourgeois epoch, National Socialists argued, was its legacy of a deep social divide, "which defrauded the German state of millions of its best people", who were driven into the hands of Marxist parties.[14]

The National Socialist Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick emphasized the importance of "incorporating … German workers … into the state as citizens with equal rights", arguing that it was a central concern of the new state to abolish "differences between classes and estates".[15] The creation of the new Germany entailed not merely the reorganization of the German state but also the making of a "New German Man" to ensure the continued existence of the revolutionary changes underway. National Socialist victory would not be assured simply by assuming power.

The virtues and values attributed to this New German Man implied an attack on the bourgeoisie that resonated with Germans in 1933, given the corruption scandals implicating members of the conservative DNVP and the general frustrations associated with overcoming social barriers in the economy and society at large. The New German Man of the future would transcend the bourgeois by being free of status-conscious conceit and hatred. In the new national community predominantly materialistic values, presumably those which mattered most to the bourgeoisie, would no longer have a place. In its "Condemnation of Self-Interest", National Socialism would "curtail self-interest" by imposing "severe penalties on fraud, usury, enrichment at the expense of others, and mercilessly eradicating everything that endangers the probity of public life".[16] Another fundamental value of National Socialism's New Man, "Respect for the Individual", was explained in such a way as to disparage bourgeois class structures that prevented individuals from succeeding based on their personal merits. People should be judged by their "human value" and not by their "birth, possessions, rank, and title" as before; "the classification of humanity according to professional status, taxes paid, and class rankings", according to the "New German Man" virtues, was considered "unworthy of a genuinely civilized people".[17] Connected with the creation of the "New Man" was Nazi criticism of the "entitlement character" of the bourgeois

state, as reflected in the rigid structure of the German educational system with its innate class bias that prevented lower-class children, including "born leaders among the sons of workers and peasants", from rising to positions of political influence.[18] The attack on the bourgeois way of life was expressed here again as an assault on bourgeois society and its class barriers.

During the period of the seizure of power, the anti-bourgeois and egalitarian posture of National Socialism was inspired by a very concrete interest—to supplant those members of its conservative coalition partner still in positions of power in the spring of 1933. The destruction of class barriers and the entitlement character of the bourgeois state therefore became central themes during the Nazi takeover. A functionary of the "National Socialist Factory Cells" put it succinctly: In "Adolf Hitler's German workers state it is of no consequence whether someone is a street cleaner or a chief executive".[19] It was contended that in the bourgeois state of the past people had put too much emphasis on "specialized expertise and outward appearances", all of which led to the neglect of man's "conscience, honor, and character".[20] In a similar vein, the French fascist sympathizer Bertrand de Jouvenel expressed admiration for what he considered Nazi egalitarianism in action: party dignitaries and typists fraternizing at Nazi Party headquarters and the doorkeeper at the law courts leading "the corporation of the Magistrate" at the national ceremony on the first of May (Sternhell 1986, p. xix). The National Socialists' pronounced criticism of formal education and intellectual snobbery exerted a tantalizing attraction on the lower and lower middle classes in the classical country of "status formalization",[21] especially since this criticism appeared to be justified. Its effect on voters from these echelons of society, though it cannot be gauged with complete accuracy, was considerable (Childers 1983).

National Socialists in Power: 1933–1939

If we change our focus and look at the relationship from the point of view of "reactionary nationalists", a very different picture emerges. The Wehrmacht general Gotthard Heinrici (1886–1971), son of a conservative Prussian parson and church administrator, is in many ways an almost ideal-typical example. He epitomizes the political attitudes of Prussian military families and his political loyalties can be seen as representative of conservative Prussians of a certain standing. Heinrici served as a front-line officer in World War I, continued as a professional soldier during the Republic and

the peacetime years of the Third Reich, was promoted to Colonel on 1 March 1933 and Major General in 1936, and later achieved fame as one of the Wehrmacht's ablest generals on the eastern front. Heinrici also left an extensive literary bequest, consisting of diary notes and letters, in which he frankly communicates his political views on the Nazi regime. Parts of the bequest have been published (Hürter 2016).

In the Republic's last phase, Heinrici was a moderate conservative who initially supported Hindenburg against Hitler and Hugenberg's radical-conservative candidate Theodor Duesterberg in the presidential elections of March 1932, but who then developed considerable enthusiasm for the Nazi regime.[22] In a letter to his parents on 4 February 1933, he still regrets that "it could not be avoided" to include the Nazis in the government; on 12 February, he is confident that "things will continue improving" if the alliance between conservatives and National Socialists holds firm; on 17 February, he welcomes the banning of the "Berlin boulevard press, which feels the need to drag everything through the mire" and is hopeful that "we will now finally escape from this Marxist-Jewish mess". On the eve of the last national elections on 5 March, Heinrici already praises the new regime for inculcating in the people "the belief in an idea that is capable of moving mountains… and sweeping away any obstacles in its path". Even though the Nazis occasionally "overshoot the mark", what counts is that there's now an end to "pussy-footing-about" and that "new life is breathed into the state". After the successful Nazi takeover of the German states, he was gratified to see the old imperial colours return (albeit in conjunction with the swastika) and lamented that the force of national energy occasionally degenerated into arbitrariness, consoling himself that this was, after all, the hallmark of a revolution, in the midst of which Germany finds itself.

In this vein, the appraisal of the new regime continues over the next few weeks, oscillating between expressions of regret over certain monstrosities and wholehearted approval of the new course. Reports of violent attacks are rationalized and allayed, because "occasional transgressions pale… in comparison to this great overall success". Heinrici writes that he considered the anti-Jewish boycott of 1 April "a very infelicitous measure, which will lead to countless injustices and insults", but one has "to keep in view the great things and amazing feats that have been accomplished and will be accomplished in the future" (9 April). With Hitler's rearmament programme, he is fully and enthusiastically in accord: "Once Hitler has remilitarized the whole people – and this in essence is his program… we will once again count as a significant power. If ever there's another war, then we won't have

to contend with the *Miesmacher* [naysayers] as we did fifteen years ago. The Nazis will see to that. They will know how to lead the people" (2 June 1933). On the occasion of a social gathering with the later Wehrmacht generals Heinrich von Vietinghoff, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, and Heinz Guderian, agreement prevailed in the political discussions among them. In a letter to his parents on 20 July 1933, he wrote: "We agreed that we can be thankful to have a Reich leadership that so clearly and emphatically advocates the national idea, is so unambiguously opposed to [a leftist] revolution and cracks down decisively in all spheres. No one will deny that bad things have happened. But what counts is the overall line, and if we compare things to the years of social-democratic rule, we have to approve it".

Heinrici maintained this basic attitude until the outbreak of the war: he endorsed Hitler's elimination of parts of the SA leadership in the stillborn "Röhm Putsch" and regrets only that it had not taken place sooner (entry of 7 July 1934); he was happy about the reintroduction of general conscription in mid-March 1935 (17 March 1935) and minimizes the "Nuremberg Laws" of September 1935 (22 September 1935). As the son of a Protestant minister and practising Lutheran, he deeply regretted the hostility of the regime towards the Churches and rejected the Reich-wide pogrom on 9 November 1938. But overall, consent and support for the regime clearly prevailed. And when war came on 1 September 1939, it finds him mentally ready. On that day, Heinrici notes in his diary, "I believe that if this war had not begun today, it would have come in a few years when England, France and America are strong again and led by determined men. Writ large, this war is a preventive war that we would have been forced into fighting anyway.…".

The National Socialist regime, on the other hand, remained critical of conservative elites and the conservative bourgeoisie (the DNVP had been disbanded at the end of June 1933). Anti-bourgeois rhetoric gradually died down in the summer of 1933, since the bourgeoisie also belonged to the *Volksgemeinschaft*, but overall a strong anti-establishment orientation persisted. In everyday life, the regime's values and policies clearly aimed at reducing the influence of the conservative bourgeoisie.

In this frame of mind, the Nazi regime created new organizations explicitly designed to break down class barriers and promote social egalitarianism, two examples of which are illustrated here. Already in 1933, students in their first four semesters were compelled to attend a labour service camp (*Arbeitsdienstlager*) for ten weeks; in 1934, a mandatory six-month labour service duty was introduced for all graduating *Gymnasium* students who

wished to attend university (Grüttner 1995, pp. 227–37). A key *Arbeitsdienst* goal was to tear down social barriers between members of the working class, journeymen, and farmers on the one hand, and future members of professional classes and high officials on the other—thus helping to build an all-inclusive *Volksgemeinschaft*. To ensure that "academic conceit and snobbery" would be extinguished effectively, the percentage of students assigned to a labour service camp was limited to about one quarter to make sure that they remained in a minority. As the future Reich Labour Service Leader Konstantin Hierl proclaimed in 1933: "There is no better means of overcoming social cleavages, class hatred, and class conceit than to have the son of a factory owner and a young laborer, a young intellectual and a farmhand serve their common people and fatherland side by side, wearing the same garb and consuming the same fare" (Grüttner 1995, p. 227). The reality of life in the labour service camps was often shaped by resentful superiors, who were bent on demonstrating to the children of the *Bürgertum* that they were no better than others, which only alienated them and thus contributed little to bringing social classes more closely together (Grüttner 1995, pp. 230–32; von Ditfurth 1989, p. 135; Roegele 1966, p. 155). Whatever the effective outcome, the political intention behind labour service had an unmistakable anti-bourgeois edge.

"Strength through Joy" (*Kraft durch Freude* or *KdF*), that vast National Socialist leisure-time organization with its tens of millions of members, also did its utmost to raze class barriers outside the workplace (Baranowski 2007; Weiß 1993). "Strength through Joy" included a comprehensive cultural and tourist programme among its offerings, reaching from opera, concert, and theatre performances, to day-long, weekend, and longer holiday trips in Germany and abroad. Unlike traditional cruise ships, KdF's ocean liners eliminated different cabin classes and offered only single class passenger berths (Baranowski 2007; Weiß 1993). In this way, "Strength through Joy" demonstrated the regime's determination to weaken the barriers between social classes and demolish the exalted position of the *Bürgertum* in people's minds (Baranowski 2007, pp. 166–75; Schneider 1999, pp. 671–83). Equality of status, if not of wealth, property, and income, was thus consistently promulgated by the policies of the regime.

The anti-establishment orientation in public life was also reflected in the administration of justice and in the sentences passed down by German courts. In the case of convictions under the so-called Perfidy Ordinance of 21 March 1933, for example (later "Perfidy Law" of 20 December 1934) to curb the spreading of "perfidious" anti-government rumours,

defendants from bourgeois-middle class backgrounds (especially German Jews) were usually punished more severely than those of the lower classes.[23] This was done not only to demonstrate the "egalitarian" quality of the "People's Community", but also because the regime was concerned that the public might accept rumours spread by bourgeois defendants as more likely to be true. Members of the judiciary also felt pressured to sentence white-collar crime more heavily, since their verdicts and alleged "reactionary incompetence" began to come under criticism from the influential SS-press organ *Das Schwarze Korps* from the mid-1930s onwards.[24] *Das Schwarze Korps* scrutinized verdicts for examples of a class-based justice that favoured the bourgeoisie, and often vilified and denigrated the legal profession as a whole, so that judges had reason to be forewarned not to let bourgeois defendants off too lightly. In criminal jurisdiction, the political attitude and supposed "character" of the criminal were thus given increasing weight, whereby the actual offence might well be less important for sentencing. In this context, a bourgeois defendant, assumed to be hostile towards the regime, could hardly count on clemency (Gruchmann 2001, pp. 663–70, 822–925; Ritter 1997, pp. 85–98, esp. 93).

Already during the Republic, it had been accepted that certain normative concepts of law and the "general clauses" (*Generalklauseln*) of the Civil Code,[25] central to Roman law, were not necessarily written in stone but rather "subject to revision", thus giving judges a certain discretionary leeway (Gruchmann 2001, pp. 731–32, 889–93, 916–26). In the course of the Third Reich, these "general clauses" were increasingly monopolized by National Socialist values, which gradually eroded hitherto prevailing interpretations of the Civil Code.[26] This development ran counter to the interests of the *Bürgertum*, as bourgeois normative standards in public life and the economy were increasingly undermined. Legal transactions that ran counter to "sound popular instinct" (*gesundes Volksempfinden*) and the "good of the Volksgemeinschaft" were soon declared null and void (Rüthers 2012, p. 218). After 1933, the concept of property was also redefined from the vantage point of National Socialist communal ideology. Property now had a social commitment to the community attached to it and was considered "an endowment and responsibility of the *Volksgemeinschaft* to its individual members", which quickly led to restrictions on the rights of property-owning individuals (Rüthers 2012, pp. 351–53). A cornerstone of bourgeois identity—private property that could be bought and sold at will—had thus become obsolete. The new dogma mandated that property was tied to the obligation of its owner towards the community.

This meant that legal ownership was guaranteed only as long as the owner did not violate his commitment to the public good (Rüthers 2012, p. 356). In a similar vein, other legal notions, such as "*Vertragsfreiheit*" (contractual freedom), that were crucial to the self-image of the *Bürger* were also ground down: a contract could be valid only if it remained within the confines of the "communal order" and fit in neatly with *völkisch* strictures (Rüthers 2012, pp. 360–6).

Finally, the new legal concept of the nation as a racially based *völkisch* community deprived matrimony of its former meaning and altered the foundation of law to the point that marriage was now viewed primarily as "a source for the preservation and promotion of the people and nationhood" (Rüthers 2012, pp. 400–3). Marriage thus ceased to be "a private affair of those concerned; it became a responsibility in the service of the preservation of the racial and cultural forces of the people" (Frank 1935, p. 955). As with so much else in the dictatorship, marriage was stripped of its private characteristics and used to further the ideological goals of National Socialism.

Hitler and the Conservative Bourgeoisie

Hitler's pronouncements directed against the conservative bourgeoisie displayed the same tendency as those in Nazi press reports: they became less frequent as soon as political power came within reach, though they never disappeared altogether. Hitler's anti-bourgeois statements can be traced throughout his entire political career, beginning with his speeches from the early 1920s and *Mein Kampf*,[27] to his talks and newspaper articles between 1925 and 1931, though they rarely appear in his public proclamations between 1932 and 1945 (Domarus 1973; Zitelmann 1990, pp. 147–75). In his rantings against the *Bürgertum*, the term is used interchangeably with "upper class", thus making it obvious that Hitler referred exclusively to the *haute bourgeoisie*.[28]

The "arrogance of the *Bürgertum*", whom he accuses of having no social conscience, forms a central theme in Hitler's criticisms. The *Bürgertum*'s inability to devise viable social policies in the interest of Germany's workers, Hitler argued, had led to the rise of Marxist parties (Beck 2008, pp. 299–301). In another complex of charges, Hitler maintained that the *Bürgertum* and bourgeois parties had no "ideals", genuine programmatic goals, or a philosophical world outlook (*Weltanschauung*) and were thus in no position to fight Marxism, since one *Weltanschauung* could be

successfully combated only by another. Bourgeois parties fought only for ministerial posts and seats in parliament, not for a great idea, and their programmes consisted merely of campaign slogans,[29] so that they could not offer their followers incentives for an all-out effort to fight the ultimate battle. Since the bourgeois world had never possessed one great idea, its period of supremacy in world history would prove to be as short as it was pitiful (Hitler 1961, p. 82).

A recurring theme in Hitler's anti-bourgeois rhetoric from the 1920s into World War II is that of the *Bürgertum*'s indecisiveness, lack of energy, and cowardice in facing life's struggles. Ineptness at coping with difficult challenges would lead to its downfall; incapable of political leadership, the *Bürgertum*'s mission had ended. While Marxism exuded "the most brutal confidence in its own victory", the *Bürgertum* was imbued with "slimy cowardice" (Zitelmann 1990, pp. 159–66, esp. 160). Similar ideas were expressed in France during the 1930s by fascist intellectuals, who argued that "the bourgeois spirit that had governed the nation had produced a civilization of pretense, of lamination, of stucco and plaster", and that "one must therefore get rid of bourgeois culture" (Sternhell 1986, p. 252). Causally linked with accusations of cowardice was Hitler's reproach of the absence of instinct and common sense that was aimed at the *Bildungsbürgertum*: "The European intellectual world, university professors and higher civil servants, into whose heads knowledge has been stupidly crammed, don't get it. In certain areas professorial scholarship is destructive; it leads away from instinct" (Picker 1977, p. 107). In the same vein, Hitler remarked that "intellectuals" were "devoid of animalistic vigor" (Jochmann 2000, p. 123), a theme also common in other fascist movements.

Similarly, Hitler deprecated emphasis on deliberation, rational calculation, and analysis—bourgeois virtues *par excellence*. He considered them to be gnawing away at the fibre of the nation's strength: "So what role can a nation play when it is governed by people of that sort – people who weigh and analyze everything?" (Hitler 2000, p. 108).

Comparison with Other Fascist Movements

Opposition to bourgeois conservatives and reactionaries can also be found in other European fascisms. It even provided commonalities with political opponents, such as Socialist parties.

Some facets of Hitler's anti-bourgeois pronouncements were shared by other fascists, such as Georges Valois, who argued that it was a shameful injustice that the bourgeoisie had left the worker "to wallow in ignorance, filth, and misery", especially since "this kind of class selfishness alienated the workers and turned them toward Marxism" (Soucy 1986, p. 167). Echoing Hitler's statements on intellectuals being devoid of "animalistic vigor", George Mosse argued that the fascist stereotype was "based upon an ideal of male strength and beauty, upon an aggressive virility, an élan vital", which was "the very opposite of muddleheaded and talkative intellectuals, of the exhausted old men of a dying bourgeois order" (Mosse 1999, p. 149); while Zeev Sternhell maintained that "the virile, vigorous fascist, spending his leisure hours on the sports field and the racetrack", constituted "the very antithesis of the bourgeois" (Sternhell 1986, p. 279).

Values such as willingness to sacrifice, conscientious fulfilment of one's duties, and heroism were held in high regard in Italian and French fascist movements, while enjoyment of life's comforts was deprecated. This is illustrated in Mussolini's famous "Noi dispreciamo la vita commoda". In France, the "bourgeois decay" of the 1930s, the "spirit of facility", and "the cult of ease" were blamed for the defeat of 1940 (Paxton 1972, pp. 21–22). As Zeev Sternhell argues, fascism denied the equation "wellbeing = happiness"; rather it "meant 'living dangerously'"—it was, in Oswald Mosley's phrase, "a great and hazardous adventure" (Sternhell 1976, pp. 315–78, esp. 338, 340) and, especially in its French variants, "a rebellion against bourgeois society, its moral values, its political and social structures, its way of life" (Sternhell 1986, p. 2). Sternhell characterized French fascism as follows: "A movement of revolt, fascism drew its dynamism from its 'disruptive power,' its total rejection of bourgeois society with its political and social structures and values"; fascists "offered a brand of neo-idealism that put the spiritual above the material" (Sternhell 1976, pp. 337, 339).

Sternhell's explanation of the anti-bourgeois character of French fascism clearly applies to the German case as well: "In addition to a political revolution, fascism sought to bring about a moral revolution, a profound transformation of the human spirit. Not only the fate of the nation was at issue, but also the destiny of civilization: [fascism]… was animated by a desire to create a new type of man, characterized by the classically antibourgeois virtues of heroism, energy, alertness, a sense of duty, a willingness to sacrifice, and an acceptance of the idea of preeminence of the community over the individuals who compose it" (Sternhell 1986, pp. 270–71).[30]

French fascist intellectuals fought democracy, capitalism, and the bourgeoisie because they regarded them "as aspects of the 'materialist' sickness eating away at French society" (Sternhell 1986, p. xiii; Payne 1995, p. 8). In Germany and France, the existence of the bourgeoisie was considered to have lessened the strength of the nation. In the German case, the inherent antagonism of the Nazi Party and Nazi regime towards its reactionary nationalist establishment might be accorded greater weight, for it undoubtedly was a decisive factor in accounting for the popularity first of the Nazi movement and then, after 1933, of the Nazi regime. Anti-bourgeois proclamations contained an implicit social revolutionary component: the Nazis' anti-establishment propaganda made the NSDAP more acceptable to the working classes, in particular since the socialists had similar slogans.

Conclusion

As we have seen, the relationship between reactionary nationalism (in the form of the conservative DNVP and the vilified "bourgeoisie"), on the one hand, and National Socialism, on the other, was lopsided. Already during the last phase of the Weimar Republic, the DNVP did its best to minimize friction between itself and the Nazi Party. During the period of the NSDAP/DNVP coalition government, the Nazis predominated. DNVP leaders showed forbearance when confronted with often brutal attacks on the party's members, the unseating of German National mayors, and ongoing encroachments on German National strongholds (Beck 2011, pp. 645–80). The conservative-nationalist elites would continue this behaviour with few exceptions until at least 1938, whereby support often went far beyond paying lip service to their Nazi masters.[31]

The picture changes dramatically when the relationship is considered from the Nazi angle: distrust, contempt, and even hatred for the despised "reactionaries" prevailed. Pronounced already during the last phase of the Republic, negative attitudes gathered momentum after the last Weimar Reichstag election on 5 March 1933, when the NSDAP substantially augmented its popular support (from 33.1 to 43.9% of the electorate, with an increase from 196 to 288 deputies), while the DNVP stagnated (roughly 8% and 52 deputies).[32] Now all caution was cast aside as the NSDAP increasingly attacked and vilified German Nationals and affiliated DNVP organizations. These attacks had ideological foundations, indicating that the anti-conservatism of the NSDAP, as well as its social egalitarian fervour, has been seriously underrated. The National Socialists' disparagement and

vilification of the bourgeoisie also could not fail to make their party more attractive to the less fortunate masses, just as their social egalitarian discourse opened up the prospect of advancement for those who had long felt stifled by social constraints. The promise that society would now be open to talent and merit may have convinced many that Germany would become increasingly socially egalitarian. This component of Nazi propaganda and policy added greatly to the popularity of National Socialism after 1933.

Notes

1. Joseph Goebbels, "Das patriotische Bürgertum", *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte* 1 (1930): 221–29, esp. 225.
2. "Von Harzburg nach Braunschweig", *Der Angriff*, 21 October 1931; "Die nationale Opposition", *Der Angriff*, 19 December 1931; Bracher (1964, pp. 10–413).
3. Bundesarchiv (BA) Berlin-Lichterfelde, Pressearchiv Reichslandbund: NSDAP und DNVP, R 8034 II, no. 9030, 7–9, 14, 15, 17, 19.
4. The anti-bourgeois thrust of Nazism was directed at the *haute* (not the "petty") *bourgeoisie*, that is, the *Wirtschaftsbürgertum* (entrepreneurs and managers in industry, commerce, banking, and business) and the *Bildungsbürgertum*, including secondary school teachers, lawyers, doctors, the Protestant clergy, university professors, engineers, and higher civil servants. Beginning in the 1840s, members of these two groups set themselves apart from the petty bourgeois milieu.
5. "Wer ist Sieger? Das Versagen des Bürgertums im Kampf gegen den Marxismus", *Völkischer Beobachter*; Bundesarchiv (BA) Koblenz, ZSg. 103, *Sammlung Lauterbach*, no. 795: "NSDAP und Bürgertum".
6. BA Koblenz, ZSg. 103, *Sammlung Lauterbach*, no. 795 (Note 9).
7. BA Berlin Lichterfelde, Akten der Reichskanzlei: NSDAP, R 34 II, no. 1195, 211–35; BA Koblenz, Nachlass Hugenberg: Ausschreitungen der NSDAP gegen DNVP Mitglieder, NL 1231, no. 89; and Hermann Beck, "Konflikte zwischen Deutschnationalen und Nationalsozialisten während der Machtergreifungszeit", *Historische Zeitschrift* 292 (2011): 645–80.
8. BA Berlin-Lichterfelde, DNVP: Politischer Schriftwechsel, R 8005, no. 19, 6.
9. 9 March 1933 at BA Berlin-Lichterfelde, "Reichskanzlei, NSDAP", R 43 II, no. 1195, 136.
10. BA Berlin-Lichterfelde (Note 13), 138, 144 verso.
11. BA Berlin-Lichterfelde, "DNVP, Politischer Schriftwechsel 1933", R 8005, no. 19, 146–53.
12. Joseph Goebbels, "Das patriotische Bürgertum", *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte* 1 (1930): 221–29, esp. 222.

13. In France, for example, Nazism appeared less menacing than Prussianism. As late as 1936, Bertrand de Jouvenel contrasted "Nazi good-naturedness" with "Prussian formality" and expressed an admiration for Nazi egalitarianism (Sternhell 1986, p. xix).
14. Walther Schmitt, "Unser Wille zum deutschen Sozialismus", *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte* 35 (February 1933): 82–86, esp. 84.
15. Wilhelm Frick, "Der Sinn unserer Zeit", *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte* 39 (June 1933: p. 245).
16. F. O. Bilse, "Die sittliche Forderung in Nationalsozialismus", *Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte* 39 (June 1933): 263–76.
17. Ibid., pp. 267–69.
18. Schmitt, "Wille" (Note 18), 85.
19. BA Berlin-Lichterfelde, Pressearchiv Reichslandbund, R 8034 II, no. 9030, 185.
20. "Das Ende des Bürgers", at BA Berlin-Lichterfelde, Reichslandbund Pressearchiv, ibid., 183.
21. In his classic *Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland* (Munich, 1968), 426, Ralf Dahrendorf referred to Germany as the classic country of "*Statusformalisierung*".
22. The following quotations are taken from Hürter (2016, pp. 165–87).
23. For details of sentences, see Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe, Bestand 507: Sondergericht Mannheim; Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Wiesbaden, Section. 461: Sondergericht Frankfurt.
24. Since its inception in March 1935, *Das Schwarze Korps* (circulation in 1944: 750,000) presented itself as the advocate of a "true, pure National Socialism" and set ideological standards. See Benz et al. (1997, p. 722).
25. General clauses are legal provisions that established general legal principles, whereby general interpretations were left to the discretion of the judge.
26. This is demonstrated in detail by Bernd Rüthers in his classic study on the development of civil law in the Third Reich: Rüthers (2012, esp. pp. 111–36, 144–82, 216–69, 351–430).
27. See Adolf Hitler (1936, pp. 47–48, 110, 190–91, 366–67, 409, 450, 538, 548, 595, 609, 744).
28. In the English edition, *Hitler's Table Talk, 1941–1944*, preface by Trevor-Roper (2000, pp. 107–8, 133–37, 397, 484), "upper class" is used interchangeably with "bourgeoisie". See also Hitler's statement, "For me the top hat is identical with the bourgeoisie", in Jochmann (2000, p. 51).
29. Speech of 16 December 1925, quoted in Zitelmann (1990, p. 157).
30. For the best general definition of fascism, see Payne (1980, pp. 3–21; 1995, pp. 3–23).
31. These exceptions were conservative officers who turned against the regime first in 1938 and then again during the second half of the war. On the background and mentality of senior army officers who supported the Nazi regime, see Hürter (2007).

32. Since the 81 deputies of the banned Communist party had been arrested or gone underground, the 288 Nazi deputies alone held an absolute majority. The DNVP had become redundant.

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CHAPTER 6

Paths of Political Right-Wing Thinkers in South America in the Early Twentieth Century: Problems and Questions

Fernando J. Devoto

This paper is very much less than an academic paper. It must be considered as a presentation of some ideas to promote a discussion about the political traditions of the right wing in South America, including more general considerations on Latin America from a more Western global perspective. At the proposed level of generalization, these ideas maybe cannot be discussed in the field of empirical evidence and put them in the field of conjecture and perspective.

Thinking About Historiography

Initially, we have at least two possibilities. The first one is a theoretical perspective. The second one is to begin with an empirical, historical approach. In the first case, we could argue that history is, or, to put it a better way, could be, an idiographic kind of science and that, whether we focus

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attention on differences or singularities, each extreme right is different from another.

But we could move away from Windelband, or more generally from a neo-Kantian point of view, but not stray too far, and remember the contextualist approach from Geertz (1973) to Pocock (1989)—new hermeneutics or new historicism. In this case, the point is that, even if we perceive formal similarities between two political phenomena placed in different points of time and space, the contexts are crucial to decode or understand (*verstehen*) the problem. In an extreme formulation, the question is put by Jorge Luis Borges in his very well-known short story, "Pierre Menard autor del Quijote" (1974, pp. 444–50). Borges argues that the same text, word for word, is another text as if it has been written by other hands at another time.

We must point out, however, that the problem of the scale that we use to analyse the process remains: macro-regional, national or subnational, i.e. the extreme right in Europe versus the extreme right in Latin America or extreme right in each country as different from another, as in Castilians versus Catalonians, etc. The problem cannot be neglected if we remember the pitfall of ancient *historicism:* its organic conception of a nation as a self-sufficient framework given by meaning.

What we said about space could be extended to time: i.e. extreme right between the two wars or in second post-war (a European periodization). Anyway, in the discussion about periodization between realists and conventionalists, the latter give us a useful approach in arguing about the links between the question posed and the periodization chosen. In this sense, if we search the specifics of the South American case, a different periodization must be proposed. But the time question could also help us to reflect on the changing perspectives that historians such as Benedetto Croce (1938) or Reinhardt Koselleck (1997) teach. In this sense, cross, transnational or global approaches are not better approaches, but only different ones, and are like the old ones although submitted to social and cultural changes in the perception of intellectual processes.

However, we could choose another way, under the influx of social sciences and nomological approaches: that is, a search for a minimum of common traits between different cases. A comparison is here the key instrument. But comparison to what? To better identify the singularities of my own case study or to identify, under Durkheimian surveillance, the regularities that could help us to speak about the kind of common experiences or ideas that could be integrated into a definition of nationalism or fascism or in its

framework? In other words, the common features of all the cases considered (Rossi 1990; Tilly 1984).

However, we could go in another direction, with Max Weber, if we assume that the results of the search of regular or common traits are not instruments to identify some impossible "true" extreme right, but only a model or ideal type to better understand specific historical extreme rights.

Another strategy is to leave aside the epistemological choice and do what the historians usually do, presenting only some initial thoughts based on fragmentary historical or historiographical research. In this sense, we can use some examples from old times that refer to the same question: the singularity of the South American case.

In 1956, a few months after the fall of the first Perón regime, Gino Germani wrote an article entitled "La integración de las masas a la vida política y al totalitarismo", where he developed the idea of the differences between Peronism and European totalitarianism (Fascism, Nazism). Germani focused on many questions, such as the difference between the class support or the benefits that the popular classes received from Perón and Peronism in their social integration in political and cultural life, or the recognition by the working classes of their power and of their rights. It was impossible then, for Germani, to compare the simulation of participation that Fascism discourse suggests with the real participation that the Peronism gave to the working class in Argentina.

There is a point of departure of the strong idea of Germani: in Latin America, not only in Argentina but also in the Vargas' regime in Brazil and in other cases, we must speak about populism, not about fascism. As he reminds the readers, it was the fact that he lived under Fascism and under Peronism that opened his eyes to see the differences between the two regimes. As he wrote in the introduction of his late book in 1978: "the personal experience (…) provided an emotional and existential background far more effective than any conceptual construct" (Germani 2003, p. 28).

In 1963, after his first trip to Latin America, Eric Hobsbawm wrote that he discovered "a continent made to undermine conventional truths". In this sense, he argued in a crucial article, "Latin America. The Most Critical Area in the World": "It will, therefore, be clear, that any attempt to analyse Latin American politics in European terms merely creates confusion. The confusion becomes even worse when we judge them not merely by our standards but by our preferences; (…) To make sense of the countries between the Rio Grande and Cape Horn, we have to look at them, not in our light, but in theirs" (Hobsbawm 2016, p. 4). Among other examples,

he specified the vision of fascism and fascists that, he argued, Europeans identify as the "men directly inspired by Hitler and Mussolini". But, Hobsbawm notes, referring to the case of MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario) revolution of 1952: "In Bolivia a coalition of local followers of the Nazis, less classifiable as nationalists and Trotskyists, made a social revolution that nationalized the mines, distributed the land to the peasants, and gave equality to the Indians". But he could have also highlighted other heterodox blends, as the Chileans Partido Agrario Laborista or the Partido Nacional Socialista, the latter being supporters of the Popular Front in 1938.

I don't want to go so far here. I only want to emphasize that one of the greatest Marxists historians and one of the fathers of the sociology of modernization, gave us a picture of the political process in Latin America with many common traits and far from canonical European models. Clearly, in Germani's view European and Latin American experiences could be considered as different types of authoritarian regimes but this is less clear in Hobsbawm. Both propositions could be included in the climate of the 1950s and the 1960s in Latin America and could be linked to the idea of established, clear distinctions between the centre and peripheral paths of economic and political development.

Ideas from the Extreme West

In the search for the different roots of European and South American political ideas and models, we can reflect on some specific traits of the latter. First of all, we need to consider the nineteenth-century heritage. It is difficult to disagree that the more general characteristics of Latin American countries, after independence, were instability, war and a new kind of personal leadership. The collapse of the urban elites and the downfall of administration and juridical order promoted the emergence of new more peasant leaderships that, nevertheless, had no less difficulty in imposing stable and lasting political governments. Brazil must be excluded from this picture—even if we take into account the many defeated revolts, especially during the Regency period—because the absence of an independence war and the continuity of the imperial structure permitted an institutional continuity. In other cases, however, there are many differences between the degree of violence and discontinuity, less strong in countries like Chile or Colombia, and stronger in other ones, as in Bolivia or Venezuela.

If the bases of support of this nineteenth-century leadership were of a rural nature, and the military fortune in wars with non-professional armies, the choices and the possibilities were different between the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. The economic, social and cultural links with European "civilization", in a climate of trust, promoted to a lesser extent an urban peripheral and often superficial "modernity". This new course was promoted by many external factors and under the stimulus of the expansion of central capitalist economies, but also because finally there was a minimum order to sustain "trade". As Joseph Conrad wrote in "Nostromo", it was an order that enables "the conditions of civilized business" (Conrad 1904).[1] This idea implies not the suppression of personal leadership, but more often its transformation, at least in the external traits (i.e. Antonio Guzman Blanco, Manuel Estrada Cabrera, Porfirio Diaz or Julio A. Roca). Later on, there were ruling elites, however, there were not what we could call a political system, nor political parties in the modern sense, with minimum organization, policy targets and an established bureaucracy—with the exception of Chile and Uruguay and to a lesser degree Argentina.

One of the books that perhaps better summarized and conceptualized this long run of Latin America personal and authoritarian leadership was "Cesarismo democrático", by Laureano Vallenilla Lanz (1991). Although the book was published in 1919, its key idea, "el gendarme necesario", was formulated in 1911 (Díaz Nieva 2010, p. 96; Lasarte Valcárcel 2008, p. 334ff.). The idea of Vallenilla was that in Latin America between the impersonal laws that are not linked with customs or environment and the personal prestige of the caudillo, only the latter could guarantee social and political order. An order legalized by the plebeian social support to the "caudillo" and by its popular origins (that means "democratic"). With satisfaction, Vallenilla not only suggested that the idea of "democratic cesarism" was formulated before fascism, but also that the legendary dictator Juan Vicente Gómez, who inspired him, arrived in power in 1908, many years before Mussolini. The Vallenilla "precedence" was defended also by the Cuban essayist and journalist Lamar Schweyer, another late supporter of positivist and social Darwinists schemes, and a follower of the old "scientific" thinkers, such as the Argentinians Carlos Octavio Bunge and Lucas Ayarragaray, who wrote their major books at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Lamar Schweyer (1927, pp. 105–106) disagreed with Vallenilla over many points, and he considered Juan Vicente Gómez as a barbarian tyrant

opposed to the desired type of the "good Dictator", but he conceded in considering him as a pioneer in proposing an authoritarian personal political model. As Schweyer noted in 1927, the ideas of Vallenilla not only preceded George Valois ("L'Homme qui vient, philosophie de l'autorité"), but personal dictatorship was a Latin American solution (the "thirty tyrants" precede Mussolini) before it became a European one. Clearly, Vallenilla had a much more positive view than Schweyer of Mussolini, Miguel Primo de Rivera and other leaders of the European extreme right (he had also an interview with Mussolini in 1934 when his work was translated to Italian), but as Lamar Schweyer argued, his first political example came from Latin American. To some extent this was also the case of the Bolivian novelist Alcides Arguedas, another thinker with a strong positivistic and racialist background: his extended admiration of European dictators in the 1930s, including Hitler in a significant position, could be put in continuity with the authoritarian solutions that he proposed before the World War. For example, in his essay "Pueblo enfermo" (1909), he argued that the only solution for Bolivians was a providential man with all power (Lorente Medina 1986). However, Lamar Schweyer and Arguedas' arguments are quite different from Vallenilla ones: the multiple racial compositions and the "mestizo" question, based on the idea of the inferiority of the mixed races, sustained their ideas of the impossibility of democracy and of the necessity of authoritarian solutions linked with what Lamar Schweyer call the combination of biological and historical "laws" (Lamar Schweyer 1927, pp. 84–89).

Returning to Vallenilla, although he lived in Paris at the turn of the century, and even although his book was published in 1925 with an introduction by Marius André, former secretary of Charles Maurras, it's not so clear whether he received the intellectual influx of Maurras before the publication of his book, considering also that the latter was not a follower of the Caesarism idea. He seems to owe more to the French sociologists René Worms or the *dreyfusard* Celestin Bouglé. However, maybe it is possible to talk about parallelism and not about influence. The same could be said about Caesarism: it had a very extended diffusion in the second half of the nineteenth century in Europe, after its first presentation in Pierre August Romieu's book in 1850 (Momigliano 1960). The notion then arrived in many ways into the twentieth century, from Wilhelm Roscher, Ernest Renan to Max Weber, Robert Michels down to Antonio Gramsci. Vallenilla said that he took the expression "democratic cesarism" from French jurist, professor, and politician, Edouard Laboulaye (Vallenilla Lanz

1991, p. 145). Nevertheless, the idea could also be linked with the use of Caesarism in Robert Michels' book and with Ernest Renan's notion of the "bon" tyrant (or the intelligent, liberal or filantropique tyrant), both works being very well known by Vallenilla.[2]

However, if we search Latin American antecessors and not European ones, we could note that Vallenilla's notion was also closer to the precedent notion of the honest or illustrated dictator (Porfirio Díaz) by Justo Sierra and was contemporary to similar ideas of the Peruvian Francisco García Calderón (Les démocraties latines 1912), when in a less developed argumentation of the problem, he sustained that in Latin America "el espíritu nacional se concentra en los caudillos, los jefes absolutos y tiranos bienhechores" (García Calderón 1987, p. 49). According to García Calderón, this was the result of two convergent traditions towards personal caudillos: one was Spanish, the other one indigenous. But it was also the result of a kind of society not well structured, without well-defined classes and interest groups. Although García Calderón, who also lived in Paris, was a follower of Maurras group, for at least some time, we hardly detect a strong influence from the group. We can note here once again the classical names of Ernest Renan and Hyppolite Taine, the "original" positivists.

We should also point out that another Peruvian, the poet José Santos Chocano, wrote "Apuntes sobre la dictadura organizadora y la gran farsa democrática" in 1922. Here again we could mention that the idea was formulated in previous texts of Chocano, such as a letter of 1912, when he wrote referring to Peru: "Lástima del país que ni siquiera pueda contar con un tirano, con un gran Tirano".[3] Once again, his models were Latin American dictators, like Estrada Cabrera and especially Augusto Leguía, who supported him, but he also was attracted by Mexican revolutionary leaders, such as Venustiano Carranza and Pancho Villa. The case of Leguía, a Peruvian civil dictator who had close relations with the USA and had ambitions of economic reforms, was interesting, because he was a model for thinkers such as Chocano or Vallenilla but not for others like García Calderón.

Summarizing: as we can see, Vallenilla was not an isolated case, and the ideas of the impossibility of democracy or even of liberal political solutions had its own path in some or even many Latin American thinkers. They were visible also in Brazil, a country with a more autonomous intellectual development in the South America framework. In this case, the personal solutions were linked with the idea of a civil or republican dictator, as in the influent Brazilian jurist and sociologist, Francisco José de Oliveira Viana.

Viana, one of the leading authoritarian Brazilian thinkers in Vargas's era, published, in 1920, another seminal book: "**Populações** Meridionais do Brasil", a sociological essay that could be considered a crucial point in traditional and authoritarian ideas in Brazil (Viana 1987).

There is a long discussion about the intellectual mainstream of Viana. Many scholars noted the links with European racism and positivism mixed with Catholic traditionalism, others emphasized the relationship with Brazilian conservatives and imperial tradition. It is sure that Oliveira Viana's crucial role in the development of corporative labour legislation under Vargas in the 1930s was very close to Italian fascist models, but it is also possible that his interpretation of the Brazil problems, at least in the 1920s, was more linked with an idealized original past, the period from the second half of the nineteenth century to the end of the Empire that includes an "Iberian" comunitarism, a valued paternalistic rural society and a centralist political and statist tradition linked with the Empire. Also, for Oliveira Viana, as with many other authoritarians, despite his nostalgic vision of the Brazilian past, the State—and an authoritarian one—was the instrument to deal not only with the absence of self-government replaced by the local caudillo and his clients, but also with modernity fights (Murilho de Carvalho 2005, p. 210). We must also underline that the 1920s in Brazil were a momentum of strong nativist climate, in search of the so-called Brazilian original solutions for the Brazilian problems linked with a critique to intellectual predecessors, accused of cosmopolitism and the imitation of European ideas and models. This was also the case with the future strongest leader of Brazil's extreme right, Plínio Salgado.

Different motifs converge in the young Plínio Salgado: the Catholic "renaissance", the literary modernism and the works of Alberto Torres and Oliveira Viana, among others (Jaguaribe 1974). Despite his participation in the Partido Republicano Paulista until 1930, his ideas went towards an overcoming of the traditional political framework. Although, like the Argentinian Leopoldo Lugones, Salgado suggests that the European alternative was communism or fascism, he did not choose Mussolini over Lenin, as Lugones did: he denied both (Salgado 1927, p. 63ff.). The European crisis is a European question, argued Salgado, and the solution must be a Brazilian solution, linked to the construction of a new race. Here Salgado exalted the "Tupi" Indians and the mixed race between Indians and Whites ("the caboclo"). Once again, the crisis of 1930 was a watershed in Salgado's ideas (the year he met Mussolini in Rome) and the fascist model took a more important place. However, the Ação Integralista Brasileira, founded

by Salgado in 1932, tried to intellectually suggest a new movement in the family of the right-wing movements. The denial of anti-Semitism could be an example of a more general temperate situation that some Brazilian thinkers defined as "Leviathan anti-hobbesiano" or "Leviathan benevolente" (Laumonier 1990, pp. 370–71). This was very clear in one of the major theorists of the Integralismo, Miguel Reale: he admits the universal character of fascism, but he insists on the necessity to contemplate the local reality. In this sense, at least in its rhetoric, he denied racism, seen as a German question, and violence, seen as an Italian one (Jaguaribe 1974, pp. 255–61).

However, we cannot generalize the roles of Vallenilla, Lamar Schweyer, Arguedas, Chocano, García Calderón or Oliveira books neither the role of the autochthonous Latin American ideas and models. For example, in Argentina, when in 1924 Leopoldo Lugones proposed a military dictatorship as the solution to the Argentinian and Latin America problems, Italian fascism was the explicit influence: more Benito Mussolini or Giuseppe Bottai than Vallenilla or the nineteenth-century Argentinian "caudillos" (Lugones 1930, 1962). This project was seen by Lugones as an idea of a new order, a future order, not as a return to an idealized past.

The fact that some contemporary observers, such as Rufino Blanco Fombona, insists on a strong intellectual relation between Chocano and Lugones, or the fact that Chocano invited Lugones to pronounce the central discourse at the centenary of South America independence, maybe only reflects the influence of Lugones in Chocano, not the opposite. A similar European perspective could be traced, but by another intellectual way, if we open the pages of the Buenos Aires leading reactionary weekly, *La Nueva República*, closer to the Maurras circle ideas than to any other group. We have many European references and a few Latin America thinkers (Devoto 2003, Ch. IV). However, it is difficult to disagree that urban Argentina and especially Buenos Aires were in the first decades of the twentieth century the more European-oriented cultural space in Latin America.

More ambiguous is the situation in another classical book of the 1920s, Alberto Edwards' "La fronda aristocrática en Chile". From the originality of Edward's book, it could be noted that in Chile in the 1920s, nativism and Catholic traditionalist ideas were growing" (Cid and San Francisco 2010). In the original articles published in the leading conservative Journal of Chile, "El Mercurio", and compiled in a book in 1928, Edwards proposed an authoritarian, personal solution to the crisis provoked by democracy in Chile. As Edwards argued, the solution could be a kind of "regular and

organized" Caesarism, or a regular monarchy, "hereditaria o no" (Edwards 1928, pp. 294–308). The first one (but not "organized") was in his own words the typical Latin American solution after the independence.

Even if the two solutions were very similar and were considered so by Edwards, we could suggest the name of Maurras behind the last one and the name of Spengler behind the first one. Both authors were very well known and quoted by Edwards, even if the influence of Spengler seems stronger (Edwards 1928, pp. 58–63). However, some anti-Semitic traits in Edwards book, linking Jews, gold and *bourgeoisie*, came under Maurras' influence. Anyway, some historians underline some similarities between "La Fronda Aristocrática" and his "Bosquejo histórico de los partidos políticos chilenos" published in 1903 and, if that is the case, the intellectual framework must be rethought (Gazmurri 2006, pp. XXIX–XXXI). In his book, Edwards also insists on the peculiarity of Chilean history, saying that the country was different from other Latin America republics and closer to European history, in its successive stages. But the idea is strongly present also in the Argentinian right-wing intellectuals.

However, we can observe that also in Edwards' case the positive examples are not provided by European authoritarian politicians, but by Chileans nineteenth-century conservative authoritarian leaders such as Diego Portales and Manuel Montt. In this, and in other opinions, Edwards seems closer to Oliveira Viana's ideas. Once again, in Edwards perspective, they were very different from other Latin American authoritarian leaders and this was one of the points of his critics in the book of Lamar Schweyer, "Biología de la Democracia". Also, it is very well known that Edwards' book could be better understood if we see it as a support to the Chilean military Dictatorship of Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (1927–1931). A photo of General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo placed in the half-title of "La Fronda Aristocrática" not only shows the solution, but also indicates the person. Ibáñez's regime was, in fact, a mix of military support and plebiscite election, as in Louis Bonaparte's classical Caesarism model. However, Ibáñez's rise to power was probably inspired by the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera, not by that of Bonaparte. In any case, close relations were established between the regimes of Primo de Rivera and Ibáñez.

We could also note that even if Vallenilla is not quoted in the book, his thesis on "El gendarme necesario" could be indirectly traced back in the work of Lamar Schweyer. Also, some similarities could be noted between Edwards and Lugones, both partisans of dictators with military support. However, the argumentation of each one was not similar. Surely

both imagine the Caesarism solution as a response to democratic social and political process opened by Arturo Alessandri in Chile and Hipólito Yrigoyen in Argentina, but Edwards, under Spengler's influence, speaks about the "state in form" that seems some idiosyncratic Chilean characteristic. Lugones, for his part, even if he had a good opinion of military presidents in nineteenth-century Argentina, such as Bartolomé Mitre or Julio Roca, thought that it was impossible to return to that world. His idea was that Argentina needed an authoritarian new leadership supported by a new and better aristocracy (the Army). The names of the Generals Justo, initially, and Uriburu, finally, were chosen.

The solutions of Edwards and Lugones seem linked strongly with those of Vallenilla. Vallenilla not only defended an idea but also supported the very long dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez, great landowner, and military chief, but we can observe that in Argentina and Chile the armies were, from the beginning of the twentieth century, more professional than in Venezuela, and included military service based on obligatory male conscription, a system that was introduced slowly in Venezuela as a substitution of the "reclutamiento forzoso", between 1919 and 1933 (Guía 2009). We can note also that Gómez, even if he was a "General", had a classical nineteenth-century Army career, constructed in the battlefields without any formal instruction.

The Army was a powerful player and a political force in the South American states in the twentieth century, including "civil" Colombia and particularly in Bolivia and Ecuador, but which was almost absent in Uruguay. Surely Militarism is a big question in the South American right-wing movement but once again it is necessary to debate the question. As we see, under the word "Army" we could have many different things, including at least two military movements linked in the 1920s with leftish goals. That was the case of many groups inside the Brazilian "tenentismo", connected with communism, or the "socialist" coup d'état from Marmaduke Grove in Chile. Nevertheless, in these and in other dimensions, the role of the crisis of 1930 in Latin America is undeniable and so its influx in the growing of right-wing movements and, as we see, in the trespassing of authoritarian South American thinkers to an explicit support to European fascism. Here we have the cases of Argentinian Carlos Ibarguren or Uruguayan Luis Alberto de Herrera. The latter, the leader of one of the two big Uruguayan parties the "Blancos" (or National), mixed a rural conservative approach to politics with a strong defence of the Uruguayan and South American context as the adequate framework to understand the country. He also had

a very good knowledge of reactionary European thinkers but, once again, Burke or Taine, not Maurras (Reali 2015). However, during the 1930s, Herrera, like others, would become enthusiastic about European extreme right regimes, such as that of Franco or Italian fascism.

Whether or not they were imagining a military regime, the right intellectuals argued about the weakness of social links in Latin American societies, as a pretext to justify authoritarian personal solutions, but they were less clear about the institutional projects or about the political support. However, as in all the cases considered, the solutions proposed implied a central role of the State in redesigning politics and society.

Problems and Questions

At this point, it is necessary to ask some questions as we promised. The first one is that we presented examples from the beginning of the century and 1930. If the texts before the First World War provided good arguments to give a more complex picture of the relations between the roots of right-wing ideas in European and Latin America, the picture provided by the examples of the 1920s is more problematic. Here, even if many Latin American thinkers argued about the originality and native roots of their ideas, the influx of European authoritarian models as Italian fascism could not be denied, even if it is difficult to measure their weight. Surely, we can argue that in the first period we have a "proto-fascist" situation (Laumonier 1990, p. 361). But that kind of notion suggests not only the ineluctable subordination of the Latin American narratives to the European political vocabulary but also a necessary path that links those ideas to a future fascist movement or regime. We are less convinced today about historical necessary paths in this or in other fields, and anyway this is clearly not the case in South America. Maybe it is better to maintain that many authoritarian ideas and models in South American have a background in a previous climate of the European thought: the time of Positivism, scientism and biological racism. In this sense, it is maybe better to speak about parallelism, but also to remember that usually European ideas are received with backwardness in Latin American.

A second question is linked with the complexity. Usually, historians collect ideas or proposals that present formal similarities and are based more on an analogy than in verifiable links between them. These operations also insist on more informal common traits than in different ones and are used in a fragmentary way far from their linguistic or political contexts. But other

remarks, not historiographical but historical, must be emphasized. The first one is that right-wing groups and thinkers were very much more complex and heterogeneous than the picture I offered suggests. The existence of many deep intellectual and political native traditions behind the new rights in South America in the 1920s does not deny the impact of new ideas and models provided by the European crisis afterwards. Only one example: the preceding pages exhibit an extensive idea of Maurras and his circle in the South American thinkers in the 1920s, as though he was not isolated or hegemonic. In this broader picture, Brazil, and more especially, Argentina, provide examples of a more extensive diffusion of the Action Française, ideas linked with the new generation of "integrism" Catholic intellectuals. The latter were also present in many South American countries in the 1920s, as a part of Western Catholic "renaissance" and associated with the emergence of new urban social groups. The movement was particularly visible at least in intellectual circles in São Paulo, Buenos Aires and Santiago de Chile, sometimes, but not always, related with literary and artistic avant-gardes. I—like many others—insisted in the past on this transatlantic dimension. In this paper, I prefer to remember other local sources and other intellectual networks inside Latin America, often forgotten, and I remark that the Latin America thought is always a mix of different sources.

Third: the intellectual context. New cultural and intellectual phenomena of the 1920s in South America were also linked with the spiritual, but secular and progressive movement of youths emerging around the strong reform movement in university students. "Reformism" maybe was the first political phenomenon with an extended diffusion in the Hispanic American world and maybe also the most original one with respect to Europe. Reformists developed a rhetoric of European decadence inside a Latin American discourse. Clearly, young people were an emerging social factor before the First World War in Europe and in South America, but mainstream ideas, as well as context, were very different in both cases. In South America, younger reformists were often linked with new political forces around the emergence of a new middle class, pushing for social democratization and political inclusion. This political expression was a kind of party that the old Germani put in his "middle-class populism" (but included others social supports) like Radical parties in Argentina and Chile, "Batllismo" in Uruguay, APRA in Peru, and maybe we could add the Democratic Party in São Paulo (Germani 2003).

Four: beyond this and other differences, another major critical difference between European and South American experience (with the not

negligible exception of Spanish and Portugal) was the war. Certainly, the war had a crucial economic impact in the economy of the South American countries in ordinary lives, in wages, salaries and unemployment and in the development of urban social conflicts, such as the São Paulo "commune" (1917), the workers riots in Rio de Janeiro in 1918 or the so-called tragic week in Argentina in 1919. These conflicts also developed the idea of a revolutionary menace, but their real importance was far from the European perceptions and farther from the brutalization of politics provoked by the First World War in Europe.

Five: another difference is the weakness of the movements "from the bottom" (clearly the Mexican case is an exception). There were some rural movements, maybe with the characteristics of Hobsbawm "Primitive Rebels", and the urban working class was not so strong to be perceived as a not occasional but a lasting menace. This situation gives us a picture very different from the European one. Reading some of Argentina's right-wing weekly journals, and except for some specific moments (i.e. the so-called tragic week), it seems that the menace was more the "democratization" of customs, or of the university life, than the social revolution. Certainly, the invocation of Maurras is sometimes the theoretical caution, but the ideas seem to be a part of a more conservative approach that is similar to Ortega's approach in the 1920s, even if Ortega is not considered as a mentor in these years.

Six: another—obvious—remark is that the South American States or, more correctly, some regions inside these States present different levels of economic development, social complexity, political participation, and conflict, somewhat of an institutional development and bureaucratization, including political parties that are not well established, and other civil society institutions.

Binary schemes don't fit a wide range of national situations. However, summarizing, we can argue that there is a difference between the three countries of the extreme south (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) and the others. Of course, some areas of Brazil were well developed and had a complex urban life, including significant levels of workers' social conflict, as in São Paulo after the First World War, but the political system was weak and the middle-class mobilization very low. The fact that the first party in a "modern" sense was Ação Integralista Brasileira in the 1930s shows that many think about the history of political parties in South America as different from European ones. And what about the idea of the Unique

Party, so strong in European right wing? It was almost absent in South America.

On the other hand, Uruguay was the only country where a civil political system consolidated, and where a secular, urban party took control of the government, ending with an endemic civil war in 1904, and then developing a successful disciplinary process under a "civilization" discourse. Uruguay's exceptional situation also includes conservative reactionaries, but inside the two-party system. When an authoritarian government with some traits inspired in Italian fascism took power in 1933 in Uruguay, the process was developed inside the major traditional political party, the urban and "liberal" Partido Colorado (Caetano and Jacob 1989).

Before that, it is possible to establish the difference between two quite ideal types of South American countries, with regard to the political experiences. Ones countries, with a long record of violence, instability and authoritarian leadership (such as Venezuelan dictator Juan Vicente Gómez, who commanded between 1908 and 1935), and others countries, in which the problems were linked with the change from oligarchical regimes to democratic ones, with or without electoral reforms, such as in Argentina and in Chile. However, there are many differences between the others, related to different levels of political pressure, social conflict or elites' confrontation.

Seven: on the other hand, regarding a mythical retrospective like the Peruvian journal "Amauta", we discover that under Mariategui's approval, it is linked with a new political agenda, the avant-garde aesthetics with a critic of profound social problems.[4] But these problems are not European classical problems, as the title of the review suggests.

Considering the positivistic heritage and all Latin American history, we forgot to remark on the crucial role of racial diversity and racial latent or explicit conflict. The race problem was not only a question in the countries that Darcy Ribeiro call "New peoples" or in the "Testimony peoples" (Ribeiro 1992): with a different degree, it was a crucial question in all Latin America countries.

We can see the problem of the uncritical importation of European schemes by Latin America historians from another example. Many right-wing intellectuals imported anti-Semitism, among other European ideas, but was anti-Semitism the crucial question or was it hostility to European immigration? The question concerns not only nationalist intellectuals but in general, public opinion. Certainly, if we read the press, Jews and other European and Asian groups were visible problems in some countries. But in everyday life, a racial thought and more often racial practices, including

prejudices, segregation and violence, were more linked with mulatto, mestizo, black and Indians groups, than with any other group. Surely, as i.e. in "Amauta", the racial question is also the social question, but here we have again a classical South American situation. In the world of writings, and not only here, we have a complex blend.

Notes

1. The passage was underlined by Malcolm Deas.
2. Laureano Vallenilla Lanz, "Cesarismo democrático y cesarismo teocrático", 4 November 1920, in Vallenilla Lanz (1991, p. 161); Michels (1914) and Renan (1925).
3. José S. Chocano a José de la Riva Agüero, quoted by Yankelevich (2000, p. 148).
4. *Amauta. Revista mensual de doctrina, literatura, arte, polémica* is online available at http://digital.iai.spk-berlin.de/viewer/resolver?identifier=IAI00005410000000000&field=MD_IAIPURL, 9 July 2017.

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PART II

Fascisms

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CHAPTER 7

Fascism and Fascists in Italy

Patrizia Dogliani

Historiography: Fascism or Fascists?

Italian Fascism still remains the most studied topic in Contemporary Italian History. In fact, after at least three waves and generations of studies and approaches, it seems that today the studies on Italian Fascism are more liberated from ideological debates and more subjected to a public discourse. A new generation of historians is undertaking new researches free from the historiographical schools in the past that have conditioned the approaches and the topics during the Italian "first republic".

The first generation of historians, faithful to anti-Fascism ideals, to the Constitution spirit and to the constitutional and anti-fascist parties, emerged from the Resistance (mainly connected to Christian, Socialist, Communist and Actionist parties) and shared a long debate on the nature of Fascism that lasted approximately thirty years. That debate focused more on the inability of the *Risorgimento* (the so-called rebirth of Italy with its unification) and the liberalism to create a modern State and a nation. It

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is fundamental to remember that the Italian historiography on Fascism is very precocious, it comes from the 1920s to 1930s when the domestic and abroad exile was already analyzing it, when Benedetto Croce, Gaetano Salvemini, Luigi Sturzo, Silvio Trentin, Angelo Tasca and Palmiro Togliatti were already writing the militant reconstruction of the origins and nature of Fascism. The debate also touched the consequent lack of a mature democracy inherited by the Republic after World War II (the so-called unfinished *Risorgimento* and the betrayed Resistance). The result was the analysis of this first generation focusing on the beginning and the end of the fascist period: the early 1920s and the early 1940s.

The second generation was defined by the debate around Renzo De Felice's interpretation of Fascism. His studies broke a tradition interfering with his "a-fascist" study on Fascism, and provoking, on one side, a strong reaction by the anti-fascist generation of historians and intellectuals that grew up after the war (Guido Quazza, Enzo Santarelli, Paolo Alatri, Piero Carocci, Enzo Collotti, Valerio Castronovo, Giorgio Rochat, Giovanni Miccoli and Nicola Tranfaglia, among others) and, on the other side, an instrumental use of this work from the post-fascist Right. De Felice's biography of Mussolini as a collective biography of Fascism was a *chef-d'oeuvre* in reassessing Mussolini as a statesman, but also an important way to acquit an entire nation and people, and partly to acquit the fascist ruling class. In addition to his impressive biography, he gave interviews to press and television journalists to guarantee this perspective. The American Michael Ledeen edited the most famous of these interviews. In it, De Felice justified Fascism defending it from several accusations and tried to reduce its responsibility in anti-Semitism and in the collaboration with Nazism, supporting the popular interpretation of a *good* Fascism until it was influenced and forced by the *bad* Nazism.

De Felice turned around the classic interpretation given by Gaetano Salvemini and his post-war school about the limits of the liberal system after World War I and also about the incompleteness of democracy in the building of the Republic. The purpose was to legitimate the idea that Fascism was no worse than the liberal State nor the republican State. In his 1975 interview with Ledeen, De Felice stated that the modernization of Italy introduced by Italian Fascism had successfully survived in the Republic, within the creation of a state industry and a welfare system. The fascist ruling class was indeed illiberal, as he recognized, but are we sure that it was, in everything else, so much worse than the present one? And as he

also questioned: Could be the fascist bureaucracy's sense of State and civil duties inferior to the republican one?

De Felice seemed to purposely disregard the studies about the reactionary mass regimes, conducted by historians such as George Mosse, whom De Felice himself introduced to Italy. He did not take sides with regard to the approach which maintains that Fascism was not only an illiberal, despotic and bonapartist system, which was achieved through the transformation of the State apparatus (bureaucracy, army, police), by the permanent exclusion and violent repression of opponents and by the creation of a compulsory mass consensus.

The exchange between Italian and foreign historiography helped to overcome the domestic disputes and it was fruitful, especially as regards to the meeting between English and US-American literature. A first historiography arrived in Italy in the 1970s, partly inspired by Gramsci's pages and it gave an important contribution to studies about Fascism, mostly focusing on the crisis of the liberal State and the rise to power of the fascist movement in agrarian areas of the Po Valley and the South of Italy. It was represented by Paul Corner, Adrian Lyttelton, Frank Snowden, Francis J. Demers, Alice Kelikian and Anthony L. Cardoza. Others introduced cultural history and the question of consent, such as David Forgacs and Victoria De Grazia. Some questions raised in the 1970s remained outlined for a long time without having been confirmed in research, and consequently, they generated the historiographical lacunae of the 1980s. When a new generation of historians approached the history of Fascism in the late 1980s and especially in the 1990s, they found the Anglo-American historiography more profitable than De Felice's work and his dispute with the anti-fascist historiography. It must be recognized that De Felice's biography remains today very useful and important due to its richness of documentation, despite its interpretation. De Felice was favoured more than other historians by the access to public and private archives and papers' legacies, and he and his school had therefore the opportunity to inquire into several important personalities of the regime as Dino Grandi, Giuseppe Bottai and Galeazzo Ciano, and also to publish their correspondences and journals.

During the 1990s, the new approach to Fascism by cultural history fascinated the Italian and foreign historiography: starting with Luisa Passerini's *Mussolini immaginario* (1991), followed by Emilio Gentile's *Culto del Littorio* (1994) and ending with Sergio Luzzatto's *Il corpo del duce* (1998). These works represented a turning point still evident in the wave of studies

during the first decade of 2000 until the collective work edited by Stephen Gundle and Christopher Duggan: *The Cult of the Duce* (2013).

The main fact is that, even overcoming the hypothesis of De Felice's work, "a dictatorship in a Man", the biography of Mussolini remains the most explored profile of a fascist leader by non-Italian historians, such as Dennis Mack Smith (1983), Pierre Milza (1999), Richard J. B. Bosworth (2002), Peter Neville (2004), Didier Musiedlak (2005), Wolfgang Schieder (2015) and other non-academic historians like Max Gallo. Most of the historians of Fascism have a biography of Mussolini in their backgrounds. There is a kind of competition in writing about Mussolini and an attempt to compare studies about him to other masterpieces written by biographers of dictators, in particular Ian Kershaw on Hitler or Paul Preston on Franco, without mentioning several important biographers of Stalin. There are very few scientific monographic profiles of important members of the fascist Party, in comparison with this great production of Mussolini's biographies, including the apologetic ones.

Some biographies of the *Gerarchi* (the fascist leaders) were assigned to journalists, like Giordano Bruno Guerri, who tried to valorize the personality and the action of several members of Fascism in a kind of "revisionist project". So, after the first collective book by Ferdinando Cordova on *Uomini e volti del fascismo* (1976) and the biography of Giuseppe Bottai by the American Alexander J. De Grand (1978), very few fascist personalities have been studied by historians. They were mostly an extension of researchers on specific fields, such as the historian of the army and colonialism Giorgio Rochat on the *squadrista*, minister of aviation and governor of Libya, Italo Balbo (1986, he was also studied by the American C. G. Segrè) and the historian of fascist culture Gabriele Turi on the philosopher and minister Giovanni Gentile (1995). Only recently a new generation of historians have shown an interest in this biographical argument and keep going back to it. For instance, Saverio Battente, Matteo Di Figlia and Giulia Albanese have found a particular interest in nationalists and the first wave of fascists, such as Alfredo Rocco, Piero Marsich and Alfredo Cucco. The non-academic historian Brunella Della Casa has been exploring the life and destiny of one of the most interesting members of the *squadrismo* (squads movement) in the Po Valley: Leandro Arpinati, *ras* of Bologna and a kind of "fascist rebel".[1]

An Imperfect Totalitarianism

A lack of analysis still remains on the entire Italian ruling class between the wars, both at a national and even at a local level. In the overlapping of the State and Party, the most important civil service was given by the first wave of fascists who went on to enlarge the ranks of public administration. Consequently, studies on the fascist State must be referred to. Alberto Aquarone's study on the *Organizzazione dello stato totalitario*, which was published in 1965, is still the main reference, followed by some good approaches to the subject made by Marco Palla and Didier Musiedlak. Finally, there is also the very recent analysis given by the most important historian of institutions, Guido Melis (2018). A step forward was made in the 1990s by Emilio Gentile's books on the relationship between the fascist Party and the State; unfortunately Gentile's history of the Party covers only the first years of its life: 1919–1922.[2]

Starting with the crucial year of 1928, at the building of the totalitarian State based on a new legislation called *leggi fascistissime* (very fascist laws), high executives in important national offices, like Foreign and Interior Offices, were recruited from the National Fascist Party (PNF) ranks. In the following years, this praxis slowed down and since 1932 they were only requested for political loyalty, moral attitudes and a card for the Party. As the members of the fascist movement and the selective nationalist party (which reached the PNF in 1923) came from socialism, like Mussolini, or from nationalism, liberalism, anarco-syndicalism, tradunionism, etc., it's very difficult to understand the nature of Fascism and which trend or group prevailed on the others in each sector of the State–Party. A 1950s enquiry revealed that the direction of the Party remained quite the same during the *Ventennio*, the twenty years of the regime, from 1921 to 1943. About 80% of the 709 provincial secretaries (*Federali*) that alternated at the local party organization belonged to the first wave of fascists who emerged at the March on Rome in October 1922, and what is more they mainly came from the middle class. Instead it is possible to identify a late generation of fascists, very young people, growing up in the youth organization: Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB) transformed into Gioventù Italiana del Littorio (GIL) in 1937 and into their political "schools" organized by the Gruppi Universitari Fascisti (GUF). The first wave of fascists was mostly formed by people coming from an emerging low middle class, mainly veterans of the Great War, joining together the right wing and extreme left in a new subversive and revolutionary movement. Once in power, they were joined by a

spontaneous and enthusiastic participation of a group of technocrats, some of which were disillusioned by socialism. An evident case was the agronomist Arrigo Serpieri, who introduced the *bonifica integrale*, the total reclaiming of the land in fascist agrarian politics during the mid-1920s.

The level of consent is still under study, because researchers are looking for "spies" that also give evidence of dissent, a silent dissent corresponding to an a-fascist attitude shown by part of the bourgeoisie and especially by the working class in their private and daily life. Here is another difference from Nazism. Even if Fascism tried to create a welfare state with the support of various *Opere* (Agencies for childhood, maternity, youth, veterans, etc.), and even if the propaganda films showed squares full of people and enthusiastic crowds, the inability of Fascism to build a new political system and to create a true welfare state in the 1930s limited the consent. The question of consent remains then the most questionable. Studying fascists along their common stages and ideology (Fascism as a movement and ideology, a violent seizure of power, a compulsory making of new State and community, a creation of consent Paxton 1998) has helped to articulate and compare the different national experiences, but the nature of consent is still difficult to understand. In this case, if they are compared too much, there is a risk to remain in a study of a generic approach to Fascism that is more doctrinal than historical.[3] The problem of consent is the trickiest question in the history of the Italian Fascism. If De Felice's thesis is accepted: the social basis of Fascism was the middle class in its attempt to assert itself as a new class, and a new presence, a third force indeed between the working class and the liberal *haute bourgeoisie*, there is still a deficit of comprehension about the nature of the popular support given by popular classes to the regime and the disillusion silently shown by a part of the middle classes in the 1930s.

The recent historiography has advanced very little in this analysis, distinguishing among an outside support or consent, a passive acceptance or participation, and an "active involvement in positions of authority (mobilization) in the fascist project to transform Italian society". Viewed from this angle and perspective, Tommaso Baris asserts: "simply claims of middle-class 'consent' in favour of regime do not suffice to describe the relationship between the middle strata of society and Fascism" (Baris 2012, p. 71). The new studies on public opinion in periphery have the purpose to test the real capacity of Fascism in keeping the consent achieved at the end of the 1920s,[4] after the elimination of all political opposition. In the middle of the 1930s, a real change could be found, when the regime had a "totalitarian

turn", a new type of politics with a new style, shaping the idea of a "new man" and also trying to introduce anti-bourgeois polemics and language to conquest the popular masses. The competition with the most dynamic Nazi model in Europe and the difficulties to overcome the concealing of economic crises suggested a search for a new politics: the totalitarian turn. "By the mid-1930s the fascist regime was at an ideological dead-end" (De Grand 2004, p. 136). Imperialism, colonialism, aggressive politics in Europe, racism and anti-Semitism reopening the Party's and movement's doors to youth and women and so on: these were the identified solutions for widening the participation in the fascist totalitarian experiment.

Generations of Fascists

In my book *Il Fascismo degli Italiani* (2008 and 2014),[5] I suggested to take this question up again under the analysis of generations. Age, education and backgrounds (economic, social, political and cultural features) are essential to understand who the fascists were. Starting with their dates of birth and their political origins, a first generation of leaders could already be defined at a national level. They were the generation of the Great War and the March on Rome, led by a generation of slightly older people, born in the 1880s. If Giovanni Gentile (1875) and Giovanni Giuriati (1876) are excluded from this list, those born in the 1880s were Mussolini, Bianchi and General Graziani. They were followed by a second generation only somewhat younger, but without the experience of the war: Ciano, Pavolini and Muti (the latter two were secretaries of the PNF during the war and the Republic of Salò). The first and second generations were influenced by nationalism and by "maximalist" and revolutionary socialism and syndicalism. Fascism was a young movement made by young people, mainly coming from lower middle and popular classes—militants, intellectuals, journalists, former officers from low army ranks—and not from liberal professions or from families with patrimonies or nobility pedigrees. Only a few came from the working class. Once in power, hundreds of thousands of people joined the PNF, up to October 1925, when the Party closed the ranks. Then, after 1927, only young people between 18 and 21 years of age were admitted, after their training in the youth organizations, with a few exceptions for categories of civil servants.

Some aspects are going to be considered from the analysis of nearly a thousand biographical profiles of men who held managerial and representative roles, both at the centre and the periphery, in the Party, the fascist

unions and important duties in the ruling of the State and in the Mussolini governments after 1924. During the *Ventennio*, the responsibilities were largely assumed by people born in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, mainly between 1889 and 1899. Bottai and Grandi were born in 1895; Balbo in 1896; Arpinati in 1892; the secretary of Mussolini, Bastianini in 1899. It was a generation who, at barely twenty years of age, wanted and welcomed the war with enthusiasm. One of them, Camillo Pellizzi (1896–1976), was one of the few truly "organic" fascist intellectuals. He fought in World War I; he was a student at Pisa University, where he was influenced by the Gentile's idealism and *La Voce*'s culture and a scholar in Great Britain for nearly twenty years, where he founded the Fascio of London in 1921. In 1925, Pellizzi identified himself with a new "historic" generation because he had lived the same experiences in politics and war, had made the same choices, had done the same readings and had had the same mentors. This generation had become the new elite. Before the war, Pellizzi said: "We had our new mentors. For socio-political problems, we quote Sorel for example; in Sociology, Pareto; in Economics, Pantaleoni. In Philosophy, it can be said that modern philosophy from […] Bergson to […] Gentile. But we didn't have the religiosity yet, because we didn't have the character […]. The important experience was the war and it was precisely in the war where the character of the new generation began to form. If I may say so, this new character is Fascism". A year later, another representative of this generation, Roberto Cantalupo, born in 1891, from Naples and a monarchic, considered Fascism "the first organic and conscious attempt to create a ruling class" and a new and therefore "young" State.

Those who survived the internal crises and discords that took place in the party between 1924 and 1927 formed the political class, when they were barely forty years old. They had the political power in Italy until nearly the end of the regime and were accompanied by a smaller group that held higher positions and who were ten years older than them, born at the beginning of the 1880s. Those who were born from 1885 to 1889 increased the number of the party leaders born in the penultimate decade of the century. They were the mature group of the fascist leadership, but still young, which during the *Ventennio* were between forty and fifty years old. They brought to the regime the experiences and political formations (socialist, anarchist, trade unionist and nationalist) that appeared during the Giolittian years and were extensively reviewed in the light of the new time of the post-war period. The group born between 1861 and 1863 (the

year of the birth of the "warrior-poet", Gabriele D'Annunzio), and the end of 1870s was smaller but strongly representative. They were a select group of people, intellectuals, professionals, jurists, military and entrepreneurs, and among them were Giovanni Giuriati and the philosopher Giovanni Gentile. They represented continuity and consistency in the political path of the Right, commonly nationalist and irredentist and the conservative vision (be it lay or catholic) of society and politics. In addition, during the 1930s, a new generation of twenty- and thirty-year-olds grew up, those born between 1900 and 1905, mainly in 1903. This is the case of the contemporaries of Galeazzo Ciano, such as Alessandro Pavolini, the secretary of the Party during the months of the Italian Social Republic (RSI), as well as friends such as Ettore Muti, who became the secretary of the Party at the age of 37 in October 1939. This generation also includes those born in the following decades between 1906 and the entry into the war.

The phase of change took place between 1921 and 1926, and it coincided with the cancellation of the parliamentary prerogatives. The social transformation of the new fascist ruling class compared to the liberal one could be understood from the professional and study titles during that period. The members of this new class were primarily accountants, surveyors, industrial experts, trade and bank employees and insurance agents. Few were teachers and few came from a family of teachers. Benito Mussolini could be found among these few. There were more army and naval officers, although it would be necessary to distinguish between those who had undertaken a full military career in the Academy and those who had been young low-rank (*di complemento*) officers during World War I. Still in the 1930s, there were more landowners than entrepreneurs and industrial managers in the national ranks of the PNF. This showed a direct involvement of the landowners in active politics. There was a social and educational growth for many PNF ranks compared to their families: many of those who had secondary school diplomas and administrative jobs went at least one step up in the social ladder compared to their parents who were manual labourers, craftsmen, employees and shopkeepers. This fact would confirm that the petit bourgeoisie benefitted most from Fascism in terms of social mobility, taking advantage of education and the new career possibilities offered by public employment. Therefore, it was this petit bourgeoisie that complained every time the access to the education and the professional sector was interrupted.

Old and Young Guards

As mentioned before, from the collective profile of the Party ranks, it seems evident that the majority of the study titles that allowed them to have a social growth were acquired straight after the war had ended. This growth was possible thanks to special measures that helped the academic and professional path of the former soldiers. From that sample, two important groups, however not the most numerous ones, stand out. In the first place, those who had started a political career while there were young and, once they were part of the Party and the directive institutes, declared themselves journalists and trade unionists. National secretaries Farinacci and Turati were part of those groups and were representatives of the new full time political careers that were accepted by the regime. These facts apparently show a strength and continuity of the party ranks and reveal a lack of dynamism and alternation in the regime, as though all the positions had been quickly occupied during the first years of the rise to power, rapidly becoming a fossilized system. However, ideologists or people who contributed to maintain the regime are not included in the ranking proposed by former investigations, because they did not hold political positions in the Party organizations. They were intellectuals and servicemen with jobs of responsibility, sometimes with great power, both in the provinces and in the central offices of the capital city.

The action of depriving the Party of its directive functions and the making of a ruling class, carried out by Starace in the 1930s, showed its first signs of weakness in around 1938, when the fascist regime had set new goals in domestic and foreign politics, as the ending of some institutes and the relaunching of its European position within the alliance with the Nazi Germany. In addition, there was a need to develop a deep political work, based on cultural proposals and not on fideist slogans. Consequently, at that time, the PNF relied on a new generation who represented 20% of the total of the national leaders. These young people, who took up jobs of responsibility in the PNF during the second half of the 1930s, seem to have contradicted everything that has been said about the irreversible ageing of the Party up until now. On the contrary, they had possibly relied on a "young guard" too late, when the institutional crisis of the regime was near, after almost fifteen years without changes in the making of a new fascist elite. They formed a homogeneous group and took on the responsibility of the position of federal secretary between the average ages of thirty and thirty-five, some of them between the ages of twenty-five and thirty.

Nearly, all of them had higher education and university studies, and many started their political career thanks to their experience, some as leaders, in the Gruppi Universitari Fascisti (GUF) and also fighting as volunteers in the Italo-Ethiopian War and the Spanish Civil War.

The youngest of them did not mind moving around the country, unlike the previous ranks of the Party, who since 1925 had shown themselves to be very sedentary and were only willing to move to the capital city. After having studied in their hometowns or at university, they were often sent as vice secretaries or secretaries to areas of the country away from their culture and society of origin. Their stay in a Federation was often brief, from one year up to a maximum of five years. This decision was taken by the Secretary of the Party; it was like a test to become a candidate for leader of the national bodies as well as for a lot of federations, especially in the bordering provinces and on the islands, because a young and energetic leader was needed to fascistize the territory or to avoid private interest, circles of power and family networks from having control. Finally, they seemed to respond to a nationalization of the fascist leadership.

This third generation was totally integrated into the fascist regime and ideology, at least until the collapse of the regime in 1943, and for this reason, it was called to save the regime from its political decline. Aldo Vidussoni represented the entire new ruling class. He was born in 1914, he was a volunteer in Spain and also a local secretary of the GUF in Trieste—a crucial city at the Eastern border with strong nationalist roots—and later became a national secretary of the GUF in 1941. At the end of that year, Vidussoni became a general secretary of the PNF, at the young age of 27.

The geographical origin of the fascist ruling class still remains to be identified at a political level. Among the deputies, the ranks mainly came from the North and Centre of the country rather than from the South and the islands, especially at federal levels of the *Milizia*. This was the result of a fascist movement that had its origins precisely in the North and Centre regions, which the first national ruling group had been nurtured from. It was also the result of the arriving into the central government, in the middle of the 1920s, of an intransigent group that represented the *strapaese* (the rural provinces) and suffered from the complex of being excluded from power, hoping to replace both a liberal political ruling class, considered to be related to Piedmont and some areas of the South, and a economic and technocratic ruling class representing the North.

The "new Italian" adopted the image and mentality of the Tuscan and Padan periphery. This trend was not even modified by the political change

of the Party that took place in 1932, when it moved some important people of the Po Valley away from central power, such as Grandi, Balbo, Arpinati or Federzoni, mainly because Fascism had the need to build a populist, anti-bourgeois and anti-urban identity, resulting from a Tuscan-Emilian Fascism.

The subject of a permanent "fascist revolution" was suggested up until the end of the 1930s. The new generations educated by Fascism specially felt it, creating expectations and illusions in themselves. The Party, as a representative of the main body, of a national cohesion, of the people itself, did not exclude the formation of a ruling elite, of a hierarchy that was based on a choice determined by moral, intellectual and competitive qualities. On the other hand, this aristocracy was substituted by an anonymous and gigantic bureaucratic system that, although it guaranteed a partial security in the distribution of services and jobs to the petit bourgeoisie and middle class that it turned to, specially drowned the hopes of promotion and free competition of the young ranks, formed by Fascism and coming from these classes. From this perspective, the fascist Party and State were in crisis due to the lack of a political replacement of the leaders even before World War I revealed the disaffection of the population to the regime.

A Single or a Collective Leadership?

In the political liturgy of Fascism, the leader is the key element. The presence of the *Duce*, the leader, the man that represents the political movement and the fascist State as a whole, its domestic and foreign politics, and the entire community of Italians, gives strength to power and reinforces the principles of hierarchy, authority and deference. This liturgy is improved by collective acts, where the faith should interpret under the careful guidance of a priest, keeper of the religion itself.

The *ducismo* represented the first European experience in this sense, and as it was the first it was also imperfect in respect to others followed afterwards. It was favoured by a set of early and concomitant factors that were given in Italy between 1915 and 1919. Among these factors were the fact that the House of Savoy was not very popular in all the regions of the country and, above all, that the civil and military government was lacking charisma facing the population during the war. This was different to what had occurred in other nations in combat. At the end of the war, there was the common conviction that the victory was not thanks to the skills of the generals, but the sacrifice and unity of the soldiers and the low-rank officers.

The *ducismo*, which became the cult of Mussolini's personality, that is to say *Mussolinismo*, emerged in this context of ideological and referential emptiness.

Mussolini appeared to be a messiah of politics, whose authority was not given by dynastic rights, but by charisma and skills shown in exceptional moments. On the front line, the trust in comrades and in the immediate superior was essential to survive. There was an archaic and modern model at the same time, that could be transformed into an elective democracy and, instead, it became populism and a personal dictatorship.

In Mussolini's figure at least three functions could be found: example, identification and protection. In the first place, he tried to prevail as a role model of and for the "new Italian" by moral strength, will and physical resistance. The identification with him, with the head of Fascism and the State, meant to be part of a community of chosen people, of a mystic body consolidated by civic and warlike virtues. Mussolini also showed himself as the guarantor and the protector, the man who represented a State that intervened in the public, labour and economic life of the citizens. In Italy, a welfare state prevailed that was not egalitarian nor based on principles of political citizenship, but it accepted and rewarded only those who were faithful and trusted in the new fascist community and nation. In this sense, the cult of the personality assumes some aspects of paternalism. Likewise, the regime adopted features of familism in the links of power between the mandatary and the beneficiary. It was what remained from an archaic and feudal society. Mussolini acted as a guarantor of this system. He was not only the boss in charge of the Party, but also the arbitrator above the parties.

Thus, the political identity of the national secretaries of the PNF—a position that Mussolini did not hold because at the time he was the spiritual chief of Fascism and the head the government—changes according to the role that the PNF had in the regime. The national political secretary of the party took on an important function only after the Matteotti crisis, when Roberto Farinacci was called to cover that position. Up until that moment, the management had been collegial, coordinated by Michele Bianchi and by the Grand Council of Fascism since January 1923. In contrast, seven leaders of the PNF gained that position from 1925 to 1943: Roberto Farinacci, from February 1925 to March 1926; Augusto Turati, until October 1930; Giovanni Giuriati, just over a year, from October 1930 until December 1931; and Achille Starace, the "longest-running" of the fascist leaders, who held the position for eight years, until October 1939. He was followed until the collapse of the regime by another four secretaries: Ettore Muti, from

October 1939 to October 1940; Adelchi Serena, until December 1941; Aldo Vidussoni, until April 1943; and Carlo Scorza, who held the position from April to July 1943.

In fact, Roberto Farinacci, ex-soldier, railway worker and *squadrista*, was put in charge of implementing the new wave of violence across the country after the Matteotti crisis for the construction of a totalitarian State. In turn, the journalist Augusto Turati restored and restructured the party by including it in the State. Starace, an officer during the war and ex *squadrista* in Apulia, bureaucratized the Party even more and made it into a kind of machine that maintained the order and into an instrument for keeping the consensus from the masses. Under his secretary, the affiliates to the Party, to the youth and female groups, and any organization that was dependent on the Party, between men, women, young people and public employees, were in total more than 21 million and 600,000 units in a population of less than 44 million people. Therefore, around half of the Italians, including newborns, were officially associated with the PNF and its mass organizations by some form.

However, the question that remains is: Who really was a fascist? Naturally, by political creed, the fascists were the leaders of the party, of the *Opere*, of the *Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale*, the superior State officers and some intellectuals. By convenience, the fascists were many national and local officers and public employees, artists, architects, writers and journalists and also teachers who would not have been able to work in the regime without taking an oath or showing their faith.

The common magistrates were often "aseptic", and left the special fascist Tribunals the duty of judging the political crimes against the fascist State. The army, on its behalf, remained independent, not committed by the oath to Fascism and *Duce*, but only to its supreme commander: the King and the dynasty. The Italians had to put together almost naturally what Fascism intended to build—a "great fascist nation"—to complete the process of national unification and the sacrifice of the nation in World War I. Therefore, Fascism was the last phase of the construction of the nation. Thus, "In Italy no one could be antifascist because an antifascist could not be Italian", as Farinacci crudely said in 1925. Or paraphrasing: no one is Italian if s/he is not fascist. All the social fascist policies moved around this conviction. Those policies denied any form of citizenship rights: only those who had adapted themselves to, agreed with and accepted Fascism had the right to be Italian, to live legally in Italy, to work and to benefit from its services and education. These were the rights and duties of the

fascists, therefore, of the Italians. Once Fascism and its system went into crisis, those millions of fascist Italians disappeared within a few months, leaving only a minority of people still convinced to collaborate with the Nazis during the RSI.

Exporting Italian Fascism

Too often the history of fascist foreign politics has been observed and studied separately from domestic politics, with an accepted traditional division in two decades, approximately 1923–1933 and 1933–1943. In the first decade, it was also seen under the guide of the traditional nationalism, inherited by Fascism. In the second decade, the international relations have been considered a lot in competition with Nazism. The question is more complex and is the result of simultaneous events and influences. There was a big influence of nationalism in foreign politics, in particular in aggressive projects of expansion in the Adriatic area; but in the 1920s, Italy was present at an international level as one of World War I winning powers, playing a main role in the League of Nations and in its agencies. Over the years, Fascism adopted a "double diplomacy", an official one in international relations and another one in supporting right wing and proto-fascist movements in Europe. Based on Mussolini's official papers, like the audiences at Palazzo Venezia in Rome, recent studies now identify this second attitude, and the agents of it.[6] Fascism not only gave financial and political support to other radical right-wing movements, like the Cagoule, the Falange and the Ustasha, but it tried to export its own model of a corporative State, intransigent culture, subversive violence and the vision of a "new man" (Bernhard and Klinkhammer 2017). Unfortunately for Fascism, the "totalitarian" and imperialistic turn produced alternative models in the mid-1930s (Matard-Bonucci 2018). The particularly evident and rapid changes at an international level could be observed by the presence of a Nazi Germany in the European arena and the crisis of the League of Nations, where Italy had played a role until the early 1930s.

Some historians, among them the ultra-conservative De Felice's interviewer Michael Ledeen, have suggested that a "fascist internationalism" existed at that time,[7] something that was impossible in the nature of Fascism. Fascism developed its own new imperialistic politics in Africa, in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Balkans, expanding its presence by army and by cultural and ideological support, drawing out the lines for its New Order in Southern Europe, even if the scheme for a "New Mediterranean

Order" only became a clear plan at the end of the 1930s.[8] In most of the areas, it clashed against Nazi competition and influence, especially in the Balkans and the Danube area and also in Spain. During the Spanish Civil War, the fascist regime was not present in Spain only by military support, but also in promoting an Italian cultural expansion, in nationalist territories. The effort was considerable, in part motivated by a desire to compete with Nazi Germany's cultural and military presence in Spain, drawing the notion that the Italian and Spanish Fascisms were more compatible due to their common corporatism and clerical fascist roots.

Conclusions

Nowadays, the most interesting issues tackle political violence and the legitimate use of violence by the State. The economic aspects and the foreign policy of Italian Fascism are studied less and less.[9] The youngest historians, those doing a PhD or a post-PhD, seem to try to fill up gaps left by the previous generations, committed to social and political history and in "hot-spot" issues that touched oblivions and forgetfulness. There are the "dark sides" of Italian Fascism, like wars, colonialism and anti-Semitism, which were reduced to a "good Fascism" in the confrontation with Nazism during a long time (Focardi 2013). In the claim for a "new" history or a renewed history of Fascism, the past and new researches need to be reassembled in an organic narrative and analysis of Fascism, to adopt a mature comparison with other fascist phenomena and to link national and international levels, and domestic and foreign politics. Italian Fascism had the time to grow and develop its policy and ideology more than other fascist phenomena, on the condition that it would not be studied from a logical and consistent perspective.

In my social history of Fascism, I have tried to show the deep contradictions of fascist politics, in setting goals that were never achieved, in changing them along the way and so forth. Fascist politics was often governed by a *realpolitik*: when it did not find a positive answer (e.g. in society, the demographic project on birth rate, ruralization and anti-migration) or when it met very strong external competitors (both in economics and ideology); Fascism was truly flexible in changing its own political goals and lines. Fascism was an omnivorous phenomenon: absorbing, integrating, neutralizing or destroying all ideas and movements in its body. It was a sort of chameleon, changing its skin every time it needed to, in a persuading approach to people and ideas. Violence and strength did not walk

alone; once the power was taken, they had compromise and adulation on their side. This is probably one of the most important differences with Nazism, which used to exercise violence all along its existence. Currently, the absence of a controversial and strong debate in the historiography about the nature of Italian Fascism has helped to develop new important researches covering aspects not yet deeply studied and analysed. Also this absence has allowed the youngest generation of historians to feel free from academic and political schools and ideological approaches. Very soon, there will be a need to reassemble this complex mosaic of new studies: both those finally getting to the point of the fascist origins in a comparative point of view (Albanese 2016) and those facing the 1930s with a different international perspective, in order to rewrite the history of Fascism.

Notes

1. To this regard, see Albanese (2003), Battente (2005), Di Figlio (2007a, b) and Della Casa (2013).
2. To this regard, see Gentile (1989, 1995).
3. I agree with Robert O. Paxton' s remarks, see Paxton (2005).
4. See Corner (2012) and Corner and Galimi (2014).
5. Patrizia Dogliani (2008, new revised edition in 2014 and a translation into Spanish, 2017).
6. To this regard, see Schieder (2013), Poupault (2014) and Kundu (2015).
7. Ledeen (1972), translated with the title *L'Internazionale fascista* (1973).
8. Read in this context Rodogno (2003), but also Salerno (2002), and several new studies on the action developed by Italian Fascism to stimulate nationalisms in favour of Italy and against Great Britain in the Mediterranean area: Malta, Corsica and Middle East. See Arielli (2010).
9. See authors contributing to Albanese and Pergher (2012 cited in Baris 2012), Millan (2014), Dominioni (2008), Ertola (2017) and Cocco (2017).

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CHAPTER 8

The German Fascists: Nazi Political Culture

Toni Morant

In the unstable early years of the Weimar Republic, the first German democracy, the National Socialists were quick to greet the events that brought fascism to power in Italy with great enthusiasm. Within the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers' Party), a then still-small political movement, the resoluteness of the *Marcia su Roma*—resulting in the fascists' entry into government in October 1922, with Benito Mussolini as prime minister—exerted a "fascination effect". At the beginning of November, the party newspaper *Völkischer Beobachter* applauded the energy, mass base and anti-communist patriotism of the Italian fascists. A leading Nazi member asserted that the party had "the Mussolini of Italy: his name is Adolf Hitler", and Hitler himself declared that the *Duce* had "demonstrated" the possibilities of a minority imbued with "the sacred national will" (quoted in Petersen 1973, pp. 14–15).

On the one hand, these effusive expressions of praise already incorporated central elements of fascism as a political culture: the cult of the leader, the combination of ultranationalism and transnational affinities, vitalism,

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anti-communism, an appeal to the masses and even some hints of political religion. On the other, the words quoted by the Nazi newspaper pointed to the Italian case, just two weeks after the "March on Rome" as showing the path to follow for fascists in other countries. Ultranationalists that they were, the then still scarcely numerous Bavarian Nazis nevertheless felt closer to fascism—at the end of the day, a foreign political movement—than to the majority of political parties in their own country. In fact, viewed from Munich, Italy seemed closer, and not just in geographical terms, than Berlin, capital of the detested republican democracy.

Until 1933, at least, the Nazis looked upon the Italian fascists as their teachers. The possession of a previous point of reference helped them to carry through their "national revolution" in Germany with much greater speed and radicalism. At the same time, the Nazis' own success gave a renewed impetus to other movements, for whom Nazi Germany became the primary benchmark, opening the way to a struggle for ideological hegemony among fascists. By the mid-1930s, Nazism had become the chief point of reference for its counterparts in Great Britain, the Netherlands and Romania and the movement's contacts and relationships extended much further still (Woller 1999, pp. 174–81; Orlow 2003, p. 255 ff.; Bauerkämper 2006, pp. 176–77; 2010, pp. 232–33). The rise of the NSDAP also accelerated the "fascistization" of many other authoritarian and reactionary right-wing tendencies, who saw in Germany a fresh example to follow when they came to choose the elements—normally related to organization, but not always—that they considered useful for their own objectives.[1]

The aim of the present paper is to examine Nazism as the German exponent of the fascist political culture. The concept of political culture is a useful instrument which permits us to analyse, in this case, Nazism as a cohesive group whose members on the one hand shared a world view, a common interpretation of the past and a desired vision of the future, as a political project to be willed into being, while on the other they equally shared a series of representations that were shaped by—and simultaneously expressed through—particular discourses, symbols, rites and practices of sociability (Baker 1994; Sirinelli 1997; Berstein 2008). We will focus both on the most characteristic elements of Nazism's world view (anti-Semitism, the myth of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, its nature as a political religion and its totalitarian ambitions), and on the visible representations of a movement that paid central attention to future generations and did not set women aside, since they constituted at least half of the "national community".

The majority of these elements were not strictly specific to Nazism, but what was original was its particular synthesis of them and above all the radicalism demonstrated in their application. Lastly, and despite the points they had in common, it was precisely these elements that differentiated the Nazis from reactionary nationalists in Germany itself, at the same time as they brought them closer to the various exponents of fascist political culture in other countries.

Racial Anti-Semitism

Biological racism was a key, essential, tenet of Nazi ideology, which saw the guiding principle of history as a struggle between races, not classes. In Germany, despite the fact that Jews constituted scarcely 0.75% of the population, not only the Nazis but also a large part of the broader right considered them agents of "Jewish Bolshevism" and the principal instigators of the "stab in the back" that had allegedly led to the defeat of 1918, the associated revolutionary outbursts and the establishment of the Republic. This hatred was especially widespread among the Nazis, who turned to anti-Semitism to explain all the ills that Germany had suffered (Benz 2000, pp. 127, 133). Their *völkisch* racism identified the Germans with a supposedly superior "Aryan race", which was threatened by the Slav peoples (reflected in an anti-Slavism that was very noticeable in the origins of the movement and during the Second World War),[2] but whose greatest enemy was "the Jews".

The founding programme of the NSDAP, the "25 Points" of February 1920, specified that Jews lacked "German blood" and therefore had no right to German citizenship, and so equally could not—contrary to the practice in Italy prior to 1938—become members of the party.[3] In one of the chapters of most fundamental importance in *Mein Kampf*, titled "Nation and Race", Hitler attributed "almost exclusively" to the "Aryans […] all the human culture, all the results of art, science and technology that we see before us today" (Hitler 1936, p. 317). And, since the cosmovision of Nazism admitted "no innocent or neutral detail in any aspect of thought or activity" (Etlin 2002, p. XVII), the obverse of this exalted creativity, "the mightiest counterpart to the Aryan", was "the Jew" (Hitler 1936, p. 329). He was defined in the singular, as an archetype deprived of any kind of individual identity, part of a collective, in accordance with the biological standpoint referred to earlier that "has always been a people with definite racial characteristics, and never a religion". Denigrating Jews as "the eternal

parasite… a noxious bacillus" and a "destroyer of culture" (Hitler 1936, pp. 335, 334, 318), the Nazis thus denied them the status of human beings.

Anti-Semitism already had great resonance in the Nazi party prior to 1933. While it was visibly less attractive to a significant number of voters (Payne 1980, pp. 57, 67), among both the membership and above all the leaders and cadres of the NSDAP anti-Semitism was not just a notable source of internal cohesion but an "article of faith" (Passmore 2014, p. 65). Once the dictatorship was established, the situation of Jews in Germany deteriorated rapidly, as their gradual social and economic exclusion was combined with and often driven forward by the violence of the *Sturmabteilung* (SA) and other Nazi organizations, this violence being another factor that—as in Italian fascism—created a sense of identity and bonds of camaraderie within the Nazi movement (Reichardt 2002). In scarcely two years *Der Stürmer*, "The Stormtrooper", the newspaper headed by the rabidly anti-Semitic Julius Streicher, increased its sales twenty times, and its brutal articles and caricatures were also exhibited in display cases in the streets (Frei and Schmitz 1989, p. 104 ff.).

If anti-Semitism was present in every area of Nazi policy, it could not fail to play a major role in the movement's growing conversion into an ideological reference point beyond Germany's frontiers. In fact, for several fascist movements it played the role of a hook with which to attract new members. The British, Romanian and Dutch fascists, for example, all sought to underline their affiliations with Nazism by adopting the same stances or in some cases accentuating their own existing anti-Semitism (Woller 1999, p. 177; Bauerkämper 2006, p. 177).

The *Volksgemeinschaft* and the Nazi "Social Revolution"

If Nazism is understood as a "palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism", following the celebrated definition of fascism by Roger Griffin (1994, p. 26), then its greatest expression was the *Volksgemeinschaft*, the "national community". After the First World War the left lost its monopoly over the concept of "revolution". In Germany, it was appropriated by projects such as the Conservative Revolution (Breuer 1995), but it was the Nazis who most declared themselves to be social revolutionaries. During the 1920s, due to the presence in its ranks of "national-leftist" or "national Bolshevik" tendencies, the NSDAP cultivated an accentuated anti-capitalist rhetoric. In 1928, this obliged Hitler to assert his authority and state clearly that

National Socialism regarded private property as a basic principle (Bauer 2008, p. 112). Nevertheless, although the Nazi idea of revolution was notably distant from that of Communism, a significant number of their political adversaries, above all abroad, acknowledged them at the time as "genuine political revolutionaries" (Orlow 2003, p. 247).

Once in power, after rapidly crushing all hints of left-wing opposition, the NSDAP appealed, in order to attract the left's former voters, to an idea of "true" socialism, which was none other than "National Socialism", one based on "facts". It does not seem accidental that the first Nazi feature film, *Hitlerjunge Quex* (1933), portrayed the tumultuous conversion and subsequent incorporation into the Hitler Youth of the young son of a working-class family. It is true that the negative characters in the film were Communists (his own father, a youth leader, the girl in his group…), but in most cases they were shown as having become so without great conviction, since—lacking alternatives—they had been seduced by the empty words of their leaders… until the arrival of Nazism. As Goebbels pointed out with satisfaction, the film embodied the hand (still) held out to the "deceived" masses (Koch 1993, pp. 169–74). So long as they first recognized their earlier errors, National Socialism offered them the possibility of redeeming themselves and becoming part of the *Volksgemeinschaft*.

Since the guiding principle was the "struggle between races", Nazism declared that differences of class, religion or between regions had been "overcome", and moved on to impose social harmony as the expression of the *Volk*, understood as a single organic being. This "national community" was characterized precisely by a populist desire to mobilize all its members in pursuit of Germany's regeneration, with Eastern Europe as a "living space" (*Lebensraum*) into which to expand. As a political project, it represented the most important policy proposal in "positive" terms of National Socialism (Orlow 2003, p. 253).

This "social experiment" was precisely one of the aspects that most attracted the attention of foreign visitors, not only fascists but also other conservatives who came to the "new" Germany to study it (Schwarz 1993, pp. 214–63). For example, after a visit in 1937 one of the senior women officials of the Spanish fascist movement greatly admired the supposed "social unity" that had been achieved in Germany and contrasted it with "Marxism and bourgeois selfishness". After only five years, she reported, "outside the factory, in travelling clothes, it is not possible to distinguish a mechanic from an engineer", which led her to describe Nazi Germany as "this *democratic* country, if we give to the word democracy its exact meaning".[4]

Nazism as Political Religion

The "aestheticization of political life" that Walter Benjamin (1936) attributed to the fascist movements sought to transmit a political message without appealing to the intellect, turning instead to sentiment, to the emotions. This was the source, for example, of National Socialism's predilection for ceremonies at night, with lights and flaming torches (Mosse 2001, p. 194). This new way of undertaking politics did not represent any kind of fresh invention on the part of the Nazis, but rather—as one more indication of their syncretic abilities—gathered together elements from traditions that can be traced back to the beginning of the previous century. Nevertheless, this sublimation of the processes of mass nationalization became an essential part of the Nazis' "new" political style, even before their arrival in power (Mosse 2001, p. 73).

The liturgy that structured these mass celebrations, markedly religious in form, evoked practices, rites and concepts from Christian doctrine, but emptied of their traditional content. At their hub was not a transcendent god, but the *Volk*, the nation. This sacralization of politics has led some scholars of fascism to speak of a political or "secular religion", which—above all in the case of Nazism—played "a dominant and pervasive role, involving every aspect of German life" (Gentile 2001, p. 56). The *Volksgemeinschaft* was simultaneously the subject and object of this political worship; it celebrated itself, and at the same time sought to express itself and represent itself to itself. Within the inclusion/exclusion mechanism characteristic of Nazism, this "celebration mania" (Scholtz 1993) served to show off "the glamorous image of the Third Reich" (Reichel 1991).[5]

Nazi political religion had its own liturgical calendar, which set the pattern for the life of the members of the "national community" for each year. Whether these events were older traditions that had been given new meanings (in other words, Nazified) or recently introduced party festivities, their purpose was the same: to marginalize the Christian calendar, to the point of replacing it completely (Reichel 1991, p. 120ff.; Thamer 2002, pp. 229–33; Mosse 2001, p. 204). The commemorative liturgy was initiated each 30 January (anniversary of the "seizure of power" in 1933), followed by 20 April (the *Führer*'s birthday), 1 May ("National Holiday of the German People"), and events such as the Harvest Festival in September, to conclude on 9 November, the day of the "Martyrs of the Movement" who had fallen in the Munich putsch of 1923. Thirteen years after these events, the National Leader of the League of German Girls, the female arm

of the Hitler Youth, recalled the putsch by proclaiming that "for us the steps of the *Feldherrnhalle* are an altar".[6]

The culminating moment in the calendar, however, came in September, in the annual national rallies of the NSDAP in Nuremberg. The quintessential symbol of Nazi ceremonial and the maximum expression of the "cult of the *Führer*" (Kershaw 2001), each year the rally brought together hundreds of thousands of people, including party members, the general public and foreign visitors. The only figure recognizable from across the distances at these rallies, however, was Hitler, and all eyes were literally focused upon him. His speech, carefully staged and dramatized, was the climax of each rally, during which a "communion" was established between the leader and the masses, and the *Volksgemeinschaft* was transfigured into "images for the world" (Kießling 2006).

The Nazis' celebrations and commemorations were among the features of the regime that most caught the attention of foreign visitors, whose accounts are highly illustrative of their effects—or the lack of them—upon those who attended (Schwarz 1993, pp. 270–85). The Swiss philosopher Denis de Rougemont, a lecturer in French at the University of Frankfurt in 1935–1936, was undoubtedly one of the most acute observers. After joining the crowds at a night-time ceremony of the SS, he was convinced that he had not attended any normal political meeting but "a liturgy… the great sacred ceremony of a religion". And, despite standing among the crowds, he concluded that "I am alone, and they are all together" (Rougemont 1938, p. 49). In contrast, the reaction of a delegation from the Women's Section of the Spanish Falange to a Nuremberg Rally was quite different. Their fascination at what they had experienced was limitless. "Nuremberg…", said one member to a journalist on her return to Spain, "You'll already have had some reports of what that was like: something like an apotheosis, magnificent, something that cannot be described…".[7]

The Totalitarian Ambition

Nazism had a totalitarian understanding of politics and sought to organize the *entire* life of the "national community" (Mosse 2001, p. 203). The first step was the total recruitment of society into the NSDAP and its related organizations. Everyone—even if they lived abroad—was expected to join one of them at each major stage in their lives. Hitler set this out with complete bluntness in late 1938. The path began in infancy; then, after eight years in the Hitler Youth, the loyal German would go on to the Reich

Labour Service (RAD) and from there to the SA, the National Socialist Motor Corps (NSKK), the SS, the army, the German Labour Front (DAF) and, ultimately, the Nazi party itself. Accordingly, from childhood onwards, all these organizations[8] had to combine together to establish a continuous "treatment" of their members, who would be "sanded down" time and again to make them "think in a German way, and act in a German manner" and become "complete National Socialists". To avoid any "backsliding", Hitler concluded, those who entered into this apparatus "will not be free for the rest of their lives… National Socialism is not at the end of its days, but has only just begun".[9]

To witness this totalizing ambition, it would have been enough to walk through the streets of any German city or town and observe the endless number of uniforms, the continual parades, the omnipresent portraits of Hitler and the hundreds of swastikas that inundated public space; alternatively, one could go to a cinema and watch the obligatory *Wochenschau* (official newsreel) shown before every feature film, or to a café where one of the "people's receivers", radio sets provided cheaply by the state, was broadcasting military marches or "important" speeches by the *Führer*. One of the features that spread most widely through everyday life and unquestionably contributed most to the Nazification—rapidly interiorized—of daily behaviour was the "German salute". A member of the Hitler Youth might repeat *Heil Hitler!* as much as 150 times in a single day (Mann 2002, p. 23). This was not just required of party members: the Hitler salute was used in countless situations, and even replaced conventional phrases such as good morning, good afternoon or good night, hello, goodbye, thank you or "yes, sir", to the point that British visitors described German life with exasperation as a "continuous *Heil Hitlering*" (Schwarz 1993, pp. 268–69).[10]

As understood by the fascists themselves (and not, therefore, in the sense used by later theories of totalitarianism), the concept of "totalitarian" meant precisely that—as De Rougemont warned—"everything is contained within this regime, and nothing can be detached from it" (Rougemont 1938, p. 72). The head of the German Labour Front, Robert Ley, spelled this out clearly in 1937, in a speech to factory workers:

> In Germany there are no longer any private matters! While you are sleeping, that is your own affair, but as soon as you wake up […] you must be aware that you are a soldier of Adolf Hitler and that you have to live according to a set of rules […] We no longer have private individuals. The time has gone

> by in which anyone could do and let things go by as they liked. I don't care a damn about the liberal conception [of things]; we no longer recognize it. A soldier has to obey. (Ley 1938, p. 71).

National Socialism arrogated to itself complete power over public life, without recognizing a separation of any kind between a state that desired to be omnipotent and a society subordinated—even when at least partly willing to contribute—to its wishes. In fact, it denied the very existence of a private sphere to such an extent that at times the new reality did not even respect the (only) limits acknowledged by Ley: those of sleep and the world of dreams. People recorded that Goebbels had appeared to them in dreams to demand they give a Nazi salute, or that they had dreamt that the walls of their house had disappeared before their eyes while a loudspeaker proclaimed from the street, "According to the decree of the 17th of this month on the Abolition of Walls […]" (Beradt 1985, pp. 157–8, 21).

National Socialism and Gender

As well as expressing ultranationalist, anti-democratic and anti-communist reactions, the fascist movements also represented a significant attempt to "assert male supremacy" (Durham 1998, p. 166). The Great War had left behind it "a sense of a complete collapse of social order" (Mazower 1998, p. 80) and with this "a new era of gender awareness" (Cooper 1998, p. 440). In its beginnings, the Nazi movement had constituted a *Männerbund* (an association or bond between men) of ex-soldiers and young men, for whom women were of little political interest (Frevert 2001, p. 220). In the NSDAP programme, women were not mentioned until the twenty-first of the 25 Points, and then only in the role of mothers,[11] the same status that Hitler reserved for them in *Mein Kampf*, writing that "the irrevocable goal of female education must be the future mother" (Hitler 1936, p. 460).

Nevertheless, in the first list of party membership, from January 1920, women formed some ten per cent of Nazism's early adherents (18 out of 190), and at this time around 20–30% of the audiences at Hitler's meetings was already female (Stephenson 1981, p. 26). Equally, although women were excluded from all leading roles (including elected offices) by the first national congress of the NSDAP in 1921, the steady trickle of women into the movement did not stop. The first National Socialist women's groups organized themselves autonomously, and for years no one coordinated

them, probably because neither the relevant local sections nor the party leadership in Munich considered them of any importance (ibid., p. 14).

During the first decade of the NSDAP's existence, its women members carried out tasks that the men of the party "really could not be asked to contemplate" (ibid., pp. 14–15): sewing and mending uniforms, embroidering banners, taking food to SA detachments and treating wounds. After the Crash of 1929, they extended their operations into social activities, supporting party members who were imprisoned or unemployed and their families. With time, they also took on the work of fund-raising and distributing propaganda, and during the election campaigns of 1930 and 1932 some women even spoke at meetings.[12] It is certainly true that many of these tasks were among those traditionally considered "feminine". However, while women carried them out they also underwent political socialization; while they washed or sewed, "the women discussed points of Party policy" (ibid., p. 26). In addition, women did not only take on these "feminine" duties, but during the final crisis of the Weimar Republic some also concealed files, documents, weapons and "comrades" on the run (Klaus 1983, p. 18; Maschmann 1963, p. 27). Some of the youngest women even took part in street fights.[13]

Once in power, the NSDAP could not leave aside the female half of the population, which was, moreover, charged with the reproduction and education of future generations. The organization and coordination of women were undertaken through a variety of organizations. By the beginning of the Second World War, the Nazi Women's League (*Nationalsozialistiche Frauenschaft*, NSF) had two million members, equivalent to over 40% of the total membership of the NSDAP (Payne 1995, p. 184), while the female branch of the Hitler Youth had close to four million (Kinz 1991, p. 25). Between one group and another, this meant that there were also tens of thousands of *Führerinnen* (women leaders) in the *Führerstaat* or state built on male leadership (Böltken 1995). The invasion of Poland and the calling up of ever more men to the armed forces intensified still further the mobilization and participation of women for the sake of the *Volksgemeinschaft*. Brought together in their organizations and party structures, they were agents of and essential participants—even "key participants"—in the practice of National Socialism (Eley 2013, p. 96).

The Prefiguration of Community: The Hitler Youth

If there was one organization that combined in paradigmatic form all the elements we have mentioned here, it was the Hitler Youth, the *Hitlerjugend* or HJ. An appeal to youth was one of the hallmarks of fascism, and the NSDAP had already been the party that attracted most members among the young during the Weimar years. It was considered a youthful political movement, whose members, leaders and even voters had an average age much lower than those of other parties, with the possible exception of the Communist KPD (Stachura 1981, p. 309; Keim 1995, p. 124; Thamer 2002, pp. 66–67), and which deployed a political language loaded with physiological references, with phrases such as "Make way, old men!", "Young Germany", "the new Germany" and so on. The first area of German life in which National Socialism succeeded in becoming a majority tendency, for example, was in the universities, as early as 1930–1931 (Stachura 1981, p. 303). By contrast, however, the first steps of its own youth organization were very modest. It constituted a "minority" that, by comparison with religious and left-wing equivalents, was on the borderline of "numerical insignificance" (Klönne 1993, p. 223; Keim 1995, p. 126).

After 1933, the future generations received special attention because, as a slogan of the time proclaimed, "Who has youth, has the future". Shaping and moulding the "complete National Socialist" would require a "long-term educational project" (Horn and Link 2011, p. 8), schools, defined as "the place of education of the German people", had the legal obligation to "instil in all German children the foundations [needed] for community life in the *Volksgemeinschaft*".[14] However, National Socialism could not put its trust solely in conventional schools nor in the other two classic instruments of education (family and the churches), all of them ultimately incompatible with the Nazis' totalitarian pretensions, and chose to expand its own youth organization as a fourth agent of socialization, the only one that was "specifically national-socialist" (Thamer 2002, p. 267). By 1936, the HJ had already grown into a mass organization and incorporated almost 5.5 million young people, equivalent to 62.8% of the population aged between ten and eighteen; three years later, after membership had de facto been made obligatory, this figure reached 98.1%. It was still not the largest Nazi organization (this was the DAF, with over 25 million members), but it was the body that marshalled the highest percentage of its "designated" sector of the population (Klönne 1982, p. 34).

According to its own conception of its role, the HJ soon displayed its "pretension of *totality*". It declared itself "competent in *all* questions of youth" and considered that the natural scope of its activities was "the *whole* of German youth", who were to be subjected—often with enthusiasm—to a "*total* youth education", in "body, mind and soul".[15] It would also act, in effect, as a foretaste, a preliminary representation of the entire *Volksgemeinschaft* in ideal form; only those who were "Aryan and genetically healthy" and loyal followers of the *Führer* could join its ranks.[16] As the magazine of the Hitler Youth's leadership declared, "whoever excludes themselves from it [the HJ]… or is excluded, is placed outside the community of the Nation".[17]

Half of the HJ's almost nine million members were female and enlisted in the *Bund Deutscher Mädel* (BDM or League of German Girls). The principal focus of their training was expected to be in physical education, cultural development and domestic economy (Miller-Kipp 2002, p. 269 ff.). Although many of the BDM's activities were gendered, its goals were shared with the male arm of the organization: to present an image of the *Volksgemeinschaft* and serve Hitler and the party in a disciplined, unconditional and acritical manner (Pine 2003, p. 370). As the National Head of the BDM, Jutta Rüdiger, declared in 1939, "We wish consciously to shape political girls. This does not mean women who will later debate or argue in parliaments, but girls and women who will be aware of the vital needs of the German People and act accordingly" (Klönne 1982, p. 83).

The totalizing pretensions of the HJ led it to clash with traditional educational institutions (Klönne 1982, p. 50ff.; Bauerkämper 2006, p. 84; Thamer 2002, p. 267). In first place with the churches, above all the Catholic Church, which even the 1933 Concordat did not protect from growing attacks in areas related to youth. In 1937, the HJ's weekly magazine published on its front page accusations supposedly from Catholic families complaining of "lascivious priests" and the "satanic things happening to German children in monasteries and sacristies", and asserted that the organization would protect them from "the Sodom and Gomorrah of the Catholic clergy". As soon became evident, the underlying conflict was the HJ's refusal to provide or permit religious education in its ranks.[18]

Secondly, the family as an institution was also notably eroded as a private sphere that was theoretically safe from state interference. Reflecting a complaint that he "must have heard twenty times", De Rougemont recorded in his diary the laments of a middle-class mother that there was no longer "any family life possible, with this System". Every afternoon the party demanded

the attendance of her two oldest children (officers in the BDM and the HJ, respectively), and in addition, twice a week the oldest girl also had to perform extra duties with her unit. She complained not only that she scarcely saw them, but also that she lacked any authority over her children. "The Party comes before everything… We are only civilians for our children. As for them, they feel they are soldiers" (De Rougemont 1938, pp. 26–27).

Lastly, frictions also arose between the HJ and the schools. It was not just that children found the leisure activities organized by the HJ (marches, hikes, camping trips…) more entertaining (Koch 1993, p. 169). Proudly arrayed in their uniforms, they began to defy the authority of their teachers and regularly miss school. As a former section leader in the BDM later recalled, "When I started the eleventh grade I began to skive off school. Serving in the Hitler Youth consumed more and more time and energy. I often went out at five am and got [to school] only in time for the second or third hour of classes, or I disappeared after the lunch break for the rest of the afternoon" (Maschmann 1963, p. 31). The school authorities could not do much about this, still less—as in this case—when the pupil concerned held authority in the HJ or BDM.

After the war began, the HJ drew closer to achieving its totalitarian ambitions. Not only did it place all its membership and resources at the disposal of the war effort (Scholtz 1985, p. 100 ff.), but the subsequent suspension of regular school activities and consignment to the countryside of millions of boys and girls (*Kinderlandverschickung*) to protect them from Allied bombing also aided the "unity of youth education" (Buddrus 2003, p. 883 ff.). As many parents suspected, once the competition of conventional schools had been removed and they were placed far away from their families (that is, without alternative sources of socialization), the children were left entirely in the hands of the Nazi youth organization and exposed to total indoctrination. It was then that National Socialism came closest to making a reality of its ideal of "a total education for total war" (Buddrus 2003).

Conclusion

The arrival of the Nazis in power was interpreted as a confirmation of the universal nature of fascism. This then-new political culture had emerged in Italy and propagated itself rapidly in dozens of countries around the world, but in the decade following the March on Rome it had not succeeded in taking power in any other country. In Germany, the Nazis—like the

Italian fascists in 1922—required the invaluable assistance of reactionary nationalists with whom they shared several objectives, above all regarding the ending of the so detested democracy of Weimar. Nevertheless, once in power, the Italian model also served the German fascists as a guide on how to assert their absolute control with much greater rapidity and radicalism; the establishment of a fascist dictatorship, which in Italy had taken years, was concluded in a matter of months.

The marginalization of their reactionary allies-adversaries enabled the Nazis to begin to institute their own project, which many observers believed could be acknowledged as socially revolutionary. After the profound social and political transformations that had occurred since 1918, the *Volksgemeinschaft* promised to overcome differences of class, religion or region: so long as one could fulfil the precepts of "racial purity", there was a place for every German within this new organic vision of the *Volk*. Meanwhile, for those who were considered "invalid" for reasons of race, politics or social hygiene there was only exclusion, degradation to the category of the "unworthy to live" and subsequent elimination. The question of the *Volksgemeinschaft*'s real impact and effects in practice has for decades given rise to intense debates among scholars (Kershaw 1985, pp. 139–48; Evans 2015, p. 139 ff.), but as a political myth it was notably attractive to the movement's supporters.

The Nazi social utopia sought to express itself—to make itself visible—in mass events with a highly symbolic content and emotional appeal. In this sacralization of politics the "national community" was, simultaneously, both subject and object. In the mass celebrations characteristic of National Socialism, the individual had no importance in him or herself, but only as a part of the masses. As political religion, Nazism sought to pervade every moment of the daily life of contemporary Germans, firstly with overwhelming propaganda, but above all by transforming their daily habits. The new Nazi calendar set out to replace the traditional content of Christian celebrations and also introduce new holidays that consecrated the cult of the community, its leader and the fallen of the Movement.

One of the most visible changes, the near omnipresent use of the "*Heil Hitler!*" slogan and salute, with a multitude of meanings and in a multitude of situations and settings, can be seen as a demonstration of the totalitarian pretensions of Nazism. With the ambitions of the state penetrating, as we have seen, even into the dreams—in reality, nightmares—of its inhabitants, in Adolf Hitler's "new" Germany the boundaries between public and private were "effectively dissolved" to disturbing extremes (Eley 2013, p. 97).

While there were some spaces that the regime did not manage to enter, as years went by it was ever more difficult to escape the totalitarian ambition of the Third Reich, especially for youth, who had not known—or no longer remembered—any reality other than that of National Socialism.

A movement that considered itself to be revolutionary and destined to forge a new society and a new human being could not leave aside the female half of the population, nor the future generations. In the first place, after 1933 the Third Reich also mobilized millions of women, and among many of them—especially those recruited into the different party organizations—it generated great enthusiasm. Many women decided to become Nazis, on their own initiative and without any man telling them to do so, as the "national-racial community" offered non-Jewish German women a framework within which to participate in the Nazi project and contribute to its construction. Secondly, from the moment of the movement's arrival in power it was precisely the youth of both sexes that became a primordial target of National Socialism, which immediately launched itself into shaping and moulding them in its own ranks via the Hitler Youth, the first organization to which every German had to belong.

The Nazi regime's totalitarian pretensions made it ultimately incompatible with all other traditional agents of socialization; not only was it unable to trust the churches, the family or even schools, but these institutions had to be deprived of their influence, to the point of being replaced with substitutes. Its political project contained numerous elements that were essentially different from the reactionary nationalism of many of those who had helped them gain power in Germany, but which were however shared—to a greater or lesser degree—with fascists in other countries. Not for nothing, when it came to visitors and eyewitnesses placing themselves on one side or the other regarding the fascination for the model of society proposed by Nazism, the determining factor was not the nationality of the observer, but the affinity of those, whether German or not, who felt part of the same political culture.

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Notes

1. For the concept of "fascistization", see Saz (2004).
2. A hatred that was very visibly present in the first volume of Mein Kampf; see, for example, Hitler (1936, pp. 13, 39, 83, and 160).
3. Point no. 4, "Auszug aus dem Programm der national-sozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiter-Partei", 24 February 1920. An original copy is in the Deutsches Historisches Museum (Berlin), inventory no. 1989/2573.2 http://www.dhm.de/lemo/bestand/objekt/PLI03302 (URL: 1 February 2018).
4. Carmen Werner, "Cartas de Alemania", *Y. Revista para la mujer nacionalsindicalista*, 2 (1938): 54–56, 55.
5. An image that was possible thanks to what was concealed on its reverse side: its destructive matrix. Although destructive or violent stereotypes could be found on all sides in almost every other area of life in Nazi Germany, their complete absence from Nazi liturgical celebrations is striking (Mosse 2001, pp. 197–98).
6. "Die ewige Wache", *Das Deutsche Mädel. Die Zeitschrift des Bundes Deutscher Mädel in der HJ* (hereafter, cited as *DDM*), November 1936, pp. 1–3, 1. The *Feldherrnhalle* was the Munich monument in front of which sixteen Nazis died during the 1923 Putsch.
7. "Con las camaradas que estuvieron en Alemania", *Fotos. Semanario gráfico nacional sindicalista*, 43 (18 December 1937).
8. And also others that are not mentioned here, such as the *Kindergruppen* for children as young as six, the National Socialist German Students' League, the National Socialist Women's League and the various organizations for professional sectors such as teachers, doctors or lawyers.
9. Adolf Hitler, speech at Reichenberg, 2 December 1938, quoted in Klönne (1982, p. 30). As on many other occasions, this was not any kind of concealed programme: this speech was published, broadcast on radio and also reproduced in the *Völkischer Beobachter*, omitting its final paragraph; Horn and Link (2011, p. 8), note 2.
10. For some interesting reflections on different dimensions of the use of *Heil Hitler* (including attitudes of rejection), see Evans (2015, pp. 119–23).
11. Point 21: "The State will take care to elevate the health of the People by protecting the Mother and Child"; "Auszug aus dem Programm der national-sozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiter-Partei", http://www.dhm.de/lemo/bestand/objekt/PLI03302 (URL: 1 February 2018).
12. "Nationalsozialistische Frauenarbeit", *Nachrichtendienst der Reichsfrauenführerin*, s.n. (4-1937), pp. 90–95, and "So wurden wir", *DDM* (November 1936), 4–9.
13. One of them, Erika Jordan, died of her wounds and her name was even included on the list of the 34 "fallen heroes of the Hitler Youth" (Miller-Kipp 2002, p. 17), note 5.

14. Directive of 15 December 1939, quoted in Link (2011, p. 79).
15. My italics; the quotations are from, respectively, "Anspruch der HJ. auf Totalität", *Die HJ. Das Kampfblatt der Hitler-Jugend* (20 January 1935: 2); *Organisationsbuch der NSDAP*, Munich, Franz Eher Verlag (1937, p. 437); and "Die körperliche Erziehung in der Hitlerjugend", *Wille und Macht. Führerorgan der nationalsozialistischen Jugend* (15 July–1 August 1936): 10–23.
16. "Die Hitler-Jugend. HJ", *Organisationsbuch* (1937): 437–64, 437. The HJ was the only party organization that included Hitler's name in its title; "More than others, *mein Führer*, through the name that we bear, we feel ourselves bound to you in person", as National Youth Leader Baldur von Schirach put it at the party rally of 1936; *DDM* (October 1936: 1–5).
17. "Unsere Hitlerjugend", *Wille und Macht* (15 May 1936: 1–4).
18. Respectively, "Eltern klagen an!" and "Der Kirche, was der Kirche ist", *Die HJ*, 26 June 1937, p. 1, and 3 July 1937, p. 1. During the same period, the Education Ministry made efforts to nullify "completely" ecclesiastical influence in schools, and—as much as possible—"to expel classes in religion from schools" and leave them as the responsibility of the Church; see Scholtz (1985, p. 85).

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CHAPTER 9

Fascism in France: A Historiographical Development Since 1945

Olivier Forlin

There have been more and more historical studies on fascism in France since the 1980s, and now, much research and many solid analyses are carried out on fascist ideology and political culture, on movements, their leaders and intellectuals considered as fascists. At the same time, some of these studies and the term "fascism" have caused much debate. Sometimes, the debate became a controversy which shifted in mass media. In order to understand the causes and the issues of the controversies, we have to take into account the evolution of memory of the 1930–1945 period, which, until the 1970s–1980s, tended to forget some historical realities. We have also to consider the first historical works on French fascism and right-wing which were carried out within a national historiographical framework. They tended to conceive it as a marginal phenomenon and underlined its foreign origins. In the 1970s and the 1980s, there was a convergence between a problematic memory of the 1930–1945 period and the publication of historical works which argued that there had been a strong fascist tendency in

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French society since the end of nineteenth century. The situation created conditions to contest the old interpretative framework and it caused controversies. Some of them were not useful to the knowledge of the radical right movements of the Vichy regime to the understanding of the period 1930–1945. But they encouraged historians to re-examine the question of French fascism and they led to further research on the French radical right and also on left political tendencies. Furthermore, from that time, these works belong to an international historiography of fascism which develops comparisons and transnational approaches, and underlines the circulation of ideas and men and mutual influences.

Before studying the political culture of French fascism in the 1930s, the article will analyse the evolution of the historiography and the memory of French fascism which has undergone three stages since the 1950s.

French Fascism: A Marginal Phenomenon?

After World War II in France and the fall of the Vichy regime, several aspects of the period 1930–1945 slipped from memory. The myth of "resistantialism", built both by Gaullists and the Communist Party, argued that French people fought against the German Army or shared the "spirit" of the Resistance (Rousso 1990). Therefore, the memory of French fascism tended to be forgotten although members of the Communist political or intellectual strata used the term. But they considered fascism as a generic and international phenomenon. They conceived it as a product of the capitalism crisis and the reaction of the middle classes. Used in political aims, fascism wasn't studied as a historical phenomenon. In the French collective memory after the war, as in Italy at the same time (Gentile 2008), a process of retrospective defascistization was going on.

Although they were independent from Marxist interpretations of fascism, the first historical interpretations showed the same tendency. At the beginning of the 1950s, in an article (Rémond 1952) and in a famous book, *La Droite en France*, René Rémond suggested a way of reading French fascism (Rémond 1954). *La Droite en France* was a study, over a long period of time (1815–1945), of the history of ideas and political cultures of the French right-wing. The author asserted that it was composed of three political cultures (liberalism, Bonapartism and legitimism) from which fascism was excluded. The force of these three cultures prevented fascism from becoming a strong political tendency in France. Therefore, it was a marginal phenomenon. In the 1930s, it can be considered as

fascist movements two leagues, Le Francisme and Solidarité Française, which had few militants, and a party, the Parti Populaire Français (PPF) created in 1936 by Jacques Doriot, which had two hundred thousand militants but disappeared only two years later. The other radical right movements belonged to the legitimist right (the Action Française) or the Bonapartist right: the Jeunesses Patriotes and the Croix-de-Feu, which became the Parti Social Français in 1936, the only one able to become a mass organization, were inspired by the Bonapartist ideology. French fascism was a marginal phenomenon which was an imitation of foreign experiences, especially of Italian fascism. So, besides several other factors, the framework of the French right-wing into three political cultures made France "immune" to fascism.

Concerning Vichy, fascism was also denied.[1] From the middle of the 1950s, the first historians who studied the story of Vichy France[2] tended to consider the 1940–1942 regime as different from the forms it took in 1943–1944. This thesis of the "two Vichys" became dominant until the research of Robert Paxton at the beginning of the 1970s. It was formulated in the book by Robert Aron published in 1954, that distinguished the "good" of Pétain and Darlan and a "bad" one identified at Laval (Aron and Elgey 1954), and by André Siegfried in 1956, who considered the fascistization of Vichy in 1943–1944 as a consequence of the war and the radicalization of Nazi politics (Siegfried 1956). René Rémond noted a difference between three Vichys: that of Pétain, that of Laval and that of Darnand and the Milice. Like Siegfried, he considered the first Vichy independent from the radicalization of the 1943–1944 period. He argued that the nature of Pétain's regime was a nationalist and a traditionalist dictatorship: it was based on traditional social classes and on the Catholic Church; it had no single party,[3] no single organization of the youth. Therefore, the first Vichy was very different from fascism which was a subversive ideology and a political movement (Rémond 1954).

These works about Vichy belonged to the process of retrospective defascistization in the collective memory and reinforced the idea of a French immunity from fascism (Forlin 2013). They were also carried out in a national historiographical framework. René Rémond, particularly, highlighted right political cultures specific to France, namely the legitimist and the Bonapartist tendencies. René Rémond's interpretation became dominant in political science institutes and in universities for twenty years, particularly at Sciences-Po, Paris, where he presided the National Foundation

of Political Sciences (FNSP) and where his students such as Serge Berstein, Pierre Milza and Michel Winock studied.

However, in the 1960s, the research carried out by non-French historians who worked on French radical right movements of the early twentieth century began to criticize René Rémond's interpretation. In 1962, Eugen Weber, in a study on the Action Française, considered that the radical ideology and methods of the league against the Republic did not lead to fascism, but it was a factor that drove some militants, particularly those of the young generation, to fascism (Weber 1964). In a book published in 1963 in Germany and translated into French in 1970, Ernst Nolte went further when he considered the Action Française as an "initial" fascist movement, which anticipated Italian fascism and then Nazism (Nolte 1970). Robert Soucy, an American historian, based his work on an extensive definition of fascism: he considered that the roots of fascist ideology were present in the thought of Maurice Barrès, and then, he classified as fascist all the radical right-wing movements of the 1920s–1930s: the Jeunesses Patriotes, the Croix-de-Feu, etc. (Soucy 1972). However, these works didn't cause too much debate outside of the academic circles and René Rémond's interpretation wasn't really disputed.

France as the Cradle of Fascism (1970s–1980s)?

The situation changed when Zeev Sternhell's research was published in the 1970s and 1980s which refuted René Rémond's theory. The Israeli historian did his thesis at Sciences-Po, Paris, with Jean Touchard as supervisor. Published in 1972, its topic was the thought of Maurice Barrès (Sternhell 2000a). Then, Sternhell carried out a study on the *Droite révolutionnaire, 1885–1914*, in 1978 and brought out a new book in 1983, *Ni droite ni gauche. L'idéologie fasciste en France*, that caused much debate in the media (Sternhell 2000b, c). The historian conceived fascism as an international phenomenon and as an ideology: he underlined the mutual influences among the European countries and developed an approach based on ideas; he considered that historical context had a minor incidence. His reflection was based on the hypothesis that an essence of fascism exists and that it can be understood by the analysis of its origins (Costa Pinto 2012). He argued that the origins of fascism resulted from the synthesis between the ideas of two tendencies: on the one hand, the ideas of the revolutionary right-wing, such as nationalism, populism and anti-parliamentary system; on the other hand, the ideas of the radical left-wing that belonged to the revolutionary

syndicalism which revisited Marxism to integrate working class into the nation and was antagonistic to capitalism and parliamentary system. This synthesis had begun with Barrès and was continued with different political and intellectual groups, for example with the thinker Georges Sorel. It resulted in a crystallization of fascist ideology in the Cercle Proudhon created in 1911. In *Ni droite ni gauche*, Sternhell considered that fascist ideology, developed by "non-conformist" political and intellectual circles which tried to define a "third way" between Marxism and capitalism, grew sharply thus preparing the advent of Vichy regime which Sternhell classified in the fascist category (Sternhell 1978). From then on, he conceived its left-wing origin as a key factor in the rise of fascism.

Sternhell refuted René Rémond's theory because he considered that France was the cradle of fascism at the end of the nineteenth century before its expansion in Europe; also because he asserted that fascist ideology was a strong tendency in the 1920s and 1930s; and because he thought that its left-wing origin was a decisive factor in its birth. On the last point, Sternhell agreed with the analysis of Renzo De Felice who had shown that Italian fascism had a revolutionary tendency (De Felice 1974, 1975). *Ni droite ni gauche* caused much debate. Of course in the academic circles, Serge Berstein, Jacques Julliard, Shlomo Sand, Pierre Milza, Michel Winock, etc., discussed Sternhell's theory in several books and historical reviews (Milza 1987; Berstein 1984; Julliard 1984). The debate also shifted in generalist periodicals (Winock 1983; Sand 1983; Sternhell 1984) and in some newspapers.[4] Besides historians, intellectuals and politicians participated in the debate.

Sternhell's research was based on a solid reflection and a use of many sources that were not much read by other historians. But the mediatization of the debate was also owed to two other factors (Forlin 2015). The first one comes under memory issues about the period 1930–1945. From the 1960s, a collective awareness about the genocide of the Jews had slowly begun; it became a significant phenomenon in the 1970s (Wieviorka 2008). It concerned the whole of the West, but in France, while the awareness developed, there was a new affirmation of negationist theory (Igounet 2000)[5] and anti-Semitic attacks occurred in Paris between 1979 and 1980. The awareness also concerned the Vichy regime since Robert Paxton showed its responsibilities in its collaboration with Nazi and anti-Semitic politics (Paxton 1973). The divisions of the 1940–1944 period tended to be reactivated in political circles, and certain politicians and their parties tended to be suspected of collaborating (Rousso 1990). The left-

wing, which was identified in the collective consciousness to anti-fascism and the Resistance, was particularly concerned by suspicion.

A second factor is to be considered. It concerns the political context which was characterized by the Front National's (FN) electoral breakthrough in 1983–1984, which subsequently became an important party. The FN is not a fascist party (Milza 1992), but a fascist group, in minority, contributed to the creation of the party in the 1970s (Lebourg 2010; Igounet 2014). And some leaders of the FN made references to the Vichy regime and to the Shoah in their speeches. Therefore, political specialists and historians began to study the nature and origins of FN ideology (Milza 1987; Mayer and Perrineau 1989).

Various leaders of the FN used the conclusions of Zeev Sternhell to shift the accusation of fascism onto the socialist left-wing which had governed since 1981.[6] At the same time, some historians began to carry out research into the commitment of intellectuals (for instance, ultra-pacifists) or left-wing politicians (ex-members of SFIO, PCF or Parti radical), besides the Vichy regime or Nazism.

In these conditions, French left-wing identity, one of whose founding principles was its effective fight against fascism in the 1930s, was destabilized by the publication of these works and the debate they caused. National identity was also weakened by Sternhell's research. From now on, the country of the revolution and human rights was also looked upon as the country where fascism originated, a tendency to fascism which grew throughout the 1930s and came to power in 1940. Zeev Sternhell reproached the French historians who shared René Rémond's theory with having preserved France from the shame of fascism.

Reconsidering French Fascism

Controversy incited historians to study once again the history of French political cultures in the first twentieth century and to reappraise the question of fascism. Several fields had been studied in the light of new issues. Radical right leagues and parties at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, and in the 1920s–1930s, were the topics of much research. The Action Française and its leader (Nguyen 1991; Prévotat 2001; Goyet 2000; Bruneteau 2008; Dard 2013), the Solidarité Française (Lahousse 1998), Jacques Doriot and the PPF (Brunet 1986), the Croix-de-Feu, the PSF and La Rocque, were studied along with others. Other historians were interested in the itinerary of political leaders or

intellectuals, analysing particularly their transition process from left to radical right (Burrin 1986; Villepin 1988). The history of anarcho-syndicalism at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century and the case of Georges Sorel were examined (Julliard and Sand 1985).

When faced with Sternhell's theory, some historians didn't change their interpretation of French fascism. However, while they refuted some of Sternhell's demonstrations and methodology, other researchers re-examined part of René Rémond's theory. They admitted that the importance of fascism in France had been underestimated and that a new kind of radical right, national-populist more than prefascist, which didn't belong to one of the three tendencies identified by Rémond, appeared at the end of the nineteenth century (Milza 1987).

A significant development occurred from the 1980s when debates on fascism shifted in mass media and the following decades when debates took place only in academic circles.

So, research on the Croix-de Feu, the PSF and La Rocque, decisive because they were mass organizations, continue to oppose the historians who consider that they can be classified as fascist movements (Soucy 1991, 2007; Irvine 1991; Passmore 1995, 2000; Leschi 2003; Sternhell 2012), the ones who consider that they were a sign of the Front National Party (Kennedy 2007) and the ones who contest these interpretations (Kéchichian 2006; Jacques Nobécourt 1996, this latter biographer of La Rocque who insists on his national Catholicism, Winock 2006, 2007; Berstein 2007, 2014; Thomas 1999 who underlines how the PSF announced the RPF of De Gaulle). These interpretations continue to be opposed, but debates have lost their intensity: for instance, the publication of a collective book edited by Michel Dobry in 2003, which criticized in its introduction the immune theory, or the translation of a book of Robert Soucy in 2004 or the reissues of Sternhell's books, or the publication of a book which is an interview of Sternhell who comments on his itinerary (Sternhell 2014), didn't cause controversy. The interpretations are so opposed; in these conditions, the debate appears unnecessary. And the specific context of the 1970s and 1980s, when there was a combination between the collective awareness of the genocide of Jews, the collective awareness about the Vichy regime, the publication of Sternhell's books and the emergence of the FN, has ended.

A Transnational Approach to French Fascism

The historiography of political cultures of the French radical right is dynamic and it came to the end of its mainly national framework. For two decades, it has belonged to an international framework which was introduced, during the 1960s and 1970s by the research of George Mosse and Ernst Nolte, and continued by Stanley Payne, Juan Linz and Zeev Sternhell. These authors have renewed the conceptualization of fascism which is considered as an international and an independent phenomenon. Comparisons between the countries have been developed.

Studies about conceptualization follow several directions. Some historians carry out research that underlines the similarities between Italian fascism and Nazism. They note their common origin in the counter-revolution and the anti-Enlightenment (Collotti 1995; Traverso 2011). They refute historians, such as Renzo De Felice, who estimate that Italian fascism was a particular phenomenon which only existed in Italy between 1922 and 1945. Other researchers, like De Felice, showed that Italian fascism, besides its reactionary tendency, underlines revolutionary characteristics in its methods and in its aims. In this circle of researchers, some suggest a definition of fascism based on a main characteristic. They consider that fascism can be defined by a main ideological characteristic. In this way, Sternhell defines fascism as the synthesis between radical right ideas and ones of a radical left revisiting Marxism in a national framework. To Roger Griffin, the main ideological aim of fascism is to regenerate humans (the "palingenetic myth") which leads to a totalitarian system (Griffin 2002, 2010).

Other historians suggest a multidimensional definition of fascism. Besides cultural and ideological characteristics, they combine organizational elements (characteristics of the movement or the party) and institutional ones (framework of the people to build a totalitarian state). Juan Linz (2000), Stanley Payne (1980, 1995), Emilio Gentile (2002, 2004, 2006) and Philippe Burrin (1992, 2000) support this definition.

Finally, some researchers refute the "logic of classification" (Dobry 2003b) because they consider that it's difficult to establish strict boundaries between the "fascism" category and movements or regimes classified as radical right or authoritarian dictatorships.

In spite of these divergences, common characteristics emerge from these studies. First, we can note an important tendency to develop an approach to fascism by its political and cultural aspects; culture includes ideology and the elements of the political religion of fascism—such as myths and ritual.

The second characteristic concerns the will of these historians to exchange views about their fields of study instead of opposing each other. By doing so, they have created a "new consensus" based on four characteristics that enable the identification of fascism: ideological and social syncretism which goes beyond the left-right divide and class divisions; its political religion dimension; its revolutionary aspect; its aim to regenerate a nation.

The last characteristic concerns a transnational approach to fascism, which results in studying comparisons and also the consequences of the circulation of ideas and practices (Costa Pinto 2011). In this way, some researchers have identified a dynamic created by the influence of fascist and Nazi regimes whose experience was typical of the interwar period and World War II. Radical right movements and authoritarian dictatorships were inspired by some elements of the two "models" such as the charismatic leader or the corporations' system that they tried to introduce, adapting them in a different context. Sometimes, they could, in turn, influence other movements or regimes. A vast field of experiences and ideas existed, and enabled hybridization processes (Costa Pinto and Kallis 2014).

The progress of international historiography has influenced research into French fascism for two decades. On the one hand, conceptual tools and comparatism make it possible to know the precise nature of political movements and see if they are affiliated to fascism or not. On the other hand, research is based on a transnational approach which insists on the phenomenon of influence, interactions and cultural transfers.

These approaches lead to the reappraisal of the place that fascism had in society and the political system, as well as a better understanding of the factors which contributed to its rise. Fascism was in a minority, but it wasn't a marginal phenomenon.

The factors which contributed to the growth of fascism were re-examined, particularly the importance of the protest movement against the republican regime by the radical right leagues at the end of the nineteenth and in the 1930s. The counter-revolutionary radical right was the head of this anti-republican fight. Historians took into account the consequences of several elements of the Great War to understand the rise of fascism: the destabilization of the Third Republic after the war, the former fighters phenomenon and its anti-parliamentarianism, anti-communism, the process of brutalization due to the war. The extent of the economic crisis of the 1930s, which continued in France in 1939, was underlined. Another important factor concerns the tendency to look for models and solutions to the French crisis out of the country. The search for a model doesn't mean

trying to introduce a fascist regime in France after observing and understanding it. Usually, it only consists of imitating some characteristics of the regime, just as a charismatic leader is able to straighten out the country (Saintin 2017), or the system of the corporate state.[7]

This leads us to conceive that even if fascist movements were weak as organizations, a process of fascistization of people's minds was going on in France, as noted by Raoul Girardet in 1955 and few years later by Paul Sérant in a book concerning some radical right intellectuals.[8] It concerned politicians coming from the leagues and from the right-wing parties, sometimes from the left-wing parties, many intellectuals and journalists. Fascist regimes, particularly Italian fascism, because of their influence, were attractive to them. Unlike the Nazi one, Italian fascist ideology had universal tendencies. Mussolini's regime used active foreign propaganda. It used political propaganda and tried to rally round European fascist movements between 1933 and 1936[9] on an international scale. The Italian regime provided support to some of these movements; sometimes, it sought to influence French political leaders who ruled the government. Fascist propaganda was also a cultural one; the regime created several structures or used different ways to develop a cultural influence. For instance, he created the *fasci a l'estero* which was directed towards the Italian emigrants (Cavarocchi 2010). He used the Dante Alighieri Institutes which taught the Italian language in foreign countries, or he designated Italian lectors in some French universities who had a political role (Dubois 2014, 2015a), besides their cultural function. Some intellectuals and journalists contributed to several associations or committees, such as the Comité France-Italie and the Comitato Italia-Francia. With the aim of promoting a diplomatic rapprochement between Italy and France, they organized meetings, conferences and exhibitions. Through these cultural actions, positive representations of Italian culture, and also of the fascist regime, circulated in France (Fraixe et al. 2014). Some of them went to Italy; sometimes, journeys were organized by fascist regimes which used tourism with a political aim. Some of the travellers were received by Mussolini in his office. They brought back travel writings from their journeys, which had been edited or published in newspapers, were favourable towards fascist regimes and described a modern Italy (Poupault 2009, 2014).

Conceptual tools allow us to understand these phenomena. To Philippe Burrin, France was under the influence of the "magnetic field" of fascism in the 1930s (Burrin 1984). This notion concerns the international influence of fascism and its influence on minds in France in some political or cultural

circles. To António Costa Pinto and Aristotle Kallis, processes of ideological, political and institutional hybridization were going on in Europe during the interwar period. Fascist regimes inspired dictatorships which borrowed some elements cross-fertilized with national traditions. Sometimes, they became a source of inspiration that others could borrow and adapt in the process. Then, a rich field of circulation of ideas and practices existed in the interwar period which could be a source of inspiration to French radical right movements or politicians (Costa Pinto and Kallis 2014).

Around World War II, the approach of the Vichy regime has also been modified. Vichy wasn't a fascist regime, but some fascists, in a minority, were present from the beginning of the regime, with a few intellectuals such as Lucien Rebatet[10] or Paul Marion who, when he was general secretary of Information and Propaganda under Darlan's government, in 1941–1942, tried to set up a totalitarian society with propaganda (Bruneteau 2014 [1999]). The process of fascistization of the regime in 1943–1944 also resulted from an internal dynamic of the regime: the independent choice to collaborate in October of 1940, the early and independent adoption of anti-Semitic rules from the summer of 1940, had linked the National Revolution, collaboration and anti-Semitism; in this way, it enabled the radicalization and fascistization of the 1943–1944 period. It reveals the uniqueness of the Vichy regime which must be considered as only one "bloc".

Since the 1980s–1990s, historical research has re-evaluated the weight of French fascism. However, if this wasn't a marginal phenomenon, it was in a minority. Some works have completed the examination of the factors which have slowed down the growth of fascism. Besides the classic factors noted by René Rémond, others have been highlighted. One of these factors is the crisis of the Third Republic which was very serious, but not enough to reach a crisis situation within the political regime in Italy 1919–1922, or of the Weimar Republic in 1929–1933. Its relative flexibility—the solution of national union majorities—allowed the crisis of 1926, 1934 and 1938 to be solved. Another factor concerns French society which was more secularized than Italian or German societies where fascism and Nazism could implant its political religion, because people were very attached to traditional religious beliefs and practices.

French fascism had an internal weakness which contributed to the slowing down of its growth. In the field of foreign policy, it didn't have a real programme of expansion and it didn't have a warmonger. Unlike Italian fascism and Nazism, French fascism was mainly concerned with

internal affairs: hostility against the Republic, hatred of emigrants and Jews, obsessive fear of the decline of France. These characteristics are inherent to French nationalism which didn't have a conquest project. Moreover, France won the Great War; so, nationalism didn't need revenge. French nationalism is a defensive one. In the second part of the 1930s, in an international context of tensions, during the Ethiopia war in 1935–1936, the crisis of Munich in 1938, and in September 1939, French fascists opted for an agreement with fascist and Nazi powers. Their pacifism was in contradiction with the nationalism which until then led their positions in the field of French foreign policy.

Finally, the main characteristics of the political culture of French fascism can be identified. In the context of the political crisis of the 1930s, French fascism searched for a charismatic leader. Some believed that Jacques Doriot, the leader of the PPF in 1937–1938, was the incarnation of the charismatic leader. Another characteristic of French fascism was to define a "third way" between Marxism and economic liberalism as a solution able to resolve the economic and social crisis of the 1930s. Italian system of the corporate state aroused a strong interest among French fascists. A third characteristic concerns the state of mind of some intellectual circles. Raoul Girardet, in a research based on the writings of fascist intellectuals such as Brasillach, Drieu La Rochelle or Rebatet, defines this state of mind as a romanticism which consists of several sentimental values or attitudes. Firstly, the action is considered as an important value and the only one able to straighten out the country and to break with republican regime and economic liberal system hated by fascists. Secondly, manliness, physical strength, violence, sport, etc., are highlighted and correlatively, the youth. Romanticism of the youth reveals the will of the fascism to get used with the modernity of the twentieth century. These characteristics coincide with the aim of the fascism to regenerate humans.

Furthermore, in the second half of the 1930s, the cradle of the fascist modernity was located in Italy and in Germany. This is why French fascists travelled over Europe to observe Italian and German experiences, and also to be in contact with the fascist movements in Belgium (Rexism), in Romania (the Iron Guard), etc. In these conditions, French fascism was confronted with a crucial contradiction between a nationalism which aimed to break with the decline of France and to regenerate the country, and the search of an agreement with fascist and Nazi powers. This contradiction, as the example of the divisions and the failure of the PPF after the crisis of

Munich showed it, is one of the factors which explain the relative weakness of French fascist organizations.

To conclude, I would like to underline the evolution of the historiography of French fascism. It came to the end of its mainly national framework since the 1980s. And for two decades, it has belonged to an international framework which develops transnational approaches. This evolution had a decisive influence on the interpretation of French fascism. It has made possible a better knowledge of political culture of French fascism.

We have also to take into account the relationship which exists between the historiography of French fascism and its memory. The convergence between the two elements is a key factor in the analysis of the historiographical debate about French fascism.

Notes

1. Concerning the historiography of Vichy and the question of the interpretation of the regime, see in this book Olivier Wierviorka's chapter.
2. The process was slow. The lack of historical studies on Vichy France, until 1964, in the *Revue d'Histoire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale*, demonstrates the state of the collective memory concerning the period 1940–1944. The first issue of the review about France under Occupation was published in April 1964. See J.-P. Azéma (1992).
3. Pétain bewared political parties which dominated the Third Republic and were partially responsible for the crisis of the regime in the 1930s.
4. Z. Sternhell, "Le fascisme envolé". *Le Monde*, 6–7 May 1984; Yvan Blot, "Réponse à Zeev Sternhell". *Le Monde*, 28 May 1984.
5. Theory and declarations of Robert Faurisson, of Louis Darquier de Pellepoix in *L'Express* in 1978, gave a new publicity to Holocaust denial.
6. After the European elections in 1984, Le Pen declared on French TV (TF1) that "fascism is derived from the left" and that "there is more than one similarity between M. Jospin and Mussolini".
7. Several groups of French intellectuals went to the Corporation Congress organized in Rome in May 1935. The Congress aroused enthusiasm among them. For instance, *Esprit* of Emmanuel Mounier sent representatives to Rome. The review published an article which was favourable towards the Corporate system (*Esprit*, no. 33, juin 1935).
8. P. Sérant (1959). The book has been recently reedited with a preface by Olivier Dard 2017.
9. These was the plan followed by the Comités d'Action pour l'Universalité de Rome (CAUR) (Action Committee for Universality of Rome) directed by the general Coselschi. Behind the aim to diffuse Italian culture out of

Italy, Coselschi tried to create an international organization able to gather European fascist movements.

10. Rebatet (1976). See the republication of the book in 2015 in *Le dossier Rebatet*, ed. established and annotated by Bénédicte Vergez-Chaignon, preface by Pascal Ory, Paris, Robert Laffont.

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CHAPTER 10

A Fascism That Came to Stay? On Spanish Falange's Political Culture

Julián Sanz

For almost a century, the term *fascism* has had a particularly wide and confusing variety of uses in the public sphere and is one of the concepts that have seen most scientific debates.[1] The same applies to the idea of *Spanish fascism*: it is difficult to imagine a greater gap between the way it is viewed among a large part of democratic and progressive sectors in the world, as one of the longest lasting forms of fascism and some academic postulates that characterize it as weak or failed. In the same way that the debates on *generic fascism* have generated notorious polemics, there is also

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a significant discrepancy of positions regarding the Francoist dictatorship and Falangism. In any event, in recent years, progress in research and the closer connection between Spanish and international historiography are helping to provide a more accurate analysis of Hispanic fascism, focusing on specific objects that are more useful for furthering understanding. This progress, however, has had no correlation with the view of Falangism in international historiography, due to scanty attention from foreign specialists to research produced in Spain and the limited international presence of Spanish historiography.[2] Many summaries of fascism therefore repeat the old clichés, some of which can also be seen in Spanish historiography itself. For that reason, we shall contrast some of these mistaken ideas about the nature of Falangism in the light of new perspectives on Spanish history and changes in the interpretation of fascism.

For a long time, it was usual to interpret fascism as an aberration on the upward path to modernity or as a mere defensive response from the oligarchy, underlining its reactionary, archaic and anti-modern elements. As it did not fit the narrative of progress, there was a tendency to explain fascism in relation to delays, shortcomings or anomalies in modernization processes, seeking causes in the *Sonderweg*, the *rivoluzione mancata* or the failure of the bourgeois revolution and the backwardness of Spanish society. These explanations have been discredited by research in recent decades which has shown the modernity of fascism and the need to study its ideology and culture, its mass appeal and the complexity of its relations with society. In short, there has been an extensive revision and very significant progress in the historiography, which, although with some delay, has recently also included study of the Spanish case.

Hispanic historiography has largely followed, although at different rates, a similar evolution. Since the 1980s, theories of backwardness have been revised, proposing a more nuanced view of the nineteenth century where modern elements, like industrialization, agrarian change, the liberal revolution, the influence of liberalism and the affirmation of Spanish nationalism, have greater presence than before. This revision, however, has only belatedly touched on nationalism and nationalization processes, study of the extreme right, fascism and the Spanish dictatorships.[3] In addition, the revision of Spain's nineteenth century has often been barely, badly or belatedly included by some twentieth-century specialists. As a result, there has been a paradox in relation to the analysis of fascism: when new studies on fascism reached Spain explaining fascist culture, mobilization and politics as modern, rupturist and even revolutionary, there was a clear contrast

with the persistent traditional, backward and old-fashioned view of society, of the Spanish right and local fascists. Since the late twentieth century to the present, however, there has been a great qualitative and quantitative leap in our understanding of Spanish nationalism, the reactionary right and Falangism.[4] This change has meant, among other aspects indicated below, a response to the theories arguing that conditions for a fascist movement in Spain were lacking.

To illustrate this change, it is useful to review the cases on which US historian Stanley Payne based his view, as his pioneering academic study on the Falange, subsequent works on Spain's contemporary history and his well-known general work on fascism have been unquestionably influential (Payne 1961, 1980, 1988, 2000). Although his later studies have granted greater importance to the role of Falangism in Franco's "semi-fascist" dictatorship, Payne's perspective continues to follow his initial argument that Spanish fascism was weak. A weakness that he has explained by the backwardness of the society and lack of a strong secular nationalism linked to the limited impact of the cultural crisis at the turn of the century and the major presence of "traditional Catholicism" opposed to the development of a modern radical nationalism. He adds factors like the weakness and division of the middle classes, the difficulty of "nationalising" masses of workers well organized by the left and the implications of neutrality in the Great War, translated into the absence of a mass of war veterans vulnerable to nationalist radicalization and a post-war crisis equivalent to that in other European countries. Payne therefore considers Spanish fascism to be an imported product, whose relevance after the war seems to stem above all from General Franco's political needs and options.[5]

However, as we shall see, a large part of these factors were not essential for the development of vigorous fascist movements, nor, on the other hand, is it correct to state that some of them were lacking in Spain.

The above factors are based only on the specific circumstances in which the Italian and German cases developed and are therefore questionable. It is difficult to demonstrate that the rise of a mass fascist movement necessarily requires a strong tradition of secular nationalism, broad development of the middle classes and the chance to attract working-class masses or war veterans to fascism, or that the relevance of the Catholic culture or the organized left wing could hinder it. In fact, fascist movements garnered significant support in societies with very different socio-economic levels, some with a powerful working-class movement (Germany, Austria, Italy), less developed middle classes (Romania, Hungary), as well as in environments with

a major presence of Catholic culture and politics (Austria, Italy, Croatia), not forgetting the strong religious basis—orthodox in this case—of the Romanian Legionary Movement. The historiography is beginning to show that it is mistaken to consider Catholicism or religion as an obstacle to the rise of a strong modern nationalism, that the proletariat and popular masses were already nationalized in working-class organizations (otherwise how would we explain the bankruptcy of the Second International in 1914?) and that the interrelation between war veterans and fascism was far from being direct.[6]

Furthermore, some of the conditions considered lacking did in fact occur in Spain. Many of the assumptions about socio-economic backwardness and lack of nationalist traditions have been greatly challenged by research in recent decades. Thus, the intellectual crisis at the turn of the century had its Spanish counterpart, with the reception of irrationalist and vitalist philosophy and the development of nationalist cultural movements like regenerationism and the Generation of '98, followed by the Generation of 1914, with Ortega y Gasset's decisive contribution. Spain also experienced the social and political *crisis of hegemony* that spread through Europe from 1917–1918, was unsolved by the Primo de Rivera dictatorship and gave way to the democratization and inclusion of the popular classes represented by the Second Republic. This situation is crucial because one of the key factors in the development of fascism was the context of democratization, with the challenges that mass politics and the rise of the working-class movement generated for the organization of hegemony and which were often met by converging around an anti-democratic project of different right-wing sectors, including fascists. This explains why Spanish fascism appeared precisely in 1931, becoming a mass movement when the political situation became radically conflictive after July 1936 and why its status as the main force in the counter-revolutionary coalition should smooth the path towards generating the single party for the long Francoist dictatorship.

Part of the historiography has considered the scanty success of early Falangism, Franco's decree to unify and take control of the party and the heterogeneous nature of the counter-revolutionary coalition underpinning the dictatorship, as the result but also reason for the failure, weakness and artificiality that characterized Spanish fascism. From this perspective, Falangism was simply a radical excrescence of the traditional far right, a depthless fascistization of the principles of authoritarian nationalism and traditionalism and at best, a brief fascist project that was definitively subordinated and denatured during the Civil War. The unified party (*Falange*

Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista, FET-JONS) was not therefore, strictly speaking a fascist single party but an artificial bureaucratic structure, subordinate to the traditional right and without consistent social support. Recent research, however, has been rejecting this image, analysing the political culture and praxis of Falangism during the Republic, the war and the dictatorship, explaining the decisive importance of the war as the context for widespread nationalist radicalization, capitalized by fascism, as well as studying its members and important spaces of power and political socialization.

Although it is impossible to consider all these issues here, we shall attempt to offer a brief summary of the essential characteristics that defined Spain's fascist movement, considering its cultural origins, ideology, imaginary, praxis, social bases and the broad lines of its evolution until the first years of the dictatorship. In this sense, we consider that the approach of political cultures is a useful instrument for our analyse, since it allows us to go beyond the traditional political history and taking into account a set of factors that are essential to explain the conformation of the Falangist identity, such as myths, rituals, symbols, forms of socialization or experience of violence.[7]

The Antecedents of a Political Culture: A New Nationalism

Spanish fascists were always well aware they were indebted to nationalist tendencies developed in the late nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century. When Laín Entralgo published *España como problema* half a century later, he began precisely there, seeking to reformulate a Falangist brief based on elements from Menéndez y Pelayo, the Generation of '98 and Ortega y Gasset (Laín Entralgo 1949; Saz 2003, pp. 381–382).

This cultural link with the *fin de siécle*'s new nationalism is clearly part of the lengthy genesis of fascist ideology, initially rooted in a set of intellectual drives, of traditions of combating democracy and liberalism. We are referring to the role of the intellectual crisis at the turn of the century, as a critical offensive against the values inherited from the culture of Enlightenment, rejecting liberalism, universalism, rationalism, democracy and Marxist socialism on behalf of idealism, irrationalism, voluntarism, vitalism, hierarchy and organicist nationalism. Particularly important was the spread of the ideas of national, racial and civilizing decadence, which brought calls for the regeneration and rebirth of the Fatherland (Sternhell et al. 1994).

Far from what has sometimes been claimed, Spain was familiar with this context, as shown by the widespread obsession with national decadence running through regenerationist and Generation of '98 literature. In the late nineteenth century, regenerationist production had already begun to grow in importance, deeply concerned with what it perceived as degeneration of the Fatherland, linked to the decline of the race. This concern was heightened by the *disaster*, defeat by the USA in 1898 and loss of the remaining empire, seen as a collective humiliation and consequence of a long previous decay. Here, the Generation of '98 must be seen as an intellectual reaction similar to that which occurred in other countries, determined to find a new nationalism and connected to the trends in fashion in Europe at the turn of the century, with irrationalism and vitalism. The Iberian Peninsula was far from being old-fashioned or culturally isolated, and some groups of intellectuals were influenced with the ideas of Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and Bergson, the nationalism of Maurras and Barrès, and Sorel's revolutionary syndicalism (Sobejano 1967; González Cuevas 2000; Saz 2003).

The new nationalism expressed by regenerationism and Generation of '98 philosophy proposed a set of ideas, issues and concerns amenable to different developments. So different, in fact, that they had a significant influence on a large part of progressive (institutionist, republican, socialist) thought which provided inspiration for the Second Republic's reformist project, as well as the cultural patterns underpinning Spanish fascism. Regenerationism with its populist connotations, its criticism of parliamentarianism and the absolute priority given to the regeneration of the Fatherland helped to corrode the liberal tradition and create a fertile ground for an anti-liberal agenda. In this direction, the work of Generation of '98 authors, like Unamuno, Baroja, Azorín and Maeztu, gave rise to an essentialist, mystical and sublimated vision of the nation, along with a rejection of the masses and critique of liberalism, democracy and socialism (Saz 2003, pp. 70–77; Cacho Viu 1997). The advance of this secular nationalism joined the development of the national-Catholicism expressed by Menéndez y Pelayo, with decisive implications for the development of anti-liberal modern nationalism, broadly influencing the different political cultures and subcultures of the Spanish right (Botti 1992; Santoveña 1994; Saz 2003).

Thus, in the early decades of the twentieth century, a broad anti-liberal nationalist agenda was gradually constructed and also expressed by the *Juventudes Mauristas* and the growing influence of Maurras' ideas in vari-

ous circles. The Great War and the Russian Revolution also affected Spanish politics and culture, strengthening the nationalist tendency of intellectuals like Maeztu, d'Ors and Ortega which strongly influence conservative sectors and the development of early Spanish fascism. Ortega y Gasset's evolution is also a good example of the authoritarian drift of European liberalism, marked by an obsession with decadence and defence of elitism against the rebellion of the masses. Influenced by Nietzsche, Pareto and Spengler, Ortega launched an anti-rationalist offensive on behalf of the life forces that exalted aristocratic, warrior and military values which meant gradually moving away from the enlightened values of reason and progress. In the essentialist, organicist, Castilianist national conception of *España invertebrada* (1921) and other works, in the call for a "national dogma" and a nationalization able to draw the people "to strong incentivising enterprises" directed by determined elites, we can find a set of ideas which, purged of any liberal remains, broadly impregnated the mental schemes of Falangism (Gil Pecharromán 1994; González Cuevas 1998).[8]

The problems which marked the post-war and 1920s throughout Europe also affected Spain as the country experienced severe social and political conflict, exhaustion of the oligarchic liberal system and General Primo de Rivera's dictatorship. The dictatorship promoted a mass nationalization plan and political reorganization that propelled the anti-liberal drift in various conservative sectors (Catholics, Maurists). Through the Patriotic Union (*Unión Patriótica*), it distilled nationalist, traditionalist and corporativist ideas, merging right-wing traditions with Europe's new anti-democratic movements (González Calleja 2005; Quiroga 2008). From the early 1920s, one sector of the right contemplated the rise of fascism with approval and interest, giving rise to some organizational endeavours, as well as violent activism from the *Sindicatos Libres*, an endogenous form of radical, socializing, working-class nationalism. The press and intellectual avant-garde watched Rome closely as a source of inspiration, and in particular, fascist ideas were disseminated by writers like Sánchez Mazas and Giménez Caballero, who explicitly proposed significantly influential fascist formulations in the following years (Saz 2003, pp. 105–118; Rodríguez Jiménez 2000, pp. 53–62; Peña Sánchez 1993; Peloille 2005; Winston 1985).

The Rise of Spanish Fascism Against Republican Democracy

The Second Republic, proclaimed in April 1931, faced serious problems right from the start in an international context of economic crisis and growing threats to democracy. As in other countries, starting the process of democratization in a society riddled with huge inequalities of class demands for social justice and significant cultural differences fed important political tensions and growing social conflict. The significant retreat of the power of oligarchy, the Church and the Army generated a strong reactive response, and this was joined by growing discontent among sectors of the middle classes and peasantry. Republican liberalism and the working-class movement were confronted by a set of defensive positions and in particular, the combination of conservative interests and Catholic mass mobilization in *Accion Popular-CEDA*, not forgetting the anti-republican combativeness expressed by traditionalist Carlism and a new reactionary nationalist right organized around Renovación and Acción Española.

In this environment of opposition to democracy, nascent Spanish fascism had been developing since 1931.[9] Early 1931 saw the appearance of the magazine *La Conquista del Estado*, an initiative from Ramiro Ledesma, a modest civil servant, devotee of Nietzsche, Hegel, Heidegger, Sorel, Spengler, Ortega y Gasset, Unamuno and Giménez Caballero. Ledesma formulated a radically nationalist discourse with a revolutionary flavour, notable for calling young men to fight, combining social justice and national greatness in order to integrate the masses in a patriotic ideal, exalting violence and its commitment to syndicalism as the basis for running the economy (on Ledesma, Gallego 2005). Shortly afterwards, another small youth group emerged in Valladolid, from the local Catholic right which also provided its leader, Onésimo Redondo. The nationalist radicalism expressed in its publication, *Libertad*, included a furious rejection of democracy, Marxism, Judaism and freemasonry, an emphatic call to youth, as well as the defence of violence and Castilianist, land-reform and syndicalist postulates.

Straight away both groups realized they were allies, mouthpieces for a new young patriotic longing, differentiated from other right-wing forces by the absolute priority attached to the nationalist component, their "direct" and "revolutionary" style, their aspiration to integrate the popular masses and their emphasis on the need for social improvement. The outcome was merger in the *Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista* (JONS) whose manifesto asserted "the absolute unity of the Fatherland" and the

forced subordination of individuals and social groups for national purposes, as well as "imperial expansion" and "the extermination and dissolution of […] anti-national, traitorous Marxist parties". It proposed an economic and social organization subject to national interest, a national syndicalist form of corporativism and a state that ensured that "all Spanish workers were entitled to bread, justice and a dignified life". It also proclaimed "maximum respect for the religious tradition of our race", but rejected the confessional perspective.[10] The *jonsismo*, which had some financial support from the Basque bourgeoisie and moved in a right-wing environment, managed to gain support in small student groups, but had little success in attracting working-class members.

From summer 1933, various initiatives were started aimed at training an openly fascist force, bringing together a sector of intellectuals influenced by Ortega y Gasset under the direction of Professor and Republican Deputy, García Valdecasas, and elements from the radical right, led by the dictator's son, José Antonio Primo de Rivera. The result was the rise of Falange Española in October, led by Primo de Rivera, with financial support from far-right monarchists and a significant presence of followers of the previous dictatorship among the initial leaders and sympathizers. From the outset, its discourse emphasized the unity of the Fatherland in the form of a strong, national state and used violent rhetoric. Its *Initial Points* featured the formula (influenced by Ortega y Gasset and d'Ors) defining Spain as "a unity of fate" and aimed to install a totalitarian state that would put an end to separatisms, parties and the class struggle. It proposed a "State that believed in the reality and superior mission of Spain", in contrast to the liberal "indifferent State" and the "State of class or group", organized around "genuine vital realities" (family, *municipio* and syndicate) and inspired by the country's "traditional Catholic religious spirit", but not subject to the Church. To that end, it called for "a crusade of all Spaniards who want the resurgence of a great, free, just and genuine Spain", demanding they show an attitude of "service" "sacrifice" and consider "life as militia" (Primo de Rivera 1966, pp. 61–69, 85–93).

In the following years, Falangism developed in a way that enabled it to gradually define its political space, sociologically close to the right, but with its own political culture. A first step was the merger with the JONS, a group that provided many of the symbols and a large part of the ideological agenda that it had been developing, helping to confirm FE-JONS in the direction of radical fascism. The *27 points* in its manifesto are a good reflection of the situation, adding to the nationalism based on a community

of fate a defined imperialist will and reiterating the aspiration to a totalitarian state. The evolution was clear in the economic and social programme, within the classical fascist third way: corporate organization based on vertical syndicates and significant social reform (nationalization of banks and major public services, employment subsidy, agrarian reform). The shift was also noticeable on the religious issue, resolved by the generic statement that the movement incorporated "the Catholic sense, of glorious tradition and predominant in Spain, into national reconstruction" while rejecting clerical interference.

Such were the principles of the "national revolution" underlined by Falangist propaganda in the following years, shaping "the first fascist synthesis in Spain" (Gallego 2014, pp. 227–33). Between 1934 and 1935, the Falange developed a discourse, ideology, set of symbols and rituals, an aesthetic, a militant identity and specific forms of political action, all of which denote a fascist political culture. In those years, it acquired greater autonomy in relation to the other right-wing forces as evidenced by the rupture with the monarchists and the growing "revolutionary" orientation. José Antonio Primo de Rivera's speeches in this period underlined criticism of "the selfish right-wing" and capitalism, as well as the syndicalist and social ideas; this "leftist" shift responded to both the need to mark the party's own profile and the ideological evolution of the leader.

Spain was without question the backbone of a discourse that made the nation the legitimizing benchmark for all political action—a myth with essentialist and historical roots which aspired to launch itself on a shared mission to give the people meaning and unity. To that end, the prostration of the Fatherland, immersed in a long decline and under threat of death by Bolshevism, had to be overcome by a national revolution with a strong social dimension. The "social justice imperative" Falangists constantly spoke of was based on a revolutionary populist conception that required the masses to be part of an enterprise that would enable the creation of an integrated, enthusiastic national community and required putting an end to the injustice and poverty associated with liberal capitalism, as well as eradicating the class struggle. All of that, however, was linked to an elitist, militarized conception of the movement and society based on charismatic leadership from the leader and a select minority of determined combatants, highlighting the call to young people as the regenerating force that would lead the rebirth of the Fatherland. Membership of the party thus took on a transcendent, messianic mission, surrounded by the exalted values of comradeship, service, action and willingness to make sacrifices for

the cause. More than specific programmatic content, the Falangists presented themselves as bearers of a new "style" and "way of being" as militia believing in a movement that represented the nation's most authentic core, frequently associated with sturdy Castilian peasantry.

In this way, the classicist and anti-romantic aspirations that Primo de Rivera showed off were counteracted by the power of the myths and the vitalist and irrationalist elaborations in Falangist mysticism. The blue shirts, speeches on unstinting comradeship and sacrifice for Spain, the rhetoric that overcame "right and left", the worship of martyrs, the emotion of squadrist violence, the belief they were contributing to national resurgence and the rejection of "sterile" liberalism, "freemasonry" democracy, detested "anti-national" socialism and "prudish" conservatism were factors that helped to gain young members, albeit in small numbers—and for that reason the idea of a minority "out in the cold" became a badge of identity.

The scanty social support conquered by Falangism before the war is one of the elements that have led practically all the historiography to declare it was a complete failure. FE-JONS was unable to organize a mass movement or penetrate the petite bourgeoisie, peasantry and working class in any significant way. When the elections of February 1936 arrived, it had 20,000 members at most, including minors. It obtained only 0.6% of the votes, although the statistic is misleading as a measure of Falangist support and above all, of its chances of rapid expansion.[11]

Thus, the problem of right-wing fascistization in the Second Republic, pointed to by contemporaries and specialists, must be addressed, but there is a lack of agreement over its scope and specific meaning. Here, we use the concept to refer to the permeation or adoption of elements of fascist ideology and praxis in sectors from other political cultures. This fascistization could be instrumental or superficial in some cases and more acute in others, giving rise to a form of *fascistised right-wing*, or so intense that it involved an integration or contribution to the forging of fascist political culture.[12]

In short, a set of factors may help to explain many people's evolution towards Falangism from 1936. The first factor is that many rightist militants and voters shared his affinity for Falange, considered to be an allied force in the fight against democracy and class struggle, defending the nation and traditional values. This feeling was influenced by the collaboration between different youth organizations in previous years: the Falangist SEU, the Carlist AET, the Catholic student federation and the *Juventudes de Acción Popular* (JAP). The second factor is the degree of anti-democratic

radicalization and approach to fascism of a large part of the right, in particular *Bloque Nacional* and JAP, not forgetting the growing authoritarian and rightist turn experienced by the Radical Party (PRR), the main liberal centre-right force. The third factor is the crisis of representation in conservative sectors from February 1936, with the failure of CEDA's parliamentary tactic and the sudden collapse of PRR, while the perception of being in a pre-revolutionary situation spread through those sectors.[13]

Between February and July 1936, FE-JONS began to experience rapid growth, despite the difficult situation due to the prohibition of the party and the spiral into *pistolerismo* among Falangists and working-class forces. At that time, it was able to attract numerous Spaniards willing to support the violent path to bringing down the Second Republic, attracted by combative activism and some of its basic slogans (national resurgence, fight against Marxism, totalitarian state above classes, social justice). They were probably mostly young people from conservative, Catholic families, many of whom had never joined a party before and some from JAP, members of the middle classes, but also peasants and workers (Lowe 2010; Parejo 2008). When the anti-republican uprising began in July 1936, FE-JONS apparently had 35,000 members, of which a large number were ready to support the uprising with arms alongside other rightist youth forces. From that moment, there was a spectacular increase in members: in the following months, tens of thousands of *camisas nuevas* (new Falangists) joined the national syndicalist ranks which swelled to over 200,000 members.[14]

The War, Formation of Mass Fascism and Falangism in the Dictatorship

Thus, the 1936–1939 Civil War brought decisive transformations for Falangism, including the loss of its main leaders (Primo de Rivera, Ruiz de Alda, Ledesma, Redondo) and subordination to General Franco. It also meant, however, that it became a mass movement, an armed, combative militia and single party in a state to be created *ex novo*, so there could be a radical rupture with the liberal-democratic past to create a new totalitarian order. The decree of April 1937 which saw the birth of FET-JONS involved the forced merger of *blue shirts*, traditionalists and other right-wing elements in a unified party, in which Falangism soon took over the political and cultural hegemony, preparing to attempt to impose its "revolutionary" project after the victory. The war also made a decisive contribution towards modelling the political culture and identity of Spanish fascism.

After July 1936, a radical change began in the rebel Spain marked by flooding the public space with propaganda and mobilization, a wave of patriotic enthusiasm, inseparable from the outbreak of violence against the left (not only military and "top down" but also squadrist and "bottom up") and from militiamen and recruits' experience of war. Thus, the preliminary layer of right-wing political socialization and anti-democratic leaning in different social strata was reinforced, broadened and radicalized by the war. The speeches and practices that filled daily life combined a set of key ideas, benchmarks, rites and ways of behaving based on Catholicism, Falangism, traditionalism and military authoritarianism. There was a profusion of palingenesic visions and aspirations. War was seen as the way of saving a nation threatened by death from its enemies, purifying and regenerating it through combat, extirpation of anti-national roots and the blood of the fallen; that was how a *new Spain* would be forged, which Falangists considered would be associated with the national syndicalist revolution and greatness abroad. There was a strong tendency towards hybridization and syncretism of a variety of fascist and national-Catholic, "revolutionary" and traditional content, where religion acquired a major role, giving rise to the legitimizing myth of the *Crusade* and the strengthening of Catholic elements within Falangist discourse.[15]

Falangism, however, did not become subsumed, undifferentiated or diluted in this counter-revolutionary amalgam, but maintained its own profiles. During Manuel Hedilla's leadership, until April 1937, the party accentuated its totalitarian affirmation, links to national socialism and Italian fascism, revolutionary and socializing tones, appeal to the working-class and peasant masses, while continuing to defend its Catholicism. And from April 1937, without forgetting the populist call, the determination to unify was developed through discursive insistence on integrating elements of traditionalism, understood as compatible or indissolubly linked to national syndicalist postulates and an attempt to reconcile fascism and Catholicism. Before and after, a series of interlinked images and myths were also developed and intended to provide a long-lasting *blue* legitimization of the war: the *spirit of 18th July* as a foundational milestone in national rebirth; the messianic identification of Falange as a militia destined to save the nation; the exaltation of combatant youth, bearer of true Spanish values, which generously spilled its blood for the Fatherland and called to impose the revolution dreamt of by *José Antonio* (who became a mythical benchmark of Falangist purity); the *myth of the Caudillo* as providential leader, saviour of Spain and guarantor of the new order that national

syndicalists aspired to introduce; in short the myth of the *national revolution* in which war was just the first step.

The force and persistence of these myths must be explained by taking into account the deep meaning of the experience of war for many members of the *Generation of 1936* who developed their political socialization in anti-republican combat, on the streets, on the fronts and in both rearguards. That experience was also insistently recreated and reinforced by propaganda and Francoist policies, generating a war veteran identity and a community of victors. The war also involved familiarization with violence and military discipline which reinforced a militarized conception of politics, linked to an extreme authoritarianism obsessed by the values of unity, hierarchy and service. For that reason, Spanish fascism cannot be understood without the 1936-1939 war, a genuine foundational crucible for the dictatorship and Francoist Falangism.[16]

But, for the Falangists, war was just the first step in their project. Hence, the Francoist victory in 1939 unleashed strong pressure to increase their power, provide the *New State* with clearly fascist content and progress towards the conquest of a totalitarian order.[17] An offensive in which the few veteran Falangists were far from being politically isolated. Numerous converts were involved, from Serrano Suñer to Laín Entralgo and other intellectuals from the radical Falangism associated with the *Escorial* magazine. Falange would then decisively imbue the symbology, discourse, centres of power and at least part of the dictatorship's policies using powerful instruments of social control and socialization (*Organización Sindical*, *Sección Femenina*, *Frente de Juventudes*, SEU, etc.). Falangism survived as a political culture with an ability to rebuild itself and change, through the post-war totalitarian offensive, retreat in the mid-1940s, relaunch in the 1950s and syndicalist populism in the 1960s. The fascist utopia of 1919–1945s Europe receded as times went by, but many of the defining characteristics of Falangism did not disappear: aspiration to a hierarchical order, opposed to liberal democracy, working-class revolution and old conservatism; the obsession with national unity and political unity around the *Movimiento Nacional*; commitment to a strong state that would impose that unity over separatism's and class struggle's germs of division; the aspiration to fuse a national faith and an idea of social justice; the struggle to integrate the masses through social policies, mass organizations and propaganda. Although rather vague, like the national syndicalism of bureaucrats in their offices, many of the longings, myths, symbols and rituals that had breathed life into Spanish fascism persisted. However, it is not clear if, after several decades, it was still possible in the 1960s or the 1970s the survival of a social space which might replicate and transmit that political culture.

Notes

1. For interpretations of fascism, see Griffin (1991), Paxton (2004), and Payne (1980).
2. Most summaries or comparative studies on fascism have based their view of Spain on a limited number of old references from English language authors (Payne, Preston, Blinkhorn, Ellwood, Carr, Jackson, Linz) and in some cases, from Spanish historiography of the 1970s and 1980s (Tusell, Fusi, Jerez Mir, Chueca). Meanwhile, Spanish historiography's freshest approaches on modern developments in the country or on fascism remain overlooked.
3. The belated revision in Saz (2001). On economic and political developments, see Prados de la Escosura (2017), Shubert and Álvarez Junco (2017), and Calatayud et al. (2009).
4. Examples of the new perspectives in Saz and Archilés (2011), García Carrión (2015), and Sanz Hoya (2013).
5. Greater importance attached to FET-JONS in *Fascism in Spain* (Payne 2000), previously published as Payne (1997). The rest of the ideas appear both in his 1961 work and that of 1997. The vision of the Spanish failed modernization was also important in another pioneer and influent work on this topic: Linz (1970).
6. On Catholicism and nation: Haupt (2006), Louzao (2013), and Botti et al. (2013). On the working class, left wing and Spanish nation, see, for example, Martí (2017). On war veterans, Alcalde (2017).
7. On political cultures, see Berstein (2008), and for his useful application in the Spanish and Latin American cases, see Pérez Ledesma and Saz (2014–2016).
8. The texts in quotation marks in *La España invertebrada*, quoted by Saz (2003, pp. 91–92). On d'Ors, who over these years produced an authoritarian nationalism with an imperialist, rational, classicist and vitalist bent that would significantly influence the origins of Falangism, Fuentes (2017).
9. For Spanish fascism since 1931, Payne (2000), Saz (2003), Rodríguez Jiménez (2000), Thomàs (1999), Gallego (2014), and Gallego and Morente (2017).
10. *JONS*, "El nacional-sindicalismo quiere", March 1933.
11. There are no reliable figures for membership nationwide, but this calculation from Payne (2000, p. 164) seems plausible taking into account the partial known data. As regards the Falangist result (there is no agreement either over the exact number of votes), account must be taken of the strong polarization between two blocks, that the party only presented lists in twelve out of 60 districts and that a significant part of its membership was under 23 years old (not old enough to vote). Everything indicates that in a situation of crucial struggle where FE-JONS had no chance and insisted on the

futility of the ballot box, its candidates only obtained votes from some of the members and closest sympathizers.

12. On fascistización, see the different approaches used by Saz (2004), Gallego (2014), and González Calleja (2011).
13. Note also the significance of the anti-democratic shift in wide sectors of the middle and modest peasantry as in other European countries: Cobo Romero (2012). There are some significant testimonies from Castilian peasants collected by Fraser (1979).
14. The statistic from July 1936 in Secretaría General del Movimiento (1963, p. 54), which numbered 245,000 members in 1937. According to Hedilla, in late 1936, Falangist militia at the front included 80,000 men, plus another 100,000 in the *Second Line* (Jerez 1999, p. 237), these figures seem reliable taking into account known data on volunteers on the rebel side.
15. For the issues noted in this paragraph and the next, see Saz (2003), Gallego (2014), Thomàs (1999), Jerez (1999), Box (2010), Sanz Hoya (2015), Rodrigo (2011), and Zenobi (2011).
16. Thus, Gallego considers that is when the "process that constituted Spanish fascism" took place (2014, pp. 443 and ss.) and Alcalde (2014).
17. On Falangism during the dictatorship, see the chapter of Zira Box in this volume and Ruiz Carnicer (2013).

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CHAPTER 11

The Portuguese "Blue Shirts" and Salazar's "New State"

António Costa Pinto

In February 1932, a group of Portuguese fascist students in Lisbon founded an academic journal called *The Revolution* (*A Revolução*). Most of the founding members belonged to the student section of Lusitanian Integralism (*Integralismo Lusitano*, IL). The latter was a radical right-wing monarchic movement that followed the example of French Action (*Action Française*, AF) created in the 1910s. A few months later, the group invited Francisco Rolão Preto to be the journal's editor. He was a member of IL's Central Committee, and his beliefs were similar to those professed by the group. In the summer of 1932, the National Syndicalist Movement (*Nacional Sindicalismo*, NS) was launched nationwide under Preto's charismatic leadership (Costa Pinto 2000).[1]

NS was founded during the transition to authoritarianism and unified the "political family" which had played an important role in the crises and downfall of the Parliamentary Republic (1911–1926) but had been

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marginalized during the establishment of stable dictatorial rule under Salazar at the beginning of the 1930s.

NS belatedly unified fascist currents arising from the large but divided post-war radical right. It attracted the most radical members of the parties and ideological pressure groups created during the twilight years of the Parliamentary Republic. Before it was outlawed and its leaders exiled in the mid-1930's, NS had set up an organization that included a sizeable army sector and had organized several coup attempts against the Salazar regime.

Portuguese fascism was deeply influenced by the IL. Although many movements emerged during the post-war crisis that was not much influenced by Integralism, its impact on NS leaders and supporters was deep. The capacity of the IL to successfully legitimate a new reactionary ideology within Portuguese political culture with an obvious foreign ideological influence was decisive.

The ideological vitality of IL and its ability to permeate the elite conditioned the successful spread of fascism in Portugal. As stated by Hermínio Martins: "At the time when Italian Fascist and Nazi models assumed 'world-historical' importance, those most predisposed to learn and emulate them had all been grounded in the teachings and intellectual style of IL". Indeed, IL guided almost all attempts to create Fascist parties, which thus "pre-empted the ground from other influences and paradigms of the extreme right".

Rolão Preto and *Integralismo Lusitano*

Born in the Beira Baixa region in 1896, Francisco Rolão Preto was the youngest founding member of *Integralismo Lusitano*, an elitist study group created in the 1910s and inspired by Action Française (French Action). A 17-year-old monarchist émigré, he was the editor of the first Integralist newspaper, *Alma Portuguesa* (Portuguese Soul), which was published in Belgium in 1913 by young exiled monarchists, some of whom had taken part in the anti-republican incursions of 1911 and 1912. This was one of many publications created by young AF-influenced monarchist émigré students in France and Belgium. Preto was a frequent visitor to the Paris headquarters of the French movement, and he later recalled: "I was in Louvain before the war and visited Paris many times. I used to visit the offices of Action Française in the Rue de Rome, where I met Charles Maurras,

Bainville, Pujo and Léon Daudet … I spent many evenings with them" (Medina 1977, pp. 185–86).

Maurras initially had a profound influence on IL, but this dissipated during the post-war period as others overshadowed his ascendancy over the Portuguese movement's political and intellectual formation (Dard 2013). During the 1920s, the proto-fascist dissident George Valois became Preto's new point of reference: indeed, Preto claimed he was inspired by two individuals from different generations and political circles whose paths had crossed during the first decade of the century: Georges Sorel and Georges Valois. Sorel was his true master. According to Preto, "it was he who made it all possible".[2] In his final interview, Preto claimed that "while the Integralists were disciples of Maurras, the National Syndicalists were not – they had cut their ties with Action Française … Valois, well, he interested us: he had moved away from Maurras, he was Action Française's dissident" (Dard 2013). Preto's intellectual and political journey from Integralism to fascism did not make him an IL dissident, but his path is in many ways comparable to that of the founder of *Le Faisceau* (The Fasces). On the eve of the Sidónio Pais's dictatorship and, as the Integralists debated the transformation of IL from an ideological pressure group to a political movement, Preto returned to Portugal and became head of the group's social affairs section.

Integralismo Lusitano started life on the eve of the First World War as a club founded by a group of young monarchists who had been colleagues at Coimbra University prior to the Republican Revolution of 5 October 1910 that overthrew the constitutional monarchy (Da Cruz 1986). The group soon ceased to be a literary society, however, and became politically active. Some of the group's members participated in the first monarchist excursions launched from Spain against the recently established republican regime. During their brief exile in France and Belgium, they came into contact with AF, which became their key foreign ideological point of reference.

Following the passage of an amnesty law, the group returned to Portugal and founded IL. They began publishing a newspaper and entered the political and ideological battlefield. António Sardinha, IL's principal theorist, had never been exiled and only became a Catholic and monarchist after the Republican Revolution (Sardinha 2006). Other members of the organization, including its youngest leader, Rolão Preto, had experienced life in exile and were more open to the influence of AF. In 1916, after the republican regime took Portugal into the First World War on the side of the

Allies, IL became a political movement. It launched a daily newspaper that popularized its political programme, which was to ensure the restoration of an anti-liberal, decentralized and traditional corporatist monarchy.

Integralism left a profound intellectual mark on twentieth-century Portuguese culture. Although influenced by AF, it synthesized the ideals of a peculiarly Portuguese reactionary nationalism in a new and enduring way. It reinvented a medieval organic corporatist social "tradition", which the liberalism "imported" by the republic allegedly sought to destroy (Lloyd-Jones 2003). To boost their ideas, they rehabilitated the nineteenth-century counter-revolutionary thought espoused by supporters of King Miguel. The first Integralists were rather dogmatic regarding the restoration of the monarchy. This complicated their relations with other anti-liberal forces, such as traditional Catholics and conservative republicans. Up until 1918, IL focused on promoting pro-monarchist coups, effectively eliminating any chance of forging a wider reactionary coalition—although it also worked enthusiastically with other anti-democratic forces.

The 1910 revolution caught the Integralists, who had absorbed "the thought of Renan and Taine … and the heat of Action Française's literature" by the time they finished their studies, somewhat by surprise (Raposo 1945, p. 27).[3] These were the years during which they read Le Bon, Barrès, Maurras and, through them, came to know the main proponents of *fin-de-siècle* nationalism. As Sardinha later recalled: "Charles Maurras once said 'our writing has led us to politics … but our nationalism is essentially aesthetic (*les lettres nous ont conduit à la politique… mais notre nationalisme commence par être esthétique*).' As I reflect on our literary origins … I recognise that literature also led us to politics" (Sardinha 1925, p. 147). The proclamation of the republic had a formative ideological impact on Integralism, for which the republic was a "crowd democracy" that led urban social groups to the political arena. Already imbued with traditional nationalism, their intellectual background railed against the republic that represented the "principles of 1789". Yet, as noted by a founding member, at this time the Integralists still lacked "the strong armour of a system" (Raposo 1945, p. 27).

The Republican Revolution physically separated the group, with some supporting pro-monarchist revolts and participated in volunteer battalions that carried out insurgent attacks from Galicia in 1911 and 1912. Following the defeat of these incursions, some went into self-imposed exile in France and Belgium. Their letters bear witness to the influence of AF.

While its ideology was already known, the French movement now became the model to emulate (Sardinha 2009). When the group returned to Portugal immediately before the war, they created IL, which was formally inaugurated in 1914. In a letter to a friend, Sardinha, who was then newly converted to Catholicism and a monarchist, explained the link between his literature and ideological projects. Writing his book, *O Valor da Raça* (The Value of the Race, 1915), he said he wanted to denounce and undermine "the enemy's interpretation of our history". In his view, the "historical crisis affecting our country makes imperious demands of what, under other circumstances, could be a psychologically peaceful and cultured youth". As he prepared the Integralist programme, Sardinha explained the ideological and political principles that should guide IL:

> Monarchists, and the king himself, must be taught what a monarchy is. We have a precedent: the discredited Miguelist literature. It must be rehabilitated, and with the popularisation of the doctrines of Action Française, which are completely unknown among us, we must create a counter-revolutionary theory that can teach these people that democracy is a socially inferior form of government, which implies the rejection of all the selective criteria that only a monarchy can offer.[4]

Most of the founding members of IL were dedicated to promoting the ideals of a traditional, decentralized, corporatist and anti-liberal monarchy as a way of historically legitimating Integralist nationalism. Young supporters, on the other hand, were shaped by prolonged exile and the adventures of war, which brought them into close contact with French intellectual "proto-fascism" and Italian nationalism. Preto was decisively influenced by the neo-nationalism espoused by Corradini in his *Idea Nazionale* (National Idea) and by the words and deeds of the Italian nationalist writer Gabriele D'Annunzio.

The main themes of Preto's writing in the Integralist press following his return to Portugal were war, the nation, socialism and organic syndicalism. If some IL leaders sought a return to a rural society and worried about how to end the chaotic industrialization that they believed had brought with it the evils of urbanization, Preto, on the other hand, combined the ideas of Sorel and Valois in a nationalist response to the crisis of liberalism and to a potential revolutionary threat.

The nationalism espoused by Preto and the Integralists never deviated from the traditions of Latin culture, which given its dominant influence

among the Portuguese cultural elite, was initially French. German nationalism and Nazism influenced Preto's activities in the 1930s, but they never overly impressed him: indeed, he was quite late in discovering National Socialism. Rather, Preto combined the French neo-nationalism of the pre-war period with the mystique and action of Italian nationalism. His admiration for the French led him to state: "France is the centre of the world, it is the light that becomes the intense and radiant Latin light". In the same article, he praised the achievements of *Idea Nazionale* and used an expression that became famous at his fascist rallies in the 1930s: "By God, this shall come to pass!" Such statements were rare among the Integralist cohort, which was always concerned with finding national roots for its ideas.[5]

In a letter to Corradini published in 1920, Preto revealed his belief in the rebirth of the anti-democratic nationalism that would usher in a new classical epoch in the Latin countries. He felt it was necessary to "believe in the triumph of the Latin order, the classical order that embraces and makes brothers of all people who are heirs to Roman civilization –France, Spain, Italy and Portugal" (Preto 1920, p. 3). Preto remained faithful to Latin neo-nationalism as he was profoundly marked by the imperialist and civilizing myths of the "Latins" as discoverers of the world, "warriors and colonisers". His first articles for *A Monarquia*, however, were more concerned with the present. During the war, he sought a reaffirmation of an authoritarian nationalism as the only way to confront the post-war era.

Preto founded the union section of the Integralist movement inspired by AF's brief pre-war flirtation with the working class. Integralism was inspired by the *Cercle Proudhon* (Proudhon Circle), as well as by the Sorelian and monarchist tract influenced by Valois, *La Monarchie et la Classe Ouvrière* (The Monarchy and the Working Class), both of which were tempered by a form of "integral corporatism".[6]

The new utopia presented by the Integralists was that of an "organic society" that could dignify the nation. IL's anti-capitalism was partly developed to counter the growing "denationalisation" of a capitalism that disregarded national frontiers and threatened to destroy the nation.

Preto's national syndicalist programme and his allusions to national myths were influenced by the Italian nationalism of both Corradini and Rocco. Their decisive influence is apparent in the articles Preto published in *A Monarquia*; in his 1920 book, *A Monarquia é a Restauração da Inteligencia* (The Monarchy Is the Restoration of Intelligence), and in some of the texts that served as the basis for his unpublished book, *A Monarquia Social*

(The Social Monarchy) (Preto 2015). This early influence counteracted the disillusion Preto felt as a result of the marginalization of Valois's syndicalism by AF leaders.

By 1919, Preto was seeking themes for mobilization from those he regarded "Italian Integralists", those who were nationalists working "outside the system" and who had broken with liberalism in 1914. These were themes the reactionary AF was only reluctantly willing to accept. Rocco's call for "national syndicalism" through which to subordinate the masses to a state constructed after the death of democracy was a more important source of inspiration for *Sindicalismo Nacional* than Corradini's mystical nationalism.[7] As the Italian historian Emilio Gentile notes: "unlike the reactionaries and traditional conservatives, Rocco accepted the presence of the masses in contemporary society and thought that, in a mass society, state absolutism should use unions to control and dominate this new protagonist of the modern world" (Gentile 1982, p. 190). The post-war crisis convinced Preto of this and brought him closer to the Italian nationalists. This showed Preto was less concerned than other Portuguese Integralists with the traditional pro-restoration stance of AF.

Although he supported the traditionalism of IL and AF, Rocco inspired Preto to organize "producers". Preto's corporatist project involved the creation of a vast web of workers' and employers' unions on a regional and industry-by-industry basis, complemented by syndicalist chambers that would regulate wages, arbitrate labour conflicts and represent each sector. Initially vague and very schematic, the project was often reviewed during the 1920s until it became the programme that was at the core of National Syndicalism during the 1930s. From the end of the First World War on, the programme served as agitation propaganda. It gave Integralism a new language that replaced the aristocratic elitism with anti-capitalism and which radicalized the anti-plutocratic themes.

The Breakdown of the Republic and the Minor Role of Fascists

The most salient characteristics of the emergence of fascism in Portuguese post-war society were the precocious adoption of the paradigm of Italian fascism, on the one hand, and its weak and fragmented party political expression, on the other.

The first political reference to fascism appeared during the brief dictatorship of Sidónio Pais. An officer and university professor who had converted

to politics, a member of a conservative Republican Party, a deputy, and former ambassador to Berlin, Sidónio Pais had a straightforward goal: to get Portugal out of the war. After initial programmatic hesitations, he opted for a populist presidentialism. He limited Republican Party political activity, established universal suffrage and held a plebiscite to declare himself president. Sidónio Pais presented a national plan for the creation of a corporatist state inspired by Integralism. He attempted to unite several conservative parties into a single entity and allowed the independent existence only of the monarchists and of a small Catholic Party.

Sidónio Pais's political discourse was anti-plutocratic during the period of war shortages, directed against the party oligarchies, and espousing a messianic nationalism. He managed to unite monarchists and conservative republicans. In all this, he made full use of his charismatic strengths. He surrounded himself with a group of young army officers who accompanied him and participated in his rallies. After his assassination by a rural union militant at the end of 1918, the monarchists rose in the north, leading the republicans to mobilize in the urban centres. With large numbers of military units declaring themselves neutral, the way was left open for the victory of the Democrats and a return to constitutional normality.

Sidonism became a point of reference for post-war Portuguese fascists, particularly for right-wing republican junior officers, intellectuals and students, who went on to create several parties that increasingly cited Mussolini's party as their model. Many cannot be characterized as fascist in any strict sense. Radical right is the most appropriate label given their perception of the nature of fascism (and Mussolini's party) and the hodgepodge of ideological elements present within the groups. Some were heirs of Sidonism and united intellectuals, students and junior officers who were republican and laic. Others emerged from Integralism. The growing participation of army officers in these organizations was especially notable.

The crisis of democracy in Portugal highlights the problem of interpreting the complex links between fascism and the various political families within conservatism in the first half of the twentieth century. The rise of fascism was only possible as part of a coalition encompassing various ideologies, interest groups and parts of the electorate until then represented by various conservative parties. This fact does not help one to understand what was unique and innovative about the phenomenon, however. As noted by Blinkhorn: "it cannot seriously be denied that as movements, parties and political ideologies, conservatism and fascism occupy very different posi-

tions within the early and mid-twentieth century European right converging at some points and conflicting at others" (Blinkhorn 1990, p. 13).

The fascists were divided and merely junior partners in the large coalition that brought down Portuguese liberalism. They represented a minority among the groups most affected by radical republicanism. The independent organizations founded during the 1920s were not strong, merely a few among the many groups appealing for a military coup. NS was only a small and lately formed part of the fascist current within the vast anti-liberal coalition that sustained the Military Dictatorship. It was deeply influenced by the cultural forces shaping Integralism. NS was programmatically committed to an ideology of reaction against modernization. It evolved in an authoritarian political context in which its main enemies already lacked a wide margin for manoeuvre. The Portuguese fascists were a by-product of the institutionalization of the Military Dictatorship. They gained strength because they were able to mobilize and garner the support of junior officers at a time when the republican parties were suspended and the dictatorship hesitated over the creation of new institutions.

National Syndicalism: A Typical Fascist Movements of the 1930s

Paradoxically, it was the Military Dictatorship established in 1926 that permitted the organization of a fascist movement in Portugal. As with other processes of transition to authoritarianism during the 1930s, one of the challenges facing the institutionalization from above of the New State came from below and from the right. In 1932, Rolão Preto succeeded in unifying the radical right within a clearly fascist organization—the National Syndicalist movement, NS—that was to become one of Salazar's main rivals at the beginning of the 1930s (Costa Pinto 2006).

The first steps in organizing NS took place during the summer of 1932. By the end of that year, it had been fully established, although for tactical reasons its leaders denied this. The organization's statutes, which Preto signed, were published in 1933. The organization model NS adopted was similar to that of many other European fascist parties. Preto had studied closely the structure of several of these parties, including the early Fascist movement in Italy, Valois' *Faisceau* (Fasces) and the Spanish *Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista* (Unions of the National-Syndicalist Offensive, JONS). Preto's NS was constructed around the charismatic figure that brought together the pre-existing groups previously dominated by Inte-

gralism. The formation of this fascist party is an example of the penetration model of party organization, in which the party was created around an individual, a small core of "political entrepreneurs" he associated with and the local groups established or reorganized to ensure loyalty to his leadership.

The European wave of new fascist movements was also an element of political identity, and Preto was at the forefront of this: in fact, NS propaganda was marked by its clear identification with European fascism. It was at the heart of the movement's identity and distinguished it from Salazarism and other political ideologies and forces. International developments were followed closely and became a point of reference for NS political activity and propaganda. Reference to international events was particularly important given that Portugal was progressing towards the consolidation of a still-contested authoritarian order.

When asked about NS identification with Italian fascism in a United Press interview, Preto prudently replied:

> They are evidently similar movements, sons of the same social anguish, of the same collective necessity. In each country, however, the revolutionary wave breaks and extends in a different way and has unique characteristics and rhythms. Fascism, Hitlerism are totalitarianisms that deify the Ceasarist state, others seek to find in the Christian traditions of the Portuguese people the formula that permits the harmonisation of the undisputed sovereignty of national interest with our dignity as free men, as living spiritual beings.[8]

This interview was often cited when other authoritarian groups, particularly the Catholics, accused him of being a mere follower of international phenomena.

Despite this demarcation, fascist conquests in Europe were a central element of NS propaganda. Identification with fascism was a structural component of NS political activity, helping mobilize sectors of the political and cultural elite that identified with it and that lacked organizational expression. There were two key aspects to NS references to international events. The movement identified with regimes where fascism had won the day, which were held up as positive examples of the "revolution". It also noted the solidarity among fascist movements, particularly those which were ideologically close to NS or which emphasized "social" and "corporatist" concerns. Almost all NS leaders wrote articles and participated in debates about fascism. Attitudes to National Socialism ranged from reserved to uncon-

ditional support, but Italian fascism and the movements close to it were identified with completely.

NS saw itself as an integral part of the fascist wave that seemed ready to dominate the political fortunes of Europe after Hitler's rise to power. NS newspapers, and Preto's editorials in particular, followed Hitler's rise and his initial state reforms with enthusiasm. Part of the conservative press, particularly the Catholic press, criticized Nazism. NS responded to all attacks by defending Nazification measures and was only more moderate regarding racist policies, although the persecution of the Jews was excused by many writing for the fascist press.

For Preto, Hitler's ascendancy represented "the new cadence of the national revolution in progress" embodying the "strong edifice of the new state" throughout Europe. He supported Hitler's "revolutionary" strategy and expressed doubts about the German dictator's surrender to electoral principles—a move he believed could "compromise his position". He preferred to see Hitler "free from political compromises, armed, vigilant and determined" to redeem Germany.[9] Preto was certain that neither the "*Centrum* nor the violence of liberal reaction – nothing – could hold back the breaking wave of Germany's national instinct", and he felt Hitler "owned the era".[10] Younger NS leaders were even more unconditional in their support for Hitler and expressed fewer reservations about Nazism than did Preto. They saw it as the great ideological movement of their generation. Hence, the following statement in the first edition of *O Nacional Sindicalista* (The National Syndicalist):

> Hitler, great animator of the multitudes [is the] perfect incarnation of a generation that loves and wants to fight, that ardently seeks to destroy the myths and sophisms of the past and to replace them with the magnificent realities of nationalism.[11]

The instrumental nature of Preto's editorials on Nazi Germany was particularly evident when he commented on the tensions between conservative authoritarians and fascists resolved in favour of the latter. Preto always stressed the similarities between Salazarism and the Dollfuss regime and criticized the conservative authoritarian mistrust of fascist movements. Nazism's "social" and "anti-plutocratic" tendencies were held up as a model to follow while the racist dimension was ignored. The fascist press criticized those who saw the persecution of the Jews as the dominant issue. It stressed "the Nazi's slow and methodical battle to conquer the state,

the liquidation of the opposition parties, the absorption of similar currents of opinion and the extermination of the only two forces that seriously oppose them – Jewish capitalism and Marxism".[12] Although closer to Italian fascism, NS ignored the initial tensions between Italian fascism and Nazism and portrayed the Nazi dictatorship as heroic. NS criticized the "conservative" non-fascist dictatorship in Lisbon and promoted itself as the alternative force that would create and consolidate a real New State.

Solidarity with sister movements was greater when the framework was closer to NS ideologically and culturally. This was the case with the JONS and the Falange in Spain (Payne 1999; Thomàs 2011). The activities of Brazilian fascists, such as Severino Sombra's *Legião do Trabalho* (Labour League, LT) and Plínio Salgado's AIB, were followed enthusiastically. Sombra spent two years in exile in Lisbon between 1932 and 1934 and took part in some NS rallies. After the foundation of AIB, which incorporated Sombra's movement, the Portuguese fascists supported Salgado, who was also in exile in Portugal (Bertonha 2014). As noted in an article of January 1933: "our Brazilian comrades also want our principles, adapted more or less to suit their circumstances, to proliferate exuberantly on the other side of the Atlantic".[13] Relations with the Falange were intense and became particularly important after Preto was exiled to Spain. These were the movements and "comrades" with which NS was most closely associated.

Salazar and the Portuguese Version of "European Fascism"

The activities of fascist movements and the support they received from fascist regimes contrasted with Salazar's "prudence" and "lack of combativeness and modernism".[14] However, NS condemned the extremist myths and violence of some Eastern European movements, such as the Romanian Iron Guard (Sandu 2014).

Ever attentive to Portuguese political events, the British Embassy was a careful observer of the development of National Syndicalism. By July 1933, British diplomats feared that Salazar's position was in danger of being undermined by its unprecedented growth "in numbers and in strength". By the summer of 1933, however, NS faced a dilemma. NS internal correspondence reveals that from early 1933 the movement had unsuccessfully tried to reach an agreement with the regime. It wanted to play a leading role in the creation of new corporations and to participate in the creation of a new order with the institutionalization of its militias. While it for-

mally recognized Salazar's success in improving state finances, NS opposed his increasing monopoly on political power. Thus, they rejected his new constitution, claiming that it represented the victory of liberal principles over integral corporatism. As a result, NS began to oppose the UN and became increasingly involved in military-led anti-Salazar conspiracies. The promulgation of corporatist legislation in the summer of 1933 had an enormous impact on NS, given that the creation of a corporatist state was one of its main aims and propaganda themes. The National Labour Statute (*Estatuto Nacional do Trabalho*, ENT) declared the corporatist principles of the New State and was largely inspired by the Italian *Carta del Lavoro*, although tempered by the regime's Catholicism. The promulgation of the ENT provoked tensions within NS because it "stole [their] thunder". The corporatism of the Constitution of 1933 had not given organic elements the monopoly on political representation desired by the Fascists. It conciliated liberal and corporatist principles of representation. The President and National Assembly were elected by direct universal suffrage, although the latter, as well as the Corporatist Chamber (*Câmara Corporativa*) seldom met and had few real powers beyond rubber-stamping executive decisions.

Tentative Conclusions

The Portuguese fascist élite originated with the radical right, emerging from a youthful group that challenged the reactionary traditionalism and pro-restoration dogma of IL. The emergence of this fascist élite under an authoritarian political order allowed them to use IL provincial network as well as those of other fascistic parties created at the end of the 1920s.

Socially, NS had two particularly notable characteristics. First, its influence among young army officers and, second, a high number of working-class members. The support of a significant number of junior officers gave NS the capacity to mobilize the actors who had played a central role in bringing down the Republic in the 1920s, particularly during the unstable years of the Military Dictatorship. NS upset the chain of command, as lower-ranking officers took up government and local administration posts, and the top brass found it very difficult to restore the hierarchy the first years of the dictatorship.

The fascists organized themselves as a political party, which claimed to be the faithful repository of the spirit of the "revolution of 28 May". They supported military values and a radical turnover in the conservative political élite to allow for the rise of the young civilians and military officers who

had participated in the 1926 coup. The fascists exalted the "*tenentismo*" of the 28 May League for some years, as it expressed resistance to stabilization and the concomitant re-establishment of the chain of command.

The high number of working-class supporters should be assessed in context, as it is not indicative of a particularly significant fascist "working class" success or of a fascist alternative within the union movement. The fascist movement developed under a dictatorial regime that severely limited the scope of action of free unions. The movement aimed to create an embryo corporatist system while remaining flexible in terms of its ability to mobilize and form support groups in the unions of the service sector in particular, which later became a part of Salazar's corporatist "national unions".

The fascist strategy, however, was overtaken by the "constitutional pacts" between the military élite and Salazar, which joined conservative groups within the UN, and put down fascist groups through violent and administrative repression. The conflict between the fascists and other authoritarian pressure groups that dominated Salazarism was expressive of a conflict that it's typical of the majority of transitions to authoritarianism undertaken in the presence of weak fascist movements. Its rapid resolution in favour of Salazarism and the concomitant defeat of the recalcitrant fascists can be summarily explained as follows.

Since 1910, there had been competing political movements and ideologies able to work with the military chiefs of the dictatorship, which did not threaten the position and values of the military. Juan Linz points out that even if its younger members sympathized with the fascists, in a transition to authoritarian rule the military tends to seek out bureaucratic élites and conservative parties rather than fascists. This was certainly the case with the Military Dictatorship established in 1926.

The "constitutionalization" and gradual civilianization of the dictatorship were negotiated according to a government initiative involving part of the civilian élite, mostly law professors, led by the then young Finance Minister, António de Oliveira Salazar. The fascists had a "negligible influence" over these processes, as they were blocked by the existence of an authoritarian right, which was supported by powerful institutions such as the Church, most military officers, as well as landowning and industrial groups.

When the Portuguese dictator decided to dissolve National Syndicalism and repress its leaders, he also stressed that "foreign" fascist identity. On 29 July 1934 Salazar formally announced the prohibition and break-up of NS. He said that the movement was "inspired by certain foreign models in terms

of ideology and political activity" and that it "exalted the value of youth, the cult of violence through direct action, the principle of the superiority of political power in social life" and demonstrated a "propensity to group the masses" behind a leader. He said NS constituted "the circle of an arc that unites the commonly held and confused aspirations of the Portuguese political extreme" and noted it wanted to be "the party that [controlled] the destiny of the revolution". For him, the creation of a militia could only cause "worries – unnecessary worries – given the responsibilities of the army". He also felt that rather than contributing to order, NS was "a perturbing and disintegrating element within the nationalist forces of the New State".[15]

In September 1935, some national Syndicalists in alliance with several other groups opposed to Salazar rose up in an ultimately unsuccessful coup against the regime. This failure marked the end of organized fascism in Portugal, with many former National Syndicalists joining the regime, especially following the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, when Salazarism adopted a certain fascist choreography. Nevertheless, this process of integrating former fascists into Salazar's New State was deliberately weak and bore all the hallmarks of the regime elite's bureaucratic caution.

The regime institutionalized by Salazar was admired by many on the fringes of the European radical right, but above all by those of Maurrassian and traditional Catholic extraction, given its cultural origin. Salazarism was based on blend radical right-wing and anti-liberal social Catholicism. The New State meant the hegemony of a traditionalist, Catholic and anti-democratic right. Social Catholicism and the Church hierarchy constituted important instruments limiting the fascistization of the Salazar regime. In other words, these elements constituted the axis of a "functional alternative" to the role that fascism played in other countries in consolidating a new authoritarian order in the 1930s.

Notes

1. Some works of Rolão Preto were republished recently: Rolão Preto (2015).
2. Ibid. The literature on Sorel is vast. For a general introduction, see Jennings (1985).
3. About Barrès, see Sternhell (1972).
4. *O Valor da Raça*: 432–33.
5. Rolão Preto, "A vaga nacionalista". *A Monarquia*, 9 December 1919, p. 1.
6. The inspiration of both the Cercle Proudhon's output and Valois's writings, especially the text quoted (Paris, 1914), are clearly visible in Preto's ear-

lier writings. On the Cercle Proudhon and Valois's first phase, see Guchet (1990, pp. 11–106), Sternhell (1978, pp. 348–400), and Mazgaj (1979).

7. Especially Rocco's manifesto, published in *Política* in 1918, as well as his interventions at the Nationalist Congress in Rome in April 1919. See Vivarelli (1991, pp. 291–98) and the reproduction of the manifesto, pp. 594–607.
8. *Revolução*, 10 January 1933, p. 2.
9. Rolão Preto, "A hora de Hitler," *Revolução*, 23 March 1932, pp. 1, 4.
10. Rolão Preto, "Não!", *Revolução*, 26 April 1932, p. 1.
11. *O Nacional Sindicalista*, Faro, no. 1, 18 December 1932.
12. *Alcácer*, 21 May 1933, p. 2.
13. *União Nacional*, Leiria, 14 January 1934.
14. *União Nacional*, Leiria, 28 January 1934.
15. Official notice, *Diário de Notícias*, 29 July 1934, p. 1.

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CHAPTER 12

Fascism in Central Europe: Big Fascisms in (Not That) Small Countries

Traian Sandu

Countries like Romania, Hungary or Croatia are certainly small powers, but also the first one is the second major contributor to the Jewish extermination after Nazi Germany and its main ally on the Eastern front, the second the most important supplier in Jews to the extermination camps in the last months of the war with the active help of the government held by the putative Fascist movement, the third have experienced a years-long Fascist government.

I will spare you refined distinctions among the "Eastern European" countries, but permit me to quote the preface that Stanley Payne, otherwise a specialist of Spain, but also of "generic" Fascism, made me the honour to write for a volume I have edited a few years ago:

> East-Central Europe is not a clearly defined region, and its boundaries are drawn by various scholars in different ways, though its core area is clear enough. Neither is it a single unified region in historic, political, economic

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> or cultural terms, since it included lands of quite different religion and, to some extent, of cultural orientation, living in the early twentieth century at different levels of modernization and industrial development. A Lutheran and largely Scandinavian country like Finland, with a stable parliamentary system, is obviously a different kind of political and cultural entity from Bulgaria or Romania. Given this diversity, it is important to treat fascism in this region in terms of concrete case studies, the approach taken by this symposium.
>
> These are rich and diverse studies in their content, but the most common denominators have to do with culture and religion. (Payne 2010, pp. 7–8)

So, Stanley Payne fully approves a cultural axis of the approach to Fascism, which is one of the rationales of this chapter. Less easy should prove to define the kind of culture Fascism brings to political thought and practice. But if we take it the other way around, we could simply assert that had Fascism brought nothing but outer manifestations to culture as mass shows and virile boastings, it would not have mobilized millions of people, as other practices as sports or youth organizations of already existing parties would have supplied this demand. Thus, if political culture in a specific society could be defined as constant values, (trans)national myths and group ideas to which common people would usually refer to in order to act in the public sphere (Sirinelli 1998), then studying Fascist impact on this more or less stable corpus should detect the modifications and new solutions it brought to the crisis which unbalanced it during and after First World War. This political culture axis closely articulates to the second one.

Another axis is the complex, but often strained relations between traditional and even far right on the one side, and Fascist movements on the other—an even older paper of mine about Central European Fascism was called "the tearing apart of the rights" to characterize these relations (Sandu 2006). These conflicts were not due only to the frequent elimination of the far left as a popular competitor, but also to fundamental ideological opposition.

Talking about ideology permits me to distinguish it from the doctrine, which might sometimes be very similar with that of more fundamentalist right, but very different from the final aim, the social impact, the organization and the style which definitely characterize Fascism.

Why Central European Fascism?

… First, because of comparative demands. Central Europe provided the three most imposing movements after the two that created lasting regimes, Italy and Germany, as the Spanish Falanga was kept in check by and eventually submitted to Franco, whereas the Arrow Cross leader was thrown in jail by Miklós Horthy, the Conservative Admiral and Regent of interwar Hungary, gathered one-fifth of the electorate and took power during a short and tragic period; the Romanian self-proclaimed "Captain" of the legionaries was murdered on the King's order, counted almost 16% of the electorate and his movement shared briefly power with the authoritarian military Ion Antonescu before being repressed by him; the Croatian Ustasha leader Ante Pavelic enlarged his movement become regime and hold power a few years.

Second, because the sole comparison between Germany and Italy is jeopardized by the monstrousness of the Jewish genocide: that is the reason why Zeev Sternhell excludes Nazism from his definition of Fascism (Sternhell et al. 2010), in spite of lately efforts done by historiography of Italian Fascism of catching up grace to harsh repression in Ethiopia and anti-Semite legislation in the late thirties.[1] Adding Central European radical anti-Semitism permits to broaden the terms of comparison and, if not to dilute the German specificity, at least to generalize fundamental and scientific racism to peoples less susceptible to know it because of their backwardness.

As a matter of fact, trends like scientific racism, social Darwinism and broad projects for European or even world remodelling were supposed to be reserved to great industrialized powers, with huge urbanized and organized, thus easy to mobilize, masses, whereas in fact intellectuals and scientists of smaller and less developed countries proved also quite productive in the field, with specific means to reach rural population, so adding new cases to build a general theory. Peasants submissive to traditional forces like monarchy, religion and local lords were believed to be less exposed to the diseases of modernity, which proved quite true, but not completely, as the following pages will show.

The Traditional Forces, Absorbed to Be Undermined by Fascism in Developing Countries: Religion, Monarchy, Family and Their Fascist Counterparts

Religion and Political Religion

First, one has to evacuate a few dead ends on the topic. One of it is the stress between religion and violence, a consubstantial part of Fascist philosophy and methods. Codreanu, the Romanian Fascist leader of the Legion of the Archangel Michael (with its political Party, the Iron Guard), provides some good answers in the field, thanks to an ideological and functional argumentation. He invokes the distinction between the perfection of the kingdom of heaven and the earthly kingdom in which he acts, as well as he recalls the role of the churches in the legitimacy of the official violence of war—through the blessing given to flags before the fight, celebration masses of victories, etc. Some other short interpretative paths are the morbid dimension and the attraction of legionaries for death, leaving aside the aspiration to the seizure of the political power, which supposes activity in the true life, not eagerness for death as such. Others have likened the Legion, especially at the beginning, with a sectarian phenomenon; but the interest of political religion resides in the massification, and not in its elitist confinement, despite the phraseology of the happy few developed by its promoters in order, precisely, to attract better…

The real problem raised by religion and Fascism in Central Europe lies elsewhere, in the ambiguous relation to ideology as a new political religion, as revived by Emilio Gentile's hypothesis. There are clear attempts from some Romanian and Hungarian ideologues to transform the charismatic leader in the chief of a new religion. I quote only a brief excerpt from Constantin Papanace—one of the leaders of the Iron Guard—*Stilul legionar de luptă. Concepția tactică a Căpitanului* [The Legionary Style of Fight. The Captain's tactic conception]; "Grace to his lifestyle [of Codreanu], legionarism has acquired all the characteristics in order to become a religion of the Romanian people" (Papanace 2004).

Nonetheless, there still remains an ambiguity when we talk about religion in the case of Central European Fascisms. Boundaries between political religion and religion in politics are less clear-cut than in the dominant urban and industrial models of Italy and Germany: in an agrarian and traditional society, religion is an integral part of the Fascist ideological mix

more than its atheist or pagan fellows. The consequences are two-folded: the transfer of religious feeling from Jesus to Codreanu or Szálasi—the leader of the Hungarian Fascist movement of the Arrow cross—is therefore more easy in practice—as a neo-Messiah who uses the ancient Messiah to mobilize the peasant masses—but also more difficult in the distinction between transcendent and political holiness: Do the peasants believe in the neo-Messiah as he represents the former one, or do they believe in him for his own value and for the aspirations he embodies? In short, Codreanu and Szálasi must at once instrumentalize religion and get rid of it, or rather vamprize its aura in order to replace transcendent by political religion. In fact, they adapt to the context and use modern brutality in the cities and before young audiences, and more traditional discourses and behaviours in the countryside.

In fact, Hungary did experience some pagan doctrines (Paksa 2010, p. 128), on the model of the more developed Germany, but Szálasi, in the mature version of his ideology, was far more consensual and synthetic between of Nationalism, Socialism and Christianity and, while referring positively to Nazism and Fascism, "was convinced that Hungarism was by far the most excellent variant" (ibid., p. 133). Nevertheless, he criticized harshly the authorities and, among them, the Church, as a pillar of the establishment preventing him to impose his ideology, in spite of its religious dimension (ibid., p. 135). Thus, in his hypostasis of martyrized Messiah in the prisons, Szálasi competed with Codreanu, killed at that time (November 1938) at the King's request: Laszlo Karsai, one of his best specialists, wrote about his pretensions to replace the Christ for the Hungarian people:

> Szálasi and his followers believed that he was the Messiah of the Hungarian people. In one of the Arrow Cross newspapers was published the picture of a muscular man, with a mustache, crucified - representing the Hungarian nation - accompanied by an article entitled "Hold on! We arrive! (Kitartás! Jövünk!). So the liberator of the Hungarian Christian people could only be the Arrow Cross Party - built on a National Socialist ideology, and its Guide (Vezer), the Messiah, Ferenc Szálasi. (Karsai 2010, p. 152)

If the Croatian Ustasha did not seem to be quite different in his instrumental relations with the Church, at least it did not yearn to generate a political religion: "The cult of the Ustasha was far too weak to oust Catholic doctrine as a public than profane ideology. Instead, the authority of the Church had to guarantee the legitimacy Ustasha power - a tactic common

to Croatian and Italian fascism" (Korb 2010, p. 169). Thus, Ustasha had not known the long process of building a replacing ideology and faith of the religious sentiment. But it replaced it by magnifying its role of Defender of the civilizational Frontier between the Western World and the uncivilized Orientals: "The historic mission of Croatia was all in this phrase: it represented the bulwark of Europe against its enemies, a stronghold of Western civilization, *Antemurale Christianitatis*" (ibid.).

And at least, the ideology of the Ustasha did not attribute a defining importance to religious appartenance, downplaying it in the national definition: "The religious criterion was only a little decisive, since as Muslims as Catholics were part of the Croatian people in the eyes of nationalists, and that the latter also assumed that the Orthodox inhabitants of Croatia were true Croats" (ibid., p. 170). That would not prevent this ideology from possessing a Messianic and palingenetic aura: "The Ustasha saw in the palingenesis of the Croatian nation the only way it can acquire in the future its sovereignty. But that meant that the Croatian community needed to be cleansed enemies of Croatia" (ibid.).

Monarchy and Its Domestication

The monarchic form of regime was intimately linked to religious legitimacy, mainly in the Orthodox Basilean space of caesaropapism, but also in the frontier spaces of Hungarian Catholicism challenged by Calvinism and Croatian Catholicism challenged by Orthodoxy. In fact, all these traditional institutions were mainly challenged by creeping modernization and the huge shock of the First World War, which demolished the empires and their centuries-long elites.

So, Central European Fascists often paid lip service to monarchy as a traditional institution they pretend to protect, but in fact, as for the religion, they aimed to destroy it from inside—not like the Bolsheviks—and seize its prestige. In his main book, *For my Legionaries*, Codreanu distinguishes between monarchy and monarchical principle, with a transparent allusion to the corrupted regime of Carol II of Romania, moreover with German origins: "So all the monarchs were not good. The monarchy, however, has always been good" (Codreanu 1972, pp. 400–401). In an intimate circle, he had been even more precise about monarchy in a future legionary regime:

> One wondered if we were royalists. We have had, as our history teaches us, good lords and bad ones. We are for the good lords, chosen out of the soul-elite of the Romanian nation. I advocated for this: we will remain royalists, but within the Legionary State; we will choose from the nation 10 to 20 young elements, among the best families, who have demonstrated exceptional intellectual abilities and are endowed with the most noble qualities and characters. These young people will be brought up, educated, and by the best teachers, at the expense of the State, and among them will be recruited the king and his advisers. We will remain in the respect of the laws and traditions of the nation, related to the Church and to the Christian faith. (Dumitrescu-Borşa 2002, p. 184)

Beyond the charge against Carol, corrupt, of foreign—a Hohenzollern!—origins and with tumultuous private life, Codreanu portrays a monarch indoctrinated by the Legionary State, submitted to the leader of the movement. In short, it meant to realize in a more absolute way what Mussolini had already done with the domesticated Victor Emmanuel III (Lupo 2003, p. 475). Codreanu's traditionalist discourse based on monarchist and religious grounds appears to a large extent forged for a simple public, for the peasantry.

The Family and the Nest

The legionary "nest" (the political cell) also made up for any family deficiencies or rejections of its members, even if the family was simply indifferent without being hostile to the Legion. As any legionary was also a proselyte, he had to drive his family into the Legion: his political choice was also a global one that could not leave his relatives indifferent. The best example, which all legionaries had to imitate, was that of Codreanu himself, who pulled his father into the Legion in 1930. But more general instructions went in this direction, as this circular of Codreanu quoted by a note of the secret services of January 1930: "In the family, the wife must convince her husband, the father his child, the child his mother. All that is Romanian must be one soul".[2] Recruitment among women and youth sometimes reversed authority relationships within families, such as those wives or children bringing husbands and fathers into the Legion. Totalitarian mobilization inside the family intimacy logically led to legionary endogamy: "I want to encourage the legionnaires' marriages with the legionaries, having at the foundation of the union, not only the appreciation of the physical

beauties, but especially that of the brilliant characteristics of the legionary soul".[3]

Thus, these traditional institutions, which the Fascists claimed to respect, were submitted to the Party and its own hierarchy and agenda. Let us see now their project for the brilliant future they proposed.

The Modern Size: Revolution, Democratism, Technocracy/Biopolitics

Revolution of the Fascist Generation: Spiritual, Palingenetic, Violent

The revolutionary mass character of the Central European Fascists is a better shared analysis and responds, precisely, to their exit from a narrow sectarianism and to the violent clash with the establishment confirming their willingness for an overall transformation, not a mere seizure of power. They possessed the two main attributes characterizing every revolutionary staff worthy of this work: social coherence of generation of a young and frustrated group and a strong and structuring ideological project, postulating the creation of a new man, era and world—a *palingenesis* (new birth) in Roger Griffin's words.

The first aspect has already been studied for Romanian legionnaires by Irina Livezeanu (1995). But these two dimensions taken separately are insufficient to account for the nature and the success of Central European Fascism. After all, the generational phenomenon characterizes many other political movements and Fascists were reluctant to write down political doctrines in structured programmes. So, the project was often expressed by intellectual travelling companions of the Party as Nae Ionescu, the philosophy Professor at the University of Bucharest and mentor of the important generation of young intellectuals as Emil Cioran and Mircea Eliade (Laignel-Lavastine 2002; Ţurcanu 2003; Călinescu 2001). Ideology is linked to the capacity to respond to the multiform cultural crisis, as Nae Ionescu puts it in an article with "griffinian" accents from 1931:

> To this structure ["of the new spiritual world"] are directed or from it result all characteristic manifestations of the last fifty years: the rebirth of metaphysics, with the critique of science and its reversal of the function of interpreter and vector of existence, with the crisis of Cartesian rationalism, the reduction of Kant and the rebirth of peripatetics, with the crisis of gnoseological idealism,

> with the success or at least the effort towards the success of realism, with the collapse of the materialistic mechanism, with the onslaught of vitalism and spiritualistic renaissance, etc.; the new religious movement, characterized by the recrudescence of dogmatic, authentically Christian religions, and the acute crisis of Protestantism, interest in Eastern spirituality extended to the Pacific rim, theosophy, sectarian movement; the inner troubles in the art up to cubism and expressionism or whatever their names and all attempts to create a style of the time categorically different and characteristic; and, not to insist too much on these non-systematic indications, in the political order the crisis of democracy and parliamentarism, which no one can dispute.
>
> Are not these categorical signs of a new world? […]
>
> Can we still say, nevertheless, that lacks the revolution in the minds that will prepare and will ensure the success of the other, the political and economic one?[4]

So, the specific core of the Fascist Revolutionary attempt is not only the inherited "fin de siècle" racist ultranationalism of the old anti-Semitic Alexandru C. Cuza in the Romanian case, but the also fin de siècle yearning to a new world, provoked by the massive post-war values' crisis. Two big levers characterize this hard core. It is first of all ability to popularize ultranationalism by synthesizing many more ideological influences that inspire a very eclectic youth, as well as conference topics addressed in student associations and intellectual nests of the Iron Guard amply testify. It is then the opposite dynamic—the ability to crystallize these multiple, sometimes contradictory, influences in a system all the more efficient that everyone found ideological aspirations merged into a syncretism. This analysis, which pervades the entire work of George Mosse, finds a wide field of application within legionary synthesis: for example, the simple call of the dead beginning each nest meeting combines the military call of the modern State built by the progressive Freemasons in the nineteenth century and the traditional evocation of the dead persons at regular intervals in Orthodox countries.

In more developed Hungary, the revolutionary turn of Szálasi was even more clearly political and social than only spiritual. It intervened partly in 1936, after a trip to Germany in October: "He launched a new periodical, *New Hungarian Labourer* ('Új Magyar Munkás') in the spring of 1937 – addressing the working class that constituted the base of Social Democrats. In the spring of 1937, Szálasi converted his moderately anti-Semite Racial Defender party into a strongly anti-Semite, revolutionary party of petty

bourgeoisie and proletariat. As a result, the party was abolished on the 15th April 1937. According to the decision of the court, Szálasi characterized his own activities as 'Communism of an other accent'" (Paksa 2010, p. 132).

Szálasi was thrown in jail by right-wing regime between the spring of 1938 and the end of 1940, and there he could "read Marx alongside Hitler and Mussolini. It is also worth mentioning that the main ideologues of the movement of Szálasi (Ödön Málnási, István Péntek, Ferenc Kassai-Schallmayer) – in opposition with the majority of the party's membership and leaders – had leftist, what is more, far-leftist background" (ibid., p. 135).

As far as the Ustasha is concerned, its very official name means revolution, the Croatian Revolutionary Organization,[5] and the popular name of Ustashi means insurgents. Here, the supposed dominating elites to get rid of were supposed to be the Serbs and the final goal the creation of a free Croatian nation. But in fact, the Serbs played the role of scapegoats like Jews elsewhere and in Croatia itself in order to promote the palingenetic project of a new State, but mainly with a new society and a new man. The special aspect about Croatian Ustasha is that it took the power suddenly grace to German-Italian victory against Yugoslavia, thus the tiny movement became at once regime and had to incorporate political tendencies that would have been at the best its allies, at worst its enemies, in a "natural" seizure of power process. So it had not to fight against them, but only as political purges of the Party, which "encompassed a large spectrum of nationalist milieus, from nationalist revolutionaries to clerical, passing through republicans" (ibid.).

No wonder then if spiritual, social and political revolution implied popular support and, conversely, led to popular legitimization for the Fascist movements.

Democratism

Roger Griffin's definition of Fascism is a radical right-wing populism with palingenetic trend. If the palingenetic dimension of Fascism is encapsulated in the revolutionary aspirations of a new society and in the biological transformation of a new man, its political type of legitimization lies in the people and in the charismatic aura the leader might build to replace traditional religion, dynasties and elites. The rational legitimization might also concern the technocratic side of Fascism once in power, but has much more to

do with traditional elites, already functioning inside the State bureaucracy, elected more or less in the frame of representative democracy.

Codreanu invokes the popular support for himself by distinguishing Fascism from two repulsive political models, the democracy and the (right-wing) dictatorship:

> I do not want to criticize the dictatorship in this chapter, but I want to show that movements and nationalist regimes in today's Europe, such as the legionary movement, the Fascism, National Socialism, etc., are neither dictatorial nor democratic. [...] By coercion and violence, we could win voices and majorities, tear off tears and sighs. But did we never see and will we ever see, even among the most unconscious peoples, fervour and enthusiasm to be born of terror"
>
> Since it is not dictatorial in its essence, what is a national regime?
>
> Is it a product of democracy? No more. Because the leader is not elected by the people, and the democracy is based on the principle of eligibility. But in national systems, the leader is not elected, he is consented. (Codreanu 1972, p. 311)

So Codreanu delineates Fascism in general, legionarism in particular, from both forms used by it in order to reconcile authority with popular support. This consensus created by the Fascist leader around the non-democratic popular membership relies on the organized masses and on the mixture of electoralism and violence, of vote and street, in view of the establishment of a regime that is consensual around the charismatic leader.

Another meaningful quotation are two sentences Hitler told to Antonescu before he repressed the Iron Guard in a reactionary right-wing/Fascist quarrel, known as the "legionary upheaval" of January 1941:

> From a historical point of view it can be said, on the basis of a vast experience, that any regime must rely on the people. History has shown that where lacks this foundation and the regime relies only on strength, in the best case it does not survive the exceptional personality who established it.[6]

So indirectly, Hitler acknowledged that the repression of the Iron Guard, while useful as compared to the Night of the Long Knives in order to calm down Romanian society before Barbarossa, was also damageable on the longer term for the Antonescu regime as it deprived it of the popular support it needed to last.

This attachment to people as political legitimization without the respect of a firm rule of law can be called populism, but perhaps populism contains concrete doctrinal determinations like race and ethnic groups (Germany, Croatia), nation (Italy), religion (Romania), whereas democratism represents the general adhesion to people as a legitimization foundation.

In Hungary, Rudolf Paksa also noted two popular steps as Far-Right Politics were concerned: after 1918, they expressed strong popular support for peasants, as well as Hungarian middle class (under Jewish concurrence in the urban jobs) (Paksa 2010, p. 126). But after the great crisis began in 1929, "National Socialists ('nemzetiszocialisták') did not rest content with the program of diminishing social differences, they wanted nothing less than 'a system change' (rendszerváltás): the significant transformation of social-economic structures" (ibid., p. 125). To a great extent that meant they favoured a popular regime and far-reaching social measures in workers' benefit.

The Ustasha State had similar preoccupations in its social and economic interventionism: "The State organization of the economy was supposed to defend the interests of Croatian workers and peasants, and protect the people against anonymous and unpredictable crises" (Korb 2010, p. 171).

Another popular aspect of Eastern European Fascism regards the minorities. As subjects of small powers, Eastern European Fascists could sometimes resent Nazi supremacy and, surprisingly enough, displayed understanding towards minorities, with the clear exception of the Jews. This was Ion Moța's position, largely due to the Transylvanian origins of this prominent Iron Guard leader—and Codreanu's brother-in-law—which accustomed him to multicultural environment (Sandu 2014, p. 223), but also Szálasi "considered Hungarism a better kind of National Socialism than its German counterpart in virtue of its more tolerant policy towards national minorities" (Paksa 2010, p. 134). Ustasha had similar tendencies towards the Bosnian Muslims or even Orthodox Serbian speakers considered to have been true Croats converted by force in ancient history (Korb 2010, p. 169).

Eastern European Fascism certainly has some special organizations of its own to mobilize the society, the best known being the legionary nests. This total care of the human person in the nest corresponds to the legionary ambition of replacing the society's most intimate frames, the natural family and the traditional Church. But the nest was also a structure adapted to a rural country, to the dispersed population, to the man to man propaganda rather than to modern means of information, to the new regions badly con-

nected by a backward system of communications and segmented according to the polarities of the empires from which they had been annexed. In a seemingly paradoxical way, the nest was thus a decentralized organization whose initiative came from "below", before the leader could control them later on. Other adapted manifestations like rides on horseback through the villages in white traditional suits could complete the more classical marches in modern green shirts in the towns.

So, as a conclusion, the path for Fascist upheaval in Eastern Europe is quite narrow between a strong traditional Right and popular categories still submissive to them. But Fascism also had its own intellectual elites ready to replace the former ones by providing doctrines and methods fit to revolutionary ideology and methods.

Technocracy and Biopolitics

Let aside the well-known spiritual or revolutionary intellectuals like Eliade or Cioran who finally stuck to the Iron Guard, Fascism also attracted middle size cadres able to organize the State on its own ideological foundations.

The best Romanian example in the field is the ephemeral journal *Axa* in 1932. The rallying to the Iron Guard in 1932 of this group of young orthodox and modernist intellectuals at the instigation of the Orthodox fundamentalist thinker Nichifor Crainic is reflected in particular in the writings of one of the most brilliant of them, Mihail Polihroniade. His article entitled "The Role of the Iron Guard"[7] combines the rejection of all political formations considered non-modern with the Messianic ideology, the seduction of the masses, the youth of the staff, all put at the service of building a strong State. This insistence on the State seems to confirm Michael Mann's theory defining fascism mainly as radical statism. It is nevertheless important to note the primacy of the movement and the younger generation, their capacity for ideological renewal and the rising of the masses, which later legitimize their ability to reorganize the State.

In another article,[8] he noted that the new right-wing movements and regimes were no longer conservative, but had the dual tendency of strengthening the powers of the State and of intervening in the socio-economic field, both tendencies working against the liberal initiative. These claims also confirm Roger Eatwell for fascism as a third way, neither left nor right. But all these different approaches are by no means incompatible, the pivot articulating them being the crisis of the liberal State of the nineteenth century faced with the shock of the First World War and the need to

renew the social contract with a State to which society demanded more in exchange for the sacrifice of individual liberties and a truly protective care.

Thus, Polihroniade took technocratic accents by calling for the creation of a modern Romanian State by extirpating clan corruption and introducing "rapid and modern methods of political and administrative conduct",[9] before extending its authority to economic and social fields.

In Hungary, Szálasi also expressed statist, technocratic, but also democratic analysis and personal views in his first important opus in 1933: one should "expect, on the one hand, the strengthening of the State, and, on the other hand, the diffusion of referenda. In his program he suggested a three-year process of 'readjustment', followed by 'five years of planned economy'" (Paksa 2010, p. 131).

The Ustasha State was also very intrusive in economic world on social protection grounds: "The importance of the State in the direction of the economy was considerable within the independent State of Croatia" (Korb 2010, p. 171).

Social Darwinism and biological racism are also important components of radical modernist ideology, a transfer from hard sciences to social wisdom. For these aspects, I will simply hide behind Maria Bucur's and Marius Turda's prolific and talented production (Bucur 2002; Turda and Weindling 2007). I will only add some quotations which prove that these theories have had a deep impact on Eastern European societies, in spite of their backwardness.

Some legionary leaders did not hesitate to mix spiritual claims and biological determinations. Alexandru Cantacuzino, one of the most radical and revolutionary leaders of the Iron Guard—very close to the thinking of its brilliant contemporary Emil Cioran—says without hesitation during the student congress of Craiova of April 1935: "Now are spread on one side the races of masters, on the other hand the races of slaves. […] Some races with imperial, dominating souls are already distinguished in Europe. These are Italy and Germany. Do we want to be among the master creatures?"[10] Thus, the distinction traditionally made by some legionary theoreticians and by Codreanu between race-based Nazism, State-based Italian Fascism and soul-based legionarism, is to a large extent denied by the young revolutionary generation influenced by the biological competition of social Darwinism and voluntarism *à la* Cioran. One year later, at the student congress of Târgu-Mureş, the same Alexandru Cantacuzino passed a motion on 5 April 1936 combining the violent hygienist fight inside ("Social hygiene measures to vitalize the physical constitution of our

nation") with an aggressive outward sketch for the Romanian-speaking element, the whole drawing radical nationalism, populist, revolutionary, racist and eliminator with regard to the heterogeneous populations, characteristic of fascism.[11] He represented a very young, fast and furious tendency inside the Iron Guard, unlike Ion Moța.

Thus the anthropological revolution with a biological dimension, the social revolution—for the renewal of the elites, against the minorities and the hostile political currents—and the international expansionism towards the neighbours were articulated—which was a novelty attributable as much to a proper dynamic of ethnic exclusivism as to the expansionist models of Germany and Italy.

In Hungary, the Party of Racial Defenders influenced very early the Far Right, immediately after the end of the war, but from defensive social and political positions; nevertheless, "scientific" racism proved also very active and genuine, as Rudolf Paksa clearly expresses: "Two of these [racial theories] made significant impact: the so-called 'racial biology' ('fajbiológia'), and 'Turanism' ('turanizmus'), that can be seen as a kind of Hungarian racial theory" (Paksa 2010, p. 127). The latter is more specific to Hungarian racism and competes with Aryan origins in the scale of a wished ascendance.

If the Croatian Fascism did not develop a political religion, its palingenetic yearnings were also reinforced by a biological vision of the Civilization gap: "Croats would be 'as members of the Nordic race, a people turned towards the construction', while 'the Serbs, born of races mediterranean or oriental, [were] imbued with a materialistic vision of life. Create did not matter to them'" (Korb 2010, p. 171). And, as Alexander Korb naturally concludes, Ustashists were ready to enforce their transformist views by violent cleansing.

He also integrates Croatian racism to the European (and worldwide) mainstream biological racism: "We also witnessed during the thirties, in Yugoslavia in general, and in Croatia in particular, an intensification of anti-Semitism based on biologizing theses, as in many other European countries" (ibid., p. 172).

Conclusion: The Limits of It All

In spite of a clear convergence of Eastern European Fascist ideologies and movements with their major Western counterparts, it is nevertheless also clear that the elements of a Fascist victory imply a certain degree of socio-

economic development. If the successes of the two major fascisms colour in a fatalistic mood certain writings of George Mosse (but give a strong heuristic optimism to Roger Griffin), whatever the talent of such a Fascist leader to propose an ideological mixture highly adapted to each specific society, we must recognize that massive mobilization is easier within an urbanized society, used to popular rallies and mass organizations, with modern means of communication.

Thus, the qualitative and culturalist interpretation of Fascist convergences and successes by a generic ideology stumbles on a quantitative threshold effect that Michael Mann raises as a main explanatory factor—second, although very important, in our opinion. The heuristic consequence is that the most innovative contribution of the new consensus is essential, but not enough to concretely reflect the reception of fascism within the target societies. Indeed, if fascism deserves this name, it is because it is perfectly adapted to the society, so it should "fatally" win at the end. But obvious is that it did not prevail everywhere, for example in Eastern Europe, which can not be attributed to the lesser political charisma or skill of its leaders, but also to the unequal resistance of societies to Fascist seduction. These approaches are obviously intimately mixed, and the study of social reaction must not be disjointed from the doctrinaire and organizational Fascist mixture.

Therefore, the analysis of the reactionary and/or authoritarian rights in Eastern Europe is an indispensable contribution: in spite of the importance of those fascisms, the political power remains in their hands. The inability to create sustainable and independent regimes relegates the Fascists in the background from which they emerged only by political murders—perpetrated or suffered—, by electoral successes following massification efforts in the late 1930s and by the transition to ephemeral power under the control of authoritarian forces or Fascist powers in wartime. Thus, in spite of being big Fascisms, the Central European ones remained subordinated to traditional elites and to the small or middle international impact of their countries. Qualitative (development) and quantitative (size) parameters do matter…

Notes

1. See, in French, Marie-Anne Matard-Bonucci (2012).
2. Report of the Secret Service from January 1930, in Scurtu et al. (2000), Doc. no. 100, pp. 204–19, here p. 212.

3. Circular no. 86 from Codreanu, 18 August 1937, in Codreanu (1981, pp. 168–69).
4. "Tot despre 'revoluţie'" ["Still about 'révolution'"], *Cuvântul*, 31 August 1931, Scurtu et al. (2002), vol. III, Doc. no. 15, pp. 66–67.
5. My inspiration here is Alexander Korb's article (2010).
6. Meeting Hitler-Antonescu in Obersalzberg on 14 January 1941, in Ardeleanu et al. (1991, p. 67).
7. Mihail Polihroniade, "Rostul 'Gărzii de Fier'", *Calendarul*, 18 July 1932, in Scurtu et al. (2002), Doc. no. 34, pp. 108–10.
8. Mihail Polihroniade, "Dreapta românească" [The Romanian Right], *Axa*, 10 November 1932, ibid., Doc. no. 40, pp. 124–27.
9. Ibid., p. 126.
10. Alexandru Cantacuzino, "Românul de mâine" [The Romanian of Tomorrow], conference held at the students' general assembly in Craiova, April 1935. In Scurtu et al. (2003), Doc. no. 39, pp. 99–105, here pp. 99–100.
11. Ibid., Doc. no. 79, pp. 175–76, here p. 175.

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PART III

Dictatorships

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CHAPTER 13

Political Cultures in the Fascist Italy: Transversalities and Contradictions

Ismael Saz

The construction of the fascist regime, as the first totalitarian experience, was a long, complex process and by its very nature, unfinished. This text attempts to explore some of the specific features of that process. It does not aspire, of course, to provide a summary of what the fascist regime was and much less of the evolution of fascist Italy as a whole. The aim here is to understand the role of the various political cultures in constructing the regime and in line with the overall approach of this volume, particularly of the fascist and nationalist cultures.

Before exploring any further, however, it is worth stopping to reflect beforehand on one of the big, if not the biggest problems in the study of fascism, whether it be Italian fascism or what has been called "generic fascism". One problem, which hovered around initial attempts at understanding fascism, in the 1920s only in fascist Italy, or by the early 1930s when it was joined by national socialism, was the issue of how relationships

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were organized between the "fascist movement" and "fascism as a regime". Needless to say, Renzo De Felice's famous distinction in the 1970s was, whatever the Italian historian's specific formulations, anything but new.[1]

Evidence of this lack of novelty can clearly be seen in Marxist approaches, generally aimed at defining fascism in terms of capitalist reaction or dictatorship of big business, but also usually simultaneously well aware that fascism was a mass movement of the petite bourgeoisie in particular, which ended up pulled by the strings of big business. Thus, in the initial and subsequent approaches of a Gramsci or a Togliatti, Austro-Marxists or Trotsky in terms of Bonapartism there was always a "petite bourgeoisie" that was not simply reactionary, "threatened" by big business from above and the proletariat from below, but was also ultimately inclined towards and inclined the conflict in favour of big business.

Of course, this dichotomy was not only present in Marxist interpretations, nor was it always expressed in the same terms. But although the differentiation between movement and/or petite bourgeoisie on the one hand and regime and/or dictatorship by big business on the other appears practically unavoidable to us today, it seems that the dichotomy has not always been articulated in relation to other historical or historiographic issues which appeared in the early years of the fascist dictatorship. We refer to the merger of the *Partito Nazionale Fascista* (PNF) and *Associazione Nazionalista Italiana* (ANI) around 1923. The dialectic here was established by the famous claim of Salvatorelli and other peers that although it was possible to speak of fascism's physical capture of nationalists, the reverse could also be said at ideological level, as here fascism was ideologically "captured" by nationalism. Two things can be said in this regard. First, this interpretation has been hegemonic for decades, basically until Emilio Gentile's contributions (Gentile 2002, p. 275ff.).[2] And second, whether or not the relationship between one and the other is established, the issue is reminiscent of the familiar petite bourgeoisie-big business and movement-regime dichotomies.[3]

Finally, another major issue regarding the evolution of the regime concerns the evolution of party and State. And here is the great explanatory key, hegemonic for decades, which established that the party was subordinate to the State. At historical level, this focus was based on Mussolini's famous circular of 5 January 1927 which established that federals were subordinate to prefects, "the highest authority of the State in the province" (Di Nucci 2009, p. 300ff.). And, from a more historiographic perspective, this approach consolidated the idea of Italian fascism as a defective totalitarian-

ism, less totalitarian, therefore than the totalitarianism of Nazi Germany. It goes without saying that in this area too, the established notions have been largely demolished by subsequent research, for example by Pombeni (1984), Gentile (1995), and Di Nucci (2009).

But what interests us here is not to follow these debates so much, which would be impossible in these pages, but to ask about the type of relationship that can be established between the three major issues noted above and whether they can help us go deeper into the issue of the regime's political cultures and the position occupied by fascist and nationalist cultures.

Our position, which we anticipate here, is based on noting that all the above issues relate to each other in a way that is not at all linear, determinist or simple, but they are related. And so therefore, an effort must be made to specify in more detail the way in nationalists and fascists worked during the dictatorship in a complex game where they were not the only players, where fractures and internal divisions and intersections proliferated. It is not, therefore, a matter of finding evidence for the existence of some type of linear, unswerving relationship but to specify whether or not there was some type of logic in the relations and interrelations between those political cultures and the evolution of the regime.

As a final preliminary issue, it must be remembered that when we speak of nationalists in the Italian fascist dictatorship we are speaking about something that did not exist as such. The ANI disappeared in the merger with PNF and from then on, they were all "fascists". As we shall see, however, the nationalists seemed perfectly identified and identifiable during the two decades and have been historiographically because, as everyone knows, references to nationalists or former nationalists are particularly frequent in the studies on fascist Italy. So, we are dealing with an individual, a player that formally did not exist, but was nevertheless present. It is worth saying, once again, that in this area, fascist Italy marked the way. For example, in Spain, *Acción Española* (the equivalent of Italian or French reactionary nationalism) was integrated into the single party, *FET de las JONS*, but did not as a result disappear as an object of reference for its allies-adversaries, the Spanish fascists. Only in Vichy France did *Action Française* continue to exist, but here there was no single party, a circumstance which was certainly influenced by the nationalist grouping itself (Dard 2013, p. 205). In our opinion, the perspective of political cultures helps to overcome the apparent contradiction that would occur with the finding of the *presence* of a *non-existent* political player. In this regard, it could be said that in Italy, as in Spain, for example, the nationalist political culture which transcended

its political structure was always present, it *existed* throughout both dictatorships.[4]

In accordance with the above, in the following pages we attempt an approach at the relations and interrelations between the two political cultures in two successive processes: one leading to fascism's rise to power and its unification and one concerning the role of the players throughout the dictatorship.

Reactionaries and Demagogues Towards the Final Embrace

As everyone knows, there is a long prehistory of relations between nationalists and others, like revolutionary trade unionists for example, which in some cases evolved towards fascism; also well known, obviously, is everything concerning the dynamics, agreement and dissent at the heart of Italian interventionism in the Great War (Gentile 1975, 1982). Now, however, we want to focus on what happened when fascism burst onto the scene, undoubtedly opening up a spiral of agreements, contrasts, divergences and rivalries between nationalists and the new force. In short, there were now two powerful nationalist cultures or, as they liked to say, "two great national forces". As already noted, nationalists were anti-liberal and anti-Marxist, so it could be said that the elements of agreement were clearly marked. But it is also obvious that the differences were just as relevant. We will not define them now. We shall merely focus on the way these two "national forces" interacted, how they related to each other and how they saw each other.

For the nationalists, elitists by definition, the counter-revolutionary effectiveness of fascism and its nature as a mass movement were beyond debate. They could only salute the ability of the new arrivals to destroy the great socialist enemy, an area in which they identified with the most radical fascists.[5] But two substantial issues separated them from the new movement. Firstly, its content was reminiscent of socialism, of revolutionary inclinations, republican tendencies, in short, there was a "temptation to rabble-rouse" (Giuliano 1981 [1922], pp. 335–39); and, in second place, closely linked to the above, the conviction that fascism was lacking in ideas and any coherent theory. This combination of perceptions influenced the way the nationalists situated themselves in relation to fascism: on the one hand, with an idea of their own ideological and political superiority which opened the doors to a possible attitude of "educating" the new arrivals.

And on the other, as they themselves lacked masses, there was a tendency to use, manipulate and parasite the achievements of the new grouping.

In contrast, the fascists were unable to see the nationalists as anything other than reactionary, elitist and friends of the traditional, economic and political elites, far removed from any popular sensitivity and monarchists above all else.[6] Of course, they rejected the nationalists' claims to political superiority. And of course, they deeply mistrusted the nationalists' attempts at manipulation and parasitism. As Mussolini himself pointed out at a meeting of the fascist party National Council in April 1922: "But I begin to energetically mistrust the shows of sympathy from nationalists. I would not want them to be the sharks of fascism; for them to use us and get rich behind our backs. Meanwhile, we shall no longer play their parliamentary game which consists in making us play roles of force".[7]

In any case, both nationalists and fascists certainly agreed, as has been seen, on the offensive against socialists and that later on they would help Mussolini gain power in the context of the March on Rome. It is worth remembering, however, that the nationalists were vigilant at all times in case the fascists turned against the king. And although they accepted and collaborated with the agreed solution, it was not their choice. Their choice, in keeping with what we said earlier, was a Salandra government, that is, the most right-wing government that could be imagined in the liberal universe (De Felice 1966, p. 528ff.; Roccucci 2001, p. 523ff.). Finally, they showed that the core element in the entire political crisis lay in achieving something very specific, reaction, and they did not hesitate to declare that openly: "The right-wing direction in the Government's work, means total spiritual, political, economic and financial reintegration in the national sense. It means, in one word, reaction".[8]

Seen from this perspective, access to Mussolini's government is also a victory over the nationalists. And, as is to be expected, it would place the collaboration-confrontation dynamics on another level. Collaborating in the coalition government, the nationalists were clearly closest in anti-liberal radicalism to the fascists. But that did not mean they would give up their own objectives or resign themselves to remaining subordinate. The outcome of this crossover of collaborations and potential rivalries would be the above-mentioned unification of the two political forces.

Thus, we come to one of the core issues mentioned earlier: to what extent was there political capture and what, and who was ideologically captured? Firstly, from the organic perspective, the nationalists had to waive practically all their claims: no federation, no organic survival or propor-

tionality of any type in the unified party, nor, it must be emphasized, any doctrinal think tank (Gaeta 1981, pp. 242–44). Did they, in contrast, manage to "capture" fascism ideologically? It can be said, firstly, that this is what they themselves preached.[9] And, as is well known from Luigi Salvatorelli onwards, Italian historiography assumed that perspective for decades. According to Salvatorelli, the merger meant "the integral adoption, by fascism, of the nationalist mentality and ideology". And he concluded: "What was absorbed and disappeared, in the merger concluded today, no longer appears to be nationalism, but fascism" (Salvatorelli 1977, p. 70).

Perhaps the match between what the nationalists wanted people to believe and what liberal, radical or Marxist historiography would argue has not been sufficiently emphasized. We believe, whether it was true or not, that the idea of ideological capture suited the focus of the fascist movement that transcended mere reaction and that of a fascist regime that would customize it. But was it really like that? We have already seen that Mussolini rejected the nationalists' organic claims and doctrinal control. The nationalists always reaffirmed their ideological supremacy over fascism and thereafter aspired to reduce it to a sort of nationalist "practice" of action and masses (Roccucci 2001, p. 530ff.). That was their intention in Italy and elsewhere.[10] But it was something the fascists never accepted. It is true that on the path towards the merger, the fascists ended up renouncing their "republican inclination" (Gaeta 1981, pp. 241–44; Roccucci 2001, p. 537) although other than for political advantage it was not clear that monarchism would become an identifying trait of Italian fascists. They also assumed nationalist positions against freemasonry which did not seem to greatly contradict the fascist world view. Nor did the national-catholic tendency of the nationalists assert itself over the rationale of the fascists' political religion (Moro 2001).[11] In any case, it is in the context of the evolution of the regime where the scope of claimed or actual "captures" can be observed.

Order and Chaos

We can all surely agree that the nationalists made fundamental contributions to the construction of the fascist regime. They included, in particular, contributions from Federzoni, in the Ministry of the Interior and Rocco, in the Ministry of Justice. We only have to remember Federzoni's role in the deployment of the entire repressive capacity of the dictatorship under construction; and Rocco has rightly been considered to be the true juridical-

legal architect of the fascist regime. These contributions apparently suffice to confirm the prevalence of the nationalists. And it seems clear that the work of both men responds well to nationalist culture and its repressive and reactionary coherence, or in other words, perfectly matches their intention to build an authoritarian rather than totalitarian regime. But it is worth remembering that the fascists, starting with Mussolini, also sought to completely neutralize all opposition to the dictatorship and that the construction of a suitable legal framework for their intentions was equally necessary; and hence there was no one better for the job than Rocco. That is, fascists and nationalists had the same objective of cementing the authoritarian dimension of the regime under construction.

Where then was the difference? In the case of Federzoni, it seems clear. He had joined the Ministry of the Interior to reassure the conservatives, by repressing the opposition right to the end, of course, but also by fighting the most intransigent, radical fascism and uncontrolled fascist violence. Hence, the animosity that he awoke in that fascism and his clear hostility towards Farinacci.[12] That is, the move was towards a repressive dictatorship but within a new and respected "legality" (Dogliani 2017, p. 66). And the same can be said of Rocco's gigantic work, which responded to the same conservative objectives of "legalising" and "normalising" the fascist revolution (Musiedlak 2010; De Felice 1968, p. 162ff.). Comparisons between these objectives and those of Fascist squadrism have been clearly summarized by Salvatore Lupo (2005, p. 195):

> Thus, while the squadrists pushed to conquer the State, the idea of State continuity was interpreted by the former nationalists. It would be difficult to attribute less hatred for democracy to either of the two factions which faced each other with hostility. The one who prepared the "very fascist" laws which would sanction the dictatorial bent was the most influential exponent of nationalism, the Minister of Justice, Alfredo Rocco. Federzoni guaranteed the fidelity of the repressive machinery at the decisive moment.

In all this process, the nationalists—"men of order" after all—could set themselves up, more or less obviously, as the obligatory reference, even if was only because they were "ministerial" and members of the single party, for the non-fascist conservative and reactionary sectors. In fact, Gramsci had already understood there were certain dividing lines within fascism, in the context of which the nationalist wing was closest to established interests: army, Church, Monarchy… (Gramsci 1978 [1926], p. 314ff.). And

subsequent historiography has also emphasized the nationalists' status as reference for the conservative world (De Felice 1968, p. 44ff.; Lupo 2005, p. 123). In this regard, Alfredo Rocco, so willing to use the most modern means to reinforce the State, was a perfect reactionary unable to conceive of another leading class that was not identified with traditional powers, starting with economic and financial power (Gentile 1975, pp. 383–85).

In another field as well, things seemed to evolve in a direction that was favourable to the nationalist conception of State and society, that is, the relationship between party and State. Here, nationalist hostility towards the party was difficult to conceal and was flatly expressed at various times by Corradini and Federzoni, among others. Corradini, in the late 1920s, in what Federzoni described a sort of political testament, said: "Too much has been said of fascism and too little of Italy. There is a way of being an excellent Italian without joining the fascist party… Less fascism and more Italy; less party and more Nation; less Revolution and more Constitution" (Federzoni 1967, p. 17). Federzoni (1967, p. 300), in the final moments, at the meeting of the Grand Council of Fascism where Mussolini was deposed: "An attempt has been made to excite the people, talking to them of Revolution rather than homeland, of party rather than state, of fascism instead of Italy".[13]

From these perspectives, nothing could match their expectations better than the repeated circulars pointing out that the party was subject to the State and the federal to the prefect. In this regard, it is worth noting that, as Minister of the Interior, Federzoni had managed, almost one year before Mussolini's famous circular of January 1927, to get a law enacted that reaffirmed the supremacy of the perfect over any other authority in the provinces (Di Nucci 2009, p. 303). Mussolini's successive and oft-cited circular would constitute in the historiography, the final demonstration of the theories underlining the importance of the nationalists in the regime and also those certifying the complete subordination of the party to the State.[14]

However, such a crucial aspect as this requires some observations. And the first and most obvious of all of them focuses on the fact that the fascist party did not subordinate itself to a State unless it was a fascist State. A State, in addition, in whose construction as a fascist State, the party itself played a crucial role. And it happened through a symbiotic process of fascistization of the State and statization of the fascist party (Gentile 1995, p. 165).[15] It must also be noted once again that the head of government, Mussolini was the head of the party, which means that in any case the fascist party would

be subordinate to its own leader and founder. It would have been different if Mussolini had been using his control of the State to ensure his own control over the party. In this regard, there may have been and in fact there were similarities between Mussolini's intentions and those of Federzoni, for example; but they were just that, similarities that were destined to evaporate as soon as the *Duce* of fascism had ensured his own objectives. Objectives that were none other than the always difficult task of gaining control of his own, complex party with its tendency to factionalism, forcing the *Duce* to work hard to assume absolute leadership (Dogliani 2017, pp. 72 and 92ff.). It is also worth remembering that Hitler and Mussolini gained leadership and undisputed control over their parties almost at the same time. Although Hitler saw his leadership acknowledged before storming to power rather than afterwards and so did not have to find support in government orders. But it must be said that the situation further reinforces the idea of the vitality of the PNF than that of its absolute inanity.

It should just as forcefully be emphasized that the circular that subordinated the federal to the prefect was far from being resolved in a linear fashion. The actual situation was much more complex, the duality was never resolved and nor were the conflicts. In fact, the aforementioned subordination was never reflected in the party's statutes, and furthermore, the repetition of the instructions contained in the famous circular is the best proof of the lack of compliance (Gentile 1995, pp. 172–75). Furthermore, if there was any codification at any point concerning the role of the fascist party in some crucial issues in political life, it was in 1941 and was not particularly in the line of subordinating the party to the State or the federal to the prefect. Thus, the two laws enacted in November 1941 established, among other things, "the obligation to consult the party on appointments, posts or commissions of public interest or political scope, including here appointments of *podestà*, of members of municipal consultations, of *presidi* and *rettori* in the provinces, which had been a constant source of conflicts between prefects and federals" (Gentile 2002, p. 188).

All of the above confirm the complexity of a situation that would mushroom during the numerous experiences of the periphery (Sanz 2011; Baris 2014) and which would turn into what Di Nucci has rightly called "*systemic chaos*". A term that also served to identify a regime characterized by many conflicts of power between its many and varied administrative and political institutions and by its drift towards a sort of organizational chaos (Di Nucci 2009, pp. 610–12). In this regard, the Italian regime, like the German one, drifted towards a fragmentation of the State. The drift was towards a sort

of struggle of everyone against everyone, of institutional Darwinism, that would be incomprehensible without the totalitarian nature of their respective parties.

Finally, beyond the "preconceptions" around the gradual emptying of the party and its conversion into a useless bureaucratic colossus, this party simply continued to increase its role in public policy (Pombeni 1984). One way or another, the successive general secretaries "reinforced, extended and perfected the party machinery and consolidated their presence in the regime and society" (Gentile 1995, p. 176). As the organizer of consensus, unavoidable element for recognition of citizenship, essential instrument for organizing relations between regime and society, irreplaceable medium for applying the principles of hierarchy and mass participation, in short, as the hub of fascist political religion, the party simply became the centre of Italian political life (Gentile 1995; Dogliani 2017, p. 63ff.). We could conclude that it was that party, in the context of all the resistances and with all its contradictions that marked the dynamics of the regime. In short, actually, Corradini's aforementioned lamentations in the late 1920s and those of Federzoni in the final crisis confirmed that there was a party and that it was stronger than they would have wanted.

In fact, a more historical analysis (removed therefore from the old dichotomies like those that totalitarianism theories established between totalitarian regimes and authoritarian regimes) should acknowledge that these antinomies make little sense (Linz 1964). Not so much because they ended up diluting the totalitarian content of the only regime that defined itself fully as that, but also because they ignored the fact that the fascist regime could be, in its own terms, both authoritarian and totalitarian. As Emilio Gentile has pointed out: "while authoritarian fascism considered the system that materialised between 1925 and 1929 to be a final, fundamentally completed stage, for totalitarian fascism it was, in contrast, just an initial stage towards the construction of an integrally fascist State" (Gentile 1995, p. 136).

From this perspective, it can be seen that the contributions from nationalists like Rocco and Federzoni identified well with the regime's authoritarian dimension and hence their unquestionable protagonism in its first decade. They did not identify as well, however, with the totalitarian dimensions present in fascist political culture from the outset. These totalitarian dimensions also marked a large part of the dynamics of that first decade and were able to introduce, by the 1930s, Gentile's totalitarian acceleration (Gentile 1995, p. 137).[16]

In short, the totalitarian objectives and dynamics inherent in fascism from the very first did not disappear with the characteristic balances of access to power and the consolidation of the regime, or with the merger with the nationalists, or with the protagonism of some nationalists in constructing the authoritarian dimension of the fascist regime. In other words, the fascist movement, with its own ideology, its own, clear totalitarian objectives, never disappeared. And it did not disappear because it was probably unable to, as Gramsci, a very close observer, unlikely to have the whims of De Felice has explained very well. In effect, Gramsci accurately understood where the strength of the fascist movement lay and the objectives it responded to before, in and after taking power. He did so, by recognizing, first of all, that fascism was *also* a social movement, which must be analysed in itself, in its stratifications because "taking into account the totalitarian system which fascism tends to install, conflicts which cannot express themselves by other channels tend to re-emerge within fascism itself" (Gramsci 1963 [1926], p. 320). Secondly, Gramsci was able to trace the strength of fascism in its ability to organize the petite bourgeoisie for the first time at national level. Thirdly, he stressed, anticipating future historiographic developments that the militia were the essential characteristic, the "bolt" that made all of the above possible, to the extent that without the militia, the very existence of the fascist party would not be possible (Gramsci 1978 [1926], pp. 253–54).[17] Finally, beyond his rather reductionist obsession with the petite bourgeoisie, the communist leader captured very well the dialectics existing between the nationalist tendency and radical fascism, together with the social and political dimensions:

> Firstly, the Federzoni, Rocco, Volpi tendency that wants to extract conclusions from the entire period after the march on Rome. [That tendency] wants to liquidate the fascist party as a political organisation and incorporate into the state apparatus the situation of the bourgeois forces created by fascism in its struggles against the other parties. This tendency also works in harmony with the Monarchy and the Chiefs of Staff…
>
> The other tendency is officially embodied by Farinacci and objectively represents two contradictions of fascism…The second contradiction is, by far, the most important: that of the bourgeoisie and capitalism. The fascist petite bourgeoisie sees the party as its instrument of defence, its Parliament, its democracy. Through the party, it wants to pressure the government to prevent capitalism from crushing it.[18]

Without capturing all these dimensions of the fascist movement, it is impossible to understand, as it were, its determination to survive by fighting to increase its areas of power. Nor is it possible to understand the decisive shifts in the configuration of the regime, like, to take an obvious example, the totalitarian solution to the crisis caused by Matteotti's assassination, or, in the 1930s, the totalitarian acceleration mentioned by Emilio Gentile.

In short, in the authoritarianism-totalitarianism dialectics, the construction of the authoritarian State which was *also* a specific fascist objective finds the most efficient collaborators among the nationalists, but in the simultaneous and successive dynamics in constructing the totalitarian State, the fascists were alone. And it must not be forgotten that as soon as they accomplished their assigned tasks, Federzoni and Rocco were gloriously retired. In 1926, Federzoni was moved to the Ministry of the Colonies and "promoted" afterwards to president of the Senate. "Discharged" in 1932, Rocco would also end up joining the Senate. Two leading nationalists "retreated" to a very conservative institution, close in general terms to the Monarchy and always in the sights of fascism's most radical sectors.[19] Compensation perhaps for their removal from the centre of political life, what was clear is that at the halfway point of the fascist regime the old nationalism had had its day. With notable clarity, a very fair observer, Palmiro Togliatti, for whom the "liquidation" of Rocco signified a mutation of fascist totalitarianism, from a more bourgeois orientation to become more popular and oriented to the masses.[20]

Transversalities, Mutual Understanding, Contradictions and Cracks

Now that historiography tends to emphasize the transnational dimension of the phenomena it analyses, it is worth remembering that the fascist movement and regime have a unique characteristic that differentiates it from all others. It was the first experience, the pioneer and creator of a new political culture and the first to launch itself into constructing a new type of State, a totalitarian one. This observation, notwithstanding its obviousness, has a series of implications that are difficult to overestimate. The first of them at a historiographical level is that, in contrast to the intentions of totalitarianism theories, the totalitarianism that "invented", demanded and fought for totalitarianism in an increasingly determined fashion, cannot be left at the bottom of the pile. Other experiences, that of Nazi Germany especially, found the path half-finished because they already knew where and in whom

to find inspiration, what elements of the fascist regime could be assimilated without more ado and which could be copied, perfected or avoided. Of course, that was not the only reason the Nazi regime took shape as a more radical and absolute fascism than Italian fascism, but it was, along with everything else, one of the factors that cannot be forgotten. Other experiences also found inspiration in the Italian regime, although some of them did so in the opposite direction to the Nazis, that is, in the sense of taking the most reactionary, most continuist and traditionalist, less revolutionary dimensions of the Italian model. And within those dimensions, of course, the authoritarian, repressive and liberticide model of fascism in whose construction the nationalists were so prominent.

The novel and pioneering nature of the experience of Italian fascism helps to understand its complexity and intrinsic plurality, its dynamics of collaboration and also those of conflict. However, in order to analyse the internal, Italian dimensions and those of the successive hybridizations that occurred transnationally, it must be remembered that in both cases we are dealing with players who would interpret the different experiences and fight and sometimes manage to introduce radical fascist regimes, like the Nazi regime or others with a reactionary bent, but also openly fascistized, like Francoist Spain and Vichy France.[21]

Two players stand out particularly in the Italian case as they would later in the French and Spanish cases: nationalists and fascists. That does not mean they were the only ones or that they were alone or had the same relative weight in the various experiences. Nor can airtight lines be established between these two political cultures, as the Italian case clearly shows with the multiple similarities, factual alliances and inter-influences between nationalists and the various sectors of the original fascism. Two aspects, however, are worth underscoring. First, this accumulation of similarities, transversalities, alliances and dissidences expressed the intrinsic feature of the fascist experience, that is, the struggle between the different sectors in the party or regime, starting with Mussolini himself to strengthen his spheres of power. The historiography clearly showed this dimension a long time ago in the Nazi case and is beginning to show now that these conflictive dynamics and tendency to the institutional chaos were just as strong in the Italian experience. Nor did the Italians have to wait for the Nazi example on this issue. And secondly, the fact that these lines were not airtight does not mean that they did not exist and were perfectly recognizable as we have attempted to emphasize throughout this text.

In conclusion, in the approach to understanding the fascist regime from the perspective of the two political cultures that are the object of study in this volume, both cultures were important. There was collaboration and there were struggles, but always from and towards fascist hegemony. And it can also be said that in the historic or historiographic lines of confrontation between "petite-bourgeoisie" and "big business" between "fascism-movement" and "fascism-regime"; and between "party" and "State" there were substantial underlying elements that may not be clear cut, but could operate in parallel or intersect, but in any event contained numerable connected vessels that must not be dismissed.

It can be specifically concluded that although they were not the only ones to row in one direction and sometimes not even the decisive ones, it seems clear that in the dichotomies noted, the nationalists were always on the second side of the binomial. On the other were the fascists, but they were not always and not all in harmony. Two lanes on a motorway, in short in which no one could appear as less destructive of freedom than their fellow travelling companion.

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Notes

1. See the interesting comparison by Giorgio Amendola of De Felice's theories and the very early theories of Luigi Salvatorelli (1977, p. XIX).
2. Alternatively, Franco Gaeta (1981) was one of the firmest supporters of the "ideological capture" argument.
3. In fact, Salvatorelli (1977, p. 12) himself formulated one of the classic definitions of fascism: "Fascism thus represents the 'class struggle' of the petite bourgeoisie, embedded between capitalism and proletariat, like the third party in a two party dispute".
4. For our conception of political cultures and its application to fascism and reactionary nationalism in the Spanish case, see Saz (2015). See also Zira Box's contribution in this volume.

5. For example, in head on opposition to the "pacification agreement" with socialists promoted by Mussolini in 1921. For this question see Gaeta (1981, pp. 226–27) and De Felice (1966, pp. 106–7).
6. For example, D. Grandi, "Per intenderci", *Popolo d'Italia*, 2 de febrero de 1922, quoted in De Felice (1966, pp. 195–96).
7. Quoted in ibid., pp. 196–97.
8. "*La crisi italiana e il programma del nazionalismo*". Federzoni's speech in the nationalist economic agreement. Milan, 7–8 October 1922. Quoted in Roccucci (2001, p. 523).
9. The relative annoyance for the little they obtained in the organic area was accompanied by the satisfaction of having achieved, as Forges Davanzati noted, the main objective of nationalism: conquest of the state (Roccucci 2001, p. 544).
10. In Spain as well the nationalists in Acción Española wanted to reduce Spanish fascism to the mere "technique" of the tradition, that is, of its openly reactionary objectives and proposals. Curiously, if that situation led one of them, José Pemartín to claim that "Spanish" fascism, because it was Catholic and monarchic, had been so centuries before Italian fascism, something quite similar happened in Italy. There for example, Cantalupo claimed that because of its monarchism and ability to reconcile religious conscience and patriotic conscience, fascism could be identified as early as the nineteenth century. See Pemartín (1937, p. 70); Cantalupo, Roberto. "Fusione storica", *L'idea nazionale*, 23 June 1923.
11. Salvatorelli (1977, pp. 71–74) was talking of the nationalists' 'national-clericalism' as early as 1923, noting its debt to French and Spanish nationalists.
12. Numerous references in this regard in Federzoni (1967).
13. On this issue, see Di Nucci (2009) and Gentile (1994, pp. 65–124).
14. A theory that Nicola Tranfaglia endorsed to underline in passing that on this opinion, there was "substantial agreement in the Italian historiography on the fascist regime" (Tranfaglia 1995).
15. Or to quote Patrizia Dogliani, what occurred was a schizophrenic symbiosis in which "the party was the guarantor of fascistisation of the State and the State of order in the party" (Dogliani 2017, p. 68).
16. This idea, repeated on many occasions by Emilio Gentile appears to be crucial: there was not, as De Felice argued, a totalitarian shift in the second half of the 1930s, but an acceleration of dynamics that came from the past and were circumstantial to the fascist political culture (Gentile 1995, p. 117).
17. On the centrality of the militia, Gentile (1995, p. 159). See also Gregori (2014).
18. Gramsci (1978 [1926], pp. 318–19).

19. In effect, many were committed to abolishing the Senate and some fascists saw it as "a den of elderly people nostalgic for the old liberal State and full regal prerogatives" (Casmirri 1980, pp. 293–94). On the place of the Senate in the fascist regime (Musiedlak 2003, p. 33ff.).
20. "Among these changes of the guard, one is decisive: Getting rid of Rocco in mid-1932. It signifies a change in the nature of fascist totalitarianism and marks the start of what is called popular politics. At that moment, fascism was making a huge effort to attract the masses to its organisations, to have them subject to the apparatus of the dictatorship. These problems of organisation of the fascist party, of the young people, of the trade unions continue to be seen from the totalitarian view point, but in a slightly different way" (Togliatti 2004, p. 138).
21. On the concept of fascistization and its application to the Spanish case, Saz (2004, pp. 79–90).

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CHAPTER 14

National Socialists and Conservative Nationalists in Germany 1933–1938

Michael Grüttner

The Alliance of National Socialists and Conservatives

At the beginning of 1933, the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) was undergoing a severe crisis. In the general elections for the *Reichstag* in November 1932, the party had lost over two million voters. Its share of vote had dropped from 37.3 to 33.1%. In the local elections held a few weeks later in Thuringia, the party lost almost 40% compared to the *Reichstag* elections of July 1932. In December 1932, Gregor Straßer, the number two in command of the party, openly mutinied against Hitler's politics and announced his resignation from all his offices and posts in the party. As the global economy had already hit its lowest point at that time, many indicators suggested that the swift rise of the NSDAP would be followed by a rapid descent. Hitler himself had already played with suicidal thoughts in December 1932: "If the party disintegrates, I will put an end

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to everything in 3 minutes".[1] Most likely, only Hitler's appointment to *Reich* Chancellor on 30 January 1933 saved his party from further decay. Above all, he owed his swearing-in as head of the cabinet to the willingness of the Conservative Nationalists to form an alliance with the NSDAP.

Who were the Conservative Nationalists?[2] The most important political force in the National Conservative milieu was the German National People's Party (*Deutschnationale Volkspartei*, DNVP), a monarchist party generally hostile towards the Weimar democracy. Around 1928, the party had approximately 700,000 members (Büttner 2010, p. 332). In the *Reichstag* elections, the DNVP's share of votes had at times reached more than 20%. At the beginning of the 1930s, though, their share of votes had decreased significantly due to the rise of the NSDAP. In the elections of 1932/33, it only gained 6–9% of the votes. Alfred Hugenberg, head of a large media group, had led the DNVP as its chairman since the year 1928. A second pillar of the National Conservative faction was the *Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten* (Steel Helmet, League of the Front Soldiers), a paramilitary organization that had been founded initially as an association for former First World War combatants. Under the leadership of Franz Seldte and Theodor Duesterberg, the *Stahlhelm* had around 500,000 members at the beginning of the 1930s. For a long time, it had been closely connected with the DNVP (Berghahn 1966). Eventually, large parts of the traditional elites, which had sustained the demised German Empire, belonged to the National Conservative milieu, among them Prussian *Junkers*, industrialists, higher officials, university teachers and members of the officers' corps.

The alliance between Nazis and Conservatives was based on common goals. Both sides sought to eliminate the Weimar democracy and to destroy the left-wing parties; both strived for armament and the breaking up of the bonds of the Versailles Treaty. Moreover, neither party had any chance of seizing and remaining in power without the collaboration of the other. At the same time, both aimed for leadership and control of the alliance.

Hitler, in particular, was only willing to join a government coalition if he was offered the office of *Reich* Chancellor himself. The conservative leader Franz von Papen was finally disposed to accept these conditions. In order to dispel conservative fears of the NSDAP's total claim to power, the National Socialists had to make wide-ranging concessions. Although it formed the strongest parliamentary group in the *Reichstag*, the NSDAP only appointed two more ministers apart from Chancellor Hitler of the cabinet of eleven: Wilhelm Frick, who took over the Interior Ministry and Hermann Göring as Minister without portfolio and *Reich* Commis-

sioner for the Prussian Interior Ministry. Hitler's cabinet, so it seemed, was a conservatively dominated committee. Furthermore, Papen, member of the cabinet as Vice-Chancellor and *Reich* Commissioner for Prussia, trusted that the conservative *Reich* President Hindenburg could remove the Chancellor from office at any time.

Both together, the numerical superiority of the conservatives in the cabinet and Hindenburg's support, were enough, in Papen's opinion, to "tame" the Nazis. Confident of his victory the Vice-Chancellor announced: "In two months we'll have pushed Hitler so far into the corner that he'll squeal".[3]

Disputes

After the formation of Hitler's government on 30 January 1933, National Socialists and National conservatives worked hand in hand to abolish the first German democracy. It was the conservative Vice-Chancellor Papen, who proposed during the first meeting of the cabinet, "to determine by now, that the next elections for the Reichstag would be the last, and that any return to the parliamentary system should be avoided for good". All that Hitler needed to do was to agree to that.[4] Likewise, the "Decree of the *Reich* President for the Protection of People and State", issued after the *Reichstag* fire (also known as *Reichstag* Fire Decree), that suspended the civil rights of the Weimar constitution and the Enabling Act of 24 March 1933, that ousted the *Reichstag* from its legislative power and enabled the *Reich* Government to enact unconstitutional legislation, were joint undertakings of Nazis and Conservatives (Bracher et al. 1962, pp. 83f., 155ff.).

However, after the *Weimar* Republic had been destroyed and dictatorship was established, substantial differences became apparent, which most of the time were expressed only internally. On closer inspection, four different areas of conflict can be identified.

Destruction of the Rule of Law

National Conservative criticism often focused on the general lack of legal certainty. As early as spring 1933, the DNVP executive committee declared "After the fierce defensive struggle against the enemies of the state, a strong legal system has to be restored as quickly as possible".[5] The conservative *Reich* Minister of Justice Franz Gürtner had a similar vision. The Ministry

of Justice headed by Gürtner aimed to install an authoritarian legal system which would impose harsh penalties against political opponents and criminals. In this scheme, legal vacuums, which the *SA*, and later on the *SS* tried to install, were only supposed to be a transitional phenomenon. Thus, the *Reich* Minister of Justice was trying to prevent concentration camps from transforming into a permanent detention system that stood outside the law and spoke out for prosecuting the abuse or murder of concentration camp prisoners. Against the arbitrary detention of prisoners in the so-called *Schutzhaft* ("protective custody") without judicial review, the Ministry of Justice sought for the juridification of the *Schutzhaft*, publicly announcing standards on its admissibility, and a judicial review of preventive detention. Moreover, Gürtner wanted to grant prisoners held in concentration camps to have their interests represented by a lawyer. The Minister of Justice also rejected the *Gestapo* practice of torturing to force confessions.

These attempts mainly failed due to SS leader Heinrich Himmler's uncompromising stance, who, in case of a conflict, could always count on Hitler's backing. In the early years of the Third Reich, sometimes concentration camp officers were successfully brought before a regular court and convicted for murder or mistreatment of prisoners.[6] In general, however, preliminary proceedings against crimes in concentration camps had to be suspended. After Hitler had principally endorsed a "tightened interrogation" of suspects, the Ministry of Justice, in an agreement with the SS, declared its readiness to refrain from prosecuting *Gestapo* officers who had mistreated political opponents during interrogation. Finally, in 1939 Hitler permitted, upon Himmler's request, the creation of its own SS-jurisdiction. Thus, the *SS-Totenkopfverbände* (SS death head's units), which were responsible for the surveillance of the concentration camps, were definitely exempted from prosecution through the legitimate judicial authorities (Gruchmann 2001, pp. 345ff., 545ff., 632ff., 703ff.).

At the same time, the judicial authorities had to stand and watch how the *Gestapo*, with growing self-confidence, set about systematically controlling justice, and correct sentences, which, in their view, had not turned out harsh enough. In such cases, the *Gestapo* moved to take into *Schutzhaft* those defendants who had already been acquitted or had received a lenient sentence by a court (Gruchmann 2001, pp. 599ff.).

Church Politics

National Socialist church politics were generally disapproved of by the Conservative Nationalists. Their criticism was mainly directed against the so-called ideological rigorists within the Nazi party (Scholder 1988, p. 140), who categorically rejected Christianity. Among the most important figures of this group were Alfred Rosenberg, Martin Bormann, Heinrich Himmler and Joseph Goebbels. The "ideological rigorists" considered Christianity to be a competing model of ideology, which interfered with the implementation of Nazism. Thus, in the long run, so the rigorists believed, there would be no place for the Christian churches in the Nazi state: "Our ultimate objective is the complete destruction of the whole of Christendom", claimed the church expert of the SS Security Service (*Sicherheitsdienst*, SD), the former priest Albert Hartl, in 1941 (Dierker 2001, p. 533). Although Hitler largely shared this view, he thoroughly ensured not to show his anti-Clericalism in public, in order not to alienate the Christian population (Grüttner 2014, p. 427).

For the same reason, a frontal assault by the regime against the churches was ruled out. Instead, the "ideological rigorists" of the party started a long-lasting feud, aiming to reduce the influence of the churches. This involved the ban of Christian organizations and groups, imprisonment of "politicizing ministers", the closure of denominational newspapers and the abolishment of faith schools (Evans 2005, pp. 220ff.).

It is obvious that these politics could not please prominent conservatives with strong religious ties. These included the Catholic *Reich* Minister of Transport Paul von Eltz-Rübenach and the Commander-in-Chief of the Supreme High Command of the Army Werner von Fritsch, who sought to convert the army to a refuge for Conservative Protestantism (Janßen and Tobias 1994, p. 146). Hjalmar Schacht, who as *Reich* Minister of Economy and President of the *Reichsbank* temporarily had a significant influence, also criticized in a memorandum to Hitler the church politics of the regime (Kopper 2006, p. 277).

Anti-Semitism

Not only National Socialists but also the vast majority of National Conservatives embraced anti-Semitism. Both considered Judaism as a "subversive", internationally oriented minority, which was not reliable whenever it was necessary to represent "national interests". Furthermore, Nazis and

Conservative Nationalists were convinced that German Jews had exerted too much influence in the Weimar Republic. Similar to the NSDAP, the DNVP also had decided not to affiliate Jews as party members (Beck 2008, pp. 179f., 215f.).

Therefore, the discrimination of the Jews by legal means rarely met any criticism among the ranks of the Conservative Nationalists. What's more, the first anti-Semitic laws from April 1933 were adopted by National Socialist and National Conservatives together.[7] Due to these laws, thousands of Jews or "non-Aryans", who worked as civil servants, doctors, university teachers or in legal professions, lost their jobs.

However, violent riots against Jews were generally condemned by the Conservative Nationalists. While *Reich* Minister of Economy Hjalmar Schacht welcomed the anti-Semitic 1935 Nuremberg Laws, at the same time, he sharply criticized the violent attacks against Jews that had taken place in the run-up to the legislation (Kopper 2006, pp. 277–89). The Prussian Minister of Finance Johannes Popitz and the *Reich* Minister of Justice Franz Gürtner shared the same point of view.[8] Even harsher was the Conservative Nationalists' criticism of the November pogrom in 1938 ("*Kristallnacht*"). The destruction of numerous synagogues, the devastation and plundering of thousands of shops and apartments, the maltreatment or murder of numerous Jews and finally the internment of about 27,000 Jewish men in concentration camps, where hundreds of them died, also caused many feelings of terror among conservatives. The Prussian Minister of Finance Johannes Popitz even claimed the punishment of the culprits after the pogrom, but Göring quickly pointed out the absurdity of this demand: "My dear Popitz, do you want to punish the *Führer*?" (Hassell 1989, pp. 63, 70).

Willingness to Take Risks

Both sides quickly reached an agreement on the goal of arming and overcoming the Versailles Treaty. However, there were differences in the realization of these objectives. The main decisive factor was the different willingness to take risks. While Hitler's policy increasingly resembled a Vabanque-style game as his power continued to consolidate, the military were much more reluctant to make decisions that were obviously accompanied by considerable risks. This difference was a recurring theme throughout the regime's "peace years". When in 1935 Hitler decided to reintroduce compulsory military service, the Minister of Defence Werner von

Blomberg initially reacted with "horror" to this news. Werner von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the German army, also emphasized the dangers associated with this move and stated in a meeting with the commanders that an armed conflict under the given balance of power could not be more than "a desperate struggle of defence". Hitler would finally dispel these concerns by apparently promising to do everything possible to avoid an armed conflict (Müller 1988, p. 208). A very similar situation arose in 1936 during the remilitarization of the Rhineland (ibid., pp. 213ff.).

In 1937, Blomberg and Fritsch once again exposed themselves as sceptics. On 5 November 1937, in the presence of the *Reich* War Minister Blomberg, the *Reich* Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath and the Commander-in-Chiefs of the three *Wehrmacht* units (Fritsch, Göring and Erich Raeder), Hitler declared his willingness to wage war against Austria and Czechoslovakia in the near future, possibly as early as 1938. Hitler left no doubt that the "way of violence … will never be without risk", but at the same time, he tried to play down the danger of a big new war. According to him, it was very likely that England had already "written off the Czech Republic in secret" and would therefore not go to war with Germany. Without English support, France's military action against Germany was also not very likely. At this point, the military's concerns came in. Both Blomberg and Fritsch evoked the danger of a British-French intervention and stressed the "necessity that England and France should not act as our opponents". Fritsch and Blomberg also pointed out the limited value of the German fortifications on the German western border and the strength of the Czech fortifications.[9] Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath also expressed scepticism, while the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Ludwig Beck, appeared even more critical. In a memorandum, he underlined the stability of the British Empire and stated that major changes in Europe's territory "could hardly be achieved without the most serious and unforeseeable turbulences".[10] Thus, Blomberg, Fritsch and Beck agreed in the fear that Hitler's politics would provoke a big new war, which, given the existing balance of power, could have disastrous consequences for Germany.

The Disempowerment of the Conservatives

Heading for the One-Party State

As early as April 1933, Goebbels noted in his diary on 19 April: "The second revolution must come. There is nothing to be done with Hugenberg or Seldte".[11] As a matter of fact, at that time the loss of power of the National Conservative Forces had already begun. After Hermann Göring had been appointed Prime Minister of Prussia on 11 April 1933, Vice-Chancellor Franz von Papen, until then *Reich* Commissioner for Prussia, lost his most important power base.

Shortly thereafter, the *Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten*, for many years the largest paramilitary association in Germany, pulled out of the National Conservative camp. After an internal power struggle, federal leader Franz Seldte took over the "sole dictatorial command of the league" on 26 April, informing his subordinates by telegram. One day later, he mandated the *Stahlhelm* "as a cohesive military unit to the leadership of Adolf Hitler" and affiliated with the NSDAP (Berghahn 1966, pp. 255ff.). In June 1933, the *Stahlhelm* command also decreed that no member of the league should be part of any party other than the NSDAP (Gaertringen 1960, p. 611).

This decision was primarily directed against the DNVP, which since May 1933 had been calling itself the *Deutschnationale Front* ("German National Front") and had increasingly come under pressure. Admittedly, in 1933 the terror of the SA primarily affected members and officials of the two major left-wing parties. Nevertheless, all other parties were also subject to Nazi attacks, including the German Nationals. Apart from verbal threats against the "reaction", violent clashes between the SA and members of the German National *Kampfringe* ("fighting rings") or *Kampfstaffeln* ("combat squadrons") took place in many parts of the country. SA men forcibly disrupted German National assemblies without the police intervening. In many places, German National politicians holding leading positions in the state administration were publicly attacked with the aim of forcing them to resign (Beck 2008, pp. 228ff.).

The decisive phase of the fight against the former ally began when on 21 June Hitler gave the order to ban the German National *Kampfstaffeln*—a paramilitary organization with up to 100,000 members. Alfred Hugenberg, the leader of the German National Front, then sent a man in his trust to Hindenburg to inform the *Reich* President about the new situation. His hope that Hindenburg would intervene in favour of the German Nationals was not fulfilled. Hugenberg, who by that time had been largely

isolated in the cabinet, waited several days in vain for an answer. On 26 June 1933, Hugenberg resigned as Minister for Economy, Food and Agriculture. Only one day later, the German National Front executive decided the self-dissolution of the party (Gaertringen 1960, pp. 610ff.). Finally, in July 1933, the existence of political parties other than the NSDAP was banned by law.[12] Within six months, the National Socialists had removed all its competitors in the struggle for power—a development which had taken the Italian fascists about four years.

Between Participation and Dissent

After Hindenburg's death in August 1934, the Conservative Nationalists had lost most of their political influence. Nevertheless, many of them continued to occupy important positions in the military and economy, as well as in administration, science and diplomacy. Especially in the early years after the seizure of power, the Nazis depended on collaboration with these conservative functional elites to meet their economic and political goals (eradication of mass unemployment, armament).

While many conservatives, like Seldte, went over to Nazism, others, such as Alfred Hugenberg, withdrew completely from politics. Several influential Conservative Nationalists kept their political positions, but maintained an inner independence from the regime. The most distinguished representatives of this third group were *Reich* Minister of Justice Franz Gürtner, *Reich* Minister of Economy Hjalmar Schacht, the Prussian Minister of Finance Johannes Popitz, the Commander-in-Chief of the army, Werner von Fritsch, the Chief of the General Staff Ludwig Beck and the German Ambassador in Rome, Ulrich von Hassell.

It was for them and others to decide up to what point they were willing to support Hitler's politics and the associated radicalization of the regime. That decision, however, was not easy to take, because despite all the criticism, the National Conservatives were enthusiastic about the successes achieved by the regime in the 1930s, particularly Hitler's foreign policy triumphs. For the Catholic Post and Transport Minister Paul von Eltz-Rübenach, the National Socialist church policy became a crucial point. In 1937, when Hitler wanted to decorate all ministers who were not members of the NSDAP with the Golden Party Badge, Eltz-Rübenach refused party membership in front of the entire cabinet and justified this affront with the oppression of the church. Immediately afterwards, he presented his resignation (cf. Longerich 2015, p. 501). In the summer of 1938,

Ludwig Beck, Chief of the General Staff, resigned during the Sudeten crisis because he regarded Hitler's aggressive risk policy as ill-fated (Müller 2008, pp. 334ff.). Hjalmar Schacht, the Minister of Economy, was involved in heated disputes with Hermann Göring, the Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan, over his forced armament policy, which Schacht considered to stimulate inflation. When he realized that Hitler supported Göring in this conflict, Schacht admitted defeat. Hitler accepted his resignation in November 1937. Sometime later, Schacht was also dismissed from his post as President of the *Reichsbank* (Kopper 2006, pp. 307ff.). Franz Gürtner on the other hand remained *Reich* Minister of Justice until his death in 1941, even though his department was increasingly marginalized in the power struggles within the regime. The Prussian Minister of Finance Popitz also stayed in office, but developed into a staunch opponent of Nazism. After the failed attempt to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944, he was executed (Nagel 2015).

The Blomberg-Fritsch-Crisis 1938

The Blomberg-Fritsch crisis of 1938 marked the end of the political disempowerment of the National Conservatives. The initial impulse for the events was the marriage of War Minister Blomberg to a young woman he had met a few months earlier. Soon after the wedding, which Hitler and Göring had attended as best men, it was leaked that the Minister's wife had not only been posing for pornographic photos in the past, but had also been temporarily registered as a prostitute. Hitler was appalled. On 27 January 1938, the Minister of War was seen off and suspended (Janßen and Tobias 1994, pp. 23ff.).

The first candidate for Blomberg's succession would normally have been the Commander-in-Chief of the army, Werner von Fritsch. At that point, Hitler remembered a police file from 1936 with the testimony of a previously convicted extortionist, who accused Fritsch of homosexual intercourse with a rent boy. Back then, Hitler had shown no interest in clarifying these accusations and ordered the destruction of the file. Now, he changed his mind and ordered a reconstruction of the file. While Fritsch solemnly affirmed that the allegations were unfounded, he was suspended and his case was taken over by the Gestapo. On 4 February, Fritsch was dismissed without waiting for the outcome of the military trial which had been initiated in the meantime. His successor was Walther von Brauchitsch, who regarded himself as a soldier without political ambitions. Shortly

afterwards, it turned out that Fritsch had become a victim of confusion; on 18 March 1938, the *Reich* Military Court acquitted him of all charges. However, Fritsch was not reinstated into his former position as Commander-in-Chief of the army.

For the succession of Blomberg, Hitler had also found a solution: "From now on, I will exercise command over the entire *Wehrmacht* personally".[13] Thus, the post of *Reich* War Minister had become redundant. It was succeeded by the newly founded *Wehrmacht* High Command (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*, OKW) as Hitler's "military staff". These changes were part of a whole range of decisions in matters of personnel. In place of Konstantin von Neurath, Hitler's close adviser Joachim von Ribbentrop took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus, the three high-ranking figures who had opposed Hitler when he unveiled his war plans on 5 November 1937, Blomberg, Fritsch and Neurath, lost their posts.

The Blomberg-Fritsch crisis strengthened Hitler's power in two ways. Now, he was no longer just the nominal but also the de facto Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Up to this time, the dictator had largely refrained from making direct interventions of the military. This restraint could now be discarded. There was nothing standing in the way of further expansion of the armed SS, either. In addition, the reshuffle of the political personnel of 4 February 1938 provided an opportunity to occupy several key political positions with Hitler's unconditional followers. Wilhelm Keitel, the chief of the OKW, was soon ridiculed in critical officer's circles for his servility towards Hitler. Joachim von Ribbentrop, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, distinguished himself in the following months as a warmonger, more than any other German politician. For his new office, Ribbentrop had qualified through numerous stays abroad, but above all through his unfailing loyalty and belief in Hitler. In August 1938, Ribbentrop assured his Secretary of State that "the Führer has never been mistaken … you must believe in his genius as he himself, R[ibbentrop], does from many years of experience".[14]

The Conservative Opposition

Plans for a Coup d'état 1934

It can be said that a National Conservative opposition against Nazism arose for the first time in spring 1934. Its centre was formed by two collaborators of the Vice-Chancellor Franz von Papen, his spokesman Herbert von Bose

and his speechwriter, the conservative intellectual Edgar Jung. In 1933, Papen and his circle had made a significant contribution to bringing Hitler to power. Scared by the failure of the conservative taming plan and worried by Hindenburg's serious illness, Jung and Bose now decided to counteract the regime's totalitarian tendencies. Their aim was the restoration of the monarchy (cf. Orth 2016; Jones 1993).

These plans were of an especially explosive nature, because at around the same time the SA increasingly became a source of unrest. After the destruction of the left-wing mass organizations in the summer, the SA leaders now turned to the military. The plans of the SA leader Ernst Röhm aimed at taking control of the *Reichswehr* and transforming the SA into a militia. In military circles, there was a quotation from Röhm circulating that the "grey rock" of the *Reichswehr* had to drown "in the brown tide" (Müller 1988, p. 91). Although Hitler expressly rejected these plans in February 1934, Röhm secretly stuck to them (Höhne 1984, pp. 204ff.). The *Reichswehr* leadership considered this piece of news to be extremely alarming.

In the light of this, Bose drew up a plan to have the SA disarmed by the *Reichswehr*, to arrest Nazi politicians such as Goebbels and Himmler and to form a new government in which, alongside Hitler and Göring, only conservative politicians including Papen and high-ranking military figures should be represented. This plan was based on the assumption that Hindenburg would impose the state of emergency and order the *Reichswehr* to take action against the SA. In fact, it was a return to the original taming plans of 1933, and Papen himself was only partially privy to these schemes.

The idea that part of the NSDAP leaders could be removed while a new government was formed together with the remaining Nazis shows the weak spot of the National Conservatives: they did not have the necessary popular support to hold on to power without allies. All the political forces that could have served as their allies had been eliminated with their support in 1933. It also remains highly questionable whether Hindenburg and the *Reichswehr* leadership would have been prepared to join the conspirators. While Hindenburg sympathized with a restoration of the monarchy, he rejected the idea of using the *Reichswehr* in German home affairs (Pyta 2007, p. 862f.).

Papen's speech in Marburg on 17 June 1934, written by Jung, would become the beacon for National Conservative rebellion against National Socialism. The Marburg speech turned into a sharp reckoning with the Nazi dictatorship. It criticized the loss of press freedom as well as the Hitler

cult and the one-party system. The author of the speech voiced particularly harsh words against SA radicalism and the resulting legal uncertainty: "No nation can afford a never-ending revolution from below if it wants to stand the test of time before history. One day the movement must come to an end, one day a solid social structure, held together by an uninfluenced jurisdiction, and an undisputed state authority, will emerge". Papen went on to attack the "reprehensible" belief that one could unify a nation "with terror". The Marburg speech, in sharp contrast to the efforts of the National Socialists to dismiss Western traditions as "liberalist", stated: "They think that true humanity is liberalist, when in reality it is a flowering of the antique-Christian culture. They call freedom a liberal concept, even though in reality it is originally Germanic. They are opposed to equality before the judge, which they condemn as liberal degeneration, while in reality it is the prerequisite of every just verdict …Their attacks are directed against the security and freedom of personal privacy, which the Germans have conquered through centuries of hard fights". Finally, in contrast to the anti-Christian attitudes of the NSDAP, the speech made it quite clear what the author considered to be the crucial issue: "It is a question of deciding between the believers and the non-believers".[15]

As a matter of fact, the Marburg speech did not become a beacon for the conservative opposition, but a signal for Hitler, who now decided to forcefully curb the smouldering crisis. His reaction to the twofold challenge was a sweeping blow, which was directed both against the "reaction" as well as against the SA leadership, while at the same time eliminating other adversaries from past and present. In total, at least 90 people were murdered at the end of June and beginning of July 1934, including Edgar Jung and Herbert von Bose.

These murders abruptly put an end to the conservative plans of a coup d'état. With the death of Jung and Bose, the conspirators lost their two most important figures. Besides, the *Reichswehr* leadership and Hindenburg no longer had any reason to come into conflict with Hitler. By liquidating the SA leadership, Hitler had, or so it seemed, formed an alliance with the army against the radicals in his own party. Hindenburg could even be persuaded to send a congratulatory telegram in which he explicitly justified Hitler's approach: "You have saved the German people from a severe danger".[16]

The Oster Conspiracy of 1938

However, for a small group of *Reichswehr* officers, the "Röhm crisis" was the beginning of their alienation from the NS regime. In the following years, an opposition group formed in the *Abwehr*, the military intelligence service of the *Wehrmacht*, which included Hans Oster, Hans Bernd Gisevius and Helmuth Groscurth. Oster and his like-minded colleagues benefited from the fact that Wilhelm Canaris, who in 1935 took charge of the *Abwehr*, secretly protected them and thus gave them considerable leeway.

During the Sudeten crisis—between April and September 1938—the National Conservative opposition for the first time gained such strength that the idea of a coup d'état no longer seemed unrealistic. In the spring of 1938, an anti-war faction was formed, whose most important representatives included Chief of the General Staff of the Army Ludwig Beck and his deputy Franz Halder, as well as the head of *Abwehr,* Canaris and Hans Oster. The crucial factor in their oppositional stance was the assumption that a military attack on Czechoslovakia would "automatically lead to a European or a world war", which, as Beck wrote in July 1938, "by human judgement … will end in general disaster for Germany". In order to prevent the imminent outbreak of war, the chief of staff suggested to the Commander-in-Chief of the army, Walther von Brauchitsch, that the "highest Wehrmacht leaders", should threaten with a collective resignation from their offices, if their warnings were not heard.[17] Although a large part of the generality agreed with Beck's opinion that a war against the Western powers would end in Germany's defeat, the proposed "strike" of the generals did not take place. Beck thereupon gave up and resigned in August 1938.

However, the activities of the anti-war faction had not yet finished. Beck's successor, Franz Halder, analysed the political-military situation in a similar way and, hesitatingly, took part in the 1938 Oster conspiracy, which not only tried to prevent the war but also aimed at overthrowing Hitler (Hartmann 1991, pp. 99ff.). Besides the core opposition group around Oster, were the head of the military intelligence, Admiral Canaris, the Commander of the Berlin military district, Erwin von Witzleben, who was supposed to lead the military action, and Fritz-Dietlof Graf von der Schulenburg, Deputy Commissioner of the police in Berlin. Their action plan was to penetrate the *Reich* Chancellery with a strike force and eliminate Hitler. At the same time, the government district, all important communication centres and the headquarters of the SS and Gestapo were to be

occupied in Berlin. In parallel, it was planned to arrest high-ranking party officials.

The Oster conspiracy was based on a broad anti-war sentiment in Germany (Kershaw 1987, pp. 132 ff.). For this reason, some historians have described it as "the most promising attempt to overthrow Hitler" (Hoffmann 1979, p. 129). In the end, however, the conspirators remained passive. It was Halder's decision not to strike until the Western powers responded to Hitler's attack against Czechoslovakia with a war declaration. According to the Chief of the General Staff, a coup d'état would only be successful if the population could be convinced that the country had been saved from war.

This linkage between coup d'état and outbreak of war meant that the plans for the overthrow collapsed after the Munich Conference in 1938. Striking out against the victorious Hitler, while the Sudeten Germans cheered for the invading *Wehrmacht*, would have come close to a suicide squad. Moreover, the main objective of the plans for a coup d'état, the prevention of a war against the Western powers, was seemingly achieved with the Munich Agreement. The assumption that Hitler's aggressive policy would drive the country into a war against the Western powers and ultimately into a military disaster seemed refuted, at least for the time being. Therefore, the Munich Conference was also a blow to the German opposition, from which it did not recover in the following years (Haffner 1996, p. 65).

Conclusion

Why did the Nazis prevail relatively quickly and easily over their National Conservative partners? Vice-Chancellor Franz von Papen had trusted that the National Socialists in the cabinet were only a minority when he forged the government alliance with the NSDAP. However, this would only have been of advantage if the non-Nazi ministers had acted as a unitary block. This was not the case. The heterogeneity of this group became obvious as early as April 1933, when the leader of the *Stahlhelm*, Minister of Labour Seldte, joined the National Socialists after an internal power struggle. From the very beginning, the National Conservative Forces did not act as a unitary block, but as individuals or as individual institutions that were only connected to each other through informal contacts. Significantly, the *Reichswehr* had not lifted a finger when the DNVP was forced to dissolve itself in 1933. Papen's hope that Hindenburg would eventually intervene in order to put the Nazis in their place also proved to be a mistake. Under such

circumstances, the small number of National Socialist ministers was not a significant disadvantage for the NSDAP. More importantly, these ministers held key positions that were crucial to the establishment of a dictatorship. These positions included, apart from the office of the *Reich* Chancellor, above all the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, headed by Göring. As Prussian Minister of the Interior, Göring was in charge of the police force in two-thirds of the *Reich*'s territory, including the capital Berlin, with a total of 50,000 men who were deployed not only against the left-wing parties, but against all parties and organizations other than the NSDAP. In the end, the Conservative Nationalists became the losers of a development they themselves had helped to initiate. Through their involvement in the destruction of the constitutional order, the Nazis were provided with those instruments (*Reichstag* Fire Decree, *Enabling Act*) that could finally also be used against the National Conservative Forces. The German Nationalists' hope that, after the destruction of the "forces hostile to state", it was possible to return to a constitutional order turned out to be a grotesque illusion.

Notes

1. *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, edited by Elke Fröhlich, Part I, Vol. 2/III, p. 78 (9 December 1932).
2. The terms "Conservative Nationalists" and "National Conservative forces" will hereafter be used as synonyms.
3. Cited in Kleist-Schmenzin (1959, p. 92).
4. Meeting of ministers on 1 January 1933, in *Akten der Reichskanzlei. Die Regierung Hitler. Part I: 1933/34* (1983, p. 6).
5. Cited in *Hitlers Machtergreifung* (1992, p. 281f.).
6. Cf. the case study by Gailus (2017, pp. 178ff.).
7. *Akten der Reichskanzlei. Die Regierung Hitler. Part I: 1933/34,* Vol. 1, pp. 320–24.
8. *Akten der Reichskanzlei. Die Regierung* Hitler. Part II: 1934/35. Vol. 2 (1999, pp. 742–46).
9. Cited in F. Hoßbach, "Note from 10/11/1937". In *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945*, Series D, Vol. I (1950, pp. 25–32).
10. Cited in Müller (2008, p. 262).
11. *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, Part I, Vol. 2/III (2006, p. 171).
12. *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1933 I, Sp. 479.
13. Decree of 4 February 1938, in Domarus (1973, p. 782).
14. Die Weizsäcker-Papiere 1933–1950, edited by Hill (1974, p. 136).

15. Quotations from: Rede des Vizekanzlers von Papen vor dem Universitätsbund Marburg am 17. Juni 1934, o. D. [1934].
16. Cited in Pyta (2007, p. 850).
17. Cited in Müller (2008, pp. 180, 340, 343, 345).

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CHAPTER 15

The Constitutional Foundations of an Ethical State: The Portuguese New State in Comparative Perspective

Goffredo Adinolfi

Introduction

This chapter looks at how the Portuguese New State (1933–1974) was established according to the principles of an "ethical State". It compares the Portuguese case with the Italian fascist regime, which made the greatest efforts to codify and implement this type of state. The authoritarian New State arose during the European fascist era, but survived the fall of Mussolini and Hitler, until 1974. In 1926, the first Portuguese parliamentary Republic founded in 1911 fell, after a coup d'état that established a military dictatorship. António de Oliveira Salazar, who became Minister of Finance of that dictatorship after 1928, was nominated President of the Council in 1932, and the following year he founded the New State after a plebiscite approving a new constitution (Pinto 1995). He became absolute

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head of the regime until 1968, when he was replaced by Marcelo Caetano for health reasons.

The key source of inspiration for the New State was the Italian fascist model. Although the Portuguese regime differed from the Italian because of its heavy reliance on the social doctrine of the Catholic Church and the absence of an expansionist policy—Portugal already had a massive overseas empire—the New State adopted the principles of Italian corporatism in the social, economic and public order spheres and for its system of controlling political dissidence (Schmitter 1975).

Despite differences in implementation and in other respects, the fascist conception of the "ethical State" was a key source of inspiration for the construction of the Portuguese New State. Following the main theorist and philosopher of Italian Fascism, Giovanni Gentile, by ethical state we mean one that dissolves the "authority-liberty dichotomy" and in which the "law is required and interiorized in the conscience of the good citizen, who is more concerned with the general good than his own" (Gentile 1989 [1919], p. 114).[1] We argue here that this concept was also the key source of inspiration for the New State, as exemplified by the constitution of 1933 and the various decree laws and institutions that sustained the principles it established.

It is necessary to qualify what one means when one speaks of a constitution in an authoritarian context. First and foremost, the idea of a "constitution" in an authoritarian context is profoundly different from the concept as practised by liberal regimes. In the latter case, constitution-making is shaped by Montesquieu's theory that the purpose of a constitution is to limit and control the powers of the state. The liberal states born after and inspired by the French Revolution were based on the fragmentation and limitation of absolute state power in favour of the rights of citizens and the separation of powers. Whether monarchic or republican, parliaments under liberal regimes were the main organs representing national sovereignty, and they represented citizens, not castes. By contrast, in an authoritarian context, the constitution is seen as an organic part of the state, and the separation of powers is replaced by the idea of cooperation between organs and powers that reside exclusively with the state.[2]

The second point concerns how one should classify regimes that were organized along corporative lines. In this context, one cannot avoid reference to the Italian fascist regime. The problem of classifying single-party regimes arises with their origins and, from the 1930s onwards, because of the profound crisis of the liberal state, it became crucial to find a consensus

among constitutional law theorists. In this context, it was claimed that the "neutrality" of the parties under liberal regimes should be replaced by an "ethical" "single" party that should do away with the multiplicity of pre-existing parties. This is what happened in Russia after 1917, in Italy after 1925 and in Portugal and Germany after 1933. At a colloquium organized in Italy in 1935–1936 by constitutionalist Oreste Ranelletti, efforts were made to highlight the essential paradigms shaping each regime type. The Italian case—a dictatorship of a state with a constitutionally established single party—was contrasted with the German case, in which the single party was an autonomous source of law.[3]

The third and final point has to do with the way in which the constitution was interpreted: literally or materially. It was considered that the "wrong" conclusions might be arrived at if the Portuguese constitution of 1933 or the transformation of the Albertine Statute, the Italian constitution that was also in force during the fascist period, were interpreted literally. The Portuguese 1933 constitution explicitly guaranteed the "freedom of expression of thought in any form" (1933, Art. 8.6) and "freedom of meeting and association" (1933, Art. 8.24). In order to get around the problem of interpretation, and in an effort to describe how authoritarian regimes worked, Italian constitutionalist Costantino Mortati came up with the concept of the "material constitution". On this view, the role of a constitutional regime can only be understood by looking at how it works and not simply by examining how the fundamental charter is interpreted.[4]

In the first part of this chapter, we examine the organization of the New State, with a special focus on how the political system was restructured with the passage of a new constitution and the introduction of norms in what can be described as a process of "authoritarianization" of the New State or of authoritarian transition. In the second part, we look at how this organization process was bolstered by various norms and institutions charged with applying the constitution. The latter were structured around a specific conception of an "ideal" political order, and since the state was supposedly organic and harmoniously organized around a single ethic, social conflict was seen as a corrupting force.

A Problem of Classification

There is a vast and literature classifying liberal and democratic regimes, and debate persists about the essential features of liberal democracies, but the classification of authoritarian regimes presents much greater problems and

continues to generate much fiercer debate, particularly concerning regimes that aimed to abolish parliamentarism[5] or liberal democracy permanently, and not just temporarily.[6]

Contrary to what one might think, there was prolonged, intense and contradictory debate among Italian constitutionalists about the construction of the fascist regime and the reform of the constitution, and a definitive interpretation was never found. Indeed, as Gustavo Zagrebelsky (1998) reminds us, a consensus has yet to emerge seventy years later. There were three essential aspects that characterized the interpretative debate about the reforms undertaken during the *ventennio* of Mussolini's dictatorship.

The "continuists", who were inspired by classic liberal doctrine, believed that the fascist state after the reforms of 1925 was merely an offshoot of a rule of law state that was still based on the separation of legislative, executive and judicial power, albeit a strongly attenuated separation (Romano 1933; Mortati 1998). By contrast, the fascists regarded these reforms as a turning point, which allowed for the emergence of a state that was substantially different from the liberal model (Panunzio 1933). Finally, the nationalists emphasized that the liberal state had been replaced by an organic state and, contrary to Panunzio and the "continuists", they highlighted the central role of an organic and ethical state in which the single party played the role of transmitting power from the centre to the periphery of the system (Rocco 1938).[7]

During the authoritarian period (1922–1925) and during the consolidation of the single-party state (1925–1929), both the Grand Council of Fascism and the National Fascist Party (*Partito Nazionale Fascista*, PNF) were subordinated to the state—the monarch ratified the decree law that nominated the Secretary-General and defined the general outline of PNF statutes. Popular representation was replaced by the notion of the organic state and the concept of competitive elections therefore ceased to make sense. Paradoxically, parliament continued to operate, although it did so in an entirely different way since the opposition parties were banned and, after 1929, elections were replaced by plebiscites, so that citizens were thereafter called on to respond "yes" or "no" to a list of questions composed by the Grand Fascist Council.

The Paradoxes of the New State Constitution

The Salazar state was the only one among the regimes of fascist inspiration that promulgated a new constitution. Although it was similar to that of 1911 in many ways, the 1933 constitution was essentially very different.[8]

From the outset, it reversed the tripartite division of constitutional powers, a central issue for liberal states. Thus, while the 1911 constitution stipulated that "the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers are the organs of National Sovereignty, and are independent and harmonious among themselves" (1911, Art. 6), the reformulated version of 1933 had this to say about the three powers: "Sovereignty resides in the Nation and has as its organs the Head of State, the National Assembly, the Government and the Courts" (1933, Art. 71). The three classic powers thus ceased to exert mutual controls and to limit the power of the state and were instead brought together to create a single source of power: the "unitary" and "corporative" state (1933, Art. 5).

This is the most paradoxical aspect of this authoritarian regime, if one considers that, from the eighteenth century onwards, the term "constitution" had evoked the need to limit power or to base power on a system of checks and balances between the legislative, executive and judicial institutions. Unlike the liberal regimes of the nineteenth century, power in authoritarian regimes was concentrated in a single, monocratic or collegial organ—generally the government or the President of the Council—which did away with the need to build a social consensus for the exercise of power, and with the organizing principles that characterized the liberal state (Vergottini 2004, pp. 267–68).

It was no accident that the Portuguese Presidency of the Council—which, as in the case of Italy, ceased to be *primus inter pares* and acquired an absolutely dominant position within the government—lost its relationship of trust with the parliament. Thus, the 1933 constitution stipulated that the National Assembly could be "freely convoked and dissolved by the President of the Republic" since the "Government is based exclusively on confidence in the Presidency of the Republic and its hold on power does not depend on the fate of any bills or votes proposed by the National Assembly" (1933, Art. 107).

In order to understand the contradiction inherent to the Salazar and Italian fascist regimes, it is necessary to acknowledge that both had more than one source of inspiration. Indeed, the constitution of the New State drew on three ideological foundations: right-wing liberalism, Integralism and Catholicism. Anti-parliamentarism was the meeting point that brought together these apparently irreconcilable forces, over which the state cast something of a "spell" that gave absolute prominence to the future dictator, António de Oliveira Salazar.[9] As Norberto Bobbio (2008) reminds us, the main target of the New State and therefore of its constitution was

not so much socialism or Marxism, but rather liberalism, which was held responsible for undermining the authority of the state, which therefore had to become more totalitarian and anti-individualistic.[10]

The state became organic on the basis of "corporative" cooperation between its powers, and it became totalitarian on the basis of the principle "all for the Nation, nothing against the Nation". It was to be totalitarian according to Giovanni Gentile's (1932, pp. 835–40) understanding of the term: "for the Fascist, everything is in the State, and nothing human or spiritual exists, much less has value, outside the State. In this sense Fascism is totalitarian, and the Fascist State, the synthesis and unity of all values, interprets, develops and gives strength to the whole life of the people". The Portuguese version of this was not very different[11]: it was incumbent upon the state to "promote moral unity" (1933, Art. 6.1); to "coordinate, give impetus to and direct all social activities, ensuring that a just harmony of interests prevails within the context of a legitimate subordination of the particular to the general [interest]" (1933, Art. 6.2); to "recognize the moral or economic corporations and the associations or union organizations, and to promote and assist in their formation" (1933, Art. 14) and to "regulate their constitution and the exercise of their functions, in accordance with special norms" (1933, Art. 15).

Thus, nothing could be done without the authorization of a state that not only regulated its internal organization in detail but also supervised the formation of public opinion (Adinolfi 2007, 2012) because, as the new constitution stated and as António Araújo underlines about its founder, Salazar,[12] it was "the fundamental element in the politics and administration of the Country, which charged the state with defending it from all factors that lead it astray from truth, justice and the common good" (1933, Art. 20).

This obsession with order was the guiding star of the regime, which claimed to be based on the natural laws that govern human organization. As Marcelo Caetano (1955) explained, the foundations of the New State had to be the natural "cells" of archaic society: the family, the parishes and the corporations. As in the Medieval Age, each cell provided for a kind of pluralistic legal order, each with its sphere of application. But Caetano was too intelligent an intellectual to truly believe in the re-establishment of a "natural order" based spontaneously on past institutions. Natural law was a powerful source of legitimization, but it inevitably led to "ethical absolutism",[13] so it was deployed mainly as a pretext given that medieval society had, of course, become extinct and its archaic cells could never

have reformed "naturally". In fact, Caetano was not a natural law and a "pluralist" theorist but a monistic positivist, so he believed that the state could not be split into a multiplicity of juridical organs. The state was to be unitary, organic and ethical. In other words, the ideology of the leaders of the New State became the ideology of a state that ceased to be neutral as had been the case under liberalism.

The idea that the single party was essential was the corollary to the organic ideology of the state that typified the fascist regimes. In Marcelo Caetano's (1955), *Political Science and Constitutional Law*, one finds no references to the single party, the National Union (União Nacional, UN), which was tolerated in Portugal during Salazar's consulate. In our view, this is insufficient to distance the Portuguese case from the Italian paradigm because, as Ranelletti emphasized (1936), it was the party that was subordinated to the state, and not the state to the party, as in the German experience.

This point is not of theoretical interest alone; it was central to the construction of the Salazarist state. The authority of the organic state could not be fractured into a plurality of parties, and the idea of a party as a "part" was banned. The UN, like the PNF, ceased to be a "part" by virtue of becoming the only party. At the same time, a single ideology or "ethic" became legitimate, so that the state ceased to be neutral and acted instead as a carrier of the values natural to the human condition, which were for that reason indispensible. The single parties become part of those constitutions that Costantino Mortati (1998) defined as material; in other words, the constitutions that considered not just the organisms outlined in the fundamental law of the country but also all those that contributed to the working of existing institutional structures.

The fact that the UN was excluded from the work of elaborating the regime's ideology—largely paralleling the role of the PNF—strengthened the notion that the single party was "naturally" linked, in a rigorously top-down relationship, with the organic state. The starting point was the family—"it is the sole right of the family to elect the parish councils [*juntas de freguesia*]. This right is exercised by the head of the family" (1933, Art. 17). The citizen, or the individual as citizen, the primary unit of the liberal state, disappeared, and his vote was replaced by the vote of the primary "cell", a collective entity that, on this view, was necessarily the family. On the other hand, as stressed by António Costa Pinto (2002, p. 437), "Portugal's single party, being kept organisationally weak and dependent, was never an

important element in either the political decision-making process or in the selection of the ministerial elite".

Rousseau's constitutional theory and the concept of popular sovereignty had no place here. Caetano (1955) explicitly and firmly rejected contract theories when he affirmed that the state was not born of the free will of citizens who freely enter into a contract, but rather of the free will of enlightened elites, which are the interpreters of the well-being of the constituent parts of the community.

The new constitutional order was based on the rejection of parliament—which ceased to be the Congress of the Republic with a chamber of deputies and a senate and was renamed the National Assembly (*Assembleia Nacional*, AN)—and on the concentration of power in the executive branch, which, as in Italy, then prevailed over the other two powers. The government controlled the UN; together with the Civil Governors and the Ministry of the Interior, the single party controlled the recruitment of parliamentarians. In this way, the government quasi-directly determined the composition of the Assembly.

Deputies also lost their freedom of opinion, which was limited by Article 89. The latter stated that "the inviolability of opinion and vote does not free the members of the National Assembly from civil and criminal responsibility [...] for offenses to public morality or the public incitation of crime" (1933, Art. 89.1), and the "National Assembly can cancel the mandate of deputies who express opinions [that] in any way incite the violent subversion of the political and social order" (1933, Art. 89.2). It is important to remember that the 1911 constitution had stated the exact opposite: "The opinions and votes that Deputies and Senators express or emit in the course of their mandate are inviolable. Their vote is free and independent of any insinuation or instruction" (1933, Art. 15).

In addition to being nominated by the government and deprived of freedom of opinion, the National Assembly of the New State also lost its powers of self-convocation, as its functioning was limited "three months that cannot be postponed" (1933, Art. 94). But the constitution went even further: it established that the "President of the Republic should respond directly and exclusively to the Nation for actions undertaken in the course of his duties, and the exercise of the latter and his magistracy are free of any vote by the National Assembly" (1933, Art. 78). It is worth underlining that the 1911 constitution provided that "the President can be removed from office by both chambers of Congress, through a resolution that is supported and approved by two thirds of its members" (1911, Art. 46).

As noted above, the power of the judicial and legislative branches was articulated by the executive. The head of state nominated the President of the Council of Ministers (akin to the office of the Prime Minister today) which—and this is another paradoxical aspect of the hierarchies of the New State—became the central link in the "material constitution" and, at the same time, was the only organism that did not require plebiscitary legitimization by the Portuguese people. Again, this reveals the proximity between the New State and the Italian fascist regime, in which the Prime Minister, *Capo del Governo* Mussolini, was nominated directly by the head of state and had no relationship of trust with the chamber of deputies.

The 1933 constitution explicitly prohibited the AN from having any influence on the formation of the government, which became "the exclusive attribute of the Presidency of the Republic, the preservation of whose power does not depend on the fate of any bills or votes in the National Assembly" (1933, Art. 111). The government as represented by the President of the Council thus concentrated legislative powers, by directly controlling the recruitment of deputies, and legislating powers, as it could make extensive of decree laws without the prior legislative consent of the Assembly. In this way, the Presidency of the Council became a sort of *exceptional legislative organ* (Cruz 1988, p. 98).

The powers attributed to the government by the 1933 constitution also extended to the judicial branch. The separation between judicial careers and the Public Ministry, which was charged with taking penal action and remained subordinated to the Ministry of Justice, became increasingly deep. The state was explicitly represented in the courts "First, by the Attorney General of the Republic; second, by the Attorney of the Republic in each Court of Appeal; third, by the delegate of the Attorney of the Republic in the case of each Court of First Instance; and fourth, by the legally designated representatives in the case of the special courts" (1933, Art. 117). Much of this was regulated by decree law and constantly amended over time. In essence, the public prosecutor, or the Public Ministry, was not an independent organ; its decisions were influenced by the decisions and guidelines for action of the government through the Minister of Justice, which also had the power to nominate, transfer, promote and exonerate civil servants working in the public ministries. In sum, as Costa Pinto (2002, p. 437) underlines, "not only was there no tension between Salazar's UN and the state, but neither the dictatorial system nor the political decision-making and implementation processes were ever threatened by the existence of autonomous political institutions".

Conclusions

The great anti-liberal wave of the post-First World War period was defeated along with the countries that sponsored the regimes ideologically inspired by liberalism. This does not mean that the authoritarian regimes inspired by the Italian fascist dictatorship could not hope to defeat the democratic and liberal model. Indeed, this goal appeared to be in sight in 1942 when the tanks of the Nazi regime had overrun every part of continental Europe with the exception of the Iberian Peninsula.

At the start of this article, we emphasized how the concept of dictatorship in fascist regimes differed from that of the nineteenth century—an exceptional period that would be a short as possible, to resolve a political impasse. Like Fascism in Italy, Salazarism subverted the order established in Portugal after the liberal wars, establishing an "ethical" and organic state. It was ethical because it was based on a specific morality and abandoned any pretence of neutrality, and it was organic because nothing should, or indeed could, be done outside the ethics of the regime.

As explained above, the reformulated view of the state was based on a theoretical consideration: that the contract-based theories of thinkers such as Jean Jacques Rousseau, according to which mean freely enter into a contract which gives rise to the state, were wrong. The anti-democratic or anti-parliamentary and anti-individualist view was that a constitution and concomitant organization of power had to be guided by the central principle of the indivisibility of the power of the state. The division of powers of the liberal era was thus replaced by a division of power into organs.

The first part of the article focused on the organization of the Salazarist state, and the second on how this organizational model was defended by the norms and institutions for its implementation. These were structured according to a specific conception of an "ideal" public order and a vision of social conflict as a corrupting force that worked against a state that was meant to be organic and harmoniously committed to a single ethic.

As Caetano himself emphasized, from the passage of the National Work Statute (*Estatuto do Trabalho Nacional*) it could be deduced that individual interests had to submit to the supreme moral interests of the Portuguese nation. Although this was not explicitly theorized, this implies the idea of an ethical state, one that was *interiore homini*. In Salazar's view, morality and law established the limits of a state, but unlike Mussolini, he did not

envisage a totalitarian state. The values guiding the state were not neutral; rather, its morality and law were inspired by the ideology of the regime.

Notes

1. As Daniela Coli argues, Gentile considered that the opposition between government and governed had to be overcome through the theory of the *interiore homini* state (Coli 2004, p. 116).
2. As Jorge Miranda (1997, p. 17) underlines, "apart from the Constitution of 1933, Portuguese constitutions have all followed western rule of law lines. They aim to regulate the political process, limit power, act on the social system, and prescribe the fundamental basis of the various branches of the law".
3. "In this mode of organisation, the Fascist Party inserted itself into the State and was by it organised like a real integrating and auxiliary institution, a civil militia at the service of the State […] For that reason, our political and social organization evinces a grand compact, harmonious unity, dominated by consideration of the general interests of the Nation, which expresses itself in the sovereign majesty of the State […] In Germany, the Party dominates the State and the People; but the Party is not an organ of the State, just as the State is not an organ of the Party. The Party stands alongside the State as an autonomous legal subject, with its own laws and authoritarian powers over its members, with the power to organize itself internally, and jurisdictional power over them". See Ranelletti (1936, pp. 8–9).
4. As Mortati (1998, p. 201) states, "…the Constitution […] is moral in two ways", namely because of its content, and because it includes not just "instrumental or purely organisational elements" but also "neutral material normative elements".
5. This is what António de Oliveira Salazar thought of parliamentarism in 1935: "The salutary principle of the division of powers effectively has been deformed by parliamentary habits (…) These norms have, in effect, subjected the Executive to the Legislative branch (…) I sense that parliaments, even when they do not become purely political organs that are alien to legislative functions, will be forced to approve only the broad bases of the great laws".
6. "The words 'dictator' and 'dictatorship' have suffered a deep and singular series of historical transformations […] from the time it was formally suppressed in the twentieth century, when the term dictatorship was redeployed to identify a form of State and Government […] One should also consider the case of a dictatorship that is not a form of Government, as when a dictator is nominated by the competent authorities under a

Monarchy or a Republic, and is given a specific and circumscribed task" (Sartori 2003).

7. In fact, "the epilogue of Mussolini's dictatorship demonstrated how the institutional aspect was not entirely secondary in fascism, given that the PNF became the regime by dictating legal procedures, and the King and the regime were liberated from Mussolini because of conformity with legal procedures: there was no betrayal, as later established with the dismal Verona processes of 1944. When the degree of defeat became apparent to all in the Spring-Summer of 1943, fascism reached the end of the line precisely through the Grand Council (24-25 June 1943) and then because of the mistrust of the King". See Adinolfi (2010, p. 361).
8. The similarities between the two constitutions should not be wondered at. As António Araújo (2007, p. 35) underlines, "it is no exaggeration to say that the 1911 Constitution established the basis for the constituent labours that led to the Political Constitution of the New State".
9. "There is no doubt that Salazar emerged as the great coordinator of labours […] nonetheless, it is a mistake to think that the 1933 Constitution was purely a product of the will of Salazar. The text approved in the 1933 plebiscite reflected a compromise that was a hindrance, as it was only in 1935-38 and, indeed, 1945, with the conversion of the Government into a 'normal' legislative branch, that the constitutional edifice of the New State was completed". See Araújo (2007, pp. 17–18).
10. As Bobbio (2008, p. 69), points out, "I believe that the focus of all negative ideas among pre-fascist (and fascist) currents is democracy. What holds them together and allows one to view them historically as a whole is anti-democratic feeling […] Democracy was not just ethically reproachable: its principles were also scientifically false. […] In addition to these generic attacks, the political critique of democracy was directed at the institutions through which it operated historically. Parliament first and foremost. The most visible aspect of anti-democratic feeling was anti-parliamentarism".
11. In fact, there are two completely different concepts of totalitarianism: the first evaluates the degree of centralisation of the political regime; the second identifies a particular type or "category" of regime. In our view, the second interpretation of the concept of "totalitarian regime" is overly evasive and therefore not categorical, since it mixes dictatorships as varied as the Nazi and Stalinist. For chronological reasons, we adhere to the first definition. On this question see Vergottini (2004, pp. 269–74). In other words, we agree with Sartori's consideration that "It made sense to conceive totalitarianism as an ideal type. Finally, a polar type is the polar end of a continuum which posits a contrary polar end at its other extremity. Thus, totalitarianism can be conceived as the opposite of democracy in polar type terms, that is, under the assumption that all the real-world cases will fall somewhere in

between, in greater or lesser proximity to one of the two poles that define the totalitarianism-democracy continuum" (Sartori 1993, p. 14).

12. This is what Salazar wrote in his Report on the Constitutional Project: "Public opinion is the greatest spiritual power that influences the exercise of the powers of the States […] It is for that very reason that it is often avoided or distorted by the organs of the parties and plutocracy. This causes immense damage to the State and its fate. This is one of the greatest causes of recent disorganisation and ruin". Quoted in Araújo (2007, p. 347).
13. "It was characteristic of the natural-law doctrine, whether as a part of ethics or theology as an autonomous discipline, that it used to operate on the assumption of a "natural order". Unlike the rules of positive law, those prevailing in this "natural order" which govern human conduct are not in force because they have been "artificially" made by a specified human authority, but because they stem from God, nature or reason and thus are good, right and just" (Kelsen 2006, p. 392).

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CHAPTER 16

The Franco Dictatorship: A Proposal for Analysis in Terms of Political Cultures

Zira Box

In recent years, the concept of political culture has enjoyed uneven progress in the academic world in Spain. A general fall into disuse of this concept among sociologists and political scientists concerned to distance themselves from an idea with too many functionalist associations has contrasted with the massive and enthusiastic embrace of the idea among historians (Morán 2010, p. 124). This has been visible in numerous instances. If the initial adoption of the term by historians was more or less intuitive and largely as a catch-all concept (Fernández Sebastián 2009, p. 29), this has given way to an increasing concern to establish the limits and reach this instrument could have in terms of our gaining a better understanding of the past (Formisano 2001, p. 394; Gendzel 1997, p. 245).

A large part of these reflections have centred around the possible definitions and consequently analytical potential that could be given to "political culture". In contrast to a predominant focus on linguistic

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elements as constituents of political action in themselves—as in the work of Keith Baker or William Sewell—other definitions have been put forward, such as that represented by the so-called cultural history of politics, which has focused, in a less performative and more constructivist way, on the patterns of meaning upon the basis of which, and within which, political behaviour develops (Hazareesingh 2007). It is precisely the latter that has been the dominant perspective in Spanish historiography, which, independently of the nuances in each case, has found in the approaches of historians such as Jean-François Sirinelli and Serge Berstein a useful implement for explaining political conduct and identities and for comprehending the symbolic and expressive dimension these elements can possess.

The greatest interest of a definition of this kind may lie precisely in its capacity to articulate the three key pillars of the political process: firstly, the constructed meanings and representations that make up a specific vision of the world, which are necessary to interpret reality and give it meaning in turn; secondly, the actions that are developed on the basis of this vision, because one must not forget that one of the essential aspects of this definition is the emphasis it places on political objectives and the connections between such world views and concrete political action, the desire to establish regimes and implement political projects; and finally, the expressive dimension, the symbolic fabric that surrounds and expresses political action, and which cannot be isolated from the other two aspects (Sirinelli 1998, p. 77; Bernstein 1992, p. 71).

Without denying the potential criticisms that could be made of this approach,[1] it is hard to argue that the use of "political culture" as an analytical tool does not offer benefits, throwing a fresh light on historical episodes to which it is applied. Hence, although both the uses to which it is put and the concepts it incorporates can be qualified, it is equally hard to deny that a rereading of Spain's history over the last two centuries in the light of the possibilities offered by these ideas opens up new perspectives and presents new questions in familiar fields.[2]

This is particularly the case with the study of the Franco dictatorship, an examination of which through the prism of political culture enables us to pose new questions and direct our analytical focus from different angles. Above all, and this is one of the principal arguments we wish to highlight here, this allows us to go beyond a confirmation of the internal heterogeneity of the regime, a characteristic that has been amply diagnosed for years, to examine the extent to which this was not exclusively an instance of a mixed, hybrid structure,[3] but of a fascistized dictatorship[4] made up of

diverse components whose various movements, desires and specific actions all eventually gave shape to the regime known as Francoism, as a political structure within which they all coexisted, and simultaneously all moulded what each of these same actors—fascists, monarchists, Carlist traditionalists and Catholic groups—was in themselves and could become. To put this another way, the aim is not simply to confirm the hybrid nature of the regime and Francoist culture, that peculiar mixture that resulted from the parallel and overlying processes of fascistization and Catholicization to which all the relevant actors were exposed, but to focus our attention on these actors, each understood as a political culture in itself with its own ambitions, which made Francoism more than just a mixed political regime. Rather, they converted it into a conflictive space in which, with variable intensity, each of its political cultures struggled to express themselves and gain power.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore these questions and to analyse the implications raised by a study of the Spanish dictatorship using this approach. The hypothesis it will sustain has already been mentioned; it is based on the idea that this will open the way to revealing more of this political system as a structure and also permit us to study the evolution of these different political actors over the nearly four decades of Francoist power, from the moment, in July 1936, when their own future development was indissolubly linked to that of the regime.

Beyond Hybridization: Political Cultures and Francoism

Corroborating the fact that the dictatorships in Europe in the interwar years formed a complex mosaic of heterogeneous regimes difficult to classify and define has been among the dominant lines of study on this period in recent years. This was already pointed out by Martin Blinkhorn in 1990, in the introduction to his *Fascists and Conservatives*: when one examines closely all the complicated empirical material on these vital years, he wrote, the labels, categories and typologies available for defining the emerging dictatorships appear equivocal and insufficient. The appearance of fascism on the European scene, Blinkhorn argued, had been a challenge to which the various traditional forces of the right had reacted in diverse ways, producing a complex web of responses difficult to classify, from a more or less vague contagion to the "selective borrowing" of particular key elements as long as they were controlled and measured "from above". In whichever

case, moreover, the authoritarian dictatorships as a body constituted an expression of a reality—that of the Europe of the 1920s and 1930s—that was profoundly dynamic and in a process of continual change, in which relationships between the conservative and radical elements of the right developed fluidly, resulting in diverse combinations in which boundaries between them lost clear outlines.

More recently, Aristotle Kallis (2014) has used the term "hybridization" to refer to this grey area, understood as the intermediate political space that existed between the two ideal extremes of fascism and the authoritarian right, within which many of the European dictatorships could be located due to the porosity between the elements within them. Faced with such a heterogeneous reality, made up of a complex fabric of exchanges with unequal results, the task of the historian consists not so much of classifying these regimes as of analysing, in each particular case, the manner in which these reciprocal influences developed and the ways in which specific actors, in equally specific locations in time and space, recontextualized the political content in common circulation (Costa Pinto and Kallis 2014). Freed from the need to categorize the dictatorships by encapsulating them in pre-existing analytical compartments, Kallis (2016) suggests, historians can escape from the taxonomical labyrinth to offer, instead, a richer and more open vision of the political map in these few all-important years.

Given the eminently hybrid nature of Francoism, it does not seem necessary to stress the interest of these ideas for the study of the regime. For some years, Spanish historiography has produced detailed work on the "fascistization" of the Spanish right, understood as the complex array of positions the varied elements of the latter adopted in response to the emergence of fascism and the role this process continued to play during the Civil War and Franco dictatorship. In this regard, the conclusions drawn have been similar to those found in other cases in Europe; a verification of the influence the fascist phenomenon exercised upon the right, and of the variable extent of this influence, given that this was a selective process in which groups tended to incorporate only those elements that benefited their own political projects (Saz 2004; González Calleja 2008).

However, a recognition of the undeniable merits of these studies does not prevent us from noting that they continue to centre their attention, almost exclusively, on the results, on the regime that was derived from all these political crossovers, mutual influences and borrowings. In contrast, what we will propose here, as suggested earlier, is that the concept of *political culture* not only enables us to rethink the hybrid nature of Franco-

ism but also, simultaneously, provides us with a different complementary analysis in which emphasis is shifted to the actors, this is to say, the components of the regime and their actions, evolution and adaptations. From this point of view, Francoism can be conceived as a historical *conjuncture*: a specific context in which the two great nationalist and anti-liberal political cultures of the twentieth century came together. Reactionary and authoritarian nationalism on the one hand and fascism on the other, with the underlying assumption that an understanding of the regime cannot be isolated from the vicissitudes, transformations and specific political actions of each of them.

Regarded in this manner, then, the dictatorship becomes the outcome—always changing and unstable—derived from the accumulation of responses that a government profoundly based around the leadership of a *caudillo* such as Francoism gave to the diverse challenges presented by its two major elements, over the years and in function of the possibilities of and limits imposed upon each of them. Freed, as we have said, from the thankless task of finding a single stable definition for this system that survived in power for nearly 40 years, our analysis becomes more flexible, enabling us to comprehend that this regime characteristically operated as a system of counterweights aimed at ensuring control over political cultures that were much more aggressive, voracious and totalistic—at least potentially—that could be permitted by a heterogeneous and—it is important to stress—fundamentally personalistic regime.[5] Hence, faced with the demands, agitation, frustrations, advances and retreats of one side or the other, Francoism gave with one hand and took away with another, reconstructing its cabinets of ministers and renewing its political elites in a constant pendular oscillation that at times took it closer to fascism and at others—more frequently—towards Catholic traditionalism. However, throughout—and this is indicative of its success and effectiveness—it enabled the *Caudillo* and his military hierarchy to retain their hold on power.

What we have indicated so far leads us to emphasize the *elasticity* of this regime, its extraordinary ability to force greater restraint upon political cultures that by April 1939 had accumulated desires to conquer and dominate (nearly) everything. It is precisely in this regard that the concept of political culture offers much of its analytical strength; in its insistence that what was at stake within the dictatorship in the contests between its principal actors was not simply discrepancies associated with different world

views, but divergent political aspirations regarding the political and institutional conception of the country. These dissonances were resolved through confrontations and political crises.[6]

Nevertheless, as we have indicated earlier, adopting this analytical approach is not incompatible with a study of the outcome—the Franco regime—that follows a line of argument which, as in studies of other European regimes, emphasizes its hybridization. To put this briefly, studying the political cultures that struggled and coexisted within Francoism does not prevent us from recognizing that beyond them or, more precisely, thanks to them, an overall "Francoist culture" also existed. A mixed culture in itself: a culture that surrounded everything, and which resulted from the enforced coexistence of fascism with Catholic traditionalism and the different forms of contagion that developed between them; a culture with diverse elements intermixed within it that had arisen out of two parallel processes, which were then urged to become mutually compatible: the result of the fascistization of all its components, alongside their simultaneous Catholicization (Sanz 2015). The analysis put forward here seeks to observe both planes, the hybrid regime and the political cultures of which it was composed.

One Dictatorship and Two Political Cultures

As is well known, the creation of the Francoist camp that eventually took power was due to an unforeseen eventuality, the failure of the military coup of 18 July 1936 and the initiation of an unexpectedly long Civil War.

The attempted coup had united around it a varied body of right-wing forces, from a military hierarchy that was itself mixed to monarchist groups affiliated to different dynasties—Carlists and the *Alfonsino* supporters of ex-King Alfonso XIII—parties with a strong Catholic and reactionary element and the fascists of *Falange Española y de las JONS*. These were all different factions, which each had their own previous history and had become radicalized in good measure through the experience of the Republic, when all had closed ranks against the democratic regime from the standpoint of a shared, and ferocious, anti-liberalism.

The Civil War disrupted the existing balance of forces. In first place, it converted parties and movements that only a short time earlier had been minority groupings into mass movements, as in the case of the Falange, whose membership multiplied exponentially from Summer 1936. In parallel, it relegated to secondary status political cultures that, like the Carlist traditionalists, were well structured but pursued political projects that were

impossible to achieve, especially within a continent, Europe, that was witnessing the rise and radicalization of fascism in different forms. When fascist political culture was seen to be far more successful in mobilizing the population and contributing to the legitimation of a dictatorship imposed by force, the Carlists withdrew into second-rank status or accepted, without too strident protests, their incorporation into broader political creations.[7]

Secondly, the circumstances of the war also weakened some of the parties and currents that had existed previously—such as the social and political Catholicism represented by the CEDA—leading to their incorporation into what, surprisingly, was seen to be a notably strong political culture with a powerful capacity for resistance: reactionary nationalism, principally represented in these early years by the monarchists of *Acción Española*. All these tendencies shared many points in common, such as a definition of Spain as consubstantially Catholic, a reverence for traditional monarchy and a rejection of mass populist politics in favour of natural institutions such as the family, corporations and regions. The difference was one of vehemence, in the clarity of their vision of what the Spain that emerged from the war would be like, and an explicit intention to fight to achieve it. In the course of the dictatorship, this national-Catholic and counter-revolutionary ideal would be sustained by a range of political elites as circumstances changed over the years, but in this first stage, its most bellicose representatives came from the *Alfonsino* monarchists.[8]

From an initial state of apparent confusion in an agglomeration that was, as we have seen, extremely heterogeneous, there was a shift to the demarcation and growing protagonism of two political cultures: fascism and reactionary nationalism. These two agglutinated within them most of the other actors, who were either subsumed within one or the other through lack of strength of their own, or withdrew into the background through disillusionment or frustration. Meanwhile, the two major forces acquired, from very early on, hegemonic status within the regime that would win the Civil War.[9]

There thus began a forcible and complicated coexistence between these two disparate political projects. This coexistence was marked by two interrelated dynamics that would characterize the dictatorship: the positioning of both of them within the regime as allies-enemies, on the one hand, and the process of appropriation-distortion with which hybridizations and crossovers developed between them on the other (Saz 2003, pp. 161–71; 2004, pp. 266–67).

The first of these two dynamics reflects the complexities and contradictions of the relations between two unequal political cultures that, as well as forming part of the same side in the war and the subsequent regime, were forcibly amalgamated within a single unified party in April 1937. From that point onwards, none of the earlier parties or organizations existed, only the official Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (FET y de las JONS), the complex creation whose name resulted from the pre-war amalgamation of two fascist groups, the Falange (FE) and the JONS, followed by the incorporation in 1937 of the Carlist traditionalists (Thomàs 2013). Both political cultures were, or were supposed to be, "allies", living together within the same institutional structures and sharing similar goals; however, they were also "enemies", keeping their distance and with occasional confrontations over ideas and ambitions regarding what Francoist Spain should be like. At bottom, and this was the principal source of difficulty, national-Catholic Spain had very little connection with the deified, palingenetic nation of Falangist political religion, in the same way that traditionalism did not fit easily with the idea of revolution and an alternative modernity brandished by the Falange. Nor was the elitist, hierarchical, demobilized society of reactionary thinking easily compatible with the mass organization and corporatism of a populist ideology like fascism. The stumbling-block lay, as was easy to see, in that these were two independent political cultures which, faced unavoidably with a need to cohabit, showed no willingness to become hybrids of each other, but rather sought to maintain their respective ideological essences in the hope of being able to make them prevail.

It was due to this latter process that the second of the two dynamics mentioned above developed, that of appropriation-distortion. In this case, it was a matter of accepting and making one's own those elements that belonged to the opposing political culture—or at least, which fit better there than in one's own—but which, within the dictatorship, still formed part of the transversal Francoist culture they all shared. This culture was, as we have seen, hybrid and plural: it gave the impression that it could synthesize revolution with tradition, the old and the new, a powerful state, its party and *Caudillo* with an expansionist, moralizing, traditional Church. It was the result of a process of fascistization that proceeded in parallel with another of Catholicization and a reassertion of tradition. Deeper down, however, tangled up in all the scaffolding that existed behind the façade of this Francoist culture of both crosses and raised-arm fascist salutes, there continued to be two political cultures that were less mixed and much more mutually

exclusive. Two political cultures that, as years went by, and depending on the possibilities that appeared before them, would reveal themselves to be more or less comfortable or uncomfortable, better or less well adapted to current circumstances and with more or less disposition to do battle with their rivals. Their mutual manoeuvres would mark the nature of Francoism until the end.

Because of their mutual ideological independence, the forcible incorporation of whatever was alien to them was done not only in the form of *appropriation* but also *distortion*. There were notable examples of this process, especially in the early years of the war and the immediate post-war years, when leading intellectuals and politicians from both sectors made great efforts to establish the compatibility between very different elements without leaving any doubt that the imported features had been adapted in a manner that benefited their own side.

On the Falangist side, for example, this was undertaken in 1938 by the writer Dionisio Ridruejo, when he set out the difference between the constructive revolution proposed by the Falange and the destructive revolution of Marxism. The Falangist revolution, he explained, was one that sought to inject new blood into the unalterable nature of the Spanish people. It was consequently a revolution fully adaptable to tradition, a tradition, nevertheless, that could not be small-minded, nor obtuse, nor nostalgic, but should be open to new things and look to the future.

In the same year, José Pemartín (1938), from the conservative monarchist group *Acción Española*, also presented an argument on how the complicated duality of tradition and revolution could be made compatible. He did so from the other political culture, differentiating himself from Ridruejo in that, whereas the latter subsumed traditionalism into Falangism, Pemartín proposed the opposite, suggesting that the vitalism and strength characteristic of the Falange should be used to bring traditionalist values into the present day, assisting in the construction of a Catholic Spain that, inspired by the sixteenth-century Golden Age, would find its place in the twentieth century.

These were not isolated examples. The role of the Catholic religion, its relationship with national morale—a key element in Falangist political religion—the role of the single party, its relationship to ecclesiastical institutions and other potential areas of confrontation were all fields open to appropriation and therefore also to distortion.[10] However, when this struggle moved on from ideological reflections to the political construction of the state, earlier arguments would be insufficient. These differences

would be expressed in the successive political crises dotted throughout the evolution of the regime.

Light, Shade and Political Crises

In effect, the reality that beneath the image of a Spain all sharing a hybrid uniform of Falangist blue shirts and traditionalist red berets two contradictory political cultures were still very much alive was seen not only in the complicated interlocking of different ideas. It was also revealed through a series of crises of variable intensity—without forgetting the multiple minor tensions from day to day—which demonstrated that these tendencies were, as well as *allies*, also *enemies*.

The first such crisis occurred very soon, as a consequence of the increasing predominance acquired by the Falange in the war and the first months of victory. The period of the war itself and the first two years of peace were certainly favourable to fascist political culture. The role of arbiter exercised by Franco often tilted the balance of power in favour of those who, in such complex circumstances, had the capacity to place Spain on the same page as other European states and mobilize the population in a situation that required mass support and legitimation. Hence, the Falange placed its stamp on the aesthetic and symbolic veneer acquired by the regime, in a profuse web of rituals and symbols which, while not solely fascist nor free from internal tensions, were undoubtedly Falangist in tone (Box 2010). Falangists also headed the single unified party and the body of organizations created to marshal the population. Above all, they occupied the areas of power that emanated from the tentacular Interior Ministry, one of the central institutions of the regime, and headed by the radical Falangist and firm supporter of Nazi Germany Ramón Serrano Suñer (Sanz 2015).

The unquestionably Falangist atmosphere of this turbulent period was not met by their political adversaries with indifference. Consequently, the immediate post-war years were a time when fears and warnings began to be expressed over a potential totalitarian paganization, a fascist statism that could take Spain away from what it truly was—Catholic and traditional—to move it closer to Italy and Germany. However, these first post-war years were also—and this is most relevant for our argument here—the time when a feature became clear that would be a constant throughout the dictatorship: that those who did not know how to manoeuvre inside its instruments of power would no longer find space within them. This was the context, for example, in which some of the most radical names of one political culture

or the other disappeared from view, those figures who, with excessively totalist ambitions, pursued a full implementation of their own political projects without comprehending that the regime was a hybrid reality, with a fragile equilibrium and with a military leader at its head. These were the years, therefore, when the leading figures of *Alfonsino* monarchism such as Eugenio Vegas Latapié and Pedro Sainz Rodríguez, Carlists like Manuel Fal Conde and Falangists such as Gerardo Salvador Merino, Dionisio Ridruejo, Antonio Tovar, Pedro Laín and even Serrano Suñer himself were left—in some cases, only temporarily—on the sidelines. All had in common the intransigence and radicalism of the political projects they supported, discordant elements in a hybrid Francoism. However, the different sides were not the same in terms of what detonated their departure or dismissal. For, while the Catholic and conservative sectors became disenchanted through the observation of a defect, that is, what they saw as a growing fascistization of the regime, the Falangists did so through excess, in a far too ambitious gamble that led to the first great Francoist political crisis, in May 1941. Fascism emerged from these events deradicalized, the political elites that represented the two political cultures were renovated, and the dictatorship was strengthened (Thomàs 2001; Rodríguez Jiménez 2000, pp. 351 and ff.).

This first period of turbulence was followed by one of relative calm. A phase that, in terms of the two political cultures, appeared to belong to those who, in contrast to the totalists of 1939–1941, felt no particular urgency to take things to extremes (Juliá 2004, p. 305). Hence, there were partial changes in the political personnel, as in the rise of social Catholicism, the tendency that had originated in the pre-war organizations Acción Católica and the Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas, and which took over from the more hard-line followers of *Acción Española*, still upholding the image of a national-Catholic and traditionalist Spain, but without their predecessors' excesses (Montero 1986). The Falange too distanced itself from earlier uproar, embarking on a process of obscuring its origins and cosmetic improvements that were even accompanied, when the war in Europe changed in favour of the Allies, by declarations intended to explain that the Falange, which was Catholic and Spanish, had never been fascist (Thomàs 2001, Chapter 5; De Diego 2001, pp. 130 and ff.).

However, the disproportionate reactions of the post-war years were not an isolated case, nor was the 1941 crisis exceptional, and nor would the key actors in the regime always accept the pace of events imposed upon them, as they did in the mid-1940s. This would become clear in subsequent years,

when, after periods of apparent adaptation to a dictatorial structure that was broader than they were, both political cultures again exhibited growing disquiet, which again had to be dealt with through dismissals, personnel changes and a further rebalancing of forces in subsequent governments.

This emerged at the beginning of the 1950s, the moment when the so-called generation of 1948, including intellectuals and politicians such as Rafael Calvo Serer and Florentino Pérez Embid, all members of the ultra-Catholic organization the *Opus Dei*, began to occupy political offices and appear on intellectual platforms from where they took over the leading role in sustaining Catholic and authoritarian traditionalism (Pérez Embid 1952; Prades 2012). It was equally visible in the ambitious ascent undertaken by the party, a Falange that Miguel Ángel Ruiz Carnicer (2008, pp. 279–80) has called "progressively more restless", and which felt aided by a context in which de-fascistization had ceased to be an urgent necessity. Some old names of radical Falangism joined the Ministry of Education, while the Secretaría General del Movimiento, the headquarters of the official party, was headed successively by two more veteran Falangists, Raimundo Fernández-Cuesta and José Luis de Arrese.

The rise of these groups was very noticeable, and so too, precisely because of their renewed radicalism, would be their fall. Calvo Serer and some other notable *Opus Dei* figures were dismissed when their championing of what he saw as an alternative force, the implementation of a Catholic, monarchist and reactionary programme as the only way towards the definitive salvation of Spain, began to be heard too loudly, and when their accusing fingers began to suggest that other elements in the dictatorship were guilty of deviation, such as Falangists or more lukewarm Catholics (Díaz 2008). The Falangists would meet their downfall sometime later, in 1956, when not only were leading figures in the Education Ministry dismissed because of student demonstrations, but Arrese was removed from the *Secretaría General*, after he had proposed draft laws which sought to guarantee the pre-eminence of the single party and the Falangist doctrinal principles that had formed part of the uprising of 18 July 1936.[11]

These dismissals were followed, as in the similar situation ten years earlier, by a changeover of elites and governments that similarly appeared to indicate that, after some had failed by trying to do too much, it was now the turn of those who had learnt the lesson and were able to behave more moderately. Hence, new political figures emerged in the government reshuffles that followed the critical years of 1956 and 1957. Standing out among them was the group of technocrats, men such as Laureano López Rodó or

Alberto Ullastres, who were also ultra-Catholic and members of *Opus Dei*, but gained key positions due to their image of technical ability and were called upon to contribute to modernizing the country and reforming the organization of the state (Juliá 2004, p. 393; González Cuevas 2007).

Nevertheless, the leading role taken by this new technocracy did not mean the underlying political projects had changed. The areas over which Catholic reactionaries and fascists confronted each other in the 1950s were the same as those that had divided them 20 or 30 years earlier: the defence of a capitalist economy, against the strengthening of national syndicalism; the monarchy as an institution, in opposition to the party; and the idea of an un-mobilized society within a traditionalist context, in contrast to a "Movement" still committed to the organization of the masses (Hispán Iglesias de Ussel 2006, pp. 97–107). Nor did it signify that there had ceased to be hard-fought differences over immediate political issues, as was shown by the debates in 1958 over the new "Law of the Fundamental Principles of the Regime", which made it evident that the disputes were not just matters of ideas, but continued to affect the construction of the state.[12] What this indicates is that both the internal and external conjunctures varied, in the same way that the manner in which the different political projects fitted together and were located within the dictatorial regime changed as well. Equally, the discordances that separated them seemed to reflect a dynamic in which calm followed a storm, but always with the possibility that the latter could burst forth once again.

This was seen in 1966, when Luis Carrero Blanco, number two to the dictator, accused José Solís, then Secretary General of the Falange and head of the official unions or *sindicatos*, of wishing to launch a challenge for power. López Rodó had accused Solís of seeking to reintroduce parliamentarism into Spain, through legislative proposals aimed at reviving and giving a fresh prominence to fascist syndicalism (Soto Carmona 1995, p. 262; Hispán Iglesias de Ussel 2006, p. 488). This clash was reflected in 1969 in the formation of a new government in reaction against the Falangist proposals, primarily of men close to Carrero and drawn from different strands of Catholicism and traditionalism, an outcome that appeared to indicate that, finally, after three decades of feuding, one political culture had visibly emerged as the victor.

Nevertheless, what these years of the 1960s revealed was something more complex and more decisive, a change that went beyond the internal frictions of the regime and indicated the *actual* failure of both projects. This was a failure different from those of earlier years, a crisis in which the dicta-

torship itself would no longer be capable of appearing triumphant thanks to its ability to hybridize between one side and the other, because what came to light at this time was the exhaustion of Francoism in the prelude to the *apertura* or opening-up of society and the arrival of democracy.

Ismael Saz (2007) has suggested that these two political cultures, which had won power as part of a dictatorial coalition and been represented over the years by different actors and political camps, exhausted their possibilities when it became impossible for them to incorporate a progressively democratized society into their political projects (Benedicto 2015). Both projects were snuffed out, at a similar moment—that of the decline of the regime and in the face of a very different Spanish society—but in different ways. That of Catholic and traditionalist monarchism faded due to its own success, with a government—the "single-colour" administration of Carrero Blanco in 1969—entirely made up of its sympathizers which nevertheless proved incapable of dealing with growing opposition to the dictatorship (Soto Carmona 2005, p. 101). The Falangist project, in contrast, declined through failure, losing hold on areas of power and losing its ability to penetrate society and the street (Saz 2007, p. 158). This was made clear by the proposals of José Solís, reactions to which demonstrated that reviving Falangist syndicalism in the 1960s was difficult not only in the *Cortes* but also in factories and among workers (Ysàs 2007).

Francoism came to an end and made way for the transition to democracy. What this chapter has sought to show, necessarily as a broad synthesis, is that an approach to these nearly 40 years of dictatorial power that focuses our attention on the different political projects that came together within it, understood as political cultures, can help us fundamentally to understand two things: the internal dynamics that defined the dictatorship and the histories—full of aspirations, alterations and frustrations—of each one of these cultures.

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Notes

1. For a critical perspective on political culture and its different definitions, see Cabrera (2010).
2. A good example is the series of six volumes published by Marcial Pons on the *Historia de las culturas políticas de España y América Latina* (concluded in 2016).
3. This was pointed out in a pioneering work on this subject, Ferrary (1993).
4. For the importance of this concept, see Chapter 1 to this volume.
5. A reflection on the classification process and the Social Sciences specifically concerning to Fascism, in Dobry (2011).
6. It is important to note that political cultures are formed within political parties or families. See Sirinelli (1997, p. 438).
7. On the experience of Carlism during the war and immediate post-war years, see Canal (2006, Ch. 11).
8. For an overall summary, see Saz (2015).
9. An overall view, in Saz (2008, pp. 215–34).
10. For more examples, see Box (2015, pp. 241–49).
11. The student disturbances of 1956, in Tusell (1983, pp. 282–97), Arrese (1982, pp. 56–61). On Arrese's projects and reactions they provoked, see Soto Carmona (2005, pp. 31–36).
12. This law referred to Spain as a "confessional State" and stated that the political form taken by the nation was a traditional, Catholic, social and representative monarchy.

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CHAPTER 17

Vichy, a Fascist State?

Olivier Wieviorka

Can Vichy be considered as a Fascist State? This question appears to be, to a large extent, obsolete. In fact, Vichy is not yet a burning issue, a situation which offers a sharp contrast with the three last decades of the twentieth century. Vichy was then a hot topic, both for historiographical and for political reasons. In 1974, Robert Paxton's book, *La France de Vichy* (Paxton 1973), for example, involved a huge controversy which was carried on with Zeev Sternhell's (1983) *Ni droite, ni gauche*. At the end of the 1960, Vichy became also a political stake which deeply divided the French political life. In 1971, a movie, *Le Chagrin et la Pitié* broke the Gaullist-Communist myth of a country united to resist. In the same way, the French were shocked to learn in 1994 that François Mitterrand, yet a socialist, had been a loyal supporter of the Vichy régime until 1943 (Péan 1994)—a reality carefully hidden for decades. In 1997, at last, the Papon's trial questioned the part played by the high civil servants during the Dark Years. The French administration was supposed to be faithful towards the Republic. But despite this legacy, they faithfully served the French State. Papon, as General Secretary of the Gironde Prefect, was a perfect example

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of this bewildering behaviour. In fact, he had taken part in the deportation of Jews in the Bordeaux area. Had this high civil servant, who became then Prefect and Minister, just obeyed? On the contrary, had he a margin of manoeuver he did not exploit, for opportunistic or ideological reasons? These were the two main questions involved by the trial which inflamed public opinion. Today, these controversies seem to belong to a very ancient past. But the nature of the Vichy regime remains a puzzling question which has to be considered both from a historiographical and a memory point of view.

Debates

In France as abroad, two main streams consider Vichy as a Fascist State. The Marxists, on the one hand, have defended this view for a very long time. Such has been the case of Roger Bourderon. In 1973, this academic developed a classical and orthodox interpretation publishing an article in the *Revue d'histoire de la Seconde Guerre mondiale*. Vichy can be considered as a Fascist State because it had followed the same path than Italy and Nazi Germany. It used the same devices and aped their ideology. Pétain, he said, had been able to seize power thanks to the elites' betrayal. French capitalists were anxious to preserve their social and economic interests. Therefore, they supported a régime which was a dam against Bolshevism—a danger which clearly appeared in 1936 with the Popular Front—"Vichy is an attempt aiming, thanks to the Nazi victory and in the frame of the New Order, to consolidate the dominating position of the greatest private interests- goals which had been precisely reached in Italy and in Germany through Fascism" (Bourderon 1973, p. 15). This analysis was quite old-fashioned. It resumed the Komintern interpretation which considered Fascism and Nazism as a means used by Capitalism to resist the Red scare. Today, this interpretation is not widespread, even if some isolated academics—such Annie Lacroix-Riz (2006)—are still supporting it.

Much more interesting are Zeev Sternhell's (1978) views. His vision is heterodox, as he asserts that Fascism is not an Italian but a French invention. Fascism, he says, was born in France at the end of the nineteenth century, thanks to the birth of what he names a "Revolutionary Right". This stream gathered Nationalists—coming from the Right—and Revolutionaries —coming from the Left which both hatred Democracy and Enlightenment. They pleaded in favour of a Revolution able to restore a national

community based on family, profession and nation. "It was thus quite natural that a synthesis emerged between the revolutionaries, who discovered in the nation a revolutionary agent, and the nationalist movement, which also rebelled against the old bourgeois world, and thought that the nation would not be finished until the integration of the proletariat" (Sternhell 2003, p. 379). From this point of view, Vichy completed an old evolution, which had begun at the end of the nineteenth century.

Sternhell's work has opened a double breach. From a historiographical point of view, it broke a French historical doxa, embodied by René Rémond and his Sciences Po followers, which has always considered Fascism as a marginal phenomenon and took for granted the "theory of immunity": Fascism has never threatened France because her Republican culture was deeply rooted in the French society. But from a memory point of view, this thesis was equally provocative, as it debunked powerful French beliefs. The vision of France as the cradle of Fascism collided with the vision of France as the country of Human rights. To consider Vichy as the result of a long process equally ruined the accidental vision which considers Vichy either as an epiphenomenon or a regime imposed by the German authorities. Last but not least, to remain that the French State had been supported by a majority of French contradicted the vision of a population deeply involved in the Resistance—a theory vigorously supported from the Liberation onwards both by the Communist and by the Gaullist camps. But the French, Sternhell asserts, prefer to glorify France rather than to put a cold outlook on her past. "The idea that Vichy was the result of a long process of incubation, that these years which we want to forget can belong to the national history in the same way as the glorious times, is still unbearable for certain historians as for certain sectors of the French public opinion" he said (Sternhell 2003, p. 389). And he concludes: "Vichy had to disappear of the national consciousness and the epic of Free France and the Resistance had to be that of quite whole France" (ibid., p. 390).

French historians generally disagree with these theories which remain marginal in the academic world. We have, however, to consider them seriously which obliges to distinguish two main levels of interpretation: the aims and the praxis of the Vichy régime, on the one hand, the support given by the French civilians on the other.

Aims and Praxis

The Vichy régime and his head, Philippe Pétain, cannot be reduced to the dimension of a common and harmless dictatorship, comparable for example

to Augusto Pinochet or Manuel Noriega.[1] Pétain was not only aiming to seize and to keep power. He had a much ambitious goal: to transform deeply the country by launching a National Revolution. According to him, France had entered a process of decadence and degeneration since 1789. The Revolution had destroyed three main natural communities: the family (by the space given to individuals); the profession (by the destruction of the Corporations); and the Nation (because of the increasing part played by Jews and immigrants). This vision was not new. It had been developed at the end of the nineteenth century by the Revolutionary Right. But the French defeat of 1940 offered a golden opportunity to reshape the country on this ideological basis.

Vichy hence intended to purge the national community, in order to exclude or destroy its black sheep. Jews were the first target. Two Statuses (3 October 1940 and 2 June 1941) restrained their rights. Jews were not allowed to become civil servants or to work for the medias. Quotas were equally enforced to limit their numbers in many professions—physicians, barristers and so on. Last but not least, Vichy launched a process of "aryanisation" which deprived the Jews of their industrial or commercial properties. Vichy was equally xenophobe. French citizens whom the father was a foreigner were not allowed to become civil servants. The French authorities received the right to intern foreign Jews without any judiciary control. And a commission screened and abolished naturalizations made from 1927 onwards, a process which struck about 15,000 people (including 8000 Jews) (Zalc 2016).

The French State equally targeted its political foes. Communists were prosecuted. The French Communist Party had been forbidden in September 1939. Vichy used the Republican legislation to intern them and arrested 5000 Communists between June 1940 and June 1941. After Barbarossa, the repression of the Communists—resisters especially—received an overriding priority. But Republicans and Free-Masons were equally persecuted. In August 1940, a law forbade Free-Masonry. On another plane, many Republican leaders were sent to jail, after or without trial. Some were even murdered—such as Georges Mandel in 1944.

Vichy, however, was not aiming just to get rid of its real or imaginary foes. It intended to reshape the French society and political order. In 1940, the French State suppressed trade unions and forbade strike. The *Charte du Travail*, promulgated on the 4 October 1941, was supposed to eradicate class struggle. Corporations were responsible for wages, recruitment, formation and were bound to encourage negotiation rather than conflict.

Vichy equally banned liberalism. The State hugely intervened in the economy. It fixed prices and allocated raw materials through the Office Central de la Répartition des Produits industriels (OCRPI) on a global level and through Comités d'Organisation (CO) in each industrial branch (Kuisel 1984 [1981]). Vichy was equally keen to reestablish a moral order which the French Revolution, industrialization and urbanization had destroyed. Family was protected, thanks to various grants and allowances. A law passed on 2 April 1941 forbade divorce until the third year of a wedding. Abortion was considered as a "crime against the State"; a woman and a man were even sentenced to death in 1942 and in 1943 on this behalf. Family was in fact considered as the basis of society. It is "the essential cell; it is the very foundation of the social edifice; it is on it that we must build; if it flexes, all is lost; as long as it holds, all can be saved" declared Pétain in September 1940.[2] In the same way, the French State led an ambitious policy towards the Youth. In July 1940, Vichy created the Chantiers de la Jeunesse, supposed to replace the draft. Each young man was obliged to spend 8 months in these centres, settled in the countryside, where young men were obliged to work and to live healthily. More than 400,000 French have been struck by this obligation. The Vichy régime, at last, increased the space of Catholicism in the public sphere. In September 1940, religious orders received to right to open schools—a right which had been suppressed in 1904–. Religion courses were allowed (but were not compulsory).

Related to the praxis, Vichy had powerful means to enforce this policy. Pétain received full powers on the 10 July 1940 and the French Parliament was soon suspended. Pétain then focused all powers: executive, legislative and judiciary as he was able to send to jail anybody without any regular process. Pétain even received the right to appoint local administrators (2 October 1940) and mayors (16 November 1940). Local and national administrations were purged, to obtain a total obedience. High civil servants were even obliged to take an oath to Pétain in January 1941.

Vichy, from this point of view, was at least a dictatorship and above all a very violent one. All Democratic Freedoms were suppressed. The Press was controlled and submitted to a harsh censorship; political parties were banned, except Collaborationist movements; and legal principles were suspended. The French court, for example, did not recognize the *res judicata* (you cannot judge twice a case which has been already judged) and applied retroactivity (to punish under a law promulgated after the facts).

All these elements clearly show that Vichy was more than a harmless dictatorship. Its aim was really to reshape the country on new foundations. Does that mean, however, that Vichy has been a Fascist State?

A German Interference?

Some historians—such as Roger Bourderon (1973, p. 31)—argue that Vichy has been a Fascist State because it aligned itself, to a certain extent, with Nazi Germany. "Governing did not it meant to get involved in a process of fascization, more or less quick?". In other words, the process of satellization led Vichy, willingly or not, to ape Nazi Germany.

This view, however, calls for serious shades. Germany, first of all, avoided to interfere in French inner policy—a datum Roger Bourderon admits. In fact, Hitler has never wanted to Nazify France (or any other country), except those which belonged to the Reich such as Austria. The occupiers intervened in French policy when their economic or military interests were threatened. At the beginning of 1944, however, they claimed for Fascist ministers. Three real Fascists—Joseph Darnand, Philippe Henriot and Marcel Déat—were then appointed. But Berlin did not aim to reshape the French political order nor to Nazify the country. The German authorities just thought that Pétain was overwhelmed and unable to maintain law and order. It was hence safer to give power to faithful collaborators. The stress put on civilians then increased; propaganda and repression intensified. But radicalization did not mean Fascization, as much as Vichy had renounced to launch, or even to pursue, its reforms. On another plane, Vichy has never considered Nazism as a source of inspiration. If Fascist Italy was often considered as a model, Nazism was much more a repellent, except for a small handle of Collaborationists fascinated by Hitler. Pétainists certainly did not aim to ape Nazism. On the contrary, they were anxious to underline their deep originality and to show that their ideology was genuinely French. Roger Bourderon (p. 33) considers this claim as an artefact. "The authors and the propagandists of the National Revolution were inside the field of Fascism and National-Socialism while they claimed they refused to imitate them". But one could observe that they had no reason to seek inspiration on the other bank of the Rhine. The French could rely on a complete ideological corpus inherited from the Revolutionary Right. In other terms, there was no urge to plagiarize the Germans as Pétain warned in October 1940. "The new order cannot be a servile imitation of foreign experiences. Some of these experiences have their meaning and beauty, but each people

must design a régime adapted to its climate and its genius".[3] As Sternhell (2003, p. 400) noted, "there is never continuity without change, but the ideology of the Revolutionary Right was much more than a background for the Vichy régime. Il was the essence of the National Revolution". In the same way, the German interventions, which became progressively more and more numerous, in France and all over European countries, cannot be considered as a process of unification on a Nazi model. Each country preserved its originality, even if its dependency towards the Reich increased. In France as in Denmark or in Belgium, the margins of manoeuvres shrunk between 1940 and 1944 but an increased vassalization does not mean an increased stage of Fascization.

Fascism or Not?

By considering all these developments, can we state then that Vichy has been a Fascist régime? It seems important to define the term of Fascism. This task is certainly not easy but has been rejected both by Sternhell and his followers. Michel Dobry (2003, p. 66) pleads for a "posture of research which, instead of beginning the analysis with a definition of Fascism, or even Fascisms, be based upon another cutting of the object, which does not deprive from the outset the historian or the political analyst to find another thing at the end of his research than the delimitation which his definition has introduced at the beginning". All the misunderstandings opposing the French mainstream group to their opponents lie in this issue. The first try to define Fascism while the others don't.

I certainly do not pretend to give a definition of Fascism. But we can seize it by some paramount features. A Fascist régime lies upon a charismatic leader which enjoys huge powers; it aims to create a New Man and is hence anxious to control the Youth and to shape a national community purged of its unwelcomed members; it exerts a tight control on the medias and massively uses propaganda; political life is reduced to a single Party; all traditional freedoms are banned and repression is harsh.

So many arguments are pleading to consider Vichy as a Fascist régime comparable to Germany or Italy. From an ideological point of view, Pétain as Hitler or Mussolini was hostile to the Enlightenment. Their visions of the national community were very close as they developed a narrow conception of *Volksgemeinschaft*. In the same way, their foes—Communists, Jews, Socialists and Republicans—were the same and the three régimes largely used coercion and repression to enforce their policies. The way they

exerted power was equally comparable. Vichy, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy lied upon a charismatic power which largely used propaganda to popularize their views. The three dictators developed a cult of personality praising the Führer, the Duce or the Winner of Verdun. On a social plane, they all refused the class struggle and adopted a Corporatist view. They equally all increased the State intervention in the economy, while trying to preserve a market economy (free enterprise, profit…). Italy, Germany and Vichy France were also anxious to restore a moral order and pretended to control the private life of their fellow citizens which is, obviously, a feature of Totalitarianism. Last but not least, Philippe Pétain was certainly not aiming to smoothe his dictatorship. In 1941, Pierre-Etienne Flandin, a man coming from a Conservative Party, suggested to create a Conseil national. His aim was to bridge the gap between the power—more and more autocratic—and the population. This Consultative Chamber, however, never gathered and Pétain was furious against it. Pétain, in other terms, never tried to renew with some kind of a representative democracy—on a local as on a national plane.

Some authors have tried to debunk the thesis of a sole and united Vichy regime, by pointing out its variety. According to them, there was a "good Vichy" (Pétain's one) and a "bad" one (Laval). In fact, many political cultures converged to Vichy. The extreme-right was much present, which sometimes leads to assimilate Vichyism to Maurassism since some advisers or Ministers belonged before 1939 to the Action Française (Wormser 1971). The Conservative milieus were equally well represented, as the examples of Pierre Laval or Lucien Romier clearly show. But Vichy also attracted technocrats, people coming from the Left (such as René Belin) or mere opportunists (René Bousquet) who were close to the Radicals—a moderate Party in pre-war France. But despite their differences, all these circles share a same vision, which was based on anti-communism, anti-Republicanism, anti-Semitism and supported by the idea that Germany had won the war. We cannot, hence, make a distinction between Pétain, Laval or Darlan, who, despite some differences, made the same policy and were eager, above all, to save the Vichy régime—even in North Africa in Darlan's case in November 1942 (Michel 1972). Anyway, some considerations lead to reject a complete assimilation to Fascism. First of all, Vichy aimed to restore the place of Catholicism. This point is not anecdotal. Nazism and Fascism pretended to embody the true faith. To do so, they enforced a political religion based on Fascist cults, Fascist buildings (such as Casa del Fascio) and to control the Youth (Gentile 2004 [2002], pp. 313–53). As

Fascism claims for hegemony, they sooner or later conflicted with Churches. Such was the case in Germany, despite the Concordat signed in 1934; such has equally been the case in Italy in 1938, despite the Latran agreement of 1929. These battles never occurred in France which, from this point of view, is closer to Francoist Spain.

Vichy, then, has never tried to launch a single political Party which is a core element of a Fascist State. Pétain thought briefly to create a movement based on the Légion française des Combattants, which was an organization gathering the veterans of the two world wars he launched in 1940 (Cointet 1995). But he finally decided to give up. The Milice, which was both a police force and a political movement claimed to play this part, was created in 1943 and claimed to play a political role. "The Milice is created to animate political life through its propaganda and its action" declared his head, Joseph Darnand, on 16 February 1943 (qt. Azéma 1990, p. 89). But the Milice never became a mass movement. It had been created too lately and gathered too few members. "It never grew, while stagnation is a regression for an acting minority" (ibid., p. 98). In Germany as in Italy, the NSDAP as the PNF has played a crucial part. They were supposed, even in a different way, to mobilize and to politicize masses. Such has not been the case in Vichy France, which is not a minor argument. In Italy as in Germany, the PNF and the NSDAP were supposed to mobilize and to politicize the masses. Vichy never shared this kind of reasoning. According to Pétain or Laval, masses were supposed to approve, not to move. The régime was therefore gambling on their abstention, rather than on their participation. It was therefore faithful to a traditional approach: the "notables" had to order, the plebs to obey. This view was certainly not fascist but was coherent with a political project born in the nineteenth century and aimed to restore traditional hierarchies.

Vichy equally refused war which is, on the contrary, an important dimension of Fascist States for various reasons. War was of course a means to ensure territorial expansion—a common goal shared both by Hitler and by Mussolini. But it was equally an end. The Führer and the Duce were faithful to a Darwinist conception which asserts that weak species are bound to disappear. According to them, the war was a perfect ordeal to test the fortitude of their people. "I am happy that Naples enjoys such terrible nights" declared Mussolini on 11 July 1941, after the bombing of Naples. "The race will become stronger. War will transform Neapolitans in a Nordic people" (qt. Milza 1999, p. 806). Pétain and his government did not share these views. They had signed the Armistice specially to withdraw from the

war and avoided to get involved in the Second World War, except in the Empire. But in Syria as in North Africa, commitments were limited and never reached a level of high intensity. Pétain has never considered that war could be a godsend able to reestablish a French identity.

Fascisms, at last, develop a special relationship with modernity which is certainly not a part of the definition but an empirical statement. Neither Hitler nor Mussolini was afraid by Modern Times. They both like speed, motors, planes and cars, and dreamed to industrialize their country—even if Fascism was born in the countryside. Of course, they paid a tribute to the past, exalting a history which was often mythicized, but their régime could be seen as a tragic adaptation to modernity. Pétain did not share these views. His dream was to come back to the Ancient Times and his supposed new man was a very old one: a peasant or a craftsman, living in the countryside, male, catholic, with a devoted wife and plenty of children. Of course, some Vichyist leaders did not share these views. As they had been struck by the defeat, these technocrats were quite influent under Darlan. But they acted discreetly, were counterbalanced by the old guard and hence did not embody the spirit of the Vichy régime. In fact, Pétain's project was reactionary much more than revolutionary. All these reasons lead to consider that Vichy has not been a Fascist State, even if some features plea in favour of assimilation. The French, however, seem to have supported both the Vichy régime and his head—another part of the question.

The Question of Support

The question of support is, in fact, a puzzling one. Pétain enjoyed a real popularity from 1940 until 1944 onwards. And his régime, at the very beginning, was certainly supported by a huge majority of French. Can we then consider that the French society has entered a process of Fascization, even before the war? Sternhell and his followers defend this thesis, but they forget a double dimension: chronology on the one hand, occupation on the other. These two factors, however, are paramount to understand the horizons of expectancy of the French.

In 1940, Pétain and his régime enjoyed a huge support. But the population backed the Etat français for multiple and to a certain extent contradictory reasons (Laborie 1990) which cannot be reduced to a Fascization of the French society. Most of the French were, first, relieved to withdraw from the war. They were grateful to Pétain to have succeeded in resolving a sudden and much unexpected disaster. They equally hoped that the

French State would be able to protect the French against their occupiers. From that point of view, Pétain was often compared to Adolphe Thiers whose government had been able to negotiate with the Germans after the defeat of 1870.

This bland vision has constantly been defended by the ex-Vichyists eager to present Pétain as a shield, while de Gaulle would have been the dagger.[4] This vision totally forgets that Pétain aimed in the same time to settle a new political order. To a large extent, this goal was shared by many French. In 1940, they hatred a Republic which had been unable to prepare and to win the war. They hence approved the large powers given to the Executive. Many French were xenophobe and thought that too much Jews and foreigners lived in their countries. Many had been shocked by the Popular Front and pleaded for a Corporatist State able to destroy the class struggle—and so on. "The ideological corpus proposed by the National Revolution, matured during half a century was acceptable for a majority of French", asserts Zeev Sternhell (2003, p. 394). From this point of view, the Israeli historian is perfectly right, a datum confirmed by the vote of the 10 July 1940. The French members of the Parliament gave full powers to Philippe Pétain with a huge majority, because they thought that Pétain would be able both to negotiate peace with Nazi Germany, but also because many hoped he would be able to create a New Order. The vote was dictated by circumstances, but it was also a vote of adhesion. From this point of view, the Parliament reflected and conveyed the expectations of most of the French population. In this way, the Pétain régime was continuous with the pre-war period. The determination to reform institutions, the appeal to a strong man and the rejection of the class struggle brought together men of the left and the right. So before 1940, a pre-Vichy consensus had taken place, which was comparable to the "totalitarian temptation" that had characterized the late Weimar Republic. As historian Detlev Peukert notes: "for people living at the time the main issue was what was going to replace the Republic when it was gone. They believed they were shot of its illusions, and they could see the glittering *fata Morgana* of a new order taking shape before their eyes" (Peukert 1989, p. 243). But—and that makes a huge difference with Nazi Germany, where hundreds of thousands of Germans fought to the bitter end—this consensus was conditional, a datum totally forgotten by Sternhell and his followers.

First of all, the expectations of the French were different, if not contradictory. Some hoped Pétain to restore the strength of the State, while others pleaded for a Corporatist State. Some dreamed of a national

community deprived of conflicts while others defended a harsh struggle against the so-called Anti-France. A few militated for a true collaboration with the Third Reich while the majority thought that Pétain would be able to resist German claims. At the very beginning—i.e. in 1940–, this variety of expectations was not a problem, as Pétain did not clearly disclose his intentions. But the Vichy régime, as time passed, became less and less equivocal. It then lost support of many French and its social and political basis shrunk, as the consensus was a fragile one.

This phenomenon was increased by the kind of support the French credited the Vichy regime. In a very stimulating approach, the Italian historian Renzo de Felice (1988 [1981], pp. 217–27), evoking the Mussolinian régime, draws a subtle distinction between "passive" and "active" consensus. In the first case, Italian just accepted Fascism; in the second one, they supported it actively and committed themselves. This has not been the case in Vichy France. Pétain was able to attract masses when he appeared in public. But his régime was unable to mobilize the French as much as it had not created mass organizations compared to the NSDAP or the PNF. Much more, its orders were less and less followed. The French State was unable to struggle against the black market (which remained marginal in Great Britain during the war). Its appeals to work in Germany were not followed. And dissent grew, even if Resistance remained, from 1940 until 1944, a minority phenomenon (Wieviorka 2009 [2001]). Pétain, as early as 12 August 1941, noticed this disaffection, evoking "a bad wind" blowing on the country.

This disenchantment grew as much as Vichy was unable to protect the French. The French population was submitted to a harsh rationing; Jews were prosecuted; the workforce was condemned to forced labour as soon as September 1942. And the war came back, in the Empire—in Syria and in North Africa—as in Metropolitan France—because of the bombings which really began in 1942.

These two elements were closely interlinked. Many French supported Pétain both because he was supposed to establish a New Order and able to resist to the German pressure. It was impossible, then, to distinguish a supposed "good" inner policy from a "bad" foreign one. Most of the French did not immediately notice this connection. But as it appeared more and more obvious, many decided to break up with Vichy. Such was the behaviour of many officers after November 1942. Many expected that Vichy would be able to impose its National Revolution without

collaborating. When they realized that this option was a dream, many joined the resistance.

In 1944, the situation appeared to a large extent, paradoxical. On the one hand, Vichy was more fascist than in 1940. True Fascists joined the government; repression reached its apex; and the régime relied more and more on its political soldiers—the Milice. In the same time, Vichy was less and less supported. When Liberation came, the régime collapsed, "as the cat in Alice's Wonderland", noted an American officer (qt. Foulon 1996, pp. 189–90). Vichy did not even try to struggle when the new Gaullist authorities seized power, which makes a clear difference with Fascist regime. In Italy, Mussolini was supported by the Republic of Salò which was strong enough to lead the Italian historian Claudio Pavone (1991) to speak of "a civil war"; in Germany, the Nazi régime fought until the bitter end and Berlin fell after a severe battle. Just equally notice that in August 1947, 55% of the Germans thought that Nazism "was a good ideal badly executed" (Stargardt 2017 [2015], p. 663).

These elements oblige to question the term of Fascization so liberally used by Sternhell (2003, p. 401) and his followers. "Vichy has been supported by the élites and was generally accepted by the population", he writes. What was true in 1940 was certainly not the case in 1943–1944, which means that we have to consider the degree of this so-called Fascization. In 1940, many French rejected the Republic, supported a political change and agreed with xenophobe and Anti-Semitic measures. But in 1942–1943, they hid Jews (the three-quarters of the Jewish community were saved by ordinary French), refused to obey the Vichyist orders and sustained, or even joined de Gaulle and the inner Résistance. The historians specialized in Nazi economy like to discuss about the nature of the German rearmament during the 1930s wondering if it has been "in depth" or not (Overy 1994, ch. 6). We could apply this grid to the so-called Fascization of the French population: in 1940, the French were certainly ready to agree with some kind of New Order, but certainly not to a Fascist Revolution. They could accept Anti-Semitic measures, but certainly not a systematic persecution and even less a policy of extermination. And they were certainly not ready to commit themselves in mass organizations to help Vichy to enforce the National Revolution. Vichy has never been able to mobilize masses as Hitler (with the Volkssturm) or Mao (with the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution) did. Fascistization, if the word is convenient, has always been superficial, conditional and versatile. It always depended on the horizons of expectations and especially of the course of the war

while, in Germany, both the Nazi régime and the Führer were supported by a mass of Germans despite defeat seemed ineluctable.

Conclusions

For all these reasons, it appears difficult to assimilate Vichy to a Fascist régime, considering either its aims and practices or the support given by the population. One could notice that resisters did not consider Vichy as such. They assimilate Vichy to treason and blame it for collaborating, but not to have made a Fascist régime. Some features can of course plea in favour of assimilation: a charismatic leader, the use of propaganda, the hate for the Enlightenment, the will to restore a national community. But the stress put on Catholicism, the reject of war, the dream to get back to a pre-industrial state, the part allotted to masses, and the lack of a single Party are sufficient to rule out this parallel. That does not mean that Zeev Sternhell is totally wrong. The Israeli historian is perfectly right when he considers Vichy as a bequest of the Revolutionary Right. Far from being an accident or a parenthesis in French history, Vichy was deeply rooted in a French tradition. In the same way, we cannot consider that the French society was "immunized" against an extremist temptation. Many French dreamed of an authoritarian, Corporatist and xenophobe New Order, and some thought to have found it in the État français. But this New Order was not fascist and could be much more considered as a counter-revolutionary tyranny. In the same way, the French were certainly porous to some Fascist themes. But as this attraction decreased between 1940 and 1944 and never led to mass commitment, it seems difficult to consider that Fascization has shaped the French society as Nazism did for the German one.

The debate on the nature of Vichy seems to be obsolete. But to name a régime properly helps to understand how it worked. From this point of view, Fascism is certainly not the perfect key to understand Vichy which has been, however, a French tyranny genuinely French.

Notes

1. Vichyhas inspired many books. Except the classical and fundamental Paxton's one, just recommend two small but stimulating text books: Rousso (2007), Baruch (1996).
2. Philippe Pétain, "Revue des Deux Mondes", 15 September 1940, quoted in Pétain (1941, p. 60).

3. Philippe Pétain, "Message", 11 October 1940, quoted in Pétain (1941, pp. 75–76).
4. This classical thesis was supported by Aron (1954).

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CHAPTER 18

Authoritarianism, Nationalism, Fascism and National Security Doctrine: The Debate on Latin American Southern Cone Dictatorships

Daniel Lvovich

The dictatorial regimes established in Latin American Southern Cone countries in the 1960s developed over a quarter of a century and held sway over different sized countries, each with their own unique history and social structure. The institutional arrangements in each regime differed considerably as well and evolved and transformed over time in very different ways in each of the cases examined here.

The 1964 military coup in Brazil ushered in a regime that lasted until 1985 and brought about a new stage in the history of Southern Cone dictatorships in Latin America. That regime was joined in 1966 by the dictatorial regime in Argentina which called itself "Revolución Argentina" (Argentine

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Revolution) and, with various internal stages, remained in power until 1973. After a short, chaotic and violent democratic interregnum, a new dictatorship, now calling itself "Proceso de Reorganización Nacional" (National Reorganization Process) governed Argentina between 1976 and 1983. In the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, after the slow process of exceptional measures and militarization of the State that began in 1968, but intensified and was formalized in 1972, the armed forces dissolved Parliament in June 1973 and started a dictatorial regime that continued until 1985. In September 1973, General Augustus Pinochet led a military coup which defeated Salvador Allende's government and paved the way for a dictatorship that remained in power for 17 years until March 1990.

It has been correctly claimed that the institutional dictatorships of the armed forces in South America were intended to correct the "vices of democracy" generated by populism (Brazil and Argentina), socialist reformism (Chile) and/or the potential threat from the revolutionary left wing (Argentina and Uruguay). In practice, these regimes achieved a regional coordination of repression, over and above major differences between them in other fields that could have even sparked a war. All these dictatorships lacked their own principle of legitimacy, because their common appeal to the National Security Doctrine failed to establish any ideological basis (Ansaldi 2004, pp. 28–29).

The four dictatorships went down different paths in terms of their economic policies, dealings with political and social opposition, the magnitude of human rights violations and exercise of State terrorism. The contrast is significant between the Brazilian dictatorship, with a developmental economic policy promoted by a technocratic-military alliance (similar on this point to the dictatorship installed in Argentina in 1966) and neoliberal-neoconservative orientations in the 1970s Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. In turn, these policies in the various fields also had very different outcomes.

In addition, there were enormous differences in the ways the exercise of political power was organized. The Chilean Armed Forces opted for a traditional military regime with a Government Junta as the maximum authority albeit with a significant concentration of power in General Pinochet. In Argentina, the *Estatuto del Proceso de Reorganización Nacional* (Statute on National Reorganization) created a military junta with the status of "supreme State organ" with powers to choose an officer from the armed forces as president. This institutional model contrasted with the Argentine dictatorship of 1966 which was backed, but not institutionally constituted, by the military. The Uruguayan Armed Forces did not use formal power

directly, at least during the first two-thirds of the dictatorship. Only in the last third did a retired army general take over the presidency of the Republic. In fact, the 1973 coup was led by the constitutional president himself, José María Bordaberry. The Brazilian dictatorship differentiated itself from the other three by opting for a political regime that enabled, albeit in a very limited fashion, the operation of political parties and Congress and periodic elections at different levels of the State (Ansaldi 2004, pp. 30–31). Time spans differed as well; each Argentine dictatorship lasted seven years, the dictatorship in Uruguay lasted twelve years, the one in Chile lasted seventeen years and in Brazil, twenty-one years.

In terms of violence towards opponents, the four dictatorships coordinated repression through Operation Condor, a secret plan which performed the tasks of intelligence, kidnapping and assassination of opponents, carried out by repressive bodies in the four countries studied here, as well as Bolivia and Paraguay.

The Argentine and Chilean dictatorships were in that order the bloodiest from the point of view of repressive violence. In the case of Brazil, there was widespread censorship, propaganda and psychological warfare as well as mass imprisonment and widespread use of torture, but the assassination of political enemies was very low in quantitative and percentage terms in comparison with neighbouring countries. Uruguay developed a great ability to control the civil population through a combination of gradual, highly selective repression. In fact, of the 230 Uruguayans that went missing, 150 were kidnapped in Argentina. Long-term political imprisonment was commonly used by the Uruguayan dictatorship. In Chile, there was widespread immediate repression after the coup, predominantly in the form of detentions and summary executions, with more limited use of forced disappearance. This initial visibility of repression gave way in successive years to a gradual spread of clandestine violence. The case of Argentina is characterized by the clandestine nature of the repression, the primacy of the method of "disappearing" people and large numbers of "disappeared" in relation to neighbouring countries, as well as the abduction of young children from their mothers, who were kidnapped or murdered (Alonso 2013).

Despite these very broad differences, discussion of the nature of Latin American dictatorial regimes has sought to account for a series of keys to interpretation which focus heavily on what are considered their common traits. These are discussions on the social bases of these regimes and their socio-economic orientations, the way in which the capitalist development processes of the region explains the emergence of these dictatorships, the

structural features of the link between the armed forces of the region and their societies, and the nature of the violence applied by these regimes in response to the challenge that the subaltern sectors mobilized had launched against the social order in the years prior to its establishment. In this work, we review the main contributions to these discussions, selecting the most significant ones to shed light on the ways in which the notions of authoritarianism, nationalism and fascism have been used to account for the nature and ideological orientations of dictatorial regimes in the Southern Cone.

Authoritarianism, Big Business and Preventive Counter-Revolution

One of the first streams in attempting to shed light on the structural traits of the dictatorships installed in the 1960s in the Southern Cone was inspired by the classical distinction between authoritarianism and fascism, developed by Juan Linz for the case of Spain.[1] This perspective was based on Guillermo O'Donnell's interpretation of the dictatorships in Brazil and Argentina in the 1960s. O'Donnell (1973) pointed to the connection between the deepening of the capitalist model and control of working class with the notion of Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State (BA), questioning the perspectives that characterized the ties between industrial modernization and democracy as ones of necessity. O'Donnell's analytical proposal emphasized the industrializing and developmental profile of the regimes in Brazil and Argentina in the 1960s. The author claimed that while industrialization to replace imports of consumer goods was directed by multi-class populist coalitions, moving towards an industrialization that included intermediate goods and capital meant deactivating the low-income sector; orthodox economic policies contrary to the redistribution of wealth; receptiveness to foreign capital; and the emergence of a technocratic elite which guided the process together with the armed forces. Those who agreed with this interpretation knew that the main leadership in the studied regimes included streams and figures from authoritarian nationalist, Catholic traditionalist, corporatist or pro-fascist ideologies as well as liberals and conservatives, but they considered that these orientations were not fundamental aspects for understanding the nature of the dictatorships or explaining their authoritarianism. According to these views, the keys to interpretation lay in identifying a need between the types of development and the authoritarian orientation of the processes.

Significantly, in a text written in 1973, the Uruguayan intellectual, Carlos Real de Azua (without resorting to the notion of BA and criticizing the use of the concept of fascism to account for these cases) defined the orientation of the Southern Cone regimes as characteristic of "liberal neoconservatism" or "neo-authoritarianism" and developed an argument similar to that of O'Donnell, but with a scope stretching beyond the borders of South America. Real de Azúa (1984, p. 67) perceived uniformity in the military takeovers of Brazil in 1964, Argentina in 1966 and Uruguayan history since 1968. In addition to the rejection of populism, these authoritarianisms were motivated by the radicalization of the trade union apparatus and government bodies in Brazil and the growing mobilization that included the appearance of forms of "open subversion" in Uruguay. In the three cases, the political apparatus was unable to solve the deepening economic crisis and North American diplomatic, military and financial agencies were having an evident impact, ranging from open promotion of the coup in Brazil, to less obvious backing in Río de La Plata. The points of contact with the modern situations in Spain, Portugal, Greece and the Philippines suggest that neo-authoritarianism is not "a local phenomenon, or rather of the Latin American hemisphere, but a peculiar modulation of modern capitalist economic and social-based political systems; an international enclave relatively peripheral to world centres of power and previous experiences of radical and even revolutionary political and social mobilisation" (ibid., p. 68).

The basic elements of these South American neo-authoritarianisms are, from this perspective, the cancellation or restriction of democratic representation, intimidation or direct repression of all forms of dissidence, the violation of a wide range of individual and social rights and guarantees; and intervention of armed forces with a variety of ideological and institutional motivations. In all three cases, despite the anti-state liberalism of the sectors that promoted the coup, the State appears as the organizer of the new social and political structure and redirection of the economy led by an emerging technocratic, civil and military sector. And again, in all three cases, the processes involved accepting dependent capitalist development with the consequent predominance of foreign capital.

The perspectives relating the dictatorships with capitalist modernization were insufficient to account for the types of regimes installed in the 1970s which did not share the developmentalist orientations of their predecessors in the 1960s. The critical analyses deployed after these shortfalls were pointed out and reviewed, included the observations in *El nuevo*

autoritarismo en América Latina, a text compiled by David Collier and originally published in 1979. The text is based on recognition of the centrality of the notion of BA; but it points out that in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina in the 1970s more violence was used to suppress parties, trade unions and labour protests and reduce actual incomes for the low-income sector than in 1960s Brazil and Argentina (Collier 1985 [1979], p. 11). For that reason the assumptions that linked the problems of industrialization with bureaucratic authoritarianism were called into question, it was argued that emphasis must be placed on the political explanations for the economic programmes and emergence of authoritarianism; considering, for example, the role of the system of parties, the political importance of the low-income sector and the importance of previous authoritarian traditions in each of the societies considered. Fernando Henrique Cardoso's criticism in that volume pointed to the need to distinguish between the characteristics of the authoritarian bureaucratic *regime* and the dependent capitalist *State*, pointing out that the relationship between regime and state is more complex and varied than the implied relationship in the model he was criticizing. Cardoso claims it is an error to assume that the state apparatus operates as a unified whole in the authoritarian regimes of Latin America, because there is in fact a considerable degree of privatization in the State apparatus. Therefore, it is very difficult to attribute to these regimes the capacity to unambiguously direct a socio-economic project: "There is more coherence in the regime at a higher level, in the discourse of ministers and generals than in the day-to-day behaviour of the State's civil servants. Civil servants often control part of the state apparatus almost independently of the government, pursuing personal economic or bureaucratic objectives" (Cardoso 1985 [1979], p. 54). Even accepting that in BA big business is particularly favoured, Cardoso points out that similar situations occurred in Mexico and Venezuela where there were no military interventions, thereby criticizing the organization proposed by O'Donnell. Therefore, Cardoso concludes that "it is simplistic to imagine that a process of dependent capitalist industrialisation can only be carried out through authoritarianism. As recent events in Chile and Uruguay show, a military junta may not even open new routes to economic growth" (ibid., p. 68).

Taking some of these criticisms into account, O'Donnell (1996 [1982]) provided the most comprehensive, systematic development of BA in the book he published upon returning to Argentina in 1982, which he presented as an attempt to contribute, through studying the case of Argentina between 1966 and 1973, to an understanding of the new forms of

authoritarian domination which emerged between the 1960s and 1970s in the four Southern Cone countries. The author maintained that before BA was established in the four cases, various heightened expressions of economic crisis, modes of political activation could be seen in the low-income sector which led the dominant classes to believe the capitalist social order was at risk (ibid., pp. 47–48). In the years before the coup d'états, there were multiple crises of government and control, in addition to the existence of armed revolutionaries in Argentina and Uruguay. Although bringing various levels of the crisis into play appeared sufficiently threatening to unleash the processes of the 1960s in Brazil and Argentina, they were not as extreme as the cases in the 1970s when social domination was at stake and so he argues that "the introduction of BA is an even more drastic reaction than the fears awakened in the preceding period" (ibid., p. 59). Consequently, according to O'Donnell what made BA so specific is that those who carried it out and supported its introduction agreed that the main requirement to extirpate the crisis was "to subordinate and strictly control the popular sector, reverse the autotomizing trend of its class organisations and eliminate its expressions in the political arena" (ibid.). BA, with the big bourgeoisie as its social basis, is therefore a system of political exclusion of a previously activated low-income sector; bringing with it the suppression of citizens and of political democracy, closing democratic channels of access to government. It is also a system of economic exclusion of the low-income sector, insofar as it promotes an accumulation of capital to the benefit of the major oligopolistic units of private capital and some state institutions, heightening pre-existing inequalities. BA differs from fascism, which is organized around a national bourgeoisie, a party and a leadership, in that the armed forces assume the leadership of state. BA promotes greater transnationalization of capital and so despite the patriotic discourse, its spokespeople "can only refuse to represent that nation".

The core of the analysis lies not at the level of ideology, but in the nature of the anti-grass-roots and counter-revolutionary reaction. The author's historical analysis of the "Argentine Revolution" distinguishes various ideological streams in BA ranging from authoritarian liberalism to anti-liberal and in some cases, corporatist expressions (including paternalist and nationalist orientations). The most relevant factor in these regimes, however, is not the political orientation of the elites, but rather the set of authoritarian practices they effectively deployed.

The centrality of the authoritarian and anti-grass-roots nature of these regimes has been emphasized from a variety of theoretical perspectives, but

that does not make them assimilable to fascism. Perry Anderson (1989) regards them as counter-revolutionary regimes with a mission to recreate the conditions for the survival of capitalism. This Marxist historian sees Latin American dictatorships firstly, as the result of the clash in the region's most advanced countries between powerful land-owning classes and strong workers movements, although he has to work hard to extend that characteristic equally to the four cases considered here. What precipitated the arrival of the dictatorships was the "populist turning point", that is, the appearance of radicalized segments in the low-income classes. The coups were preventive counter-revolutions intended to eliminate a left wing that would not resign itself to accept capitalism. To that end, an entire civil society was traumatized by a dose of terror sufficient to dissuade new revolutionary challenges, restoring the conditions for capitalist accumulation, so that a controlled capitalist democracy could arise from these bases.

Alain Touraine (1982) proposes the concept of *Antipopulist State*, hinged on the authoritarian exercise of power and purely repressive control of the population. For Touraine, this repressive character is the common denominator of Latin American authoritarian regimes. In fact, Touraine proposes an interpretative disjunction in relation to most of the perspectives by proposing that the dictatorial regimes "are more directly anti-popular than pro-capitalist". The fight against popular pressure and the economic and political crisis which it unleashed seems more central in the military regimes of Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina and Bolivia than the support for an economic policy that these regimes provided more by their convergence with their own anti-popular goals (Touraine 1987, p. 76).

Recent historical research has made contributions that help to rest importance from the idea that the dictatorships were imposed only by force over popular sectors, that they never sought to mobilize the population and had no support. A very fruitful line of research has shown the determination of the dictatorships to extend their bases of support through social policies, nationalist rhetoric, cultural initiatives, gender mobilizations and institutions and other ways of generating social consensus which sometimes managed to achieve the intended results.[2] Thus, the idea that these regimes were exclusively anti-popular and refused to seek ways of legitimation and consensus may be questioned or at least qualified. Another set of studies analyse the, albeit limited, initiatives of the military regimes to mobilize part of the population and socialize it in dictatorial values such as the Rondón Project in Brazil (Pravato 2011) and the Children's Gendarmerie and the "Let's march to the Border" project in Argentina (Lvovich and Rodríguez 2011).

Fascism as a Structural Trait

The notion of fascism was frequently used as an invective to refer to Latin American dictatorial regimes. In fact, since 1973 to the present day, the Communist Party of Chile has used the term to define General Pinochet's regime, and the Communist Party of Argentina characterized General Onganía's regime as corporative-fascist (Cernadas 2018). This category enabled different actors to denounce repressive violence as resulting from the extension of the fascist experience in Europe, but now manipulated from Washington, and differentiates the nature of the military regimes in relation to what is considered the valuable content of Latin American nationalism.[3]

In addition to this use of the concept of fascism, the notion was used as an analytical category in the academic debate to refer to Southern Cone dictatorships. One of the first intellectuals to propose such use was Brazilian dependency sociologist, Helio Jaguaribe (1977 [1968]), who in the late 1960s coined the concept of "colonial fascism" which he characterized as combining external dependency and internal repression of the masses. This trait makes this model a special type of fascism distinguished by having a dynamic centre that is external rather than internal. Like European fascisms, domination is exercised by a self-erected governing elite using discretionary control procedures. According to Jaguaribe, the difference lies in the fact that European fascism was autonomous and endogenous whereas the Latin American variant was dependent and exogenous. In fact, the fascist colonial model tends to prevent the social changes required to develop an autonomous endogenous economy.

In 1977 in Mexico (then one of the focal points for Latin American exiles), the debate on application of the concept of fascism was developed in the first two editions of *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, under the title "*Socialismo y fascismo en América latina hoy*". That thematic dossier sought to discuss the nature of the authoritarian regimes governing many Latin American countries at the time. In that debate, three types of variants in the analyses focus on the notion of fascism: The first, following Trindade (1982, p. 117), can be regarded as "an idea that resists the transposition of the fascist concept after its initial European signification" and refers in more qualified terms to "fascistization processes" or "fascism as a project"; the second recovers the original idea of fascism—judging it to be suitable for use as an explanatory concept for 1960s Latin America—when qualified by the description "dependent" or "atypical"; and the third considers fascism

in the broad sense, "dissociating it from any characteristic conditioning by European phenomena and limiting its specific nature to the dynamics of Latin American social formations". The works by René Zavaleta Mercado and Agustín Cueva both highly influential in some of the academic circles and political debates of Latin American exiles can be included in the first group (Marchesi and Markarian 2012, p. 217). The Bolivian intellectual pointed out that the imperialist presence in South America and the lack of mass mobilization by the dictatorships prevented these regimes from becoming fascist structures, although their social projects were fascist. Ecuadorean Cueva (1976, 1977, 1978) considered that in the second half of the 1970s the fascistization of Latin America was little different from the European cases, and its distinctive traits were the reaction of capital against workers and the deployment of repressive terror (Zavaleta 1977).

The second group includes contributions from some Dependency Theory adherents. Jaguaribe's contributions were joined by those from Theotônio dos Santos (1977, p. 184) who proposed the concept of "dependent fascism". According to his hypothesis, the new military regimes stemmed from the failure of the populist experience and the alliance of classes under the hegemony of the national bourgeoisie. The "dependent fascism" model is organized ideologically around the National Security Doctrine and although the leadership principle is replaced by a military and civil technocratic elite and the party by the bureaucratic apparatus, "the idea of repression and order examined as a factor in national development is typically fascist".

Finally, the third group is exemplified by Marcos Kaplan's (1976, p. 123) perspective. Discarding all references to European cases, he suggests certain essential traits of this sui generis fascism:

> Consolidation of that oligarchic elite, and its system of alliances, reinforced state intervention and redefinition of its application, developmentalist ideology, specific use of science and technology and co-option of certain sectors of the technocracy, reorientation of the educational system, growing resources for symbolic forms of power, the militarisation of power, universalisation of coercion and the creation of a new political order. (Kaplan 1976, p. 123)

It is impossible for Kaplan's assertions to find any empirical basis since, for example, it was clear in 1976 that the majority of Southern Cone governments had not adopted the developmentalist model and science and technology were not among their priorities. The conclusion, therefore,

must be that insistence on using the concept of fascism lies more its evocative power than the search for a certain conceptual accuracy.

Atilio Borón (1977) formulated the most radical criticism against the use of the concept of fascism for Latin American dictatorship regimes in the dossier. The Argentine sociologist observed that as the dictatorships lacked mass support and a totalitarian ideology and were closely linked to transnational capitalism, there were no elements to suggest the use of that term. The use of state violence against the working classes is not synonymous with fascism; it is inherent in any class-based society. According to Borón, it is the armed forces who take on the status of organic party of the big bourgeoisie and consequently appear as the party of order after the crises of populist experiments. That allows him to conclude that "the Military State is the historical alternative to fascism and its current solution manages capitalist development of the periphery" (ibid., p. 521).

From a very different theoretical perspective, Alain Rouquié (1984 [1982]) develops precisely the category of military state which he confronts with fascism. Based on a comparative analysis of the experiences in Latin American, he proposes the role of the military in the state as the key to understanding the dictatorships. From this viewpoint, the French author claims that:

> Rather than defining the nature of these regimes, it is necessary to determine the functions of the military within them. They constitute a sort of alternative hegemony in the face of the crises we have analysed. A corset to replace the body and flesh of a coherent leading class. The military prosthetics replaces the living nature of an organised and efficient consensus. The State - apparatus that replaces the State - social balance of power. Which does not mean that the army is above the classes or that it is an instrument of the bourgeoisie, but rather that it can act according to both, not as an alternative but simultaneously. (Rouquié 1984 [1982], p. 302)

From this perspective, military states arise to suppress politics, not to establish another political order. They do not aspire to mobilization but to depoliticize, they do not indoctrinate workers but encourage them to return to the private sector. Unlike fascisms, they do not use anti-capitalist rhetoric. "None of that happens here, where violence is exercised openly. The military do not hide" (ibid., p. 300).

The notion of fascism has barely been taken up again since then to account for the structure of Southern Cone authoritarian regimes. That

does not mean that the concept has not been used to show certain similarities in very limited stages of mass mobilization, especially for the Argentine dictatorship. For example, it was used to refer to the nationalist explosion which accompanied the Malvinas War, considered an act of "fascist redemption" (Cavarozzi 1986), or in the ways in which Videla's regime used the sporting successes of 1978 and 1979 "to give the appearance of a link of consensus with the masses and reap the political benefit" which, in addition to the manipulation of opinion through a brief totalitarian mobilization during the Southern Atlantic war "were the closest the regime ever came to fascism" (Corradi 1996, pp. 100–101).

Fascism and Nationalism as Ideologies and in Authoritarian Regimes

Few authors consider the military regimes in the Southern Cone to be ideologically fascist. Perhaps, the most noteworthy contribution, but with specific reference to the case of Argentina, is from Federico Finchelstein, who found a common thread leading from the authoritarian nationalists of the 1930s to the illegal repression of the 1976 dictatorship. Continuity can be seen in the ideology, practices and a political culture based on a binary conception of the political field, which required total war to annihilate the enemy within. The bearers of this excluding, militarist, anti-Semitic and Catholic political culture were nationalists, ultraconservative Catholics and military governments from 1930 to 1976. Finchelstein regards nationalism and fascism as synonyms: in Argentina, "the nationalists" were the "local variant of transnational fascism" which in Argentina took on a Christian and militarist aspect. In the 1976–1983 dictatorship, "the nationalist ideology became state machinery". It was less the result of Cold War hemisphere security plans and more "a product of the historic genealogy of Argentine fascist nationalism" (Finchelstein 2008, pp. 135–36). The annihilation of the enemy within and "concentration camps" where anti-Semitism was frequent and forced disappearances took place, constituted the practical implementation of nationalist ideology.

Most researchers, in contrast, while not ignoring prior political traditions including predominant political identities in the armed forces, present tables where "nationalist" positions are one of the tendencies within the dictatorial regimes, often in dispute with liberal-conservative groups. From this viewpoint, the legitimacy of these regimes can only stem from constitutional legality which they must ultimately demand. To quote Rouquié

(1984 [1982], p. 384), the only thing that legitimizes military regimes "is the future (…) The past can justify the military's access to power, but the often repeated references to political and social chaos, to the power vacuum and all types of threats, correspond to the objectives to be achieved. Military regimes always take the future as reference".

Nationalists, liberals, conservatives, pro-fascists and Catholic traditionalists all managed the different areas of the states, sharing the counter-revolutionary perspective that nurtured repressive strategies which, in turn, reached very different magnitudes in the various countries. In this context, the National Security Doctrine appears as a common denominator, both in the way it specifically oriented the counter-revolutionary fight and as a factor of cohesion for military and government staff. The National Security Doctrine originated in North America and was adopted at different rates by Latin American Armed Forces from the 1960s. It gave the military a major role in what were considered local scenarios of an international fight between the two major blocs in the Cold War period.[4] The doctrine was expressed in different ways according to the traditions of the armed forces in the different countries. In the case of Chile, which was a late adopter, it was linked to economic and social development objectives (Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate 2003, p. 130). This orientation legitimated the intervention of the armed forces in internal security (considered a battlefield against a subversive enemy that acted in many ways, not only in the form of armed insurgency) to defend Western values and the nation. Down that road, the application of French or North American counter-revolutionary methods generated, to different extents, the existence of genuine State terrorist regimes.

In this context, however, broad currents were developed undoubtedly linked to nationalist right-wing traditions. This is the case of corporativism, a trait Chile's Armed Forces aspired to include in a new institutionalism, under the form of protected democracy which claimed to be an alternative to Western democracy (Huneeus 2000, p. 39). Also, in the case of Argentina, corporativist political projects were unable to sustain their control over other currents, both during the dictatorship headed by General Onganía, and within the Ministry of planning in the years of General Videla (Giorgi 2014, 2015; Gomes 2014; Canelo 2008). Various anti-communist, ultraconservative Catholic, traditionalist and authoritarian nationalist organizations, like Campanha da Mulher pela Democracia (CAMDE), the Athenaeum of the Republic, Christianity Courses and the Jaime Guzmán trade union movement, provided support and government

cadres for the dictatorships in the four countries (Cordero Martins 2009; Scirica 2014; Valdivia et al. 2006, p. 200).

Despite all this evidence, however, the dictatorships cannot be considered en bloc as nationalist. Although all members of these regimes were anti-communist, they were not all hostile to liberal democracy which generally appeared as a long-term horizon to which the regimes aspired. If authoritarianism and censorship were the rule for long periods, there was no determination to generate a single worldview, other than official propaganda, attempts to manipulate public opinion and fight Marxism. Nor was anti-Semitism a common trait—in the case of Argentina, the practice was repudiated in the government's official communications. Similarly, the idea of conducting a crusade for Christianity met with opposition to the dictatorships from a large part of the ecclesiastical hierarchy in Chile and Brazil and some bishops in Argentina. Unlike the rhetoric of nationalists, ultraconservatives and fascists in the 1930s, the Southern Cone dictatorships were not critical of imperialism and in fact they facilitated the introduction and predominance of foreign capital in the region.

Rather than the concepts of nationalism and fascism, the structure and objectives of these regimes can more suitably be described and explained by calling them counter-revolutionary or National Security dictatorships, or authoritarian conservatives, which included corporativist, ultraconservative or nationalist projects, in competition with others of a different nature. The repressive nature and political deactivation of low-income classes was the common denominator of all these regimes, but their approaches and dimensions were very different. Although these regimes undoubtedly favoured the dominant classes and transnational capital, their approaches differed greatly, as did their approach to militarization of the state and their models for economic and social development.

Despite the marked differences between the four cases that we have pointed out, the Southern Cone dictatorships were successful in their mission to deactivate the popular sectors mobilized under populist or socialist flags, through repressive methods, but also through the deployment of various consensual strategies. However, and despite the fact that constitutional reforms were promoted, and in one case managed to materialize and endure, those regimes failed to establish principles of legitimacy other than Republicans, nor were they able to guarantee the establishment of an authoritarian order that would be perpetuated in the time.

Notes

1. Authoritarianisms are defined as political systems with limited political pluralism, lacking a developed, guiding ideology but with characteristic mentalities, with no methods for extensive and intensive political mobilization, except during certain moments of their development and in which a leader or sometimes a small group exercises power within limits that are poorly defined formally but in fact predictable. See Linz (1970).
2. Among others, Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate (2010), Marchesi (2001, 2009), Osuna (2017), and Ferreira Guimaraes (2015).
3. See, for example, Zea (1976), Almeyda (1979).
4. The National Security Doctrine has also been considered, following Dimitrov, as an expression of dependent fascism, by operating as the basis for State domination by a section of the bourgeoisie. See Tapia Valdés (1980, pp. 271 ff.).

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